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Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to investigate the reasons behind the mixed effectiveness 
of the EU pre-accession conditionality applied to the Central Eastern European 
candidates for membership.
The process of enlargement to the East, concluded in 2004 with the accession of 
ten new countries, involved an unprecedented scope of EU conditionality applied to the 
prospective members. However, as the findings of this research demonstrate, the results 
of the grand European project of policy transfer to its new members have been mixed. 
Using a one-country cross-policy framework, I try to answer some open questions 
arising from the empirical analysis that the literature on conditionality has not thus far 
answered.
The study draws on Putnam’s two-level game model (Putnam 1988), analyzing 
international negotiations in their dual, domestic and international context. In theoretical 
terms, the interest of the research is in the entanglement between domestic and 
international policy processes. The key claim is that external pressures must be matched 
with the specific domestic context since none of these variables alone can explain the 
dynamics of adaptation. The effectiveness of EU conditionality is contingent on the type 
of acquis communautaire and the presence or absence of opposition to the reforms. The 
project aims to identify which properties of this framework or their combinations 
facilitate adaptation and which, to the contrary, impede prompt adjustments.
The findings from the case studies challenge the conventional static approach to 
conditionality and demonstrate how instrumentalization of the international (EU) level 
of the bargain at the national level may lead to endogenous changes of the latter, namely 
mobilization of the social interests. This effect could explain why conditionality has not 
been as effective as the asymmetric bargaining power and the material advantages of 
compliance would lead one to expect.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Introduction
Different approaches have been used to explore the adaptation of the candidate 
countries to the EU. There is a growing body of literature that uses conditionality as an 
analytical framework for understanding the process of accession. Joining the 
Community required from the candidates far-reaching structural adjustments in 
practically all spheres of economic and political life. Successful completion of these 
reforms was an indispensable condition of membership. However, as the empirical 
studies on transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) demonstrate, 
the adjustment processes have not always advanced in accordance with expectations. 
Therefore, the conjecture that high incentives or material advantages certainly bring 
rapid policy and institutional modifications seems premature. In this project I will try to 
assess the effectiveness of conditionality as a mechanism of shaping the trajectory of the 
adaptation processes. Such an investigation may have significant political relevance for 
future enlargements, already on the EU agenda. In a theoretical sense, the study aims to 
contribute to the host of literature on the role of external influences in shaping domestic 
political and economic choices.
The demise of the communist systems in (CEE) at the end of the 1980s triggered 
aspirations among the countries in the region to EU membership. From the moment the 
communist bloc was dismantled, a ‘growing alignment with Western European and 
Atlanticist structures’1 has become an overriding foreign policy goal of the CEE 
transition countries (Balcerowicz 1995: 84). However, since the Copenhagen summit of
1 The key principles of the Polish foreign policy as outlined by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Polish Foreign 
Minister in 1989.
1993 it became clear that the applicants would need to meet a broad array of economic 
and political conditions prior to joining the Community. These criteria, gradually 
specified in the course of the pre-accession process and during the accession 
negotiations, formed the core of the EU conditionality regime. Conditionality is defined 
as the mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain 
policy actions, in support of which the EU or other agency will provide specified 
benefits: membership, financial assistance etc. (Killick et al. 1998; Grabbe 2001a; 
Grabbe 2002; Grabbe 2002a; Hughes 2003).
The literature on enlargement takes various perspectives on pre-accession 
conditionality. Some studies take a generalist approach and analyze it from the 
International Relations standpoint, with a focus on the way it plays itself out in the 
accession process (e.g. 1998a; Bronk 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Smith 
2003). Others, in turn, take the comparative government perspective and start the 
analysis from the country seeking accession, examining how conditionality is used in its 
relations with the European Union. While a number of these accounts see conditionality 
as the effective external reform anchor (Bronk 2002), in others it merely presents a 
moving target for underlying power struggles and its impact on policy output remains 
uncertain (Jacoby 2004). The cross-country accounts assessing the working of 
conditionality within one policy area (Hughes et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003) 
have established that it is not homogenously effective in all candidate countries. 
Alternatively, the single case analyses (e.g. Marek and Baun 2002) inform about the 
compatibility/tension between demands of the EU and domestic political agenda. More 
recent studies attempt to reconcile some of the contradictory findings of these two 
streams of the literature, matching the properties of EU conditionality with the domestic 
contexts (Jacoby 2004; Vachudova 2005). The current project, while falling into this 
latter category, shifts away from the government-centric view of conditionality, which 
is a mainstream of the literature2, and emphasises domestic dynamics of accession 
negotiations and post-negotiations adaptation. With the benefit of hindsight, it will try 
to synthesize some of the contradictory findings of different ‘schools’ of conditionality.
2 Although Jacoby (2004) is an exception.
Using a one-country cross-policy framework, I try to answer some open 
questions that other studies on conditionality do not or, by design, cannot answer. In 
theoretical terms, the interest of the research is in the entanglement between domestic 
and international policy processes. The argument of this study is that EU enlargement is 
a foreign policy project, which can be implemented successfully (in terms of adaptation) 
under particular domestic conditions. The construction of the acquis communautaire3 
and, on the other hand, of the domestic politico-economic systems, provides the 
institutional framework in which political decisions are undertaken. The project aims to 
identify which properties of this framework or their combinations facilitate adaptation 
and which, to the contrary, impede prompt adjustments. It is argued that the ample 
experience of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)4 with conditionality may 
provide useful insights for understanding the political economy of the relatively new 
EU conditionality regime5. The general conclusion from the empirical studies on the use 
of conditionality by the IFIs holds that a ‘good’ domestic political environment is 
crucial for the effectiveness of conditionality (Reynolds 1995; Burnside and Dollar 
1997). It thus calls for a re-examination of domestic factors and their role in the course 
of adjustment to the demands of an international agency6.
The study draws on Putnam’s two-level game model (Putnam 1988), analyzing 
international negotiations in its dual, domestic and international context. This project, 
however, utilizes an interpretation of the model de-emphasizing the strategic choices of 
the negotiators, and focuses instead on the institutional constraints pertaining to the 
negotiation process and historical legacies of the candidate country. The pace and 
structure of negotiations are broadly framed by the asymmetric bargaining power of the 
EU, accession timetable and position of the EU as delegated negotiator for the old EU 
member countries. However, the dynamics of the process to a large extent is defined by 
domestic contingencies, such as the political prerogative of ‘return to Europe’, the
3 It varies between particular policy fields as a result of a different pace and depth of integration in various 
areas. As a consequence there is a divergent degree of integration in different policy fields signified by 
varying shares in decision-making power between the responding national (sub-national) and 
supranational institutions.
4 World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) stand for IFIs.
5 The scale of conditionality in the current enlargement process to Central Eastern Europe (CEE) gives 
the notion another dimension and significance, especially when combined with the relatively low level of 
development of the new members. It is thus more relevant than ever before to draw parallels between the 
EU conditionality regime and the IFIs’ conditioned structural adjustment programmes.
6 Be it EU or IFI. At this point supranational features of the EU do not make much change.
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absence of alternative ideological or systemic paradigms, volatile political systems alias 
strong entrenched interests in some areas as well as social mobilization traditions. The 
model thus expands on the domestic level and its dynamics, which are given in the 
original Putnam framework. It demonstrates how instrumentalization of the 
international (EU) level of the bargain at the national level may lead to endogenous 
changes of the latter, namely mobilization of the social interests. This effect could 
explain why conditionality has not been as effective as the asymmetric bargaining 
power and the material advantages of compliance would lead one to expect.
The study argues that properties of the acquis communautaire (thin or thick) are 
important for mitigating various social reactions to adaptation and provide the 
Commission with better or worse tools for insisting on candidates to reform. On the 
other hand, domestic opposition to adaptation prior to accession structured the behavior 
of the government during the accession negotiations and influenced its ability to deliver 
on the undertaken commitments. The combination of these two variables is crucial for 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality in instigating policy change.
The study consists of an empirical analysis of four different policy areas, which 
illustrate different realizations of these variables. While the acquis is thick in the 
Fisheries and Competition policies, the number of rules and regulations in Regional 
policy and Taxation remains considerably smaller. In turn, the strong opposition from 
entrenched interests accompanied adaptation in the Competition policy area and 
Taxation, while domestic groups were weak in the Fisheries and Regional policy. The 
process of adaptation to the EU, however, instigates social mobilization in these two 
latter areas. The selected case studies are policies crucial both for transposition and for 
EU membership. At the same time, they belong to the ‘problematic’ negotiation 
chapters, thus defying explanations of varying effectiveness of conditionality based on 
the mis-fit concept (Boerzel and Risse 2000). The research hypotheses maintain that 
where there are strong prior interests a thick acquis mobilizes domestic opposition 
against regulation and thus renders conditionality less effective. However, in policy 
areas without prior interests, a thick acquis provides better guidance for implementation 
and therefore may serve as a more appropriate tool for the policy transfer.
Poland was the largest of the applicant states in the fifth round of enlargement 
and as such, she enjoyed the highest political bargaining power. It makes it a
particularly interesting case study in the context of asymmetry of power (between the 
EU and a candidate) and conditionality of enlargement. On the one hand, the reform 
processes in Poland have been underpinned by the strong desire of ‘return to Europe’ 
but on the other by a conviction that for political reasons and thanks to support of 
Germany the potential failures in adaptation may be overlooked. The leadership 
ambitions based on this a priori ‘supremacy’ made it arguably a country setting the 
precedent for all other applicant states. This has been visible especially in the early 
stages of the accession negotiations where Poland sought to set the standards for other 
applicants, in terms of demands for transition periods as well as the pace of 
negotiations7.
Furthermore, the episode of the “Solidarity” movement makes Poland an 
especially interesting case for studying domestic interest groups and social conflict. The 
historical institutionalist framework, which this project draws upon, utilizes these 
traditions and validates previous experience for explaining present policy-making 
processes and policy choices. It also acknowledges the primary role of the institutional 
structures, in which political cleavages take place and through which the preferences of 
actors are channelled. Access to the original documentation in the Polish language will 
enable an in-depth empirical study on the domestic political preferences and their 
evolution throughout the pre-accession process. Such a policy-tracing method as 
proposed in this project requires detailed examination of these internal documents in 
their original version.
The next section highlights the extensive ex ante conditionality used in the fifth 
enlargement by the Commission to promote policy reforms in the Central Eastern 
European (CEE) candidates for membership in line with the acquis. The following part 
outlines the puzzle arising from the examination of literature on the fifth enlargement 
and accession conditionality of the EU. A further section presents in what way the 
single country multi-policy study may resolve some unanswered questions arising from 
the empirical research and literature on the subject. It charts the variables used in this 
research project. Further, the methodology and case studies proposed for testing the 
hypotheses of the research will be presented. The conclusions summarize the arguments 
and present the research outline.
7 On 1 September 1998 Poland, as the first negotiating country, submitted to the Commission the 
Negotiating Positions in the seven chapters. In that way it effectively started the accession negotiations.
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1. The conditioned nature of the fifth enlargement
... This is the key justification for conditionality; if you ask for a gift, you must 
listen to your patron.
(Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro
1984)
Conditionality is a mechanism by which various international agencies, be it 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or the European Union, promote policy 
reforms of particular countries in line with their preferences. In other words, the patrons 
(IFIs) use various incentives or disincentives "to alter [a] state's behavior or policies" 
(Checkel 2000: 1). In formal terms, conditionality signifies a mutual agreement by 
which a target government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support 
of which an IFI or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance or 
other benefits (Killick et al. 1998: 6). The two key implications from application of this 
definition are that, firstly, it presupposes the voluntary character of the agreement and 
secondly, it does not exclude the possibility of punitive action once the deal has been 
signed. Formally, however, the conditionality regime is not coercive. It is assumed that 
countries subjected to conditionality approve the pre-agreed measures exercised towards 
them, no matter whether they imply awarding positive behavior or penalizing for 
failures.
Although it is the International Financial Institutions, in particular the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that have championed the use 
of conditionality towards the states provided with financial assistance, the EU has
o
increasingly followed the 'conditionality path' in its pre-accession strategies . In 
particular in the fifth enlargement leading to inclusion of some of the CEECs (Central 
Eastern European Countries) into the EU, the latter applied an extensive ex ante 
conditionality regime towards the candidates. Since the signing of the Europe 
Agreements recognizing post-communist countries' aspirations to membership, and 
moreover, the 1993 Copenhagen summit setting broad criteria for accession, the
8 For a detailed comparison of the two types of conditionality regimes, applied by the IFIs and the EU, see 
Chapter II.
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comprehensive framework of political, economic and legal conditions structured 
relations of the EU with the CEECs (Cremona 2003: 1). In a nutshell, they served to 
encourage the potential members to implement the acquis communautaire prior to 
enlargement. However, the EU also aimed to lock the CEECs on the politico-economic 
reforms path by tying the hands of policy-makers committed to bringing their countries 
into the Western zone of civilization and economic prosperity (Bronk 2002). Thus, EU 
conditionality has had a dual role to play. On the one hand, it may be seen as a political 
tool of external governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) and on the other, a 
technocratic measure of assistance in the adoption of particular legal solutions.
The distinct features of the fifth enlargement, in particular candidates' relative 
poverty, their recent undemocratic past and large number, have been used as 
justification for a more intense pre-accession conditionality regime than exercised by 
the EU at any time in the past. Apart from the features pertinent to the candidates, the 
contextual conditions in the fifth expansion also favored the use of some additional 
policy tools towards the applicants. While shared objectives and historical experience 
lay as the underlying assumptions of the past enlargements (see Preston 1997; Smith 
2003), they came under severe pressure during the 2004 expansion. Moreover, in the 
beginning of the 1990s, the threat that shattering the social and economic order of 
CEECs may unleash forces able to topple the fledgling democracies became imminent. 
Grave consequences of such scenario were exposed by the events taking place in South- 
Eastern Europe. This international context reinforced the Community's dedication to 
ascertain applicants' firm commitment to the undertaken course of the reforms. It was of 
particular importance if the expansion East were to fulfill its basic political goal "to 
extend the zone of economic prosperity and 'democratic peace' as a prophylactic against 
war, nationalism and autocracy" (Hill 2002: 96). These broad motives stood behind the 
unprecedented scope and what some authors interpret as excessive strictness (Grabbe 
2002a) of EU demands.
Together with crystallization of the membership offer, in particular after the 
formal recognition of accession to the EU as CEECs' ultimate foreign policy goal in the
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trade and cooperation agreements (so-called Europe Agreements)9, the second, 
technocratic element of conditionality, has gradually gained salience. The agreements 
(EAs) focused on trade measures and “consolidated objectives of the earlier trade and 
co-operation agreement[s] through extending the liberalization process” (Preston 1997: 
198). The key objective of the accords was to create free trade area between the EC and 
associated countries10 by gradual removal of trade barriers (within ten years)11. 
However, the EU also requested that the candidates approximate their laws with the 
acquis in several areas beyond the customs union, such as company law, accounts and 
taxes, banking, intellectual property, rules on competition, protection of workers in the 
workplace, financial services etc. (see Art 69, Europe Agreement with Poland 1991). 
The request for adaptation in these fields was not, however, matched by any timetable 
for accession or the prospect of concrete rewards. The linkage between these 
'conditions' and the prospect of membership remained rather vague. In consequence, the 
EU’s ability to reinforce the implementation of these measures, in particular with 
respect to competition and public aid rules, was at best mixed, at least until the 
accession negotiations commenced.
In line with the definition of conditionality presented above, the relations 
between the CEE candidates for membership and the EU acquired a 'conditioned' nature 
from the moment the Community recognized applicants' aspirations to membership and 
the latter accepted that it comes with some conditions attached. The membership 
conditions evolved throughout the pre-accession period, from the broadly formulated 
'Copenhagen criteria', to stipulations of implementation of the specific directives in the 
domestic legal systems, upon which the progress of accession negotiations was 
contingent. Although side-payments, in particular from the regional policy budget in the 
framework of Phare, Sapard and ISPA programs, served as encouragement for 
adaptation, the real benefit on offer was one, full membership in the European Union.
9 The trade and cooperation agreements, Europe Agreements, were signed with the applicants between 
1991 and 1996 (with Poland in 1991) and included recognition of membership in the EU as an ultimate 
objective for the states that wish to join.
10 Hungary and Czechoslovakia also signed the agreement.
11 However, trade liberalization in ‘sensitive’ industries and agriculture were excluded from the scope of 
the accord. The agreements embraced a wide range of issues beyond trade measures, such as the 
establishment of a platform for political cooperation and cultural dialogue11. Specific goals included 
provision of the appropriate framework for the political dialogue, promoting trade and harmonious 
economic relations and a basis for the Community’s financial and technical assistance (Art. 2 of the 
Agreement with Poland). See Bull. EC 12-1991, 1.3.2.
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On the other hand, the only reliable ‘stick’ of the Commission in non-distributive policy 
areas was the threat of suspension of the progress of accession process, most ostensibly 
used in Slovakia’s case after the Meciar government came to power.
The Community explicitly formulated its membership criteria for the CEE 
countries aspiring to membership during the 1993 Copenhagen summit12. The so-called 
Copenhagen criteria stipulated that the prospective members are “stable democracies, 
respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities; have a 
functioning market economy; adopt the common rules, standards and policies that make 
up the body of EU law”. The Madrid European Council of 1995 extended the list to 
include also the ‘administrative capacity’ condition. One year earlier, during the Essen 
European Council13, the term 'pre-accession' was assigned to depict relations between 
the applicants and the Community14. The pre-accession strategy of the EU enshrined in 
detail the accession conditions for the applicants for membership. It comprised the 
bilateral treaty commitments, ‘Accession Partnerships’, technical assistance and 
participation by the candidates in the Community programs (Cremona 2003: 1).
The pre-accession conditionality was refined or re-defined in the subsequent pre­
accession documents. In this context, the Single Market White Paper, published in 
1995, was of particular importance. It furthered the provisions of EAs by covering a 
number of additional policy areas, which candidates were to align with the acquis. The 
document listed the Single Market legislation, which needed to be adopted in the first 
order, but also described administrative and technical structures needed to ensure that 
the legislation is effectively implemented and enforced. In fact, the White Paper did 
constitute some revision of EU conditionality since it prioritized and specified the 
adjustment process. The conditionality of accession was further re-emphasized by the 
1997 Luxembourg European Council, which explicitly stipulated that the candidates 
ensure not only that the acquis is transposed into their legal system but also “actually 
applied”. These conditions were further taken on by the Reinforced Pre-accession
12 Copenhagen criteria; http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm
13 The Conclusions of Essen European Council.
14 The terms ‘European Union’ and the ‘European Community’ are used interchangeably throughout the 
paper.
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Strategy15 announced on 13 July 1997 in the Commission’s Agenda 200016. The 
Commission explicated that the scope of certain problems (with enlargement) make it 
necessary from 1998 onwards, “to establish intermediate objectives with precise 
conditions attached” (CEC 2000:83). In that way, the Commission elevated the pre­
accession conditionality to the position of a key element of the ‘method’ of CEE 
enlargement.
Since the launch of the Accession Partnerships in 1998, conditionality became 
the legal cornerstone of EU pre-accession strategy (Maresceau 2003). The Accession 
Partnership Regulation 622/98 explicitly mentioned the insufficient progress towards 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria or meeting Europe Agreement obligations as possible 
grounds for suspension of the assistance granted to an applicant.17 It thus upgraded the 
Copenhagen criteria from political pre-conditions of the European Council to “legally 
binding conditions, subject to sanctions alongside the conditions contained in the 
Europe Agreements” (Maresceau 2003: 37), which earlier lacked the leverage. In that 
way the Copenhagen criteria have acquired features that distinguish them from the mere 
‘membership rules’ (Smith 2003) and are thus treated in this research as an instance of 
conditionality.
In consequence, apart from the candidates' commitment to implement 
appropriate reforms within a set timetable, the verification of their fulfillment became 
the inherent element of EU conditionality. This second aspect, of particular political 
sensitivity, was absent in the previous expansions of the Community (Mayhew 2002: 
19). A range of tools was developed to observe candidates’ progress in realization of 
their pre-accession commitments. They included the Avis (Opinion) of the Commission
15 The Strategy was created in order to facilitate the reforms in the candidates’ countries with the aim of 
focusing on the priorities of accession. It put the elements of pre-accession policy under one umbrella of 
the Accession Partnerships.
16 Prepared at the request of Dublin European Council. The strategy added two elements of the pre­
accession, which were to guarantee consistency between the preparations of accessions and negotiations, 
bringing together under a single framework all the resources and forms of assistance available for 
facilitating adoption of the acquis and extending participation of the applicant countries in the 
Community programs and mechanisms to apply the acquis (see Agenda 2000).
17 Accession Partnership Regulation 622/98 anticipates a sanctioning mechanism: “Where an element that 
is essential for continuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking, in particular when the 
commitments contained in the Europe Agreement are not respected and/or progress towards fulfilment of 
the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession assistance granted to an 
applicant State”.
19
about the candidates, the annual Regular Reports, the accession negotiations documents 
(screening lists and negotiations Position Papers) and National Programs of Preparation 
for Membership (NPPM). They formed the cornerstones of the institutional framework 
facilitating accession. While the first two documents were prepared unilaterally by the 
Commission (although on the basis of the information provided by the applicants), since 
the start of the accession negotiations the timetables for adaptation became a ‘common’ 
affair, bringing EU conditionality closer to the IMF and WB policies applied to the 
borrowing countries. This evolution was linked to the fact that at the negotiation stage 
the membership offer became more viable, which also increased the political weight of 
EU conditions. Thus, they needed to acquire the character of a ‘mutual agreement’ 
instead of previously imposed unilateral conditions.
The accession negotiations, which started with Poland and five other candidates 
in 199818 and a further six in 1999, gave the EU conditionality regime new dynamics. 
Since, the candidates' progress in adaptation was assessed fully on an individual basis 
rather than collectively. The decision to start negotiations with a particular candidate 
was taken by the European Council on the basis of the Commission’s recommendation 
prepared in the 1997 Avis. It was actually the first formal tool of differentiation between 
the applicants. The Luxembourg European Council in 1997 gave the green light for 
commencement of negotiations with six applicants (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)19 and in 1999 in Helsinki the EU took a 
decision to start talks with the six remaining candidates (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania and Slovakia). The EU member states also demanded during the 
Helsinki European Council that “progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with 
progress in incorporating the acquis into the legislation and actually implementing and 
enforcing it”20. Although by that time some of the candidates, Poland included, were 
already well into the course of negotiations, the real talks on controversial issues had 
not yet commenced. Thus, the rule applied to all the countries negotiating their terms of 
accession, from the so-called Luxembourg and Helsinki groups.
18 On the basis of recommendations from the Avis of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers 
took a decision to commence the negotiation process with eleven candidate countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Hungary) and 
to commence the accession negotiations with five of the CEE states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, 
Slovenia, Hungary) and Cyprus. Since, this group of countries has been named the ‘Luxemburg Group’.
19 And the negotiations kicked off in March 1998.
20 Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Introduction (par.l 1)
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During the accession negotiations, EU conditionality was specified to the level 
of adoption of concrete legal acts. The process began with ‘stock taking’, that is 
preparation of the list of discrepancies between the candidates' domestic laws and the 
acquis. Apart from pointing to the missing or incoherent with the acquis legal acts, the 
candidates presented the timetables for their adoption. If it exceeded the anticipated date 
of enlargement, the problem was left aside to the ‘real’ negotiations. Nevertheless, the 
progress of negotiations in their later stages was contingent on the implementation of 
commitments declared in the negotiation positions of the candidates. The candidates 
adopted their National Programs of Preparation for Membership including commitments 
and timetables for their implementation. The annual Regular Reports, which at the 
beginning focused on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, gradually became the 
tool of verification of the progress in adoption of the acquis, in line with negotiation 
(Mayhew 2002: 22) and NPPC commitments.
The accession negotiations were the strongest tool of conditionality mainly due 
to the precision of included demands and exact timetables attached21. The negotiation 
documents provided tangible benchmarks against which the progress of the candidate 
was assessed and in that way solved the ‘ambiguity problem’ (Grabbe 2002) of the 
Copenhagen criteria.
The EU demands for transposition of the practically full acquis communautaire 
before enlargement, by no means matched by concrete prospects or deadlines for 
accession, constituted, however, a persistent source of domestic political pressures. 
Thus, the incumbent governments of the candidates faced a dual challenge of 
accommodating the EU requests on adaptation on the one hand and on the other, 
sustaining the popular support for integration at a sufficiently high level as to win the 
accession referendums.
2. Unanswered questions on the EU conditionality
21 Together with the National Program of Adaptation to the Acquis accepted in July 1998, which 
determined the direction of the necessary adaptations together with the timetable of implementation. 
However, the EU judges the progress in adaptation primarily on the basis of commitments from the 
accession negotiations.
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The expanding scope of EU conditionality and, arguably, its effectiveness in 
promoting reforms in CEE, resulted in a host of studies analyzing this phenomena22 
This rich body of literature on the application of EU conditionality may be 
disaggregated into the two key parallel, yet intertwined debates.
The starting point for analysis of the first stream is the general nature of EU 
conditionality and its impact on transition in CEECs. Some of these studies see it 
predominantly as an external reforms anchor, with generally positive contribution to the 
politico-economic transition processes (Bronk 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; 
Vachudova 2005) or for maintaining the coherence and values of the EU (Smith 2003). 
On the other end of the spectrum remain scholars stressing the inappropriateness of the 
EU conditions for states undergoing the transformation process (Grabbe 2002; Grabbe 
2002a; Hughes 2003; Hughes et al. 2004a). The debate originates from the fact that the 
European systemic solutions and the body of law have not been created with the idea of 
tackling the specific problems, which the transition economies encounter. However, the 
implicit assumption of this literature is that the EU matters as a policy-maker in CEE 
and the conditions put in front of the candidates for membership are powerful 
instruments of inciting policy change.
The second stream of debate questions exactly this premise and addresses the 
issue of the effectiveness of conditionality, exemplified by its potential to bring policy 
change. The analysis in these studies start from the country in which conditionality is 
applied and examine how it is played out in domestic politics and is used in the 
accession negotiations (Jacoby 2004). The policy-tracing accounts on the mechanisms 
of EU conditionality also reveal the mixed results of its application across countries 
and/or policy areas (Hughes et al. 2002; Marek and Baun 2002; Hughes et al. 2003). 
Evidence for the effectiveness of conditionality in steering systemic changes in CEE is 
doubtful despite the asymmetry of the bargaining power in favor of the Commission 
(Grabbe 2002), emphasized by the absence of an alternative (to EU membership) 
ideological or systemic paradigm (Hughes et al. 2004a), as well as the malleability of 
domestic institutions in transition countries.
22 See e.g. Grabbe 1999, 2002; Bronk 2002; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003; Hughes et al. 2003, 2004, 
2004a; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Smith 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 
2005; Grabbe 2006; Mastenbroek and Keading 2006; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007.
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The studies on the effectiveness of conditionality attribute these ambiguous 
empirical results to various factors. Some focus on the varying degree of misfit between 
the European- and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions (Boerzel and Risse 
2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003), compounded by varying domestic veto points, 
actors and/or institutions responding to the adaptational pressures from the EU or 
learning and socialization (Boerzel and Risse 2003). Other accounts point to the 
shifting results of costs-benefits calculations in the pre-accession period 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007), 
inconsistency in the Commission's attitudes or absence of a clear-cut policy model 
(Hughes et al. 2003) undermining the efficiency of EU conditionality. Nevertheless, 
despite broad research work tackling the topic from various perspectives, there remains 
a series of unresolved questions on the effectiveness of EU conditionality, in particular 
concerning the reasons behind the mixed results of the CEECs’ adaptation in cross­
policy areas. The key findings of the literature on EU conditionality presented below 
allow the juxtaposition of the alternative model proposed in this research project with 
the existent literature.
The effectiveness o f EU conditionality in promoting policy change in transition
countries
Empirical studies on the adaptation of CEE candidates towards EU demands 
focusing on the implementation of both economic and political conditions have shown 
an array of results. Hughes et al. (2003), in their analysis of the adaptation of CEECs to 
the EU regional policy, have demonstrated diverse patterns of regionalization across 
candidates for membership. The study has questioned the implicit assumption of some 
of the enlargement literature (Grabbe 2001a; Grabbe 2002; Smith 2003) about the 
strong causal effects of conditionality on policy and institutional change. Hughes et al. 
(2003: 28) assign the limitations of the “conditionality model” in regional policy to the 
incoherence of the Commission's strategy applied in CEE, facilitated by the sparse 
acquis communautaire in the field and the persistence of national idiosyncrasies and 
historical legacies difficult to overrule, in particular in the context of ambiguous EU 
regulations in the field. Heather Grabbe (2006) shares this view while adding that the 
EU has not fully used its potential to shape policy outcomes effectively in the ‘Free
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movement of persons’ area due to the inconsistency and lack of precision inherent in the 
membership criteria.
Other studies focused more on the domestic context of application of EU 
conditionality. In an analysis of transfer of democratic and human rights standards to 
Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) argue that the impact of the 
EU was rather uneven. The study of the “democratic conditionality” applied in these 
countries demonstrated that the effectiveness of the EU in promoting change was 
negatively correlated with the domestic political costs of compliance. Thus, larger 
political costs of the reforms for the target government decreased the EU’s ability to 
promote its policy model. Similar conclusions are found in the later analysis by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 664), who argue that adoption of the EU rules 
takes place when the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic costs of adjustment. 
The effectiveness of EU conditionality varies with its credibility and domestic costs of 
rule adoption. The study, however, makes a distinction between the two contexts of 
conditionality: “democratic conditionality” and “acquis conditionality”. In the case of 
the former, in line with conclusions from an earlier work by Schimmelfennig et al. 
(2003), the effectiveness of EU external governance in promoting adoption of EU rules 
in areas of human rights and liberal democracy depended primarily on the size of 
adoption costs. In countries with poor democratic and human rights standards, the 
political costs of adjustments appeared prohibitive and EU conditionality ineffective. 
Thus, authoritarian governments, such as the Meciar government in Slovakia, failed to 
comply even when benefits offered by the EU were credible (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004: 670). Vachudova (2001), however, challenged this view, arguing that 
even in such cases the EU incentives could make a difference through domestic 
empowerment and electoral change.
By contrast, when it comes to the adoption of specific rules of the acquis 
(“acquis conditionality”), the causal linkage between EU demands and successful rule 
transfer was strongest when credible membership perspective was on offer. Before that, 
the rule adoption was patchy and selective. Thus, the most important condition for rule 
transfer was the credibility of EU threats and rewards, which clearly increased with the 
start of the accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 671). The 
likelihood that the EU would deliver on its promise (increasing with the start of 
negotiations) was critical for the candidates’ cost-benefit calculations. Schimmelfennig
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and Sedelmeier also argue (2004: 672) that in cases of the ‘acquis conditionality’, once 
explicit membership offer was put on the table, the size of adoption costs became 
largely irrelevant, also due to the fact that they would then be discounted against larger 
aggregate benefits accruing from the membership. Thus, unlike in the political context, 
under certain conditions (credibility of membership), the costs of adaptation did not 
matter.
Yet another approach to the study of EU conditionality based on cost-benefit 
calculations was taken by Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007). The cross-country 
analysis of candidates’ compliance with the Commission’s demands (in Regular 
Reports) takes upon the credibility argument of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) 
and demonstrates that declaration of the date of accession had key importance for the 
working of EU conditionality. However, their game-theoretical study presents exactly 
the opposite view by arguing that an increase of credibility, clearly associated with 
provision of the date of accession, raises the risk of candidates' defection from the 
reform course. The examination of the acquis transposed into domestic law has revealed 
that countries most certain of their accession into the EU (the “frontrunners”), such as 
the Czech Republic, scored relatively low in terms of adoption of the acquis23 
(Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 13). The certainty about future membership would 
thus be a demobilizing factor rather than encouragement for more effective adaptation. 
Under these conditions the EU conditionality should be more effective before the date 
of accession was publicized, a view clearly shared by the Commission, which refused 
declaring the likely enlargement date until late 2000.
In general, EU conditionality is argued to be most effective when one-time 
benefits from defection are relatively small and the membership provides considerable 
benefits to both the EU and the candidate (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007: 3). The 
key problem with such reasoning, however, is that in empirically confirmed cases of 
non-compliance the candidates have failed in fulfillment of their own commitments 
rather than ‘broke off negotiations’ because of the rational assessment of the benefits 
from defection as high. Secondly, the ‘utility-maximizing’ candidates evaluated the
23 However, Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007: 13) admit that domestic factors, such as administrative 
capacity or domestic incentives for change should be considered for more reliable interpretation of the 
presented scoreboard of legal transposition.
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costs and benefits from EU membership at the time of submission of the formal 
application for membership, in Poland’s case in 1994. No further specification of EU 
conditionality could seriously affect their calculation. In particular, the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria already pointed to the ability of the candidate to adopt the acquis 
communautaire in full as a condition for accession. The applicants were thus aware very 
early on that no option of adaptation a la carte was available.
Unresolved questions on the application o f EU conditionality
Despite a vivid debate on the EU conditionality regime and its potential to 
instigate policy change in the candidate countries, as outlined above, there are still 
several unresolved questions pertaining to conditionality. As mentioned above, apart 
from the opposite views on the role of credibility of EU threats and rewards, the 
scholars disagree about the importance of the quality of the acquis communautaire in 
promoting reforms and the impact of the costs from adaptation upon the decisions of the 
candidates. There are also varying accounts of how exactly the domestic institutional 
environments of countries seeking accession matter for the effectiveness of 
conditionality and in what way the latter affects the former (Jacoby 2004; Vachudova 
2005). The underlying issue in these debates is the role of the domestic context in 
responses to external pressures, and thus entanglement between the two factors.
EU conditionality is to a large extent defined by the acquis communautaire, 
which delineates the scope of possible actions of the European Commission towards the 
candidates or provides the framework for its negotiation strategy. An increasing number 
of studies analyzes the impact of properties of the acquis upon the EU’s ability to 
instigate policy change in a particular policy area (Hughes et al. 2003; 2004; Jacoby 
2004; Hughes et al. 2004a; Grabbe 2006). The analysis of the acquis communautaire as 
a tool of conditionality, however, poses a series of problems. While a particular type of 
the acquis may facilitate adaptation in one area, it can slow it down in another. There is 
a general tendency to consider thin acquis as a less effective ‘tool’ of conditionality. 
Hughes et al. claim that “it is plausible to expect that thick acquis would provide strong 
leverage for the Commission to achieve particular outcomes in its interactions with the 
CEECs, while the explicit leverage of thin acquis would lead to weak formal 
conditionality” (Hughes et al. 2004a: 525).
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Theoretically, however, a thin acquis may work both ways. It could also increase 
the informal conditionality since it gives the Commission greater scope for ambiguity 
and imprecision in defining its policy recommendations. On the other hand, as Jacoby 
presents in his “embedded rationality model” (Jacoby 2004: 10), thin acquis (low 
density of rules) matched with the high density of well-established domestic actors, may 
lead to the smoother “emulation” and unpressured learning, instead of the high-profile 
struggles impeding adaptation. Moreover, even without strong entrenched interests, a 
high density of rules leads to bigger problems with approximation due to the technical 
difficulties as well as possibly being seen as an undue limitation of the governments’ 
strategies. The studies on the conditionality regime exercised by the International 
Financial Institutions (EFIs) seem to confirm this line of argument. An excessive number 
of conditions is simply difficult to fulfill and overly limits the flexibility of the national 
authorities in their policy design. A large number of conditions may therefore have 
counterproductive effects when applied in the poorer policy environments (see Elborgh- 
Woytek & Lewis 2002; Erbas 1998, IMF 2001a). The ‘streamlining conditionality’ 
agenda of the IMF anticipates, therefore, a reduction of the specificity and scope of the 
structural conditions. “The emerging broad consensus is that IMF programs should go 
back to the basics and contain fewer conditions rather than many” (Erbas 1998).
As this debate points out, the acquis may produce different results in terms of 
adaptation depending on the type of domestic institutional environment it is applied in. 
In this context, early scholarly accounts on EU conditionality focused predominantly on 
the gap between the policies in the EU and a country seeking accession. The studies on 
effectiveness of conditionality drawing on the misfit concept or “goodness of fit” logic 
of policy-change24 (Heritier 1995; Knill and Lenschow 1998; Green Cowles and Risse 
2001; Boerzel 2003; Boerzel and Risse 2003) claim that the timing and quality of 
implementation of the EU laws in the domestic systems of its member countries 
depends on the congruence between the EU policies and the relevant national 
legislation. The smaller the gap between domestic and EU policies and institutions, the 
easier the adaptation. However, due to rather inconsistent empirical evidence on the 
centrality of the misfit for adaptation (Knill and Lenschow 1998; Haverland 2000), a 
number of auxiliary variables have been developed to supplement and improve the
24 These accounts have as their source research on Europeanization focusing on adaptation of the EU 
member countries to the EU rules, norms and policies.
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empirical soundness of the model. Some studies have dismissed the “goodness of fit” 
hypothesis in its entirety on the grounds that it is too deterministic and leaves little room 
for domestic contingencies (see e.g. Mastenbroek and Keading 2006: 348).
Nonetheless, the domestic context has continued to occupy a focal place in the 
studies on adaptation inspired by accession to the EU. The utility-maximization 
approaches employed perception of the costs of adaptation as the key determinant of the 
working of EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Steunenberg and 
Dimitrova 2007). As mentioned above, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 664) 
demonstrated the existence of a negative correlation between the effectiveness of the 
EU in promoting change and the domestic political costs of compliance. They argued, 
however, that a credible membership offer rendered these costs largely irrelevant25, as 
they would be discounted against larger aggregate benefits accruing from the 
membership.
The rational choice approaches focused on interest bargaining present, however, 
a very government-centric view of conditionality. They implicitly disconnect the 
decision-makers in their intergovernmental material bargaining from the constituencies, 
which seems overly parsimonious even in countries of such weak civil societies as in 
CEE (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). The CEE elites had to consider the opinions of the 
affected actors and the society at large due to the fact that the negotiated terms of 
accession required approval in a national referendum. Gradually falling support for
9 f \accession in most of the applicant countries throughout the 1990s (CBOS 2002: 4), 
called for a revision of the premise on consistent social support for membership based 
on the “interest asymmetry” argument.
Bringing the non-governmental actors into the analysis, however, requires 
reconsidering the concept of the net benefit of adaptation. They may no longer represent 
aggregate values, but rather the specific costs or benefits for particular policy sectors 
should be accounted for. The general costs-benefits balance from membership in the 
Community, while a key component of a government’s decision to submit the 
application, did not figure as highly for specific social groups likely to lose out or
25 For the ‘acquis conditionality’.
26 This tendency has been reversed after implementation of the active pro-membership campaigns and 
other domestic measures.
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benefit from accession. Therefore, consideration of the multiplicity of social interests 
brings about the need to disaggregate the notion of costs-benefits from accession. This 
balance may look entirely different in various policy fields and may thus encourage 
support for or resentments towards the EU from the relevant social groups. Therefore, 
while the “massive benefits from accession” have been of key importance at the 
decision-making stage of application to the European structures, they do not necessarily 
secure quality adaptation in the later stages of the pre-accession process.
The external and domestic elements pointed out by the conditionality literature 
as important for the trajectory of the pre-accession process provided the basis for studies 
that attempt to link the two arenas. They follow the clues provided by the International 
Relations literature on interstate negotiations. It recognizes the complexities of 
entanglement between domestic and international affairs and the reciprocal influence on 
domestic and international political outcomes (see e.g. Putnam 1988; Grossman and 
Helpman 1994; Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Milner 1998). With the benefit of the 
hindsight, the examination of results of the accession negotiations and the record of 
compliance carried out a few years after accession reveals a few contingencies difficult 
to explain from either international or domestic perspective. Surprisingly, the CEECs 
negotiated transition periods or failed to comply with the acquis even in the areas where 
adaptation would bring tangible benefits (as in distributory polices, for instance 
Regional policy or Fisheries). On the other hand, as Grabbe (2006: 202) argues, in the 
area of ‘Free movement of persons’ the EU “managed to achieve its central goals 
despite having to override strongly principled objections from the candidates and 
contradictions with its own policy paradigms”. The pattern of the transition periods as 
well as compliance with the pre-accession commitments cannot be fully explained 
neither by the cost-benefits calculations nor negotiation powers, based on the 
asymmetry of the enlargement process, alone.
The cross-policy variation of the results of EU conditionality may be captured 
by institutionalist accounts, which assign the explanatory power of actors’ behavior to 
institutions, in which political cleavages take place and through which actors’ 
preferences are being channeled. Varying institutional and bureaucratic capacities 
across policy domains (Jacoby 2004: 39) may provide at least part of the explanation for 
the diverging scores in adaptation, not always in correlation to the costs of
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approximation or the material benefits on offer. The key claim of the historical 
institutionalist approach (Pierson 1996: 126) is that the decisions of the interest- 
maximizing actors, although in a strong initial position, are ‘path-dependent’27 and thus 
unanticipated or undesired. The institutional stickiness makes it difficult to change a 
policy quickly and profoundly from outside.
The implicit assumption about the institutional stickiness argument is that 
CEECs do not represent an institutional vacuum. While they might have gone through 
the stage of the ‘systemic vacuum’ at the moment of systemic shift in 1989-1990, the 
communist systems presented a complex institutional framework, which was not 
instantly dissolved together with the communist authorities (Hausner et al. 1995). 
Rather, obsolete institutional structures and social relations as well as patterns of 
behavior inherited from the previous system have proven on a number of occasions the 
serious obstacles to transition and reform implementation (Balcerowicz 1992). There is 
no reason to assume that the role of these factors, although diminished due to the timing 
of accession and progress in politico-economic reforms achieved, would come to 
nothing in the case of approximation to the EU.
The tenets of the historical institutionalist approach have been incorporated by 
Jacoby (2004) into the model of adaptation, which grounds the explanation of the 
pattern of “emulation” jointly on external and domestic factors. While the former 
includes leverage of the International Organizations based on the density of the 
institutional environment, the veto players, norm congruence, state capacity and societal 
capacity define the domestic context (Jacoby 2004: 35). Jacoby argues that CEE elites 
respond to the International Organizations’ institutional demands but also consider their 
national capacities and interests, which condition their choices. The domestic context 
for adaptation matters in the sense that the elites emulate differently in policy areas with 
strong preexisting actors, and those where actors are weak or nonexistent (Jacoby 2004: 
39). While Jacoby’s comprehensive study of adaptation (to the EU and NATO) in 
several policy areas provides valuable insights into the entanglement between the 
pressures from International Organizations and the domestic contexts, he takes the 
domestic context as given and static.
27 It is important to note that for ‘path dependence’ to operate the impact of institutions on subsequent 
action must be unintended. If people set up certain institutions to ‘tie hands’ than it is impossible to claim 
that institutions themselves worked as a commitment device. In such a case the decision to act within 
particular institutional patterns preceded the institution (see Parsons 2007: 73).
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The mutual impact of the external and domestic pressures, in turn, assumes the 
possible shifts in domestic context in response to the international demands during the 
adaptation process, which in turn impact upon its quality. As Vachudova demonstrated 
in the general analysis of the reform trajectory in CEE (Vachudova 2005: 107), “the 
relationship between the EU and credible future members gradually changed the 
domestic balance of power in illiberal states against rent-seeking elites, undermining the 
strength of their domestic power base by making the political system more 
competitive”. Thus, while the density of actors defines the government’s strategy of 
compliance, the adaptation processes may also structure to some extent social groups’ 
behaviour or lead to shifts in social representation. In particular, perceptions about the 
costs linked to the reforms or the need to incur the costs mobilize domestic interests, 
which may impede an initially smooth adaptation. Therefore, I will argue that Putnam’s 
concept of the win-set as a constraint for decision-making elites may be useful for 
analyzing the results of the external pressures.
While the external geopolitical and historical context of EU conditionality has 
been broadly analyzed (see e.g. Hughes 2003; Smith 2003), there are gaps for 
conceptualizing the domestic dynamics leading to adoption of EU rules. Although a 
number of studies have included domestic variables in the research on conditionality 
(Borzel 2003; Borzel and Risse 2003; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2004) or pointed to the domestic context as explanatory variables to some unresolved 
issues indicated above, there is little research in which the domestic context carries the 
merited weight. Zubek and Goetz represent the scholars turning in this direction; 
however, they focus on the legal transposition records in the candidate countries, which 
represent only a partial element of the effectiveness of EU conditionality (Zubek 2005). 
A few years after enlargement, with the benefit of the hindsight, there is a possibility to 
go further with the analysis and assess also the factual adaptation record and even policy 
results in specific fields.
3. An alternative model: comparison across policy areas
While literature on the EU conditionality regime has established that EU 
pressures have produced a varying impact across member countries and policy areas, it
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provides an array of explanations behind this differentiation. This project, using single 
country/multi-policy analysis, aims to contribute to this stream of literature, which 
attempts to conceptualize the various responses in answer to the EU entry conditions.
In line with some of the accounts outlined above, the research starts from the 
premise that EU conditionality has not been applied in a policy or political vacuum and 
that national considerations played a considerable role in policy reforms (Hughes et al. 
2003: 29). In line with these arguments, the project draws on the historical neo­
institutionalist approach considering historical idiosyncrasies and path-dependancy as 
factors intervening in the trajectory of CEECs’ adaptation to the EU.
At the same time, as the accounts on conditionality applied by the International 
Financial Institutions (IFI) have demonstrated, the type of requirements posed for a 
country benefiting from assistance does matter for its capability/willingness to adapt. 
This research project, therefore, undertakes a two-fold approach, in which properties of 
the acquis would be examined in relation/context to the particular policy and especially 
the social actors and their preferences with regard to compliance.
Moreover, the research will also demonstrate the dynamic nature of the process 
of adaptation to the EU, which affects not only the shape of the policies expected to 
align with the acquis, but also the social and political realities of the applicant countries. 
The new costs-benefits framework but also transfer of the novel norms and ideas 
(Grabbe 2006: 205) contribute to the social mobilization in response to EU 
conditionality. The government’s ability to adapt to the EU measures and room for 
manoeuvre during the accession negotiations is contingent on these dynamics framed by 
existent social pressures. In that sense, the project will demonstrate how technocratic 
politics may paradoxically lead under certain conditions to politicization. The 
ownership concept employed by the International Relations literature (Khan and Sharma 
2001: 13) does not grasp this phenomenon since in itself it is driven by a technocratic 
interest in soliciting support for the measures agreed between the incumbent 
governments and the international agency.
The effectiveness of EU conditionality is contingent on both domestic and 
external factors, the properties of the acquis communautaire and the presence or absence 
of opposition to the EU-inspired reforms. The first variable establishes a direct link 
between the Commission’s strategy towards candidates (Hughes et al. 2003) with the
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institutional environment of EU conditionality. Since the unclear membership criteria 
(Grabbe 2006) were eventually specified prior to start of the accession negotiations and 
disaggregated into the specific legal acts, the construction of the acquis became the 
basis for applicants’ commitments and the EU’s monitoring actions in the later stages of 
the pre-accession process.
On the other hand, the study draws on the accounts focusing on the domestic 
context for adaptation (e.g. Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). However, it disaggregates the 
general domestic costs of compliance through the introduction of the notion of prior 
opposition to adaptation. The social attitudes towards the EU have been constructed 
based on the perceptions of costs from approximation to the EU for particular social 
groups rather than society at large.
The underlying question is how the type of the acquis has played itself out in the 
accession negotiations, whether for instance the thin acquis facilitated or impeded 
negotiations and, later on, adaptation, and whether it had a de/mobilizing effect on the 
society. Thus how much do the various institutional arrangements at the EU level matter 
for the process of incorporation of EU law (as well as norms and practices) into the 
domestic level of CEECs and how does the latter respond to particular types of 
pressure?
Working hypotheses and research variables
The two prime hypotheses put forward in this research are that conditionality is 
not always effective, and secondly, that its effectiveness varies across policy areas. It is 
argued here that properties of the acquis communautaire are important for mitigating 
various social reactions to the necessity of adaptation and provide the Commission with 
a better or worse tool for pressuring the candidates to reform. Domestic preferences 
with regard to EU demands (referred to as ‘prior opposition’) and the features of the 
acquis communautaire (thin or thick) will thus provide for the independent variables 
influencing the effectiveness of EU conditionality. The research explores whether the 
particular configuration of these two (domestic and external) factors matters for the 
effectiveness of conditionality.
I will argue that in areas where there are strong prior interests against accession, 
a thick acquis mobilizes domestic opposition against regulation and thus renders
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conditionality less effective. However, in policy areas without prior interests, a thick 
acquis may provide better guidance for implementation and therefore could possibly 
serve as a more appropriate tool for the policy transfer.
Putnam’s two-level game model (Putnam 1988) is utilized for conceptualization 
of the relations between the EU, national government and domestic interest groups. The 
model assumes that all international negotiations consist of two parallel games, at 
international and domestic levels. While domestic groups pressure the government to 
adopt favorable policies, the national governments seek power by “constructing 
coalitions among those groups”. At the international level (Level I) national 
governments strive to “satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988: 434). Thus, the presence of 
domestic entrenched interests narrows down the negotiation win-set and paradoxically 
may strengthen a government’s position internationally, leading to more favorable 
results (temporary derogations) in the accession negotiations.
Definitions
Conditionality in this research is defined as a mutual arrangement by which a 
government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which the 
EU or other agency will provide specified benefits: membership, financial assistance 
etc. (Killick et al. 1998; Grabbe 2001a; Grabbe 2002; Grabbe 2002a; Hughes et al. 
2003). The study assumes that conditionality is a mutual and voluntary agreement 
between the applicant country and the EU. In exchange for certain systemic reforms and 
adoption of the acquis into the legal system (outlined in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria) 
the EU promised to the candidates membership in its structures (although an exact 
schedule was not provided at the beginning of the process). The pace of the accession 
process and disbursement of any additional benefits were made dependent upon the 
assessment of the progress made by the candidate. However, the EU could also apply 
penalizing measures for apparent failures in adaptation. The conditioned relation 
between the CEECs and the EU commenced the moment both sides recognised the 
mutual dependence between the pre-conditions (Copenhagen criteria at first) and the 
prospect of membership and other benefits, such as pre-accession funding, institutional 
ties etc.
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The EU conditions in each examined policy area will be identified in the pre­
accession documents: Conclusions of the European Councils (starting from the 
Copenhagen Conclusions of 1993), Europe Agreements, Single Market White Paper, 
Accession Partnerships, Regular Reports, National Program of Preparation for 
Membership, screening tables, Position Papers in the accession negotiations and their 
amendments.
The project does not make a conceptual distinction between the pre-negotiation 
conditions and the requirements set during the phase of accession negotiations. 
However, the stress is on the negotiation phase conditionality due to the fact that it was 
only in the course of the screening of laws that a systemic check of the incoherence 
between domestic legal orders and the acquis was undertaken. The results of the 
screening of laws provided the basis for specification of the Commission’s requirements 
and after which the possible terms of accession were outlined.
Thus, the dependent variable of the research, effectiveness o f conditionality, is 
defined based on three key elements: (i) results of the accession negotiations, (ii) formal 
rules adoption, (iii) policy output. EU conditionality may be considered effective when 
the candidate agrees to implement a particular section of the acquis communautaire 
without requests for transition periods, in line with Commission’s general request from 
the Copenhagen criteria. Secondly, appropriate legal provisions from the pre-accession 
documents mentioned above were transposed into the domestic legal system according 
to the pre-agreed schedule (such commitments may be traced in the National Program 
of Preparation for Membership or candidates’ screening lists and Position Papers). 
Thirdly, the policy goals were achieved, which may be assessed after transition periods 
pass by for the areas, where they were granted. Achievement of the policy outcome is 
examined based on the policy goals outlined in the acquis communautaire, the Treaties 
or other relevant documents. Conditionality would be only partially effective if one of 
these elements was not fulfilled. The timeframe of the project (1993-2006) limits an 
examination of the effectiveness of EU conditionality to the measures, the 
implementation of which was completed within this period.
The purpose of the current research is to assess the effectiveness of 
conditionality through the cross-policy, single state empirical analysis. I explore, in 
particular, whether it has a differential impact on various policy fields. The focus is on
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the relation between the character of the acquis and the effectiveness of conditionality. 
The study will allow establishing which particular features of EU conditions or 
domestic institutional environments facilitate or infringe the ability of the EU to 
influence reforms in CEE candidates. The focus on one country, on the other hand, 
allows insulating the effects of conditionality from unobservable country-specific 
factors influencing compliance (like different bargaining positions related to the size of 
a country). The key independent variables of the project are: (i) presence/absence of the 
‘prior’; (ii) thin/thick acquis and the effectiveness of the acquis on the combination 
between these variables.
The project assumes that the acquis communautaire has a different construction 
in various policy chapters. The terms thin/thick acquis are broadly used in the literature 
on enlargement although there is no standard definition of the exact meaning of these
9 o
terms. Therefore, in this research, thick acquis signifies those policy areas where the 
member countries are obliged to achieve particular policy outcomes in a clearly defined 
manner, i.e. it is prescriptive as regards the means. Thinness o f the acquis refers to the 
policy areas where there are sparse regulations at the EU level, which stipulate the 
achievement of a particular policy/institutional outcome without specifying the means 
to attain it. These are softer modes of regulation allowing for more flexibility with 
regard to the modes of implementation of the policy measure.
‘Prior domestic opposition ’ refers to policy areas where there are strong and 
organized social actors, such as business or sectoral representation, trade unions, civil 
society organizations etc. The negative attitude towards adaptation may result in 
Poland’s application for a transition period in a given policy chapter or problems with 
adaptation.
‘No-prior domestic opposition ’ refers to situations where there are no such 
groups opposing adaptation or where implementation of the acquis has not been 
contentious, either due to the thinness of the acquis or where concurrence between the 
domestic law and the acquis precluded any conflicts about adaptation. Since the project 
takes historical institutionalism as a theoretical perspective, the prior and no-prior are
28 The terms ‘policy areas’ and ‘negotiating chapters’ are used interchangeably (according to the division 
into 29 chapters in the negotiations’ documents).
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defined on the basis of actors’ preferences entrenched in particular institutional 
structures rather than the mere existence (or not) of a policy template before accession 
to the EU.
A particular permutation of these variables may impede or facilitate adjustment 
and it is the properties of the acquis communautaire that are important for mitigating 
various social reactions to adaptation. In general terms, a thick acquis seems to provide 
a better guidance for the applicants’ governments in policy areas where adaptation does 
not incur significant costs for the social actors. On the reverse, social interests opposing 
adjustment to the EU may be more easily accommodated in policy areas where the 
acquis is thin and the member states’ governments enjoy greater leeway when it comes 
to the method of adaptation. In both of these cases, EU conditionality and the following, 
the process of candidates’ adaptation is likely to work more efficiently. During the 
research, four policy areas representing different realizations of the independent 
variables will be examined: Taxation, Regional policy, Competition policy and 
Fisheries.
Table 1.1: Two-level game outcome of the accession negotiations
Research hypotheses Thin acquis [effects of large 
international win-set depends 
on domestic context]
Thick acquis [effects of small 
international win-set depends on 
domestic context]
Pre-existing organized 
opposition [small domestic 
win-set, room for ‘national 
ownership’ depends on 
thickness of conditions]
Small win-set strengthens 
government vis-a-vis EU; 
national ownership and 
accommodation of interests 
possible [asymmetry of EU 
power less assertive].
Conditionality partially 
effective.
Taxation
Two small win-sets are bound to 
lead to conflict; social mobilization 
effect and threat of backlash 
against EU accession.
Conditionality least effective. 
Competition/state aid
No or fragmented pre­
existing opposition [large 
domestic win-set; degree of 
mobilization/ shrinking of 
win-set depends on 
conditionality because 
thickness gives nascent 
opposition a target]
Blueprint filling a gap, 
conditionality can be used as 
[weak] reform lever by 
domestic elites [asymmetry of 
EU power strong and 
discretionary].
Conditionality partially 
effective.
Regional policy
Small international win-set can be 
used as [strong] reform lever; 
potential mobilization effect at 
[limited] cost of effectiveness, 
possibly ‘democratization against 
the odds’.
Conditionality effective due to the 
mobilization effect against 
adaptation.
Fisheries
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In line with the framework outlined above, the tentative order of the policy chapters 
from the one in which conditionality was most effective to the least effective area 
follows.
I. Fisheries represents the policy area where a thick acquis is matched with 
no prior opposition to the reform. Thus, a small international win-set may be used as an 
effective reform lever and presumably the conditionality works effectively. However, 
possible social mobilization may take place at a cost to the effectiveness of 
conditionality.
II. In the area of Taxation a small domestic win-set due to the existence of 
strong domestic groups opposing the EU-inspired reforms may be relatively easily 
accommodated by a thin acquis.
ID. The acquis communautaire in the Regional policy field is thin and no 
domestic opposition to reforms existed prior to accession to the EU. Thus, 
conditionality may be used as a (relatively weak) reform lever by domestic elites. 
Nonetheless, the absence of a clear policy blueprint guiding the reform may impair 
adaptation.
IV. A thick acquis combined with strong domestic opposition produce the
worst results in terms of conditionality in the Competition policy area. Two small win- 
sets are bound to lead to conflict and the social mobilization effect poses a serious threat 
of backlash against EU accession. Therefore, in this area conditionality is presumably 
least effective.
An interesting finding of the research may be that counter to the simple notions 
of the thin-thick acquis, adding another dimension, the prior opposition may produce 
radically different results from those conventionally suggested by the literature. Thus, 
while a thick acquis presumably is the most effective in the area of Fisheries, strong 
domestic opposition to the reforms in the Competition policy field renders it the least 
effective from all analyzed cases.
The case studies
The case study for the research is Poland. This choice was motivated by a 
number of factors. Firstly, the broad political consensus on the break with the past
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makes it an interesting case for studying conditionality, as one may assume that the 
malleability of the domestic institutions should render the EU conditionality regime 
particularly effective. Also, Poland is not an obvious case from the perspective of 
‘asymmetry of power’ arguments. On the one hand the country has projected a strong 
desire of ‘return to Europe’ since the beginning of the 1990s, but on the other, 
throughout the pre-accession period the country based its projections for membership on 
the political incorrectness of leaving it out of the first-line candidates, as well as 
Germany’s political support. Moreover, the transition process commenced in Poland 
relatively early and was driven predominantly by domestic forces, at least in its first 
phases. Thus, it allows the exploration of various policy areas, in which there may or 
may not be social opposition to accession. Poland’s experience with the ‘Solidarity’ and 
social movement tradition make the exploration of this aspect in the context of 
adaptation to the EU particularly interesting.
Policy areas under scrutiny
The choice of case studies was motivated by differing realizations of the 
variables indicated above as important for the working of conditionality. However, in 
order to control for the ‘misfit’ arguments, all areas represent difficult fields from the 
adaptation perspective (although to varying degrees due to the different qualities of the 
acquis in each policy area). Additionally, the cases do not include politically highly 
contentious areas, such as Free movement of persons or Free movement of capital (land 
acquisition), where the conduct of negotiations and adaptation were to a large extent 
influenced by broad public opinion on EU requirements.
Case 1: Taxation -  thin acquis/prior opposition
The EU regulations on Taxation are sparse but adaptation involved an increase 
of several types of taxes. The policy field is characterized by strong prior interests, in 
particular in the examined sub-area of excise tax on cigarettes, where social actors are 
represented by country-wide business organizations as well as the sectoral organization 
of the tobacco producers. A small number of economically strong (foreign owned) 
actors arguably force the government to consider their demands (Olson 1965).
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Case 2: Fisheries -  thick acquis/no prior opposition
The thick acquis communautaire, regulating in detail all commercial activities 
related to fishing, created a small negotiation win-set at the EU side of the table. On the 
other hand, no active prior opposition to adaptation at home allowed Poland’s 
government to close the negotiation chapter without applying for transition periods. 
Adoption of the Common Fisheries Policy acquis prior enlargement placed, however, 
heavy burden both on the Polish fishing industry and public administration services. 
The adaptation record will thus depend on ability of the government to mitigate 
potential social discontent with such terms of accession.
Case 3: Competition policy -  thick acquis/prior opposition
The acquis in the Competition policy (state aid section) is thick and stipulates in 
detail the amount of public aid that might be disbursed by public authorities to support 
regions and enterprises. From the outset the negotiations in the area have been very 
controversial since adjustments to the EU would have adverse effects for a particular 
group of actors (enterprises which invested in the Special Economic Zones). Strong 
vested interest opposing adaptation have a potential to stall the accession negotiations 
and compliance with the EU competition rules.
Case 4: Regional policy -  thin acquis/no prior opposition
The thin acquis in the Regional policy field leaves the means of adaptation to the 
discretion of the member countries. The absence of social opposition towards adaptation 
combined with fragmented vested interests and positive distributory effects from policy 
adoption should facilitate compliance with the EU. Implementation of the EU cohesion 
policy rules and in particular of the partnership principle is likely to contribute to social 
mobilization.
Empirical research
The empirical work will involve examination of the governmental documents 
(policy programmes like National Development Programs) and documents from the
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accession negotiation period (Regular Reports, screening tables, Draft Common 
Positions, Common Positions, Negotiation Positions etc.). However, less formal 
recommendations, reports from the social consultations, interpretations of the acquis 
and materials from the technical consultations will also be examined. Additionally, a 
series of open interviews will be conducted with key persons involved in the process on 
the Commission side, mainly from DG Enlargement, representatives of the Polish 
governments and relevant social groups. The study requires detailed policy tracing to 
assess what were the motivations behind the particular decisions on the application for 
the transition periods, and the granting of those concessions on the other hand. Since 
evolution of the actors’ position took place throughout the pre-accession period, the 
study will identify the learning processes among the actors involved and the 
consequences for the evolution of their respective positions.
The progress in implementation of EU demands will be examined against the 
benchmarks provided in the commitments undertaken in the accession negotiations 
(screening documents and Negotiation Positions) and in the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). Special attention will be paid to the timetables for 
implementation of the particular measures, which have been included in these 
documents. Therefore, the bulk of the empirical work focuses on legal requirements and 
the implementation of the measures from the NPAA and the Negotiating Positions 
(subsequent versions) in the relevant negotiating chapters.
Theoretical contribution o f the research project
An investigation into EU conditionality in the context of social mobilization 
literature may explain more accurately some unresolved questions pending in the 
'conditionality' stream of literature. When the social groups mobilization is considered 
as a domestic factor playing a role in the accession negotiations, the outcome of the 
study coincides with Putnam’s two-level games paradox (Putnam 1988) of domestic 
weakness contributing to the international successes of state negotiators. The originality 
of the research lies in combining two streams of literature that have not been confronted 
yet.
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The project utilizes the two-level game framework (Putnam 1988) in an 
interpretation that de-emphasizes the strategic choices of the negotiators and instead 
focuses on the institutional constraints, such as the asymmetric bargaining power, 
accession timetable, EU as delegated negotiator for old EU members etc. On the other 
hand it focuses on the domestic context of an applicant, namely the historical legacies 
and national idiosyncrasies (no foreign policy alternatives apart from ‘return to Europe’, 
authoritarian state traditions, weak political party systems but in certain areas strong 
organized interests, tradition of social movements). Thus, the project expands on the 
domestic level and its dynamics, which are taken as given in the original Putnam 
framework. The research demonstrates the possible instrumentalization of one (EU) 
level for the bargain at the other (domestic), which may lead to endogenous changes at 
the domestic level, such as social mobilization of interests.
The strong emphasis on the domestic context and its inherent dynamics signifies that the 
project drives away from the state- or government-centric view of conditionality, which 
has been the mainstream view of the literature. As was already mentioned above, the 
research shows concretely how technocratic politics, paradoxically, may lead to 
politicization. This effect could explain why conditionality has not been as effective as 
the asymmetric bargaining power and the material advantages of compliance would lead 
one to expect.
Conclusions
Drawing on the International Relations literature (Putnam 1988; Milner 1997; 
Milner and Rosendorff 1997), which underscores the significance of domestic factors 
for the results of the intergovernmental negotiations and rich empirical experience of the 
IFIs with conditionality29 this project argues that consideration of the domestic context 
may overcome the inherent problems with modeling conditionality, underlined above.
The further chapters of this thesis will demonstrate that the internal dynamics 
within a country subjected to conditionality are important for the effectiveness of the 
external governance tools applied by the EU or other institutions. Similarly, the cross­
policy variations may be explained by consideration of the specific policy contexts, in 
which conditionality is applied. This argument follows Checkers (2000) and others’
29 See e.g. Reynolds (1995); Burnside and Dollar (1997); Killick et al. (1998); Khan and Sharma (2001).
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observation (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007) that conceptualization of conditionality 
should consider the peculiarities of domestic conditions.
The two following chapters are devoted to the analysis of the two variables 
defined as key for the working of the EU conditionality regime applied towards the 
applicants for membership. Chapter II presents the inconclusive outcomes of the debate 
on conditionality applied in the international context by the International Financial 
Institutions. Further, it points to the commonalities and differences between the IFIs’ 
conditionality regime with that applied by the European Community. It presents the 
principles guiding the past enlargements and differences between those and the Fifth 
expansion. Further, the two-level games context of the accession negotiation is 
presented. Chapter El focuses on the domestic context, in which EU conditionality 
towards Poland was applied. In particular, it discusses the evolution of the state-society 
relations in the post-communist countries and outlines the existent social mediation 
mechanisms in-built in the accession negotiation process. The next four chapters 
analyze the case studies, and conclusions summarize the research findings.
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CHAPTER II
A ccession  conditionality  as a  tw o -level  gam e
Introduction
Conditionality, as a tool of policy change, has been extensively applied by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)30 in countries benefiting from international 
financial assistance schemes. This chapter will demonstrate the interesting analogy that 
may be drawn between the EU and IFIs’ conditionality and examine which lessons from 
the ample experience of the latter may be learnt to the benefit of the EU as well as the 
candidate countries. In both cases the focus is the relations between a multilateral 
agency representing other states and a sovereign country. It is consequential for the 
legitimacy of the conditionality regime and available enforcement mechanisms. The 
starting point, however, is the uneven distribution of wealth, political power, political or 
economic status etc. between the two players. This asymmetry provides the basis for 
usage of mechanisms inducing domestic policy change, such as conditionality.
Nonetheless, the material advantages and asymmetric bargaining power between 
the provider of resources or membership status do not assuredly secure compliance. The 
amount of empirical research on the behavior of states receiving international financial 
assistance as well as more recent studies on the EU accession conditionality show the 
inconclusive effects such policies have produced.
The question about the effectiveness of conditionality applied by the IFIs or the 
European Union is in principle about the domestic response to international pressures. 
Conventionally, studies on IFIs’ conditionality utilized the principal-agent (PA)
30 International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) stand here for International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs).
44
framework to conceptualize reciprocal relations between the donor and a recipient 
country. According to the model, the international institution is the principal and 
delegates specific tasks to the agent, i.e. the applicant for international assistance, such 
as implementing certain laws or policies, the fulfilment of which is seen as a 
precondition for international assistance achieving its goals.
However, systemic deficiencies in-built in such relations may and often do lead 
to non-compliance and in effect failure to accomplish the stated goals of the 
programme. The body of literature and IFIs’ empirical analyses have examined the 
inadequate effectiveness of the international conditioned aid schemes, and the design of 
the IFIs programmes has been evolving in response to the reached conclusions.
As this chapter will demonstrate, the so-called structural conditionality of the 
IFIs translates well into the thin/thick acquis of the EU and thus the latter is as 
susceptible to similar criticism and flaws as the former. This chapter presents that 
Putnam’s (1988) two-level game model of international negotiations offers more 
promising theoretical approach for examination of the EU pre-accession conditionality. 
As argued in the Introduction to this work, the characteristics of the acquis 
communautaire in the policy area (conceptualized as ‘thin’ or ‘thick’) are vital to the 
ability of the EU to promote policy change. Through Putnam’s view, the acquis 
delineates the scope of the viable win-sets, that is, the terms of an accession deal 
acceptable for the European Union. The applicant’s negotiators adapt their negotiating 
strategies accordingly. While this chapter focuses on the acquis communautaire and its 
role in structuring adaptation, the next section of the thesis analyzes the domestic 
response to EU pressures. I will show how the international ‘game’ in the two-level 
bargain may lead to endogenous changes at the national level, namely social 
mobilization. Putnam’s framework captures both sides of this complex process, 
explaining the causal linkage between events at the international and domestic scene in 
a more comprehensive way than the principal-agent model.
The chapter proceeds with an outline of the key arguments in the international 
debate on the usage of conditionality by the IFIs and its evolution over time. A further 
section shows the analogies between the EU pre-accession conditions and the IFIs’ 
regime, pointing to the common dilemmas related to application of conditionality in 
both contexts. The next part presents Putnam’s two-level game framework of the
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international negotiations as an alternative to the principal-agent model. It applies the 
Putnam’s framework to the fifth enlargement negotiations of the EU and explains the 
role of the acquis in application of EU conditionality. The conclusions summarise the 
presented arguments, which will be supported by the empirical evidence, sought in the 
further chapters of this thesis.
1. The international debate on conditionality
The IFIs’ experience with conditionality has shown how difficult it has proven 
to introduce policy change, in particular in the short-term. Evidence that was openly 
debated under Koehler’s chairmanship at the IMF indicated a dilemma: structural 
conditionality that tries to induce profound changes in the policy regime of a country 
that gets credit (and does not simply serve to ensure repayment of credit), has a 
relatively bad implementation record. Yet the consensus in the international 
development community was driving exactly in the direction that aid without profound 
changes in the policy regime of a country that gets credit is unsustainable31.
The ineffectiveness in application of the political-structural conditionality has 
been conventionally analyzed as a principal-agent problem related to asymmetry of 
information and difficulties in setting appropriate incentives for change. Efforts to 
induce ‘national ownership’ (see Johnson and Wasty 1999; Khan and Sharma 2001; 
Erbas 2003) of the IFIs’ programmes in the 1990s attempted to remedy these 
deficiencies. Successful compliance of beneficiary countries was to be asserted by 
fostering understanding and commitment to reforms’ goals and their implementation 
among incumbent governments and other stakeholders.
However, if ensuring national ownership was to be the key for success of the aid 
schemes, it raises the question of why have conditions continued to be imposed in the 
first place? Moreover, despite undertaken efforts to secure national ownership of the 
applied measures, the effectiveness of the IFIs’ programmes remains broadly 
questioned.
Nonetheless, the focus of recent debates on implementation of the conditioned 
aid programmes turned to domestic contexts, in which the conditions are applied. They
31 For a review of the structural conditionality of the IMF see e.g. IMF (2001b).
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point to the ‘good policy environment’ (Burnside and Dollar 1997; Collier et al. 2000) 
as a variable essential for the programme success. Likewise, the tailor-made type of 
conditions is broadly seen as a remedy to some of the problems encountered by the 
early, across-the-board programmes for the Third World countries. The analysis of the 
type of conditionality applied by the EU to the candidates for membership in this 
context reveals that to some extent it remains largely isolated from these vigorous 
debates on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) measures.
The rationale for utilization o f conditionality in the international aid schemes
The emergence of ‘multilateral’ conditionality is intrinsically linked with the 
formation of the International Financial Institutions. Although the origins of multilateral 
conditionality may be traced to the League of Nations and its ‘reconstruction schemes’32 
for some European countries, the upsurge of its usage took place after World War II and 
the creation of the Bretton Woods international institutions in 1944, the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their initial objective was to assist in 
overcoming economic difficulties in the war-torn Europe. The IMF was to provide a 
short-term balance of payments credits and to stabilize the post-war financial system 
while the Bank’s objective was to promote long-term growth in its member countries33. 
With time, however, both institutions became the primary financiers of development 
projects in the Third World and conditionality of aid programmes the basic strategy to 
ensure compliance of the national governments with policy programmes attached to aid 
schemes.
The initial ‘hard’ IFIs’ conditions attached to aid programmes covered 
principally monetary and fiscal policy. Compared with the IMF, the conditions attached 
to WB programmes were much less specific and sparse and concerned public sector 
budget deficits, credit to the private sector, and reduction of the current account deficit 
and currency devaluation (Kapur et al. 1997). The composition of IFIs’ conditionality 
until the mid-70s reflected a strong reliance on the monetarist approach viewing excess 
demand as the root cause of budget deficits and inflation, exchange-rate disequilibria,
32 They took the form of demands for the currency reforms, setting fiscal equilibrium and introduction of 
monetary discipline. Various means have been used to guarantee enforcement of the League of Nations’ 
programmes and to safeguard the interest of the foreign creditors (see Santaella 1993).
3 On history of the Fund see De Vries and Horsefield (1969); Dell (1981); Kahler (1990); James (1998).
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currency overvaluation and hence payment difficulties (Stokke 1995: 8). In answer to 
the so-defined problems, IFIs designed largely standardized adjustment programmes 
focused on correction of the economic policies of the borrowing countries. Conditions 
attached to the programmes aimed to restore control over the money supply, reduce 
current account deficits through import substitution and export promotion, lead to 
exchange-rate devaluation, deregulate prices and cut consumer subsidies and eliminate 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers (Dreher 2002: 8).
Domestically, conditions served predominantly as a commitment device. Since 
participation in the IFIs’ conditioned programmes locked the government into the 
particular set of policies, it increased the confidence that the anticipated economic 
outcomes would be achieved. Rejection of policy measures being a part of the deal with 
the IFIs was also more costly and thus conditionality was to reduce the general risk of 
default (Vreeland 2001). Conditionality, therefore, may be seen as a solution to the 
credibility problem of the governments suffering from it, which may be exemplified in 
the low international credit ratings or other evidence (Killick et al. 1998: 15). 
Governments are also more willing to accept the IFIs’ conditions for reputational 
reasons as their indirect effects may be increases by private investments. In that way 
conditionality aims to contribute directly as well as indirectly to the improvement of its 
economic policies.
The theoretical framework conventionally used to conceptualize relations 
between the IFIs and the borrowing countries is agency theory and the principal-agent 
(PA) model (Martin 2000; Drazen 2001; Khan and Sharma 2001). The framework 
explains how to organize relationships, in which one party (the principal) determines 
and delegates tasks to another party (the agent). In the version of the theory applied to 
the international setting, the IMF or the World Bank play the role of the principals 
delegating the implementation of a particular policy to the agent, a country benefiting 
from financial assistance, in exchange for provision of funding. The key question to be 
solved in such relations is how the principal may control the actions of the agent, or 
inversely, to what extent an agent is able to pursue its tasks independently of the 
principal. The key assumptions of this model are conditions of imperfect (asymmetrical) 
information (Pollack 1997) and some degree of divergence of actors’ preferences.
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The source of potential conflict between the principal and agent is the likelihood 
that . agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the 
constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal” (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 
1991: 5). There are two types of agency problems in-built in such relations: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to the situation when the principal 
cannot ascertain whether the agent accurately reveals his ability to do the work, for 
which he is being paid (Eisenhardt, 1985). Therefore, the agents least fit to fulfill the 
tasks may apply for the job. In the IFIs and borrowing countries setting this means that 
countries with the poorest policy environments and weakest abilities to implement the 
programmes have more incentive to apply for funding. The problems inherent to the 
efficiency of foreign aid schemes stem from the fact that states where aid would work 
do not actually need it. In turn, the absence of effective institutions prevents aid from 
working in places that need it most.
Moral hazard, the second agency problem, occurs due to the “possibility that 
bureaucracies will choose policies that differ from the preferences of the enacting 
coalition” (Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002). In the IFIs’ case, moral hazard represent 
situations in which access to additional funding provides an incentive to pursue policies 
inconsistent with IFIs’ preferences or the letter of agreement. For instance, a country 
endowed with IMF or World Bank financing increases its military assets, which it could 
not afford before.
Both phenomena represent potential ‘agency losses’ occurring due to shirking or 
slippage. The former is a condition in which the agent uses delegated powers to pursue 
his own preferences at the expense of the principal’s. Shirking takes place when the 
agent has an incentive and an ability to pursue his own interests (Moe 1995) while 
slippage may take place if the structure of delegation itself creates incentives for the 
agent to pursue his own aims distinct from the principal interests.
The occurrence of moral hazard and adverse selection provides theoretical 
justification for the use of conditionality. It allowed the donors to undertake strategies 
that secured the policy choices of aid receivers coinciding with borrowers’ preferences. 
In situations where the agents have a predisposition to shirk, the IFI needs to reassure 
that it possesses tools to prevent or mitigate it. The IFIs thus refer to the use of 
conditionality, which links approval or continuation of the financing with
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implementation of the specific elements of economic policy receiving the financing. 
Once all funds are released, there is very little leverage on the part of the IFIs. Their 
influence is additionally weakened in situations when agents represent the sovereign 
countries, since the available enforcement mechanisms are particularly deficient. There 
is no possibility of resort to a court of justice, which could force the shirking country to 
return to the right policy track.
The inconclusive effects and evolution o f the IFIs * conditionality regime
Nonetheless, empirical studies on the implementation of the IFIs’ programmes 
have shown a mixed effectiveness of Fund’s and WB conditionality and negligible 
positive correlation between its application and income growth (see e.g. Bauer 2000; 
Dollar and Svensson 2000; Easterly 2001; Easterly 2006). Thus, “getting the incentives 
right” (Checkel 2000: 18) proved apparently insufficient in promoting the policy shifts 
in countries suffering from policy problems and economic crises. Participants in the 
international aid schemes have either shirked implementing the advised reforms or have 
proven unable to fulfill undertaken commitments. On the other hand, the IMF was 
broadly criticized for failure to respond to differences between the borrowers in terms of 
capacity to adjust and to variations in economic shocks (Fahy 1984: 241). By the mid 
1970s it also became evident that in some cases “maladjustments in the balance of 
payments” could be quite protracted and rooted in structural rigidities and distortions 
(IMF 2001b: 3). Thus, the monetarist assumptions underlying the Fund’s advice started 
to be considered as unsuitable for all developing economies.
The recognition of the unsatisfactory results of conditionality if applied solely to 
the economic sphere brought the attention of the Bretton Woods institutions to the ‘soft 
state’ (Myrdal 1969), namely the importance of reforming the political and 
administrative systems as accompanying the economic policy reforms. With the 
establishment of the Extended Fund Facility in 1974 the Executive Board agreed to 
provide financing “. .. in  support for comprehensive programmes that include policies of 
the scope and character required to correct structural imbalances in production, trade
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and prices”34. The shifting preferences of the Board and the increasing emphasis on 
economic growth reinforced the importance of the structural contexts, such as the 
presence of extensive market distortions or the lack of appropriate institutional 
underpinning for effective policies.
While between 1980 and 1984 conditions focused primarily on international 
trade and the fiscal sector, thereafter measures referring to the financial sector as well as 
privatisation and institutional reforms gained importance (Dreher 2002: 14). Between 
1985 and 1986, less than 20% of the upper credit tranche of the Standby and Extended 
Arrangements included conditions related to structural measures (IMF 2001a). At the 
end of the decade such conditions were covered under almost two thirds of the 
arrangements, whereas until the mid-1990s they were present in almost all programmes 
(Dreher 2002: 16). While upholding the consensus on the general need for programme 
conditionality, the reforms undertaken since the early 1980s and in particular in the 
1990s focused on changing the type of conditions attached to the adjustment operations. 
IMF and WB’s involvement in the post-communist countries after the collapse of the 
bipolar international system have ultimately reasserted the shift in their approach to 
conditionality.
Technically, the IFIs’ ‘new generation’ conditionality measures include a range 
of mechanisms attached to ‘drawings’ (the IMF term for loans’ approval), specified in 
the Letter of Intent35 or the Memorandum on Economic or Financial Policies. These are 
the preconditions, performance criteria, benchmarks and programme reviews (IMF 
2001b). The preconditions or prior actions are the measures undertaken before the 
presentation of a programme to the Executive Board37 for authorization and aim to 
enhance the capacity of the programme to meet its objectives. Performance criteria are 
attached to structural measures that are critical to the success of the adjustment 
programme and have to be implemented according to the pre-agreed timetable. Failure 
in implementation should lead to the suspension of further loan disbursements by the
34 Executive Board Decision No 4377- (74/114), September 1974.
35 This document specifies the policy actions that the borrowing country pledges to undertake.
36 These are the elements of the structural conditionality known as programme monitoring techniques, 
adapted to monitor the progress of structural reform.
37 The Executive Board of the IMF consists of 24 Executive Directors, with the Managing Director as a 
chairman. It is responsible for the daily operation of the Fund.
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Fund until a new agreement is reached38. They provide target indicators, such as fiscal 
deficits and the balance of payments. Finally, programme reviews offer a framework for 
assessing structural reforms against established benchmarks, which are difficult to 
define ex ante (see IMF 2001b: 6).
Along with the IMF’s introduction of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 
in 1986, a new tool of conditionality emerged, the ‘structural benchmarks’. They are to 
map out the series of steps towards an overall policy result. Structural benchmarks 
differ from the performance criteria since failure to meet them does not stop the 
programme. Rather, they serve as markers in the assessment of progress with the 
implementation of reforms in a given area (IMF 2000: 1). However, compliance or lack 
of it helps to inform the Board about the advancement in structural reforms during 
reviews of the programmes. The introduction of the structural benchmarks emphasized 
the increasing role of the structural conditionality, which is often difficult to 
characterize quantitatively or even qualitatively and is therefore less suitable as 
performance criteria (IMF 2001a: 5). It has also marked the shifting role of the IMF, 
evolving towards the development agency with a focus on growth in developing 
countries (Dreher 2002: 15).
Inherent dilemmas related to application o f the international conditioned aid 
schemes
Notwithstanding the undertaken comprehensive reform of the IFIs’ 
conditionality regime outlined above, the implementation of the new generation of 
assistance programmes did not bring a clear-cut improvement of the results (Burnside 
and Dollar 1997; Burnside and Dollar 1998; World Bank 1998; Dollar and Svensson 
2000; IMF 2001a)39 In many instances, the impact of the IFIs’ interventions was only
38 Typical IMF Financing Preconditions and Performance Criteria: general commitment to cooperate with 
the IMF in setting policies; reducing government spending, budget deficits, and foreign (external) debt; 
reducing the rate of money growth to control inflation; ending government monopolies (i.e. privatisation); 
deregulating industries and reforming the banking sector; redirecting domestic credit from the public to 
the private sector; ending government wage, price, and interest-rate controls and government subsidies; 
raising real interest rates to market levels; removing barriers to export growth; lowering tariffs, ending 
quotas, and removing exchange controls and discriminatory exchange rates; maintaining adequate levels 
of international reserves; devaluing the currency for countries in "fundamental disequilibrium" (see 
http://www.imfsite.org).
39 A summary of studies on IMF conditionality and their results may be found in Annex I of the IMF 
(2001a). Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programmes - Policy Issues.
52
limited and transitory. Those findings triggered public debate on the “merits and 
demerits of the extensive structural reform agenda of recent Fund-supported 
program[me]s” (IMF 2001b: 3).
The key problem with the reformed IFIs’ conditions (as well as introduction of 
the structural benchmarks), and the source of their criticism, has been the deteriorating 
clarity with respect to the boundaries of conditionality (IMF 2001a: 5) The expansion of 
structural conditions appeared to unduly limit the scope for domestic policy choices 
(Khan and Sharma 2001: 20) since many structural reforms were more intrusive than 
macroeconomic policies. The very broad character of the structural benchmarks, such as 
the obligation to prepare action plans, increased allocation to the health service or to 
improving immunization in the population (Dreher 2002: 16), substantially enlarged the 
IFIs’ interference in the areas falling thus far into purely domestic affairs. There 
appeared an inherent tension between the desire of the IFIs to cover aspects of the 
policy central to programme objectives and the intrusiveness of such interference into 
the domestic affairs of sovereign states.
Nonetheless, despite the generally weak correlation between income growth and 
aid programmes, the empirical studies also showed that aid applied in ‘good policy 
environments’ did make a change (Burnside and Dollar 1997). Reynolds’ (1995) survey 
of long-run development experiences concludes that “political organization and the 
administrative competence of governments” has been the single most important 
explanation of variations in developing countries’ growth records. Such conditions 
could be created in countries aware of the necessary reforms (as suggested by the IFIs) 
and committed to their implementation, that, is, those that fostered the ‘national 
ownership’ of the IFIs programmes (see Khan and Sharma 2001; Erbas 2003). Finally, 
the IFIs also observed that in successful programmes, such as in Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire 
and Uganda, the authorities took a strong role in setting the policy agenda and in 
technical discussions, and were closely involved in the preparation of policy documents 
(IMF 2001a: 52). Open, inclusive public debate sanctioned by the top leadership clearly 
contributed to the success of the reforms’ implementation.
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Drawing on the clues of the ‘national ownership’ debate and in light of the 
insufficient effectiveness of the IFIs’ conditionality regime, the IMF undertook a series 
of reforms aimed at increasing commitment to change in the recipient countries. The 
underlining assumption was that persuading government and relevant stakeholders to 
difficult policy measures increases the probability of their implementation (Johnson and 
Wasty 1999; Khan and Sharma 2001; Erbas 2003). Theoretically, the ownership was to 
remedy the inability to anticipate all contingencies that could affect the programme and 
to specify in advance actions governments should take (Khan and Sharma 2001).
The modification of the IFIs’ conditionality regime relied on three key elements: 
narrowing the scope (focusing) of structural conditionality, reducing the level of detail 
of programme monitoring, and greater flexibility and inclusiveness of programme 
negotiations (IMF 2001a). The Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Conditionality 
(IMF 2000) reaffirmed that “structural reforms that are critical to the achievement of a 
programme’s macroeconomic objectives will generally have to be covered by Fund 
conditionality; however, a more focused and parsimonious application of conditionality 
is envisaged for structural reforms that are relevant but not critical to these objectives” 
(IMF 2001c). In general terms, greater ‘thinness’ of the conditions was to assure a better 
implementation record.
National ownership seemed a solution to most of the problems encountered by 
application of international conditionality. Yet, there is a conceptual difficulty with 
reconciling the need for conditionality with country ownership if it implies that even 
without the external pressure, the same or a similar course of policy reforms would have 
been undertaken by the policymaker (Khan and Sharma 2001: 13). Application of 
conditionality is motivated exactly by the lack or insufficient country ownership of the 
programme and the IFIs’ approach reflects an implicit assumption of the principal- 
agent framework on the divergence of interests between the patron institution and the 
borrowing country. The appropriateness of the model, however, has recently been 
questioned also by the IFIs (IMF 2001b: 12) due to the political sensitivity of conjecture 
about interest divergence as well as problems with its reconciliation with national 
ownership.
In the context of application of programmes for CEE, the Fund admitted that in 
cases when ownership was weak, marked by misreporting, overstatement of reforms
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implemented by the authorities, lack of adequate support by local authorities and 
conflicts between the government branches, conditionality was intensified. This 
intensification has not, however, seemed to help improve policy implementation in 
countries not committed to reforms. By contrast, states with strong national ownership, 
such as Baltic countries, were able to successfully implement programmes without 
extensive conditionality (IMF 2001a: 53). The study of World Bank conditionality 
(Collier et al. 2000) demonstrated that underlying political economy factors rather than 
the Bank’s efforts or monitoring techniques were critical for a programme’s success. 
Conditionality was effective only in environments in which governments were already 
committed to reforms and in countries where genuine movement for change had existed 
before the assistance arrived (IMF 2001a: 57). The key problem then is how to foster 
national ownership in states with poor policy environments, especially that structural 
reforms imply inevitable transition costs for some social groups. Strong vested interests 
have a chance to block the reforms even when these are supported by the incumbent 
governments.
The principal-agent model fails to account for the variation of tools of 
conditionality applied in response to the mixed effectiveness of the ‘old’ fiscal 
conditionality as well as inherent problems with undue intrusiveness of dense structural 
measures. Therefore, it cannot capture the EU’s application of both thick and thin 
acquis. Moreover, it is a static approach assuming an invariable distribution of 
constraints and preferences and thus cannot conceptualize the politicization effect that 
the application of external conditionality may instigate. Adaptation process through 
infringing costs upon entrenched interests under certain conditions may provoke social 
mobilization and even political shifts. The policies of the IFIs have often spawned 
resentment across the developing world. They have also impacted the social and 
political realities of countries receiving international assistance. For instance, the 
populist political movements, such as the Peronist parties in Argentina (facing serious 
economic crisis since the 1990s) have frequently used the IFIs as scapegoats for the 
enduring social hardships in order to improve their electoral result. In 2002, the 
announcement by the Argentinean finance minister that the country would discontinue 
its IMF loans payments, and not surrender to its social assistance schemes, caused 
widespread riots, which led to the collapse of the government and continuing economic 
chaos (Peet 2003: 84). Albeit on a smaller scale, social mobilization in response (direct
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or indirect) to the external pressures has also taken place in the CEE candidates for EU 
membership. For instance, the prospect of reduction of Poland’s fishing fleet in the 
Baltic Sea as a measure of adaptation to the Common Fisheries Policy triggered 
fishermen protests, which eventually brought Poland’s government to open conflict with 
the European Commission.
These examples demonstrate that social and political effects should also be 
accounted for in studies conceptualizing the effectiveness of conditionality, as social 
mobilization ensuing from its application may affect countries’ abilities and/or 
willingness to reform. This also renders the principal-agent model less appropriate as a 
framework for understanding conditionality.
The European Union, as the section below demonstrates, has seemed to repeat a 
few already recognized mistakes committed by the IFIs while exerting pressure on the 
third countries. Possibly, utilization of the two-level game model (Putnam 1988) for 
conceptualization of this process and accounting for its inherent dynamics and power 
play between the actors, may reveal why some of these mistakes have been committed.
2. The evolution of EU conditionality
Unlike in the previous enlargements, with usually fragmented and/or pertinent to 
the particular countries adjustment problems, completion of the fifth accession process 
required an across-the-board40 overhaul of the main aspects of candidates’ economies. It 
involved far more extensive and therefore intrusive pre-conditions for membership and 
methods of control of the candidates’ adaptation to Community rules (see e.g. Grabbe 
1999). Arguably, novel conditions and monitoring techniques were utilized by the EU 
to safeguard the 50-year achievements of European integration as well as to assure the 
EU’s role in guiding the CEE transition process. However, while some of the recent 
reforms of the IFIs’ conditionality regime outlined above were aimed at streamlining 
the programmes, so to increase country ownership, the strictness of application and 
large number of conditions seem to position the EU conditionality regime in proximity 
to the early-stage ‘hard’ IFIs’ measures. It is thus reasonable to expect that their
40 Perhaps Slovenia was an exception among the candidates due to its relatively good economic situation.
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implementation encounters similar problems to those that triggered the reforms of the 
IFIs’ conditionality.
In its recent expansion, to include eight Central Eastern European countries, 
together with Malta and the Greek part of Cyprus, the European Union has to a large 
extent drawn on its past experience with widening the borders. Apart from the formal 
rules on enlargement, the Community strategy rests on the set of principles guiding the 
accession negotiations, as well as the less explicit “assumptions shaping the 
expectations of the participants and the progress of negotiations” (Preston 1997: 9). 
However, while there has been a rather consistent pattern of rules and regulations 
facilitating subsequent expansions, the EU has modified some strategic assumptions and 
principles of enlargement while opening its borders to CEECs. The changes concerned 
mainly the conditioned nature of enlargement to the East (Maresceau 2003: 37). The 
strict ex ante conditionality regime (Grabbe 2002a), based on the mechanisms 
monitoring adaptation to the acquis as well as tailoring European aid to the set of 
particular demands, presented novel elements, absent in the past (Mayhew 2002: 19). In 
addition to that, the completion of the Single Market Programme and related increase of 
the volume of Community laws significantly broadened the scope of conditions to be 
met by the candidates. Thus both the extent of conditions and introduction of the 
mechanisms for monitoring compliance make comparison of the recent forms of EU 
conditionality and the IFIs’ structural conditionality even more relevant.
The principles guiding past enlargements o f the Community
Membership conditionality is not a novelty in the Community enlargement 
strategy. Setting criteria for entry was present since the very first enlargement of the EC. 
It allowed to “protect and promote” (Smith 2003) the European integration process 
despite the necessary changes induced by subsequent enlargements. From the outset, the 
early forms of pre-accession conditionality were designed to safeguard the Community 
rather than the applicant’s interests (EC 1992:12).
Nevertheless, the Treaty basis for conditionality, as for conducting enlargements 
in general, is vague. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, potential 
Community members have to belong to the “European nations” and must share the 
“ideals” of the signatories of the Treaty. The latter points to the “determination to strive
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for peace and freedom among nations”. Only the Treaty of Maastricht in Article 6(1) 
further specified the meaning of ‘ideals’ common to the ‘European nations’ by 
demanding from the future members to observe the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights41 and the rule of law’42. None of these, however, is easily 
measurable and sufficient in itself to join the club.
Confronted with limited formal guidance, the Community member states 
developed a strategy of enlargements, which aimed to maintain the equilibrium between 
their fear to forfeit hard-won achievements of integration and simultaneous strains to 
put up with the external political and economic challenges. Preservation of a delicate 
balance between the continuous advancement of the European integration, termed 
‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of the EC’s geographical range43 has been the guiding 
principle of the Community since the first British application for membership. As Paul 
Taylor (1996: 99) noted, the combination of interests and values, which could sustain 
the governance system of the EC “had taken a good many years to evolve, and it 
represented an achievement which should not be abandoned easily”. The set of explicit 
membership rules, but also “unspoken, implicit expectations of the suitability or not of 
prospective members” (Smith 2003: 106) was to preserve the values of the Community. 
While implementation of the rules, the acquis communautaire, has formed the backbone 
of EU conditionality, the history of enlargements exposed the equal importance of that 
second, ‘cultural’ element. Strict assessment of the formal application of the acquis 
might in fact serve as formalistic justification behind the absence of member states’ 
agreement for accession based on the latter. It may also allow gaining time for 
achieving the intra-Community consent for enlargement. Thus, the apparent 
‘inconsistency’ in application of EU conditionality (with stricter interpretations of the 
rules for some countries than others), pointed out by Smith (2003), has in fact had its 
own distinct rationale.
41 As guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.
42 TEU Article 6(1): “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law. 3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States. 4. The Union 
shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.”
43 For discussion see e.g. Wallace (1989).
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It was during the first attempt to expand the EU to include the UK, when the 
basic principle of enlargement was that the candidate adapts to the Community and not 
vice versa, was reaffirmed. Paradoxically, an outward demand of the UK in its 
application for membership from 1961 to consider its ‘specific situation’, in particular 
with regard to relations with Commonwealth and EFTA countries, provoked a statement 
from the Council of Ministers and the President of the European Commission that “the 
accession of new members must take place in such a way that they may subsequently 
share fully in the working out of common decisions in a Community spirit” (EEC 
1963:15). In the same “Report on the state of the accession negotiations with the UK” 
(EEC 1963) the Council of Ministers laid down basic principles to be observed in the 
accession negotiations. Foremost, they clearly spelled out that “any application for 
accession to the Community would mean that the country concerned unreservedly 
accepted the rules and objectives of the Treaty of Rome; consequently negotiations for 
accession could only deal with the conditions of admission and the adaptations of the 
Treaty, which these would involve”. Secondly, due to the political and economic 
considerations, a country’s accession to the EEC would automatically involve its 
accession to the ECSC and EURATOM. Thirdly, these two rules must be made clear to 
the applicants at the very first meeting (EEC 1963:12). From this time onwards, 
although differently formulated, these principles have become a mantra of the European 
Commission repeated to the all forthcoming candidates for membership.
In particular the first principle, of unreserved approval of the “rules and 
objectives of the Treaty of Rome” would have important implications for the future 
enlargement negotiations. It implied the inviolability of the acquis communautaire and 
no room for permanent derogations, no matter the domestic implications (some 
exemptions to this rule were, however, accepted in the future). In the context of 
subsequent, Southern European countries’ applications for membership, the 
Commission argued that abandonment of this assumption would hold the risk of 
“reducing the significance of Community” (EC 1978:48). The Commission specifically 
motivated this approach in so-called Fresco on the Mediterranean enlargement and 
argued that “Greece, Portugal and Spain want to be part of a strong Community. If it 
were diluted, weakened, or became nothing more than a free trade area, or even a
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customs union, it would be of only limited interest to the three applicant States and to 
the present nine member states” (EEC 1/78: 6).
However, in light of the mounting challenges with application of the 
‘inviolability of the acquis’ rule towards poorer South European candidate countries, the 
Community specified its ‘transition periods’ doctrine for the enlargement negotiations. 
While during the first application from the UK the Community recognized that despite 
the general request to adopt the acquis in full, some adjustments on the EC’s side might 
be required, the Six in an official note to the UK’s government stressed that the possible 
problems arising due to adaptation should be settled by means of additional protocols 
(to the Treaty establishing EEC). However, they could not “modify the tenor and the 
spirit of the Treaty” and had to concern transitional arrangements (cited in Nicholson 
and East 1987:21). A similar opinion was expressed by the Commission in its Opinion 
on the UK, Norwegian, Danish and Irish application in 1969 (CEC 1969). The 
comprehensive interpretation of the concept of the transition period was given by the 
Commission only in 197844.
It is clear that the applicant countries could not shoulder all the responsibilities involved in 
membership the moment they join. There must be a transitional period which, in view o f the extent, 
diversity and nature o f the problems it is supposed to deal with should, while remaining a purely 
exceptional arrangement with a strict time limit and strict rules o f application, offer enough flexibility to 
enable the negotiations in each case to come up with solutions capable o f dealing with the particular 
problems o f each applicant. (EC 1978: par. 42).
The possible time-span for such temporary derogations would extend from five 
to ten years (EC 1978:14). In the context of EFTA enlargement and declarations from 
some CEE post-communist countries about their willingness to join the Community, the 
Commission reaffirmed this position in the 1992 paper prepared for the Lisbon 
European Council. It stressed that the Commission will “show comprehension for the 
problems of adjustment which may be posed for new members, and will seek adequate 
solutions” under the condition that as a principle acceptance of the acquis “to safeguard 
achievements of the Community” is maintained (EC 1992:12). However, in a number of
44 “General considerations on the problems of enlargement” (EC 1978), which presented the guidelines 
for Mediterranean expansion.
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instances in the context of the last CEE enlargement this range of flexibility has proven 
not quite sufficient and the Commission had to resign from some of its strict rules.
Additionally, in answer to the challenge of adjustments of the South European 
countries, the Commission tentatively proposed, firstly in the case of Greece, a pre- 
accession period. The Commission in its Opinion on the Greek application of 12 June 
1975 suggested that the pre-accession stage should be established before any specific 
transitional periods came into effect.
In the case o f  Greece, where structural changes o f  a considerable magnitude are 
needed, it would seem desirable to envisage a period  o f  time before the obligations o f  
membership, even subject to transitional arrangements, are undertaken . .. In the C om m ission’s 
view what is needed is on the one hand a substantial economic programm e which w ould enable 
Greece to accelerate the necessary structural reforms, and on the other, measures to bring 
Greece into a closer working relationship with the Community s institutions. (CEC 1976:10)
The complementary instrument to the suggested pre-accession period was a 
proposal to allocate to Greece45 special funds as a part of the Regional Social and 
Agriculture Guidance Funds. Even before accession, Greece would actively participate 
in decision-making over the funds’ commitments, so to bring it closer to the working of 
the Community. However, the idea of the pre-accession period met with resentment 
from Greek politicians and coincided with the Council’s rejection of the Opinion. 
Nevertheless, the proposed solution and especially the financial assignments to the 
candidate before accession was a noteworthy novelty in the Community method of 
enlargement. Although it did not eventually play a role in the Greek accession, the idea 
was utilized in the upcoming enlargement East, in the form of Phare and other pre­
accession programmes46. In this case, however, far more extensive conditionality was 
attached to Community measures. The Accession Partnership Regulation 622/98 
stipulated that the Council of Ministers “takes appropriate steps with regard to any pre­
45 Beforehand, in 1961, after two years of negotiations, Greece signed the Association Agreement 
(entered into force on 1 November 1962) The agreement anticipated the creation of the customs union 
and recognized the Greek aspiration to full membership when Greece’s economic progress allowed for it. 
The Agreement was later suspended during the military regime in 1967-74 and reactivated prior to Greek 
accession to the EC.
46 Apart from the Phare program, Agenda 2000 introduced ISPA and SAPARD schemes designed to 
assist in the pre-accession reforms in the CEE applicants for membership in the European Union in the 
fields of agriculture, infrastructure and environment protection.
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accession assistance” if commitments contained in the Europe Agreement are not 
respected or progress in implementation of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient 
(Maresceau 2003: 37).
Another common rule worked out during subsequent enlargements has been the 
style of conduct of accession negotiations, which take place simultaneously with the 
range of applicants. This system has naturally leaned towards evening out the terms of 
accession (type and length of the transition periods) for all the candidates negotiating in 
parallel. Although the Commission has frequently stressed that “the candidates would 
be assessed by their own merits”47, based on which their accession could progress, the 
“negotiations in networks” (Jonsson and Stromvik 2005) were a reality. Similarly, the 
candidates were able to negotiate transitional arrangements, which would, however, in 
the majority of cases represent the ‘one-size-for-all’ solution. It allowed the 
Commission to reduce the calls for opt-outs and thus simplify the negotiations but also 
to publicly ‘single out’ the ‘problematic’ candidates (Avery 1995). This in turn was an 
effective way to soften obstinate applicants.
The tools o f conditionality applied in the fifth EU enlargement
The extensive in scope, and applied ex ante conditionality regime towards the 
applicants for membership, characterized the fifth round of the European Union’s 
enlargement. Both the pace of proceeding with applicants as well as financial assistance 
granted to CEECs were for the first time contingent upon the progress in reforming 
candidates’ economic and political systems. The pace of reforms to be completed prior 
to accession was regularly monitored by the Commission in its Reports.
The comprehensiveness of conditions presented to the candidates in the fifth 
enlargement places the EU regime in proximity with the structural conditionality 
exercised towards the countries benefiting from the international assistance 
programmes. While this section outlines the key features of the EU conditionality 
regime in its expansion to the East, the following shows the parallels with the 
conditionality applied by the IFIs.
47 For instance, Conclusions from the Lisbon European Council, June 1992.
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By 1996 twelve countries lodged their application for membership (see Annex 
2.1.), which, together with the pending Turkish application, would nearly double the 
size of the Community in terms of population. Leaving the Turkish case and tiny Malta 
and Cyprus aside, applications arrived from the post-communist countries, with their 
distinct historic experience and traditions. Centrally managed economies and the 
communist single-party political systems had created economic and social patterns 
entirely incompatible with the realities of the EC member countries. Thus, for the first 
time, the diversity which the EC has been struggling to harness and press into the 
‘European’ frames, was that explicit.
Nonetheless, similarly to the ‘Community method’ of enlargement consolidated 
through subsequent expansions, the EU conditionality has developed gradually over 
time and changed its character throughout the decade-long pre-accession period. The 
EU had no clear blueprint of the conditionality regime in 1991, at the stage of signing 
the Europe Agreements (EAs). The lack of political consensus among the Community 
members in the beginning of the 1990s about proceeding towards the newly 
independent countries at Europe’s eastern flanks (Dinan 1994), precluded any concrete 
commitments on the EU’s part with respect to date and strategy of enlargement. Thus, 
the first ‘new generation’ agreements with CEE, the Europe Agreements, included only 
vague recognition of their aspiration to future membership. Similarly, the Copenhagen 
summit of 1993 set only very broad criteria that potential members from the region had 
to meet in order to join the EU in a rather indefinite future. Both equipped the EU with a 
large scope of flexibility in the later responses to potential demands from, CEE as well 
as to the unfolding politico-economic situation.
Conditionality o f the pre-accession aid
Prior to any talks about accession, early relations between the Community and 
the post-communist countries focused on the aid programmes and gradually deepening 
institutional ties. The first concrete reaction of the Western countries to the 
transformation of the East arrived from the G748 summit meeting in Paris in 14-15 July
48 The seven most industrialized countries in the world.
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1989. Its participants established the Phare49 aid programme for the forerunner 
transition countries with the aim to “support the process of economic and social reform 
under way” (EEC 3906/89). The European Commission50 was endowed with the 
responsibility to coordinate the financial aid of 500 million Ecu appropriated from the 
EC’s 1990 budget, which increased to 785 million in 1991 and one billion in 199251 
(Kramer 1993: 223). As another initiative of the EC, in 1991 the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was created in order to assist establishment 
and growth of the private sector in the former socialist countries (see Saunier a Touscoz 
1991). ISPA52 and Sapard53 assistance programmes, established a few years later, 
supported specifically investments in transport infrastructure, environmental protection 
and in rural areas.
EU assistance for the post-communist countries was disbursed primarily as 
grants earmarked for concrete projects aimed at economic restructuring. The Council 
Regulation specifically pointed to the areas that assistance should target (such as 
agriculture, industry, environmental protection etc.) but noted that in the choice of 
measures to be financed “account shall be taken, inter alia, of the preferences and 
wishes expressed by the recipient countries” (EEC 2906/89). The nature of the 
programme has evolved with early activities focused on the immediate needs of 
transition economies and a gradually widening scope to address longer term economic 
development and investment requirements. Phare was in principle ‘demand-driven’ with 
partner countries in the driving seat when it came to shaping the programmes. This 
approach was to “ensure that partner countries had a real stake in the programme, and 
that it remained flexible and responsive to the very different, and rapidly evolving, 
needs [...]” (PE 1998: 4). Essen European Council of 1994 incorporated Phare to the 
pre-accession strategy as its key financial tool. It thus explicitly linked the programme 
with the accession process, at the same time increasing the share of funding allotted to
49 “Pologne-Hongrie: Actions pour la Reconversion Economique”. In July 1990 the Community extended 
Phare aid to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia.
50 On the basis of the Council Regulation (EEC) 3906/89 of 18 December 1989.
51 For an account of the distribution of funds between beneficiary countries according to Phare 1992 
‘indicative programs’, cf. Together in Europe, Brussels, No 14 1.9.1992
52 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession established in June 1999 and focused on financing 
large infrastructural projects in the field of environmental protection and transport infrastructure.
53 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development established in 1999 with a goal 
of supporting the adaptation of agriculture in CEECs to the rules of CAP.
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large infrastructural projects (up to 25%) and confirming the multi-annual programming 
approach.
Following the publication of Agenda 2000 (CEC 1997c) and stepping-up of the 
enlargement process that ensued, Phare objectives were reformed. The initial goal of the 
programme, to facilitate transition, was redefined to support the applicant countries 
above all in satisfying the EU conditions. The new guidelines defined the essential 
priorities of Phare as assistance in adoption of the acquis communautaire, namely 
“building up the administrative and institutional capacities of the applicant countries 
and financing investments designed to help them comply with Community law as soon 
as possible” (EC 1266/1999).
This reinforcement of linkage between Phare assistance and applicants’ 
adaptation to the EU was accompanied by the move to make granting EU assistance 
conditional upon implementing the programmes aimed at preparing candidates to meet 
the obligations of membership (CEC 1997c). Poland’s Accession Partnership 
specifically stated that “Community assistance for financing projects through the three 
pre-accession instruments Phare, ISPA and SAPARD is conditional on respect by 
Poland of its commitments under the Europe Agreement, further steps towards 
satisfying Copenhagen criteria and in particular progress in meeting the specific 
priorities of this Accession Partnership in 2000. Failure to observe these general 
conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial 
assistance”54 (CEC 1999a: 13).
Apart from the availability of funding, the satisfactory progress in adaptation 
was to allow the candidates to take more responsibilities in the contracting and payment 
of assistance. Decentralization of Phare management was, however, contingent upon 
demonstration of the “management and financial control capacities”, specified in the 
Annex to the Council Regulation (EC 1266/1999, Article 12). Notwithstanding existent 
possibilities of programme decentralization to increase candidates’ role in 
implementation of the EU assistance, project selection, tendering and contracting were 
still subjected to ex ante approval by the Commission55. The EU also retained the power
54 On the basis of Article 4 of the Council Regulation (EC) 622/98.
55 Article 12 of the Council Regulation (EC) 1266/1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in 
the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending Regulation (EEC) 3906/89.
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to reduce or withdraw allocated funding, in case candidates demonstrated a breach of 
the Community rules or proved unable to prepare an effective project pipeline. In 1998 
the Commission applied this rule in Poland’s case by reducing its allocation of Phare by 
EUR 34 million in response to Poland’s apparent incapability to present “sufficient 
mature projects meeting the priorities of the Accession Partnership” (CEC 1999). In 
such a way, the Commission sent a clear signal to the candidates that it is ready to use 
its aid conditionality in practice.
EU pre-accession conditions as a moving target goal
Following the Conclusions of the Strasbourg European Council in December 
1989, the Commission committed itself to “examination of the appropriate forms of 
association with the countries which are pursuing the path of economic and political 
reform”. Subsequently, at the request of the Council, the Commission started the 
preparation of the ‘second generation’ association agreements as a basis of contractual 
relations with the transition countries (CEC 1990)56. The Europe Agreements (EAs) 
with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were signed in December 1991. Their 
principal goal was establishment of the free trade area between the EC and associated 
countries by gradual removal of trade barriers (within ten years), with the asymmetry of 
liberalization to the benefit of the CEECs. To only the partial satisfaction of the CEE, 
the EAs in their preambles recognized EU membership as candidates’ “final objective” 
and that the goal of the accords is to “help to achieve this objective”.
The agreements, however, have neither set concrete deadlines nor a timeframe 
for possible accession. In turn, they did include a strong element of conditionality. The 
associated countries were expected to approximate their “existing and future legislation” 
to that of the Community as “the major precondition for [Poland’s] economic 
integration”57. The preamble to the agreements plainly spelled out the link between full 
implementation of the association and the “actual accomplishment of [Poland's] 
political, economic, and legal reforms” (Europe Agreement with Poland)58. The very
56 The EC concluded the ‘first generation’ agreements with some COMECON countries in the 1980s. 
These were standard ‘trade and cooperation agreements’ anticipating the gradual removal of trade barriers 
within ten years (for Poland, five years).
57 cf. Europe Agreement EC-Poland: Art. 68.
58 For discussion see also Smith et al. (1996); Preston (1997); Sedelmeier (2000).
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broad scope of issues embodied by the agreements59 implied that “implementation of 
association” meant that the candidates were expected to adopt the majority of EC 
policies. No mention of the chances for future membership accompanied these 
demands. Despite the fact that such a broad agenda involved considerable costs, the EU 
decided not to take any further commitments with regard to financial assistance (apart 
from the modest Phare budget already set up, facilitating transition in general60), as, for 
instance, during the Mediterranean enlargement61. The very weak linkage between the 
demands formulated in the agreements and the anticipated reward potentially impaired 
the ability of the EU to reinforce implementation of the policy measures they included.
The second outward expression of the pre-accession conditionality applied 
towards the CEE candidates for membership were the criteria for the applicants 
presented during the 1993 Copenhagen summit. Contrary to the EAs, however, the 
Conclusions of Copenhagen made an explicit link between meeting these criteria and 
accession (not merely an economic cooperation). They stipulated that prospective 
members are “stable democracies, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the 
protection of minorities; have a functioning market economy; adopt the common rules, 
standards and policies that make up the body of EU law”62. The Madrid European 
Council of 1995 extended the list to include also the ‘administrative capacity’ 
requirement. These conditions, despite their vagueness, created a point of reference for 
all later Community documents, which gradually specified them and narrowed them 
down to more quantifiable measures. Eventually, the 1998 Accession Partnerships 
explicitly upgraded both the conditions from the EAs and the Copenhagen criteria to 
legally binding conditions, subject to possible sanctions (Maresceau 2003: 37).
59 The provisions on approximation of laws concerned the areas of customs law, company law, banking 
law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, financial services, protection of workers in the 
workplace, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect 
taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment. Priority was given to the 
competition law (cf. Europe Agreement EC-Poland: Art. 69).
60 Only in 1999, two additional programs, ISPA and SAPARD, albeit with relatively modest budgets (per 
year EUR 1.04 billion and EUR 520 million respectively), were enacted to alleviate part of the adaptation 
burden.
61 In the latter, and concretely the Greek case, the Community offered additional financial appropriations 
in exchange for agreement for the pre-accession period.
62 The prospective member states have to be “stable democracies, respecting human rights, the rule of 
law, and the protection of minorities; have a functioning market economy; adopt the common rules, 
standards and policies that make up the body of EU law”.
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By 1994 it was clear that full implementation of the acquis and adjustments 
anticipated by the Europe Agreements were necessary, if insufficient, conditions for 
further talks on enlargement. The comprehensive pre-accession strategy introduced in 
the Essen European Council incorporated earlier elements of the EU policy and added 
two new items: the Single Market White Paper and the Structured Dialogue. The White 
Paper selected the Single Market legislation, which needed to be adopted first, described 
the administrative and technical structures ensuring that the legislation is effectively 
implemented and enforced, and outlined the ways of focusing EU technical assistance. 
The Paper furthered the provisions of the EAs by covering a number of additional 
policy areas but the Commission negated allegations that it is a new source of pre­
accession conditionality. In fact the White Paper did constitute some revision of EU 
conditionality since it prioritized and specified the road to adaptation mentioned in 
some earlier documents.
f r o
The Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy, announced on 13 July 1997 in the 
Commission’s Agenda 200064, the blueprint for enlargement, further strengthened the 
pre-accession conditionality. The Commission argued that the scope of certain problems 
(with enlargement) made it necessary from 1998 onwards, “to establish intermediate 
objectives with precise conditions attached” (CEC 1997c:83). The Accession 
Partnerships of 1998 broadened the applicants’ reform agenda by placing all previous 
measures towards the candidates under one title and adding provisions on administrative 
capacity, environment and Justice and Home Affairs. Additionally, Agenda 2000 (CEC 
1997c: 85) also emphasized the monitoring role of the Commission. It was to report to 
the Council on the “progress achieved by the candidates in the programme for adopting 
the acquis, particularly through Accession Partnerships, with a view to fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria”. In that way, the Commission, with the full support of the member 
states, legitimized pre-accession conditionality as the key element of the ‘method’ of 
EU enlargement to the East. At the same time, the member countries allowed the
63 The Strategy was created in order to facilitate the reforms in the candidate countries with the aim of 
focusing on the priorities of accession. It put the elements of pre-accession policy under one umbrella of 
the Accession Partnerships.
64 Prepared on the request of Dublin European Council. The strategy added two elements of the pre­
accession, which were to guarantee consistency between the preparations of accessions and negotiations, 
bringing together under a single framework all the resources and forms of assistance available for 
facilitating adoption of the acquis and extending participation of the applicant countries in the 
Community programs and mechanisms to apply the acquis (see Agenda 2000).
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Commission to penetrate the policy-making of the applicants to a far greater extent that 
it would be possible for the case of EU member states.
During the accession negotiations, the Commission continued to verify the 
progress of adaptation on the basis of requirements mentioned in particular in the EAs 
as well as the Accession Partnership, weaknesses pointed in the Commission’s annual 
Reports on the candidates’ preparedness for membership, commitments from the 
National Programs of the Preparation for Membership and the accession negotiations. 
The level of complexity of these demands was unprecedented. There has been no 
recourse to such extensive measures in the past enlargements, in particular the 
expansion to include South European countries, which due to political and economic 
context is often compared to the fifth enlargement. When it comes to adoption of the 
acquis prior to accession, the Commission considered asking the applicants “to observe 
some common discipline in certain well-defined areas even before accession” (CEC 
1978: 7). It also reasserted that “these measures could on no account be general ones; 
they will have to be specific, worked out with the applicant country in connection with 
specific sectoral objectives and, where appropriate, integrated in multiannual 
programmes taking account of the Community’s general interest” (EC 1978: 7). Spain, 
Greece and Portugal were offered corresponding financial aids, also from the resources 
of the European Investment Bank (ED3).
Each subsequent element of the pre-accession strategy made a link to preceding 
documents, thus steadily increasing the burden of adjustments to be carried out by the 
candidates for membership. However, most of these developments took place in a 
unilateral fashion. Mayhew argues (2002: 20) that such unilateral conditionality does 
not oblige the partner to fulfill the conditions set in front of him. Indeed, although the 
candidates found themselves under mounting pressure from the annually published 
Regular Reports, a number of key reforms postulated by the EU remained 
unimplemented. For instance, Poland’s competition policy and public aid rules, present 
among the earliest conditions, were not adapted to the acquis until the accession 
negotiations commenced. Even at that stage, in 2000, in the middle of negotiations, 
Poland’s government adopted the law on public aid, incoherent with the acquis. The 
unilateral character and gradual expansion of the conditions appeared as potential 
problems for their future implementation.
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The EU conditionality regime vis-a-vis the IFIs’ practice
The ‘moving target’ character of EU conditions applied towards the candidates 
for membership in the fifth round of enlargement was subjected to concerted criticism 
from academics as well as policy-makers (e.g. Smith et al. 1996). Moreover, the 
gradually increasing scope of conditionality was accompanied by an increasing blurring 
of its borders. Similarly to the IMF’s case, the poor demarcation of boundaries between 
what was and what was not structural conditionality, together with the relative 
discretion in enforcement, meant that it was not always clear which actions would be 
discordant with the letter of agreements. The IMF itself has questioned the scope of 
such extensive conditionality, asking whether it crossed “the limits of its effectiveness, 
and whether it has become so intrusive as to weaken national ownership for economic 
policies and thus defeat[ed] its intended purpose” (IMF 2001a: 52).
Although the first pre-accession documents included primarily economic 
demands, ever since Copenhagen the political and administrative capacity tier of the EU 
conditionality gained increased importance. The all-encompassing character of these 
conditions is reminiscent of the structural phase conditionality of the IFI. However, 
while the new approach to application of conditionality by the international institutions 
was marked by an increasing focus on the selectivity of conditions, simplification and 
decreasing their number, in the EU enlargement case each subsequent document worked 
out by the Commission has arguably expanded the scope of conditions to be met by 
applicants prior to enlargement. The level of intrusiveness of the EU conditions was 
thus increasing rather than diminishing with time.
Such a situation was possible due to a practical absence from the political debate 
(at least in the initial stages of the enlargement process) of questions about the 
intrusiveness and legitimacy of the EU measures, pertinent in the IFI’s recent discourse. 
In Poland’s case, the first post-communist government based its foreign policy goals on 
the quest of ‘return to Europe’, which had limited alternatives for the followers and 
diminished their leverage in talks with the EU. Throughout the 1990s none of the major 
political forces would have taken the risk of questioning or moreover, resigning from 
this clearly delineated target. However, the candidates’ declaratory commitment to 
adaptation, rather than an effect of rational decision-making based on the cost-benefit
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analysis of the impact of accession, has resulted largely from the path-dependancy of 
the historic decisions undertaken in the beginning of the 1990s. The absence of credible 
external policy alternatives to membership in the EU and NATO (Grabbe 2001) largely 
conditioned the future positive responses towards the new challenges posed by the EU 
during the pre-accession period. This, however, did not suffice as a guarantee for 
successful implementation of the EU conditions.
Moreover, the European Commission, by refusing to recognize the possible 
incongruity between the goals of transition and accession (Goetz 2001), precluded 
questions about the legitimacy of conditions leading to their achievement and discussion 
on possibly ensuing domestic divisions. It seemed to overlook the IFIs’ experience with 
conditionality, which pointed to the strong country ownership as a foundation for 
successful programme implementation. This was to be fostered by better relations with 
recipient countries’ governments but also other important stakeholders. The history of 
IFIs’ conditioned programmes illustrated that opposition to the measures from various 
entrenched interests, such as civil servants, staff in the state-owned enterprises etc. and 
failure to identify and protect vulnerable groups, weakened national ownership and 
further, hampered programme implementation (IMF 2001a: 53).
In the EU enlargement case, if at all, such recognition came in the conclusive 
phase of the process in light of the risk that discontented interest groups may use their 
power to block ratification of the accord. At this stage, rather than redesigning the 
measures or persuading antagonistic domestic actors about their necessity, winning 
social support could take place only by yielding to interest groups’ demands. The 
transition periods and side payments (for instance to farmers) were occasionally used by 
applicants’ governments to solicit their agreement for accession.
Paradoxically, the lack of consideration of possible domestic opposition in the 
initial stages of enlargement process, based on the false assumptions about across-the- 
board support for the reforms, resulted in more ‘costly’ adaptation. On the one hand, the 
EU, contrary to its official enlargement doctrine and in particular the principle of 
immutability of the acquis, had to agree on numerous transition periods and exemptions 
in areas where opposition to the reforms was particularly fierce. Thus, the pattern of 
transition periods (see Annex 2.2.) does not show correlation solely with the costs of 
adaptation but also numerous derogations in the areas where such fiscal costs did not
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ensue. Long transition periods with respect to implementation of the EU tax laws or 
banking directives present cases, where adaptation involved neither the fiscal costs nor 
serious technical difficulties.
The necessity to ‘buy’ social support for enlargement allowing for delivering on 
the pre-accession commitments in the late stages of the accession negotiations 
paradoxically have also empowered candidates’ governments vis-a-vis the EU. 
Putnam’s two-level game account (1988) of international negotiations, presented below, 
explains the logic behind such dynamics, which led at times to surprising loopholes 
(accepted by the EU) in the process of adaptation. It helps to understand why, contrary 
to expectations based on the asymmetry of the enlargement premise, the accession 
conditionality of the EU has been surprisingly non-effective in some policy fields.
3. A two-level game account of the accession process
Theories of international negotiations increasingly recognize the complexities of 
entanglement between domestic and international affairs resulting in reciprocal 
influence on domestic and international political outcomes. Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ 
model of international negotiations conceptualizes this entanglement between domestic 
and international contexts (Putnam 1988) by disaggregating international talks into two 
parallel negotiations. At the national level (Level II) domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and the national 
governments seek power by “constructing coalitions among those groups”. At the 
international level (Level I), national governments strive to “satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988: 
434). Neither of these two games may be overlooked by accounts conceptualizing 
outcomes of international negotiations.
There are a number of implications for the international negotiations, which 
Putnam identifies throughout the model. All Level I international agreements that may 
be ratified domestically at the Level II board constitute the ‘win-set’. If there is no 
overlap between domestic and international win-sets, the agreement is impossible and 
conflict will prevail. On the other hand, the larger the win-set at Level II, the more 
likely or easy it is to find an agreement at Level I. Conversely, a smaller win-set carries 
a greater risk that negotiations would break down. In other words, more flexibility at
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the domestic level makes international agreement more likely. The relative size of the 
win-sets will also affect distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. 
Larger win-sets at Level II provoke stronger pressure on the negotiators from the 
international partners. Thus, paradoxically, smaller domestic win-sets give the 
negotiators a bargaining advantage (Putnam 1988: 440). A country that can agree a 
broader set of solutions will not be able to drive the best bargain in the Level I 
negotiations. However, partners to negotiations would strive to strike a deal acceptable 
to everybody in order to avoid an ‘involuntary defection’65, that is, a situation when one 
of the negotiators is unable to deliver on the promise, due to the failed ratification at 
home (Level II). This logic strengthens the ‘paradox’ of weakness at home contributing 
to international empowerment of negotiators.
According to Putnam (1988), there are three main principles governing the size 
of the ‘win-set’. Firstly, domestic preferences and coalitions and the relative strength of 
‘isolationist’ to ‘internationalist’ forces within the constituency of the negotiator. 
Constituencies for which the cost of no-agreement is low will also be more skeptical 
about a Level I deal and thus, naturally, more ‘isolationist’, and vice versa (1988: 442). 
Thus, in general, smaller and more dependent countries with more open economies 
would be more inclined towards international cooperation than larger and more self- 
sufficient countries. Secondly, there will be different dynamics governing various types 
of conflicts. Putnam makes a distinction between the ‘homogenous’ (boundary) and 
‘heterogeneous’ (fractional) conflicts (1988: 444). In the case of the former, the 
constituencies favor one particular solution but differ with respect to the minimum 
value of the offer they find acceptable. The ‘heterogeneous’ conflicts represent those 
issues on which various constituencies have different or opposing preferences. In case 
of the former the negotiator’s challenge is to “manage the discrepancy between his 
constituents’ expectations and negotiable outcomes while the hard-liners opposed to 
agreement raise the risk of involuntary defection and impede the deal" (Putnam 1988: 
444). In ‘heterogeneous’ conflicts the line of cleavage within domestic constituencies 
may cut across the Level I division. Thus, it may encourage the emergence of 
transnational alignments expanding the win-set. Against the conventional view claiming
65 By contrast with ‘voluntary defection’ referring to situations where a rational agent reneges in the 
absence of enforceable contracts, which is a sort of prisoner dilemma problem. In reality it may be 
countered by the iterative character of international relations; however, in the analysis of EU accession 
negotiations it is less relevant as the accession is a one-off experience.
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that domestic unity is generally a precondition for international agreement66, Putnam 
argues (1988: 445) that a government divided internally may be more likely to strike an 
international deal than the one firmly committed to one policy.
Last but not least, the size of the win-set depends also on the political institutions 
and formal arrangements for ratification as well as the strategies of Level I negotiators. 
The higher the threshold required for ratification, the smaller the win-set. Also, a 
smaller autonomy of a decision-maker, who is more accountable to the public, 
diminishes the win-set and has less possibilities to offer side-payments (Putnam 1988: 
448).
In general, since the win-sets are affected by Level II preferences and 
coalitions and Level II institutions (as well as Level I negotiators’ strategies), a full 
analysis of international developments must be rooted in the theory of domestic politics.
Poland’s accession negotiations as a two-level game
Similarly to any other international negotiations, accession talks may be 
conceived as a two-level game. As Poland’s Chief Negotiator stated, the accession 
negotiations present a two-dimension process. On the one hand, they demanded 
working out Poland’s position domestically and on the other, externally, to carry out the 
‘real’ negotiations with the EU67. Thus, the negotiator of the Accession Treaty has to 
move between two-level prerogatives. On the one hand, to ascertain continued social 
support for enlargement and the agreed deal, and on the other, to undertake 
commitments related to adaptation while controlling for the risk of domestic defection. 
The complexity of such a two-level negotiation process lies in the fact that “moves that 
are rational for a player at one board [...] may be impolitic for that same player at the 
other board". Nevertheless, there are powerful incentives for consistency between the 
two games as well as the need for some consistency between the external and domestic 
rhetoric of the negotiator.
66 See Artis, and Ostry (1986).
67 The address of Poland’s Chief Negotiator during the 8th Senate Session (1998).
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The international dimension
The institutional framework for the accession negotiations endowed the 
Commission with the particularly important role of being the member states’ delegate in 
proceeding with the applicants. The Commission services prepared the documents and 
position papers for the Council of Ministers, as well as proposals for replies (Draft 
Common Positions) to the candidates’ positions, subsequently approved by the member 
states in the Council of Ministers as Common Positions of the EU. The Common 
Positions, which frequently included questions to the candidates and requests for 
clarifications, formed the basis for the amendment of candidates' position papers. The 
Commission was also in charge of preparing the technical studies on the impact of 
particular position papers in concrete negotiation areas. Moreover, being involved on a 
daily basis in talks with each of the candidates, the Commission advised them on the 
acceptable ranges of solutions for the member countries (their win-sets) (Mayhew 2002: 
124). This position gave the Commission the possibility to impact the negotiation 
strategies of the candidates, while imperfect information about the room for 
negotiations held by all other actors placed it at the center of the negotiations as the 
most reliable source of information.
The EU, in the Eastern enlargement, as outlined in the previous section, had 
insisted on implementation of the acquis in full from the day of accession. Although 
some derogations were anticipated, they were supposed to be ‘limited in scope and 
temporary’. The Commission strained to reduce the complexity of the negotiations by 
insisting on one-size-fits-all solutions (Friis 2005: 208). It also tried to play the 
candidates off each other in order to secure the most preferable terms of agreement (for 
the EU), that is, maximally limited in number and length transition periods. These 
strategies, supplemented by mutual suspicions about candidates’ individual political 
goals, have proven successful to an extent that they indeed precluded any significant 
cooperation between the applicants. Avery (Avery 2003: 4) argues that candidates’ 
insistence to be treated by their own merits presented another obstacle to such 
cooperation. In fact, the Commission persistently denied allegations about treating the 
CEECs as an interdependent group (Friis and Jarosz 2000; Avery 2003; Friis 2005) and 
instead insisted that negotiations with each applicant are conducted individually, so 
their chances for accession were not contingent on others’ performance (Presidency
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Report 2000). Thus, the acquis communautaire as an expression of EU conditionality 
during the negotiations, rather than some common negotiation strategies, delineated the 
scope of possible derogations for the candidates.
The largest room for manoeuvre (international win-set) and chances for 
obtaining assent for the transition periods seemed to be in the areas in which the acquis 
was thin and where old Community members had already enjoyed individual solutions. 
In such fields the win-sets of the EU were larger than in policy domains with thick 
acquis. In policy domains with sparse acquis the Commission could undertake a more 
flexible approach towards applications for transition periods. For instance, the 
Community had far more problems with justification of its rejection of the application 
for a transition period in Taxation, where a thin acquis was riddled with exemptions and 
derogations than in the Competition policy, a densely regulated area central to the 
common market. Therefore, the negotiations in the chapters characterized by a thick 
acquis and where a candidate applied for derogations tended to be more difficult and, 
theoretically at least, chances for transition periods smaller. Yet, there have been 
surprisingly many transition periods granted to- CEECs even in the fields where the 
acquis was thick and in policies central to working of the EU (see Annex 2.2.). 
Consideration of Putnam’s (1988) domestic level negotiations in the accession talks’ 
dynamics may allow an explanation for why there have been derogations granted in 
areas at first sight without chances for such exemptions. Secondly, it remains less 
certain whether the lack of a transition period in fields declared as difficult to adapt 
hampered or conversely, facilitated adaptation.
Domestic context
As argued above, the size of domestic win-sets determines the degree of 
flexibility of partners to negotiations. When the range of possible solutions is small, 
negotiations are more likely to break down without a deal. However, Putnam’s paradox 
holds that a smaller domestic win-set may also present an advantage in the international 
forum.
The size of domestic win-sets is based on internal support for the negotiated 
outcomes and the domestic institutional context of negotiations. Domestic opposition to
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the proposed solution decreases the range of possible win-sets and vice versa. In the 
case of accession negotiations, divided into the 31 policy areas, it is to a large extent 
contingent upon the attitudes of the interest groups losing or benefiting from anticipated 
policy changes in each field. Thus, the negotiations themselves structure the possible 
conflict sectorally with most involved interest groups organized along business lines. 
The second important component of the domestic context is the institutional framework, 
in which the negotiator carries out his tasks, namely his position within the executive 
structures, ability to act independently and his degree of dependence on other members 
of the government. The win-set of an institutionally weak negotiator is generally smaller 
(Putnam 1988) since he has less possibilities to offer benefits such as side payments to 
solicit support behind the deal.
There has been a consistently high public support level for Poland’s accession to 
the EU since the beginning of the 1990s, underpinned by the calls for 'return to Europe' 
and perspective of economic benefits from enlargement. However, the increasing costs 
of adaptation prior to enlargement and the protests of particular groups complaining 
about unfair treatment, such as the farmers, have contributed to increasing opposition 
against enlargement with only 55% of society for accession in March 2001 (see also 
Zagorski 2004). The opinion polls from that period also note a more or less equal 
division within the society on those trusting that Poland's negotiators appropriately 
represent the national interests (42%), and people doubting their abilities and/or 
intentions (43%) (OBOP Communique 2000).
Table 2.1.: The level of social support for integration with the European Union
How would you vote in a referendum on 
Poland's accession to the EU?
The timing of the poll
VI
>94
V
’95
V
'96
IV
'91
V
'98
V
. 9 9
V
' 0 0
III
‘ 0 1
III
' 0 2
XI
’0 2
For accession to the European Union 77 72 80 72 6 6 55 59 55 67 73
Against accession to the European Union 6 9 7 1 1 19 26 25 30 25 18
Difficult to say 17 19 13 18 15 19 16 15 8 9
Source: Prepared on the basis of the CBOS communiques of January 1999, March 2001, and November
2002
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Poland’s Constitution (1997) suggests that “a nationwide referendum may be 
held in respect of matters of particular importance to the State” (Art. 90.3 and Art. 125). 
Furthermore, there has been an agreement that a referendum is held in order to obtain 
social concord with negotiated terms of accession. Thus, decreasing rates of support for 
enlargement raised concerns that accession may eventually be blocked by discontent 
interest groups or radical political forces.
Falling support for accession to the EU suggested that the perception of Poland 
from without and within as ‘internationalist’ in attitude (according to Putnam) was 
premature. The absence of viable foreign policy alternatives to accession has not 
necessarily meant that failure to reach an agreement with the EU (on enlargement) was 
perceived as extremely costly by most of the society. The apparent risk of ‘involuntary 
defection’ brought the government’s attention to the topic of social consultations of the 
terms of accession. Therefore, in February 2000 the authorities decided on disclosure of 
so far guarded position papers. The Chief Negotiator68 claimed, two years after the start 
of accession negotiations, that disclosure of the documents presented proof of the 
government’s willingness to conduct an “open information policy about the integration 
process”. During the same debate Pawel Samecki (Undersecretary of State in UKIE69) 
pointed to the increasing focus of the government on "identification of the key social 
groups from the point of social support for integration".
One of the leading Polish sociologists, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska commented in 
1999 that the majority of Poles perceived the European Integration as an elite project, a 
discourse between Bmssels bureaucrats and the government, which did not affect 
common people. “This could lead to perceptions that EU integration is something 
enforced upon the society” (Kolarska-Bobinska 1999: 355). Diminishing social support 
for accession due to the mere perception of the costs of adaptation limited the 
government’s negotiation win-set, that is, the scope of socially acceptable solutions to 
the negotiation problems. This result became even more evident after the start of the
68 (2000) Kronika SejmowaNo 108 (412).
69 Office of the Committee for European Integration, an administrative structure created in 1996 to 
facilitate preparation for accession to the EU.
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accession negotiations and exposure by various interest groups of a number of 
difficulties with adaptation. Falling general support for accession but also, arguably, 
social mobilization in response to particular problems with harmonization, demonstrate 
how Level I dynamics may also lead to shifts of the domestic, Level II win-sets. The 
empirical chapters of this thesis will demonstrate in detail the exact factors that have 
triggered such an effect.
Institutional context for the Chief Negotiator
The counterproductive division of powers between key decision-makers in 
Poland’s membership negotiations was a source of the institutionalized weakness of the 
Chief Negotiator. As mentioned earlier, a lower autonomy of the negotiator diminishes 
the domestic win-set since it reduces possibilities to offer side-payments (Putnam 1988: 
448).
The Polish institutional framework for conduct of accession negotiations was 
particularly complex and, subsequently, the decision-making powers and competencies 
dispersed among various branches of the executive. Poland’s Council of Ministers 
created a new function of the Government Plenipotentiary for Accession Negotiations 
as the Chief Negotiator of the accession negotiations with the EU70 in the Chancellery 
of the Prime Minister. Jan Kulakowski, and then Jan Truszczynski, held the position in 
AWS-UW and SLD governments71 respectively. The Chief Negotiator in the first 
negotiation team held the rank of Secretary of State and reported directly to the Prime 
Minister. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bronislaw Geremek72, and the 
Secretary of the Committee for European Integration (KIE), Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, in 
charge of the adaptation process in general, were equal in ranks. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs supported the Prime Minister in conduct of his coordination and control 
functions over the process of adaptation. He also held the position of the head of the 
Polish delegation to the accession negotiations in Brussels, while the Chief Negotiator 
was only the deputy head.
70 By the ordinance of the Council of Ministers on appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for 
Accession Negotiations on Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union from 24 March 
1998.
71 The governments created by the centre-right forces of AWS Coalition of NSZZ Solidarity and Liberty 
Union (UW), which ruled in 1997-2001 and leftist government, which came to power in the result of the 
September 2001 elections and comprised the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Labour Union (UP).
72 Wladyslaw Bartoszewski from July 2000 until October 2001.
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This institutional set-up was a source of continuous tension between the three 
figures and weakened the position of the Chief Negotiator. Answering to the 
inefficiencies of this structure, the SLD government appointed its Chief Negotiator as 
the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (see Annex 2.3. on 
actors in the accession negotiations), as other candidate countries did73 (UKDE 2000a: 
107). Although this move may have introduced more logical structure of competencies 
between the key political figures in charge of enlargement, it also further weakened the 
position of the Chief Negotiator, who now reported directly to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
Such a complex institutional structure had two major implications. Firstly, the 
number of actors involved in the accession negotiations diminished the political power 
of the Chief Negotiator, and secondly, it created multiple access points for the interest 
groups to intervene in the areas of their concern. When it comes to the first implication 
mentioned above, in particular during the first phase of accession negotiations (led by 
the AWS-UW coalition government) there was an acute internal conflict between the 
Chief Negotiator Jan Kulakowski and the Chief of the Office of the Committee for 
European Integration, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. The latter held the politically important 
function of the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration (KIE), an 
administrative body chaired by the Prime Minister and in charge of programming and 
coordinating Poland’s integration policy, a wider task than the accession negotiations. 
The Chief Negotiator was formally just an ordinary member of KIE. In fact, both 
negotiators were insignificant figures politically and their choice represented rather a 
compromise between the political forces forming the coalition governments. As is 
shown in the following chapter, the politically weak position of the negotiators also 
seemed to contribute to their weakness vis-a-vis the interest groups able to mobilize 
against the proposals of the position papers, and threaten with vetoing accession, have 
not their demands been considered.
73 The Chief Negotiators of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia 
were Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Secretaries of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
their respective countries. The Chief Negotiator of Cyprus held the function of Coordinator of the Legal 
Harmonization Process (and the tasks related to negotiations were highly centralized within the 
Negotiation Team); in Hungary the negotiations were led by the Representative of the Hungarian 
Republic to the European Communities (with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs playing a major role) and 
the Maltese negotiator was an Advisor to the Prime Minister (strengthening the role of the Chancellery in 
the negotiation process).
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Conclusions
The stress on structural measures as underpinning for the economic policy bring 
the EU conditions set out in the Copenhagen criteria and the Europe Agreements close 
to the IFIs’ ‘hard’ conditionality regime. Arguably, the largest problem encountered by 
the latter in implementation of their conditioned aid schemes was the excessive number 
and scope of the measures, the ambiguity of demands and patronizing attitude of donor 
institutions preventing domestic consent on the policy implementation. The empirical 
studies on the results of the programmes demonstrated that the complex system setting 
appropriate incentives for change and monitoring mechanisms has not prevented 
countries from shirking. In general, IFIs’ conditionality applied in countries, in which 
governments and/or important social stakeholders were reluctant towards the reforms, 
was ineffective in instigating policy change. Thus, recent reforms of the IFIs’ 
conditionality regime focused on streamlining the conditions, decreasing the 
intrusiveness of the measures and paying greater attention to specific domestic 
circumstances, in which aid is applied. The thinness of the conditions seemed to 
facilitate adaptation more than dense net of requirements and sophisticated monitoring 
techniques.
This conclusion goes counter to conventional view on the EU conditionality, 
which maintains that thick acquis provides better guideline for adaptation and alleviates 
problems with lack of clarity of the conditions. The EU, in the beginning of the 
accession negotiations, set up detailed, supposedly non-negotiable conditions based on 
the principle of uniform application of the acquis, similarly to the IFIs in the initial 
phases of their activities. However, similarly to the international agendas, the European 
Union, with the progress of the negotiation process accompanied by falling support for 
accession in the CEECs, realized that conditionality could not simply be imposed. The 
mounting social discontent forced the governments of the applicant states to open the 
negotiation process to the public and some kind of social consultations. As the 
following empirical chapters demonstrate, properties of the acquis in some policy areas 
facilitated the search for a compromise while in others room for manoeuvre was 
effectively limited by dense legal networks. The EU had to agree to numerous
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compromises and grant temporary derogations even in the areas key to the functioning 
of the common market.
The two-level game approach to international negotiations (Putnam 1988) 
provides conceptualization of such mechanisms. Moreover, it allows an explanation of 
the surprising success of the candidate countries, which, despite the asymmetry of the 
enlargement process, managed to convince the European Commission to grant them 
transition periods for implementation of the acquis, even in cases falling into Single 
Market regulations. The so-called Putnam paradox shows how consideration of the 
domestic interest groups, which exert pressures on negotiators, may subvert the 
expectations on the relative weight of the partners involved in the international 
negotiations. The weak or divided government facing opposition to the reforms from the 
relevant constituencies may be able to actually negotiate a more favorable international 
deal. A small win-set, defined by a thick acquis, paradoxically may contribute to its 
empowerment vis-a-vis international partners, the EU Commission and ‘old’ member 
states in the enlargement case.
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CHAPTER III
T h e  d o m e s t ic  c o n t e x t  in  a c c e s s io n  
NEGOTIATIONS
Introduction
The literature on EU accession conditionality justifies its use as a commitment 
device (Bronk 2002), external governance tool (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004), 
or safeguard for achievements of EU integration (Smith 2003). Departing from these 
debates and drawing on the empirical findings from application of IFIs’ programme 
conditionality, this thesis claims that both the results of the accession negotiations and 
the effectiveness of adaptation cannot be consistently explained without considering the 
domestic context in which conditionality is applied. The key claim is that the state of 
candidates’ adjustment to the EU is contingent upon a particular combination between 
the external pressures from the Commission and their domestic reception. This work 
conceptualizes these two key dimensions as ‘thickness of the acquis’ and 'prior 
opposition'. The previous chapter argued that the extent and detail of the acquis in 
particular policy areas can be interpreted as a determinant of the government’s 
international win-set. In this chapter, the domestic ‘black box’ will be opened so as to 
see how interest groups and civil society determine the government’s domestic win-set.’
As presented in the previous chapter, Putnam’s two-level game (Putnam 1988) 
conceptualization of the results of international negotiations proves useful for 
explaining the outcome of accession negotiations and working of EU conditionality. 
Moreover, as this chapter will show, it allows to capture the ‘side-effects’ of accession- 
led adaptation, such as social mobilization. The two-level game approach, by taking 
account of the domestic dynamics, gauges the apparent politicization effects that 
implementation of, in principle, technocratic EU laws may trigger. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the principal-agent model cannot explain this kind of dynamics since
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its static approach assumes an invariability of domestic preferences and institutional 
constraints. This project, focusing on the domestic context of application of the EU 
conditionality, analyzes the social and institutional context of accession negotiations, 
which define the domestic win-set of the negotiators of the Treaty of Accession.
The recurrent assumption that EU conditionality has been applied in the socio­
political void is misleading. Although civil society in CEE is weaker than in West 
European countries, entrenched interests (such as foreign investors or post-Solidarity 
trade unions) do exist and do not act within the institutional vacuum. As a number of 
studies demonstrated (Kolarska-Bobinska 1990; Gomiak and Jerschina 1995; Hausner 
et al. 1995), institutional frameworks and patterns of social behavior in the post­
communist countries are changing, yet remain in many cases contingent on the very 
recent past. In line with the neo-institutional view, I will argue that historical 
idiosyncrasies and path-dependency of past decisions have intervened in the trajectory 
of CEECs’ adaptation to the EU.
Existent social groups respond to the reforms undertaken by incumbent 
governments, in particular when these incur upon them considerable losses. This ‘prior 
opposition’ to the implementation of the EU rules and regulations acts within the 
institutional constraints characterizing new systemic reality. One should expect that 
adaptation to the EU results not solely in expansion of the legal underpinning of the new 
system but also contributes to the evolution of the socio-political scene.
There are two empirical puzzles coming into view in the context of EU 
enlargement that justify the undertaken approach. Firstly, the CEE members of the 
Community have managed to negotiate different terms of accession, expressed by the 
number and length of transition periods (see Annex 2.2.). Since the acquis was to be 
applied uniformly across the EU member countries (at least theoretically), this result 
suggests that some domestic intervening variable played a role in structuring the 
outcomes of the accession negotiations. If this would not be the case, the pattern of 
temporary derogations for all candidates should converge and remain in correlation only 
with difficulties in adjustment of a technical and/or fiscal nature.
Secondly, the connection between the record of adaptation and fiscal costs of 
adjustments also seems weak, contrary to the expectations of the ‘goodness of fit’
approach (Heritier 1995; Knill and Lenschow 1998; Green Cowles and Risse 2001;
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Boerzel 2003; Boerzel and Risse 2003). The new member states encountered problems 
with the legal approximation and implementation of the EU rules even in those areas 
where compliance did not involve significant costs, for instance in the regional policy 
field.
The following sections will present how a historical institutionalist approach 
may be utilized for explaining the social context in which EU conditionality is applied 
and which structured the position and win-sets of Poland’s negotiator of the Accession 
Treaty. The second part outlines the key features of the social background in which EU 
conditions were to be applied, demonstrating that comprehensive accounts of adaptation 
are bound to consider it as a vital point of the analysis. The following part focuses on 
the interest groups operating in post-communist Poland and channels of communication 
with the government, which they could use during the accession negotiations. Thus, it 
explains what ‘prior opposition’ to negotiations or lack of thereof actually means. The 
conclusions summarize the findings and elaborate on how the thin/thick acquis plays 
itself out depending on the domestic context, and in which way prior/non-prior 
distinction influences the effectiveness of the EU pre-accession conditionality.
1. An institutionalist account of the process of Poland’s adaptation to the 
European Union
The studies on the IFIs’ conditionality and its effectiveness revealed that the 
success of the programs “has depended more on underlying political economy than on 
the efforts of the [World] Bank or other outside actors” (Collier et al. 2000: 23). There 
is general consent that consideration of particular domestic conditions in countries 
benefiting from assistance plays a key role in assuring program efficiency. This view 
corroborates with Putnam’s finding (Putnam 1988) that the domestic context of a 
negotiator’s activities structures his achievements in the international scene, and 
indirectly, the terms of an international accord. There is no rational reason to expect that 
these premises would not hold for the EU enlargement negotiations. To the contrary, as 
analyzed in the previous chapter, there are many similarities between the conditionality 
regime applied by the international financial institutions and the European Union. 
However, while there are numerous accounts of the international level game in the EU
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accession talks (Friis and Jarosz 2000; Mayhew 2002; Mayhew 2002a; Avery 2003), the 
research on the domestic context of the candidates has been less plentiful.
The argument of this chapter is that the particular trajectory of social and 
political events in Poland contributed both to the set-up of the accession negotiations 
game, and to the effectiveness of the EU in projecting its policies in the candidate 
countries, captured by the term ‘conditionality’. Since social phenomena do take place 
in particular institutional and historical contexts, the tenets of the historical 
institutionalists provide useful guidelines for analyzing them.
The broad claim of institutional theories is that "institutions matter” or the 
“organisation of political life makes a difference”, which boils down to the statement 
that configuration of formal and informal organizations, rules or norms causes a 
particular course of action (March and Olsen 1984; March and Olsen 1989; Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Pierson 1996). The institutional organization of the policy or political 
economy is the “principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating 
distinctive outcomes” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 6). In his seminal work Douglas North 
defined institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
or as “regularities in repetitive interactions [...] customs and rules that provide a set of 
incentives and disincentives for individuals” (North 1990: 3-4). The institutions thus 
have two vital qualifications; they are designed by man and have impact on human 
behaviour.
The ‘historical’ stream of institutionalism is based on the tenet that individual 
and collective actions are indispensably guided by interest maximization but they are to 
a certain degree constrained by behavioral patterns and commonly defined rules of 
collective life (Pierson 1996). These rules may be followed even when the result goes 
counter to the achievement of one’s interest. The stream is ‘institutional’ as it assigns 
the explanatory power of actors’ behavior to institutions, in which political cleavages 
take place and through which actors’ preferences are being channelled. It is ‘historical’, 
as it utilizes historic traditions and validates previous experience for explaining present 
policy-making processes and policy choices. Political developments are thus understood 
as processes that unfold over time. In such a context institutions are not only the formal 
constraints of human action but also the rules and norms influencing their beliefs and 
goals.
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The state-society relations in CEE may not be comprehensively explained 
without consideration of historical legacies from the communist past, neither omitting 
the historical legacies of systemic shift. Patterns of collective behavior, despite immense 
systemic changes, at times surprisingly recreate themselves in the new reality. Thus, the 
theoretical approach validating these contingencies seems the most appropriate to study 
post-transition developments in CEE.
The key claim of the historical institutionalist approach (Pierson 1996: 126) is 
that actors, although in their strong initial position and acting to maximize their 
interests, nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms in ways that are either 
unanticipated or undesired, known as ‘path-dependance’74. This implies difficulties in 
changing a policy quickly and profoundly from outside. The temporal aspects of politics 
have considerable implications in terms of lags between decisions and their long-term 
consequences, and constraints that emerge from societal adaptations and shifts in policy 
preferences occurring during the interim. Early contingent choices create patterns of 
relationships that feed back unintentionally to alter constraints and incentives for later 
decisions (North 1990). In other words, historical decisions interact with the 
environment to form the context for future choices. The imperfect information about the 
future environment (due to the restricted time horizons of decision-makers), shifting 
preferences of decision-makers over time and autonomous actions of agents feed into 
the gaps between institutional preferences of designers and the institutions and policies 
(Pierson 1996).
This research takes on historical institutionalism’s approach for two reasons. 
Firstly, as was already mentioned, the EU accession process and the principles guiding 
it, such as conditionality, were not designed in a neat and planned way. Rather, they 
resulted from events unfolding over time, unpredictable in the beginning. Thus, each 
subsequent policy choice was path-dependent on previous decisions and the 
consequences of future decisions impossible to predict. For instance, the options for 
enlargement elaborated by the Commission in 2000 anticipated a few very different 
scenarios of expansion: to include just the small states; to invite forerunners including
74 It is important to note that for ‘path-dependance’ to operate, the impact of institutions on subsequent 
action must be unintended. If people set up certain institutions to ‘tie hands’ than it is impossible to claim 
that the institutions themselves worked as a commitment device. In such a case the decision to act within 
particular institutional patterns preceded the institution (see Parsons 2007: 73).
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Poland or all candidates together at a later date as a ‘big bang’ enlargement. The 
dynamics of the process were contingent upon the political situation unfolding over 
time rather than a result of the carefully drafted plan, since neither side had a clear 
concept of how to structure their relationship at the beginning of the accession process 
in the early 1990s. Thus, these relations cannot be gauged by the framework based 
solely on the rational motivations for action based on a costs-benefits calculation.
Secondly, contrary to the conventional view, this paper argues that EU 
conditionality was not applied in a void. The systemic vacuum created by the collapse 
of the communist system is often mistaken for an institutional vacuum (Hausner et al. 
1995: 4). While the former denotes “absence of the overall systemic logic, no dominant 
axis of societalization secured through the conduct of key societal agents in a 
regularized, elaborate, and interconnected set of institutions”, the latter indicates a lack 
of institutions. In this project I will argue, in line with Hausner et al. (1995), that post­
socialist trajectories have been dependent on complex institutional legacies, which pose 
major limits on the prospects of reforms and shape expectations and patterns of 
conduct75 (Hausner et al. 1995: 7). As sociological accounts of the transition process in 
CEE agree (see e.g. Kolarska-Bobinska 1994; Gomiak and Jerschina 1995; Hausner et 
al. 1995; Hausner et al. 1995a), particular patterns of social behaviour such as political 
apathy, social atomization or specific institutional outcomes, for instance, strong 
bureaucracies, represent the inheritance of the previous economic and political orders, 
often persistent for decades after their dismantling.
2. The evolution of state-society relations in post-communist countries
The studies on CEE transition depict the state-society relations as opaque and 
point to the underdevelopment of civil society in the region (see e.g. Wnuk-Lipinski 
1995; Korkut 2005). Gomiak and Jerschina (1995) assign the underdevelopment of 
decentralized mechanisms of social mediation to the communist legacies of branch 
corporations and the survival of the old economic, political and social patterns forming
75 Hausner et al. (1995) see their work as placed in the middle ground between polar ends, where one 
represents a situation of systemic vacuum in which new institutions can be deliberately introduced, with a 
historical determinist view on the other end, according to which historical legacies determine the future. 
In their work path-dependancy suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of current 
institutional innovations (Hausner et al. 1995).
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the network of the system (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995: 169). Similarly, Hausner et al. 
(1995a: 366) argue that the development of the interest representation system in post­
communist CEECs was hampered by monist traditions of socialism with its deliberate 
monitoring and centralized system of interest representation. Ekiert and Kubik (1999), 
in turn, stress that "the legitimacy and stability of the political regime" of the early 
1990s and the "absence of disruptive shifts in state economic policies" coexisted with a 
"relatively high level of protest activities" (Ekiert and Kubik 1999: 196).
The Polish socio-political scene at the beginning of the 1990s was characterized 
by social atomization, accompanied by a relatively large number of protest actions. The 
communist system left a legacy of antagonized state-society relations underpinned by a 
high level of distrust. Thus, while the social divide between ‘us’ (society) and ‘others’ 
(the communists) facilitated widespread Solidarity protests, there was little tradition of a 
‘positive’ contribution to governance that the post-communist society could draw on. 
The formation of a civil society able to take part in the policy-making requires a high 
degree of social trust and working out effective communication channels with the 
government. Poland, scoring very low in terms of social trust level (CBOS 2004) and 
drawing on its protest politics tradition, faced a considerable challenge in the 
development of such a mode of governance. Underdevelopment of interest mediation 
mechanisms proved consequential for the ways of solving the problems related to 
adaptation processes to the EU, starting from the accession negotiations.
Ramification o f the communist rule fo r  the state-society relations in
contemporary Poland
The communist party-state tried to obtain control over all aspects of economic, 
political, and social life. In 1952 the authorities dissolved all pre-war social 
organizations and nationalized their property. Practically all organizations active under 
the communist rule were placed under party control, with the Roman Catholic Church 
enjoying semi-autonomy and official trade unions depicted as pseudo-autonomous (see 
Ekiert and Kubik 1999: 84). The party control did not embrace solely the illegal groups, 
such as dissidents or black market networks. Gaining influence over all other 
organizations, performing various ideological, political and social functions, served as a 
tool of ‘colonizing’ the public sphere through extending party-state penetration of the 
society (Ekiert and Kubik 1999: 100).
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The communist regime was characterized by the longstanding conflict between 
society and state. The antimony ensued from the communist party’s conviction of its 
superior knowledge about the society’s needs, which required no affirmation in the 
course of elections or via independently organized institutions (Rose 1996: 251). This 
approach, however, resulted in the endemic distrust of party politics and permanent 
cleavage between the social and political spheres.
In addition to that, in a state-owned economy labour relations were not 
constructed based on the traditional employee-employer division (Hausner et al. 1995a: 
382). Factories managers alike rank and file workers were employees of the state. The 
social dialogue, understood as a platform for deliberation and search for compromises in 
industrial relations, could not develop in the condition of denial of existence of 
interests’ diversity between the two groups. Social protests have thus substituted other 
forms of communication. The distrust between 'us, the people' and 'them -  authority' 
was to remain a feature of the post-communist countries, making it difficult to re­
establish trustworthy independent institutions capable of mediation between society and 
state.
Apart from the fundamental political and ideological indivisibility and lack of 
autonomy of major institutions (Hausner et al. 1995a: 365) the socialist system was also 
characterized by the absence of autonomous forms of interest representation, which 
could facilitate open mediation. The notable exception was (quasi-autonomous) 
economic interests organized in 'branch corporations' or 'large enterprises' (trusts), 
which acted as both economic and political organizations. They were state-owned and 
controlled by the Central Planning Committee but also acted as agents representing 
workers, managers, and sometimes local authorities (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995; 
Hausner et al. 1995).
The legitimate role of these interest groups was that of the 'transmission belts' 
for official policies of the party-state organs, Politburo and the Central Planning 
Committee (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995: 27). However, particularly in late 
communism, the role of the branch corporations had gradually evolved into more 
dynamic, 'bargaining agents' in the actual functioning of the central planning (Gomiak 
and Jerschina 1995: 28; Hausner et al. 1995: 28). Externally, they bargained for
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resources with the central state bureaucracy and internally distributed gains and 
privileges to all interests affiliated to the branch.
The development of bargaining mechanisms and following empowerment of the 
corporations vis-a-vis the central authorities could take place due to the deepening 
economic crisis and persistent scarcity (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995). The maintenance 
of power by central authorities in this context became increasingly reliant on the 
redistribution of resources in line with the demands of the politically strongest agents. 
In addition to that, the increasing complexity of the economy also increased the 
dependence of the central planners on the corporations’ knowledge Thus, late 
communism view increasing proliferation of bargains between the state authorities and 
various sectorally-organized groups (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995; Hausner et al. 1995). 
It created specific institutional order, characterized by the key role of the sectoral 
interest groups organized according to industry branches, the centralistic mode of 
bargaining through the conflict, maintenance of power based on distribution of 
resources and distribution of privileges in return for social peace (Gomiak and Jerschina 
1995: 170).
Apart from the corporations and bargains at industry level, there were, however, 
hardly any socially acceptable institutional links between the private sphere (micro-) 
and the communist system (macro-). The mezzo-level institutions were perceived as 
conceived from outside and alien. This approach encouraged the development of 
informal and personal links, replacing the formal network of the system (Korkut 2005). 
The absence of an institutionalized relationship with politics positioned citizens in the 
role of the 'consumers' rather than subjects of politics, over which they had little 
influence (Bruszt 1988:59). This, in turn, encouraged political apathy or, conversely, 
increasing social frustration about both the economic and political deficiencies of the 
system triggered participation in the mass protests. Since the 1980s the protest actions 
were led by the Solidarity trade union, established with a goal of defending workers’ 
rights. Paradoxically, however, the activities of the Solidarity movement contributed to 
a weakening of development of the social mediation mechanisms in post-communist 
Poland.
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Solidarity’s past and development o f interest mediation mechanisms in post­
communist Poland
The arrival of Solidarity as the causative force for systemic transformation 
dominated the discourse on Poland’s civil society and interest representation in the early 
1990s. The movement was seen as an expression of the broad denial of legitimacy of 
the communist rule and extraordinary pact between workers and intelligentsia. In 
principle a trade union, the movement underwent a dramatic revolutionary time in 
1980-81 and a remarkable resurgence in 1988-8976, which eventually led to a 
celebrated end when its representatives sat down with the government to negotiate 
Poland’s future at the Round Table77. Since the 1980s it formed a fusion of workers and 
intellectual dissidents to the communist system, thus creating a broad ‘civic movement’ 
platform. The opposition to the party-state was the key unifying factor, which held 
possible differences between these two environments in check.
Since participation in the movement transgressed to broader social spheres than 
labor and because the other active trade unions united in the All-Polish Trade Union 
Alliance “OPZZ”, were discredited due to their links with the communist system, the 
Solidarity ‘alliance’ shortly began to epitomize Polish civil society in general and soon 
the political representation of this society. This role was institutionalized after the first 
democratic elections in June 1989, in which Solidarity participated as the key 
representative of civil society vis-a-vis the party-state. Its internal rhetoric further 
reinforced the vision of the ‘national’, rather than ‘class’ movement. Both in 1980-81 
and later, the union propagated the perception that society may differ in degrees of its 
radicalism, views about the movement’s tactics, knowledge of political and economic 
theory and personalities, but not with regard to interests or values, since the most 
important of the latter were to be, naturally, pan-national in scope (Szacki and Warman 
1991: 714). Solidarity’s seize of formal power to rule, however, soon verified these 
ideals.
76 For a comprehensive history of the Solidarity movement see Ost (1991).
77Actually, Solidarity was the only opposition represented at the Round Table negotiations (while on the 
opposite side sat representatives of the government, the Communist party and the pro-government labor 
unions, politically discredited in the years to come).
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The first serious test to the unity of the movement came with the engagement of 
Solidarity’s ‘elite’, the intellectual wing, in forming the first post-communist 
government. The new authorities, led by the deputy-PM and finance minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz, embarked on the liberal economic reform plan known as the Polish 
“shock-therapy”. The package of reforms consisted of trade liberalization, imposition of 
convertible currency and institutional changes, such as privatization, de- 
monopolization, reforms of the budgetary sphere, social insurance and tax system and 
introduction of self-governance, but foremost measures to tackle hyperinflation, which 
included cutting the budgetary deficit, higher interest rates and practically freezing 
salaries (Balcerowicz 1992: 48). Paradoxically, the Solidarity rank and file members 
were the first to feel the negative effects of the implementation of this program.
The social costs of the reforms became apparent very soon after their 
implementation on 1 January 1990. Although most of the economic sectors experienced 
recession, resulting in a 12% fall in GDP in 1990, particular difficulties were felt in the 
heavy industry and transport sectors, dominated by public ownership, where output 
decreased by 19.5% in 1990. Due to both privatization and the real growth, there was no 
recession in the private sector, where production increased by 48% in the same year 
(Balcerowicz 1992: 177). Thus, though not all changes led to a deterioration of the 
situation, heavy industry, a home base for Solidarity, was hit the hardest. It was the 
Solidarity government, which won the power in the name of the workers, who inflicted 
on them such a burden (see Ost 2005). By the beginning of the 1990s differences 
between the Solidarity elite and rank and file members became practically
no
irreconcilable . Both factions, however, kept appealing to Solidarity symbolism and 
ethos.
Despite well-documented accounts of the frequent workers’ demonstrations in 
response to the rising difficulties (see Ekiert and Kubik 1999), some scholars argue that 
part of Solidarity’s leadership, which did not participate in the governing structures, 
decided not to support workers’ protests directed against ‘their governments’ (Ost 
2005). In fact, Solidarity leaders, who decided to remain affiliated with the trade unions 
rather than take a position in the new administration, confronted the dilemma of
78 Ost argues that workers were marginalized in Solidarity by in the 1980s, when their tasks were 
constrained to simple actions, such as distributing samizdat press and paying dues (2005:43).
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whether to support the government or to assist in manifesting workers’ discontent with 
liberal reforms by leading protest actions against them. As Ost argues (2005), in an 
attempt to combine water with fire they had chosen to channel the social conflict with 
the government along the ideological, rather than class, line. The reason behind 
workers’ suffering was presented as ‘false’ capitalism rather than radical reforms in 
themselves. Thus, the division between ex-communist and pro-Solidarity forces 
remained the most important line of social cleavage.
The subsequent political events of the early transition period seem to corroborate 
this argument. NSZZ Solidarity79, which refrained from outward criticism of the post- 
Solidarity governments, fiercely opposed even pro-workers reforms, if introduced by 
the following incumbent government80, formed by the ex-communist Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD). A notable illustration of such an approach was Solidarity's rejection of 
the invitation to participate in the Tripartite Commission established by the SLD 
government and comprising representatives of the government, large trade unions and 
employers' organizations81. The creation of the Commission actually represented the 
first serious attempt to set institutional structures for social mediation with a view to 
provide an opinion-making and consultative body for trade unions (and employers' 
organizations). The rejection of this forum of dialogue by NSZZ Solidarity 
demonstrated its shift towards political contention as its raison d ’etre (Ost 2005: 79). 
Nonetheless, these uncompromising attitudes proved detrimental to the position of the 
union among society at large and workers themselves, reflected in the declining 
membership rate and support level. While at the Round Table time the movement 
enjoyed the support of 60% of opinion polls' respondents, by 2001 the majority 
negatively assessed its activities (CBOS 2005: 275)
The Solidarity position towards the reform process outlined above had vital 
consequences for Poland’s socio-political scene. Most importantly, it further held up the 
development of the rudimentary interest mediation mechanisms inherited from the 
previous regime. By refusing to recognize the existing divergence of interests between
79 Stands for „Niezalezny Samorz^dny Zwi^zek Zawodowy ‘Solidamosc’” -  The Independent Self- 
governing Trade Union Solidarity”.
0 For instance, NSZZ Solidarity did not support removal of the wage tax, which was long promised to be 
eliminated by the Solidarity leaders, like Wal?sa (who did not keep this promise).
81 At the very start of its operation the Tripartite Commission was to tackle the health reform problem.
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‘Solidarity’s government’ and NSZZ Solidarity, the movement precluded a natural 
outburst of the conflict, or rather for the hidden social frustrations to rise to the surface. 
Thus, the standard mechanisms of solving such disagreements between society and the 
government could not be worked out and practiced. Social protests remained the key 
method of expressing dissatisfaction with the governments’ actions82.
The inconclusive approach of Solidarity towards the defence of workers’ 
interests also contributed to the empowerment of more radical political forces (such as 
Solidarity 80, Radio Maryja proponents and Samoobrona) with clearer political agendas 
in that respect. As Ost (2005) argues, by structuring social conflict into ideological, 
rather than pragmatic lines, Solidarity opened a Pandora’s box of Polish nationalism, 
radical Catholicism and backwardness.
Independently of the events outlined above, the ongoing structural 
transformation utterly changed the context of activity of the trade unions and Solidarity 
in particular. The privatization process led to a depreciation of the heavy industry’s 
weight in the economic output and decreasing employment in the production sector. 
These developments naturally diminished the political role of the industry workers, 
gradually substituted by another group ‘discriminated’ by the transition process, the 
unemployed. While in 1990 blue collar workers constituted 25% of the workforce, 
which amounted to more than 4.5 million people, in 1995 there were 3.7 million 
industry workers, and in 2004 less than 3 million83. The unemployment rate during this 
period steadily increased to reach 20% at the beginning of the 21st century. By 2002 
there were around 3 million private enterprises in Poland. Both the unemployed and/or 
self-employed in small companies exceeded the number of heavy industry workers.
Thus, the transition brought about significant changes to the social structure, 
which diminished the role of the trade unions as a social player. Diversification of the 
social interests turned the focus towards civil society and interests groups other than 
workers competing for political resources and access to decision-makers. However, the 
confusing political positions of post-Solidarity and other parties, and permanently 
shifting political coalitions, affiliations and strategies resulted in the general political
82 The stigma of ex-communists left the OPZZ (which continued to function as a competitive trade union) 
unable to take this role over from Solidarity and promote institutionalization of the conflict mediation 
mechanisms.
83 Data of OBOP (Reports from 1990 until 2005).
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apathy of Polish society. Remarkably, during 1989-93 Poland had six governments and 
eight prime ministers and experienced a substantial personnel turnover at the top 
executive positions (see Annex 3.1.). Only 1.1% of Poles in 1991 belonged to political
QA
parties , whose activities came to be monopolized by a narrow political class, 
organized in numerous small groups and focused heavily on national level politics with 
a vacuum underneath (Kubik and Ekiert 1999:97). The interest mediation mechanisms 
were underdeveloped and the social protest remained the key way of expressing 
discontent with government’s actions.
Civil society and collective action in the transition context
The fall down of the communist systems and party-state in CEE attributed a new 
relevance and currency to the idea of civil society (Kumar 1993: 375). There is a 
general consent among scholars about the positive correlation between the developed 
civil society and working democratic system. Civil society, defined as “the realm of 
organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules” 
(Diamond 1996: 228), occupies the area between the private sphere and the state 
(Kumar 1993: 383)85. The various interest groups competing for representation and 
mediation with the authorities were the struggling to shape the development on modem 
democracy and thus act as a power limiting and checking the state (Diamond 1996; 
Howard 2003).
Conceptualized in such a way, civil society could not develop in communist 
Poland, where the distinctions between the three spheres were blurred or non-existent. 
The state permeated the social, while the political realm was often not discemable from 
the state. The legacies of the communist atomization of society and the opaque relations 
between the industry workers and the state settled in the first years of transition did not 
set appropriate grounds for civil society to develop.
84 OBOP Report 1992
85 The notion originates from Alexis de Tocqueville’s distinction between the three realms of society, 
state, the system of formal political representation, and in particular in dividing the civil from the 
political.
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It is frequently assumed that under real socialism the civil society was shaped in 
outright opposition to, and in shadow of, the omnipotent state. The abolition of that 
system should then precipitate a reversal of this situation, strengthen the society and 
weaken the state apparatus. The grass-root growth of public life, self-organization of 
citizens and mushrooming interest groups should fill in the gap left by the state and 
modify the ‘protesting’ nature of the civil society.
Contrary to these expectations, the beginning of the 1990s marked a lack of 
enthusiasm and low level of participation, apathy and hostility (Kolarska-Bobinska 
1994: 42). As mentioned above, during the first years of transition, the dominance of 
Solidarity as a representation of civil society and amalgam of the 'political' and 'social' 
spheres actually inhibited the development of control mechanisms of the state powers. 
Almost twenty years after the systemic change the empirical accounts (see e.g. Padgett
2000) pointed to the relative weakness of the post-communist civil society compared to 
Western European countries. Despite an increase in the number of civil organizations 
right after the fall of the communist system, their figures remained far below the EU’s 
average, the organizations without links to each other86 and consequently their leverage 
on the policy-makers was insufficient. At the same time, scholars point out the 
predominance of individual over collective values leading to the domination of self- 
interest over collective or common interests. Padgett notes (2000: 16) that “[t]he profile 
of normative values [suggests that the] post-communist society are unconducive to the 
type of intra-group interaction that generates the normative values informing collective 
forms of behaviour”. Similarly, Gibson (1998: 3) argues that “[civil society in the mid 
to late 1990s is being undermined by the radical individualism, social anomie and 
distrust, and just simple greed that are pervasive in these societies”.
Such a weak condition of civil society is assigned either to the cultural after­
effects of restrictions placed by the communist state on participation in public life 
(Marody 1992; Sztompka 1993), or a collective action problem embedded in the 
structural context of post-communist society and “dislocating effects of market 
transition working against formation and mobilisation of collective interests and
86 In 2002 only 30% of the registered organizations, most of which had been active at the local level, 
belonged to any regional, sectoral or country-wide federations or associations (Herbst, Gumkowska 
2004).
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identities” (Bernhard 1996;m Padgett 2000:1; Ost 1993; Ost 1995). Hausner et al. 
(1995a) pointed out that in Western Europe, relatively long periods of freedom of 
associations allowed interest groups to be set up, adapt themselves to their political 
surrounding and gain recognition from the state. Historically, CEE brought to the new 
system of interest representation elements from their immediate economic past, which 
was not feudalism, as was the case in Western Europe, but socialism, with its deliberate 
monitoring and centralized system of interest representation as well as a specific 
industrial model.
The economic liberalization, privatization, take-overs and proliferation of new 
companies laid the foundations for development of diversified social interests. The new 
groups, however, remained ingrained in the post-communist legacies. As a result of the 
Round Table compromise a large part of the new elites comprised the old communist 
elites. As Gomiak and Jerschina argue (1995), in 1993 around 60% of company owners 
were the communist nomenklatura and despite the dissolution of the Central Committee 
of Planning, negotiations with corporations still occurred at the central level. Although 
the formal expression of corporations ceased to exist, the groups of interests, linked by 
their functional and political ties as well as personal relationships, survived the regime 
change. Thus, the old networks actually revitalized themselves and in the absence of 
other efficient organizational media old behavior patterns were reproduced (Gomiak 
and Jerschina 1995: 170).
Nevertheless, there was rapid numeric growth and diversification of the social 
groups (see e.g. Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Forbrig 2002; CBOS 2005) in Poland after the 
systemic change. The increasing membership and voluntary financial contributions to 
organizations, as well as the gradually increasing level of trust in NGOs (CBOS 2004) 
gave new substance to the notion of civil society. According to the data of Klon/Jawor 
Association (2005: 6)87, the dynamics of growth of foundations and associations was 
highest in 1989-1990, when it exceeded 450%. In 1993-1994 this increase stabilized at 
the level of 115%. However, the aggregate number of organizations includes a high 
share of relatively 'young' organizations, which suggests that in parallel to the
87 Klon/Jawor Association is a non-profit NGO set up in 1990 by a group of sociologists from the 
University of Warsaw. It gathers information about the NGO sector in Poland and is one of the largest 
banks of information about NGOs in Europe (www.klon.org.pl).
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impressive increase of their numbers, many organizations were relatively short-lived. 
The official data from the National Bureau of Statistics (GUS) does not necessarily 
show such tendencies, as there is no legal obligation to de-register non-active 
organizations. Notwithstanding the reasons behind such fluctuations, these dynamics 
show that this sphere has not reached full stability yet.
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The data on the types of social organizations registered with the General Court
OQ
Registrar (KRS) shows the dominance of associations and foundations , that is, the 
most flexible forms of organizations, next to the voluntary firemen units (oddly 
qualified as NGOs). However, the qualitative assessment of the NGOs sector is difficult 
due to the fact that a number of entities, in particular foundations, were established by 
companies with a view to process semi-legal financial transfers for private rather than 
‘social’ goals.
Table 3.1.: Number of NGOs in Poland in 2004
Type of organization Number of entities
Associations 45,891
Foundations 7,210
Voluntary Firemen Units 14,000
Social organizations 3,524
Trade Unions 17,113^°
Religious organizations (mainly Catholic Church units) 15,244
Gumkowska, M. and J. Herbst (2005).
89 The Act on the public utility organizations of 24 April 2003 introduced a definition of the NGOs. 
Foundations are defined as institutions based on the possessions devoted by the founder for supporting 
the realization of a particular goal (charity, cultural, etc.). The associations are defined as voluntary, self- 
governing and lasting non-profit organisations. They can carry economic activity.
90 There are minimum ten employees needed to establish a trade union in a company.
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Economic self-government organizations 5,515
Employers’ Associations 60yi
TOTAL 108 557
Source: Klon/Jawor Report 2005
The beginning of the 1990s also faced the pre-eminent growth of business and 
employers’ organizations. For several years these entities were unable to outbalance the 
trade unions in their relations with the government, due to the organizational weakness 
and lack of appropriate legal regulations. However, recent years have shown the 
reinforcement of their position, also due to the progressing privatization of the economy 
and reduction of the role of the state as an employer. As the table below presents, there 
is also a relative concentration of industrial activities in a relatively limited number of 
organizations. By the end of the decade business organizations amounted to a few 
thousand and were organized in a few major associations. In 2004 the Entrepreneurship 
Council was enacted as an umbrella organization in an attempt to unify business 
representation and reinforce its position, so to be reckoned as important social partner of 
the government.
Table 3.2.: Economic organizations associated in the Entrepreneurship Council
________ Business Centre Club_________________________________________
________ Confederation of the Polish Employers___________________________
________ The Polish Chamber of Commerce______________________________
________ Polish Confederation of Private Employers "Lewiatan"_____________
________ Polish Business Roundtable____________________________________
________ Managers Association in Poland________________________________
________ The National Economic Council________________________________
________ The National Association of Trade and Services___________________
________ American Chamber of Commerce_______________________________
________ Foreign Investors Chamber of Industry and Commerce_____________
________ Polish—German Chamber of Industry and Commerce_______________
________ Polish Craftsmen Association__________________________________
Source: www.radaprzedsiebiorczosci.pl
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of business organizations in carrying out their 
basic statutory task, that of representing the vital interests of commercial entities, is
Q-3
questioned by both the government and the organizations themselves . While the
91 Organizations listed in the www.pkpplewiatan.pl. The Ministry of Labour mentions four key 
employers’ organizations as its partners.
92 Gumkowska, M. and J. Herbst (2005).
93 Interview with the adviser on EU affairs of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers "Lewiatan" 
in December 2005, and with the Director of the Regulations Department (in 2006-2008) in the Ministry 
of Economy in August 2008.
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largest business organizations established in the early 1990s (such as the Polish 
Confederation of Private Employers “Lewiatan” or BCC) were perceived as working to 
the benefit of their leaders rather than their rank and file members, 98% of Polish 
companies did not belong to any formal business group (Solska 2008). The attempts to 
unite the environment under the formal institutional umbrella, the Polish 
Entrepreneurship Council proved only partially successful. The member organizations 
(see Table 3.4.) managed to present a common position with respect to one issue only, 
the support for a lower tax rate for enterprises, a project endorsed by the Jerzy Miller 
(SLD) government. There were practically no other important initiatives taken by the 
forum. The increasing competition between particular organizations and specifically 
their leaders are commonly seen as the reason behind these difficulties. In fact, the 
organizations are ruled in a non-democratic way, their leaders are non-elected and 
practically non-removable, and the regular members seem to serve as a support for their 
ambitions and interests rather than vice versa (Solska 2008).
Nonetheless, the largest business organizations, as ‘employers’ organizations 
enjoy more formal ways of communication with the government, through participation 
in the Tripartite Commission of the state, trade unions and employers (2001). As 
mentioned earlier, it was enacted by the SLD government in 1994 as a realization of the 
'Pact on enterprise in the course of transformation' agreed between the government and 
social partners. Its key competencies include the conduct of consultations in the matter 
of remuneration for work and social services as well as participation in the preparation 
of the budgetary laws. The Act on Tripartite Commission (2001) set up detailed criteria 
for the employers' organizations and trade unions eligible for membership. The trade 
unions have to represent at least 300,000 members and employers' organizations 
represent companies employing at least 300,000 employees. The trade unions thus are 
represented in the Commission by NSZZ Solidarity, OPZZ and the Forum of Trade 
Unions. The Confederation of Polish Employers, "Lewiatan", Polish Craftsmen 
Association and Business Center Club in turn represent employers’ interests.
The organizations that do not meet the criteria allowing for participation in the 
Tripartite Commission (or are regional or sectoral in character) have fewer possibilities
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to formally communicate with the authorities. However, in line with Article 7.5 of the 
Act on the Tripartite Commission (2001), they may be invited to participate in works of 
the Commission as guest members of a member organization. Apart from that they may 
take a position on the texts of legal acts, if invited to participate in the social 
consultations by the organs in charge of their preparations. The rules of conduct for the 
Council of Ministers from 1997 anticipated that the projects of a legal act should be 
accompanied by their justification, which, among others includes the results of social 
consultations (1997, par. 9.2.). The author of the bill “could decide” to send the act for 
social consultation (1997, par. 10.3.), but prior to the accession negotiations there was 
no legal obligation to consult the projects of bills.
In general, the effectiveness of the Tripartite Commission has been at best 
mixed. Although the Act on the Tripartite Commission (2001) anticipated that its 
members had the right to include on the agenda all matters of concern with large social 
or economic repercussions, the level of activity varied depending on the approach of the 
incumbent government. The representative of “Lewiatan”94 argued that Jerzy Hausner 
from the SLD government (Minister of Employment and Social Policy from October 
2001 until March 2005) was the most pro-dialogue minister and perhaps the only one to 
fully appreciate the role of formal social dialogue institutions, such as the Tripartite 
Commission. In turn, the governments with an unenthusiastic approach towards social 
consultations in general tended not to bother to convene the Commission. The latest and 
perhaps the most radical example was the PiS (Law and Justice) government, in power 
since September 200595, which did not convene the Commission even once, instead 
choosing a la carte social partners to be consulted on important matters96 outside any 
formal frameworks.
Thus, despite the legal credentials, the effectiveness of the Commission remains 
a hostage of political affiliations and atmosphere. In turn, consultations on more specific 
matters of interest to business or other social partners have an ad hoc character and their
94 Interview with the adviser on EU affairs of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers “Lewiatan” 
in December 2005.
95 In power until September 2007 and, since 2006, in coalition with the extremist Self-defence party and 
the League of Polish Families.
96 The PiS government discussed the project of raising the minimal salary solely with the Solidarity trade 
union, not informing employers’ organizations at all.
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conduct and list of participants depends on the unit within the government in charge of 
the preparation of the legal act, and the minister in charge.
According to common practice, the government’s unit sends the draft legal act 
for consultation or will even meet organizations interested in an issue, however, without 
commitment to take their opinions into consideration (there is no referee in such 
meetings). However, in most cases the organizations are ‘consulted’ after inter- 
ministerial consultations over the draft legal proposal, which is difficult to change at 
this stage. There is neither habit no a legal requirement to conduct social consultations 
at earlier stage of the law-making process97. The NGOs representatives’ claim that 
social partners are regularly not allowed to propose corrections since the draft document 
arrives with notification that the act is 'in the course of intra-govemmental 
consultations'. Often the organizations do not receive the final version of the legal act 
but the government nevertheless argues that the consultations have already been 
conducted98. Such social consultations serve as a fa9ade rather than representing an 
effort to learn about the opinions of social groups interested in the matter. Eventually 
the informal modes of communication prevailed in all cases, where the real social 
consultations have been conducted. In some branches, however, for instance in the case 
of tobacco producers discussing the level of the excise duties, the consultations were 
facilitated by a lack of formal underpinning. The industry representatives claimed99 that 
the stricter rules and lobbying regulations implemented after accession to the EU have 
worsened the atmosphere of dialog taking place ex ante in a more informal fashion.
Nonetheless, the absence of mature formal interest mediation mechanisms due to 
the excessive focus on the trade unions as social representation in the early 1990s, and 
ineffective business representation, have provided the social context in which the pre­
accession process was to take place. Such a setting led to several pathologies in terms of 
communication between the ruled and the ruling. First of all, the unclear links between 
the entrenched interests and executive branch of the government based on informal 
contacts were conducive to the corruptive behaviors. The crowning experience in that 
sense was the ‘Rywin-gate’ affair from 2005, which led to the collapse of the left
97 Interview with the Director of the Regulations Department (in 2006-2008) in the Ministry of Economy 
in August 2008.
98 Interview with the Board Member of Polish Humanitarian Action (NGO) in March 2006.
99 Interview with the President of the National Association of Tobacco Producers in September 2008.
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government in power and arrival to the political scene of more radical forces basing 
their legitimacy on the declared fight with corruption. The corruption scandals have 
further undermined the position of business groups, already weakened by the 
competition between them. The 1.5 million small and medium companies operating in 
Poland at the beginning of the 21st century were thus left without formal and legal 
channels of representation. This led to the strengthening of the small sectoral 
organizations and informal contacts as a basic mode of communication. Eventually, 
both business and the government have complained about the absence of partners to 
‘talk to’ on the important matters and reforms. The next section presents how these 
features played themselves out in the accession negotiations context.
3. Accession negotiations and interest mediation mechanisms
The process of adaptation to the EU presented a considerable economic, but also 
a political, complexity. The politico-economic adjustments as spelled out in the 
Copenhagen criteria and later the pre-accession documents involved a complete 
revamping of some existent policies, as in the case of Regional Policy, or at least 
reforms in others, like Taxation. In both cases such changes were bound to infringe 
costs upon a number of vested interests. On the other hand, broad social support for 
enlargement was indispensable for obtaining a positive vote in the domestic referendum 
on the Accession Treaty. Therefore, implementation of EU measures was bound to 
involve at least fragmentary social consultations on particularly contentious issues. 
Although Agriculture, Free Movement of Persons, Environment, Free Movement of 
Capital (land purchase), Justice and Home Affairs and Transport were considered the 
most difficult negotiation chapters (KPRM 1998b), controversial bits and pieces were 
present in most other policy areas as well. As presented above, the fifteen years that 
passed since the overthrow of the communist system to accession witnessed vital events 
at the Polish social scene.
Although, as pointed out above, formal social mediation mechanisms have not
fully developed and civil society has been in the course of reconstruction, the Polish
socio-institutional scene may by no means be considered a vacuum to be filled in with
the new EU content. Apart from dynamic growth of the social organizations and NGOs,
there have also been less formal and less organized patterns of communication with the
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authorities developing throughout the 1990s. A number of reforms, for instance the 
administrative reform of 1998, have been conducted with the involvement of the 
interested actors (local self-governments in this case) although the social consultations 
have perhaps not been carried out in such a systemic and transparent way as the 
Western standards would require. Thus, it could be expected that entrenched interests, 
some of which have been consolidating since the very beginning of the 1990s, would 
take a position on the challenges posed by the process of adaptation to the EU. While in 
some fields these interests were rudimentary and informal, in others, such as for 
instance in the tobacco industry case, they have formed since the mid-1990s stable 
institutional structures.
The government, but also Poland's Parliament, seemed to recognize the need for 
broader social consultations and frequently called for greater involvement of social 
organizations in the process of negotiations. Jaroslaw Pietras (cited in Rzeczpospolita
2001), the Secretary of the Negotiation Team, declared that "consultations with the 
entrepreneurs, NGOs and political opposition are indispensable as there is no sense in 
proposing changes of the negotiation positions if in the result protesters and 
demonstrations appear in the streets. We [the negotiators] need to be aware of how 
much we can afford"100. Similarly, the Chief Negotiator, Jan Kulakowski, and PM Jerzy 
Buzek, during the parliamentary debate on European Integration (Sejm 2000), stressed 
the importance of the "complex policy of informing society about the European 
integration" and "particular attention paid by negotiators to the consultations with 
parliament and social partners". Such efforts were also noticed by the representatives of 
the largest business groups, who recall the appeals of Minister Hiibner, (chief of UKIE 
from November 2001) on the need for engagement of business in the ongoing 
negotiations process101.
As this section, however, shows, there have been numerous initiatives by the 
authorities to create some framework for mediation with society and the vested 
interests. However, few formal channels of communication eventually were established, 
while they were also largely omitted in the real social consultation that took place in
100 My own translation.
101 Interview with the Member of the Establishes' Board of BCC, member of the Economic and Social 
Committee of the European Union in March 2006.
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some policy areas. These were conducted mostly in an informal fashion and as a result 
of the mounting pressure from the interested social groups, rather than as an initiative 
from the authorities.
Both the screening and the negotiation processes took place practically in a legal
vacuum102. The negotiation mandate and other instructions had the form of internal
documents, most often endorsed at the level of the Committee for European Integration
(KIE 1998). While the code of works of the Council of Ministers required that some
sort of social consultations are conducted when enacting the regular legal acts, there was
no legal requirement to carry out such action in the course of preparing the negotiation
position. Nonetheless, the governmental actors involved in the accession negotiations
admit that they believed that interest groups should have a chance to take a position on
1 01particularly controversial negotiation topics . Thus, there were a number of initiatives 
the Chief Negotiator’s services and other governmental departments aimed at 
structuring the social consultation process accompanying the negotiations (see below). 
This section analyzes the properties of the channels of communication between the 
negotiators and society (formal and informal) and which social partners had been able to 
make use of them. The following empirical chapters demonstrate how in various policy 
fields this institutional setting has been used in practice.
Rationale for consideration o f social interests' views during the accession
negotiations
There are two basic reasons behind the declarative commitment of Buzek's 
government, commencing the negotiations on Poland's membership in the European 
Union, to social negotiations in the context of Poland's adaptation to the EU. Firstly, 
such contacts were likely to benefit the government in political terms and legitimize its 
actions. As the collective action theory argues (Olson 1965), the relationship between 
the executive and interest groups is based on the principle of mutual benefit. While 
interest groups need the executive/legislative to create a favorable regulatory framework 
or to obtain beneficial distributory decisions, political actors also desire the support of
102 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European Integration, in September 2008.
103 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European Integration, in September 2008; Interview 
with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession Negotiations in 
March 2006.
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the interest groups as constituencies, campaign sponsors and social mobilizers, as well 
as information providers (Milner 1997). Secondly, as Putnam (1988) stresses, each 
international agreement needs to be ratified. In the case of Poland's Accession Treaty 
such ratification was formalized104 with a consequence of decreasing the negotiator's 
win-set, in Putnam's parlance. Thus, knowledge of the social attitudes towards the 
proposed concessions and terms of accession allowed the negotiator to design an 
optimal negotiation strategy. In areas of strong social opposition to implementation of 
the acquis the negotiators had higher chances to bargain for more favorable terms of 
accession (transition periods or derogations). It may be argued that disclosure of the 
Negotiation Positions in 2000 served exactly this purpose, to increase the pressure on 
the Commission and provide the government with better leverage at the international 
negotiating table.
Different theoretical accounts argue that the relationship between the executive 
and various interest groups is based on different types of dynamics (Dahl 1957: 202-3; 
Milner 1997). The 'collective action' theory (Olson 1965) explains why some groups 
gain better access to the policy-making and what determines their relative importance. 
The assumption of the theory (see also Woodbridge 1993; Bell and Wanna 1992; 
Lindblom 1977) is that the party in power is concerned about achieving good economic 
results, so to increase its chances of re-election. Although this increases the dependence 
of the executive on business groups, paradoxically, it does not prevent the government 
from taking decisions clearly counterproductive to the achievement of economic 
objectives. As Olson (1965) argues, small groups are privileged in their relations with 
the executive as they are able to overcome problems with cooperation such as free 
riding or conflicting interests. Their members face real social pressure and thus are more 
susceptible to persuasion. There is a higher chance that an individual is pivotal and they 
often engage in the repeated games. Therefore, large interest groups, such as taxpayers, 
remain latent and are not represented. They are unable to maintain control over their 
individual members’ behavior and when benefits are negotiated, they will accrue to all 
individuals, also to those who did not cooperate.
104 The referendum was to be conducted based on the constitutional provisions (Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland), which, in Art. 90.3 and Art. 125, state that “a nationwide referendum may be held in 
respect of matters of particular importance to the State”.
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Olson's arguments (1965) were furthered by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), 
who applied them to the theory of regulation. While Stigler argued that regulations are 
supplied by legislators and agencies in response to demands from the interest groups, 
Peltzman focused on the political support offered by the groups competing for favorable 
regulations. Therefore, regulations will benefit interest groups, which are better 
organized and, as Olson’s analysis presented, those will primarily be small interest 
groups with strong preferences. Applying these arguments to the accession negotiations 
case, one might expect that in the areas where 'prior opposition' represented small, 
uniform business groups, the negotiator's position was relatively weaker and that these 
groups should be more powerful in terms of influencing the scope of the win-sets in the 
negotiations' bargains. This approach might explain the tougher position of the Polish 
government with respect to the applications for transition periods in sectoral matters, 
such as pharmaceuticals, investments in the Special Economic Zones or taxation of 
tobacco products, than the issues concerning large social groups (see Annex 2.2.). 
Moreover, in these areas the government was also able to gain more concessions from 
the European Commission, which would conform to Putnam's account (1988) of 
international negotiations.
The government's dependence on the social interests during the accession 
negotiations was strengthened by the formal requirement that the Treaty is ratified after 
a positive vote in the accession referendum. The ratification procedure, as Putnam 
argues (1988: 448), affects the size of the win-sets, which tend to narrow down in 
parallel to the increasing strictness of the rules of ratification. Poland's second chief 
negotiator, Jan Truszczynski, admitted that negotiators were under constant pressure 
from the lobby groups, which often threatened to oppose accession to the EU if their 
demands were not considered (cited in Businessman Magazine 2003).
In Poland's negotiation case, a simple majority for accession was sufficient to 
validate membership. Eventually, 59% of eligible voters participated in the referendum
conducted on 7-8 June 2003, 77% of which expressed their support for accession to the
EU. Nevertheless, such a result was far from certain at the start of the talks. As 
mentioned earlier, the rate of support for accession has varied and in the midst of the 
accession negotiations in March 2001, it achieved its lowest point, with only 55% of 
society declaring support for accession and 30% against it. As a result, the SLD
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government, which came to power in September 2001, instantly embarked on a new 
round of information campaigns for the European Integration and appointed a high level 
official in charge of it105.
Accession negotiations: channels o f communication for the social interests
The process of social consultations during the accession negotiations suffered 
from several predicaments, which, however did not mean that such consultations had 
not taken place. The major problem was a lack of appropriate legal underpinning for 
lobby activities in general and with respect to the accession negotiations in particular. 
Instead, there were a few programming documents (see below) stressing the need for 
regulations in this matter but providing only very general guidelines, and focusing 
mostly on the dissemination of information on integration rather than specifically on 
social consultations. The proposals for formalization of the lobby activities prepared by 
the services of the Chief Negotiator (KPRM 1998; UKIE 1998b; KPRM 1999) did not 
materialize. Moreover, discussions on the Polish negotiation position were inhibited by 
the fact that they remained confidential until halfway through the year 2000 (KPRM 
1998a). Thus, even where formal institutions for consultations were set up, their 
usefulness was limited since the social partners could not have access to the texts of the 
position papers. On top of that, as the Negotiator’s services admitted, the administration 
did not posses information on the actors in the third sector, nor the database of all the 
postulates of the social groups (KPRM 1998). In this situation, the government’s actions 
with respect to social consultations were necessarily selective and often restricted to the 
most controversial issues.
The formal framework for the government’s actions in the matter of 
dissemination of information on the process of integration and accession negotiations 
provided the National Integration Strategy (NIS) from 1997 (KIE 1997), and the Public 
Information Program (PIP) (KIE 1999). The legal basis was the Article 7.3 of the Act 
on the Committee of European Integration (KIE) (1996), which stated that the 
"President of the Committee cooperates with state organs and nongovernmental 
organizations in the matters falling within the competencies of the Committee". In line
105 Slawomir Wiatr and, later on, Lech Nikolski were appointed for the position.
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with this demand, the NIS declared in 1997 that the government would “consult with 
the representatives of the producers on issues important for them in the context of 
preparations for membership, negotiations and the membership itself, and in special, 
well-motivated cases allowed by international commitments of Poland, will search for 
temporary protection measures supporting the restructuring activities”. The document 
also encouraged enterprises to “influence the negotiated [with the EU] terms of 
accession through forming representative groups able to carry out current and long-term 
assessment of developmental problems and to articulate their group interests in 
consultations with the government”. When needed, these groups should “prepare the 
restructuring programs, which would form the basis of application for the temporary 
protection supporting such restructuring actions” (KIE 1997: 17). Concrete solutions, 
however, were left to be designed in the Public Information Program (KIE 1999) 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in May 1999.
Formally, the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE), in 
charge of realization of the Public Information Program106 (KIE 1999) centralized 
“soliciting support of the most influential and respectful representatives of the society, 
including churches and religious organizations" (KIE 1999: 3). The Department of 
Information and Social Consultations and the Department of the European 
Documentation were to support the activities of the Chief Negotiator in this matter. The 
major external institutions set up to assist in the realization of this goal were the 
National Council for European Integration and the Partnership Groups. However, both 
had serious limitations as channels of communication for the social groups.
The National Council for European Integration was enacted in autumn 1999 (the 
first meeting took place on 3 November) by Jerzy Buzek as an opinion-making and 
advisory body to the PM chairing the Committee for European Integration. It 
comprised, however, as many as up to 70 members and in fact the most it could do was 
to "sensitize various social groups in Poland with respect to matters pertaining to the 
European integration and support social dialogue in this context"107. Additionally, at the 
later stages of its functioning the Council was charged with over-politicization and
106 For actors participating in the accession negotiations and their roles see Annex 2.3.
107 http://euro.pap.com.pl/
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becoming a "stronghold of the concrete ruling option"108, thus unsuitable for the 
members not identifying with it. For this reason, the opposition leader, Marian 
Krzaklewski, in May 2002 demonstratively resigned from his membership in the 
Council.
Less spectacular but perhaps more effective mechanisms for social dialogue 
were created in the course of the screening process and the accession negotiations109. 
The Guidelines for the Accession Negotiations (KIE 1998) declared that “inclusion of 
broad social circles into the integration process is a condition sin qua non of the success 
of the grand challenge of parallel systemic transformation and integration with the 
European structures. This is one of the fundamental priorities of the Polish 
government.” These were supplemented by the documents issued by the Chief 
Negotiator’s services in the PM Chancellery (KPRM 1998) specifying that a special 
forum linking the central administration with the social organizations should be 
established, and that such cooperation should rely on “exchange of information and 
reaching a common position of the ‘ruling’ with the ‘ruled’”.
The most important such institution were the so-called Partnership Groups, set 
up with the goal of involving the social partners and NGOs interested in the European 
integration in the process of accession (Biegaj 2000). The Groups operated during the 
screening of laws process, the first phase of the accession negotiations. They functioned 
alongside the Task Groups110 within the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of 
Accession Negotiations to the European Union. Each Team (see Annex 3.2. for the 
screening procedure), which was in charge of formulation of the negotiation position in 
its particular area, was assigned a Partnership Group as a base for social consultations 
(UKIE 2000a: 60). The goal of their involvement was to help to create a channel of 
transfer of information, consolidate the opinions of the NGOs and enable them to 
comment on the proposals for changes (KPRM 1998).
108 Ibid.
109 For detailed accounts of the course of the accession negotiations see e.g. Friis and Jarosz (2000), UKIE 
(2000a), Mayhew (2002, 2002a).
110 There were 37 Task Groups divided along the sectoral lines, with two groups, no 32 and 34, in charge 
of assessment of the negotiation positions in the context of their socio-economic and budgetary effects.
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Nonetheless, the formula of the Partnership Groups had serious predicaments. 
Although the partners could participate in the preparatory meetings before the screening 
sessions111, they had not received access to the proposals of the Polish position papers. 
Moreover, the documents, based on which the social partners were to prepare their 
position, included only the acquis (list of the EU legal acts) without Polish equivalents. 
The latter were prepared by the Negotiation Team in order to identify potential 
negotiation problems. The empty screening tables (with the acquis in a given policy 
field only) required thorough analysis in view of their consistency with Polish law. Only 
then could the interest groups give an opinion on the prospect of adaptation in a 
particular policy domain. This was very difficult considering that some portions of the 
acquis were very extensive, such as in the Free Movement of Goods, where the acquis 
amounted to more than 1000 pages. Additionally, the social partners received them just 
a few days before the preparatory meeting, during which the potential discrepancies 
with Polish law were to be discussed. Clearly, such an approach required considerable 
administrative effort, exceeding the capacities of most of the Polish interest groups.
The working rules of the Partnership Groups, motivated by the necessity to keep 
Poland’s position confidential, practically disabled the formal consultation process in 
the initial stage of the negotiations. Hardly any social organization in Poland was able to 
analyze the pre-accession documents, especially given that they arrived without a Polish 
translation. For instance, one of the largest business organizations, the Business Centre 
Club, employing around 30 personnel, had just one employee dealing with issues
1 1 a
related to accession . As the UKIE itself argued, the Partnership Groups had not 
become a platform for dialogue between the government and the social actors (UKIE 
1998b).
111 The Commission sent to the candidates two lists of acquis, A and B, for each negotiation area. List 'A' 
included major legal acts in force, such as Treaty provisions, directives and regulations. Screening list 'B1 
listed the Commission’s recommendations, Community programs, examples of the international 
agreements between the EU and the third countries and other documents, often of an informative 
character and not binding for the member states. During the multilateral meeting the applicants' 
delegations were briefed on the key legal acts in the chapter. At the following bilateral meeting the 
candidates presented to the Commission their declarations with respect to the extent of implementation of 
the acquis in the policy area and qualification of each legal act as either 'fully implemented’, ‘no 
transposition necessary’, ‘partially implemented’ or ‘not transposed yet’ (see e.g. UKIE 2000a).
112 Interview with the Member of the Organizers' Council of BCC in March 2006.
112
The Department of Support for the Accession Negotiations thus proposed the 
establishment of new forms of dialogue. All of these assumed the revealing to the 
partners of the content of the negotiation papers. The ‘Post-screening’ meetings would 
allow for the inclusion of those partners in the negotiations, which could assist with 
their expertise, leading to the preparation of the appropriate expert opinion on 
problematic topics. The ‘Triangle Tables’ would allow the NGOs and sectoral 
ministries to meet the representatives of the Chief Negotiator, thus expanding the 
Partnership Groups formula. The ‘Cost Analysis Group’ would involve representatives 
of business environments and assess the costs of adaptation in particular areas (UKIE 
1998b). However, apart from the few meetings of the Triangle Tables, without any 
tangible output, other initiatives remained just on the paper. The UKIE official 
argued113 that the only institutionalized form of social consultations was taking place 
during the screening phase of negotiations in the framework of the Groups, at the stage 
of formulation of Poland's negotiation positions. Although contacts with the social and 
in particular business environments had not ceased in the later phases of the process, but 
rather to the opposite (UKIE 2000a: 59), later consultations took place on an ad hoc 
basis and in a more informal fashion.
As mentioned above, the social organizations in the majority of branches, apart 
from the industrial or large business organizations, at the end of the 1990s were still 
rather weak if compared with the Western European standards. They rarely disposed 
sufficient administrative and financial capacities to gather indispensable knowledge for 
active participation in such a consultation process. Demanding procedural rules 
discouraged the organizations from participation in the created channels of 
communications with the authorities, which both sides, the interest groups and the 
government, have actually complained about. A business organization representative 
admitted114 that, due to insufficient flows of information, the lack of a branch-oriented 
organization formula of the business interest organizations (apart from the 
Confederation of Polish Employers), and the insufficient interests and organizational 
capacities of particular branches, the organizations representing them were underused in 
the accession negotiations.
113 Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession 
Negotiations in March 2006.
114 Interview with a Member of the Organizers' Council of BCC, member of the Economic and Social 
Committee of the European Union in March 2006.
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Officials participating in the accession negotiations, in turn, have complained 
that on a number of occasions there were no social partners to communicate with during 
the accession negotiations115. In an interview with Businessman Magazine the Chief 
Negotiator, Jan Truszczynski, admitted (Businessman Magazine 2003) that with regard 
to some issues, despite contacting the relevant interest groups enquiring whether the 
transition period in a particular area would be desirable from their perspective, there 
was no or a negative reaction. In this context, Truszczynski presented the example of 
hen breeders. Although at the beginning of the negotiations they were not interested in 
any transition periods, once other groups "started to receive transition periods", they 
demanded one too. On this occasion they threatened the negotiators that they and their 
families would vote against accession if no transition period was negotiated with respect 
to the size of hens' cages. It is worth noting that in the Negotiator's words the transition 
periods were negotiated "for a particular interest group" rather than out of objective 
need.
The objective obstacle to systemic solutions with respect to contacts between the 
government and interest groups was the particular dynamics of the negotiations 
themselves. The schedule of talks was tight and not entirely controllable by the Polish 
Negotiating Team. On a number of occasions the position had to be worked out in a 
timeframe dictated by international rather than domestic dynamics. In such cases only 
the best organized groups were able to provide constructive contribution to the 
negotiations within the required time limits. Most of the groups simply lacked the 
potential to assess and correct such complex issues as the negotiation positions. Another 
problem noticed by the business interest representatives was the passivity of the Polish 
companies and their inability to organize, as well as underestimation of the EU as a 
forum for dialogue116.
Nevertheless, as Jan Truszczynski admitted (cited by Businessman Magazine 
2003), "[djuring the negotiations the Team of Chief Negotiator came under pressure
115 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) in the Office of the Committee of European Integration in September 2008; Interview 
with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession Negotiations in 
March 2006.
116 Interview with a Member of the Establishes' Board of BCC in January 2006; Interview with the 
Member of the Organizers' Council of BCC in March 2006.
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from various social groups, including entrepreneurs, demanding transition periods in 
various areas"117. Moreover, it was not only the groups, but also the negotiators, who 
benefited from such contacts. Applications for each transition period sent to the 
Commission had to be thoroughly documented. As the Chief Negotiator admitted, the 
insufficient analytical capacities within the government condemned authorities to using 
the impact analyses on implementation of particular sections of the acquis prepared by 
the independent sources and interest groups' organizations. Clearly, there was no way to 
prevent such analyses being biased in favor of particular industries' interests. Often, 
they predicted a catastrophic picture of Poland's economy in case there was no transition 
period appropriate in length acquired. The negotiators realized this but had no choice 
but to use the available sources of information. Additionally, "these anticipations have 
often fallen on fertile political ground" (Truszczynski cited in Warzecha 2003). For 
instance, producers of generic drugs argued that in case of failure to negotiate a 
transition period, the prices of pharmaceuticals will plummet. Such an argument was 
difficult to disregard for any politician118.
Another factor was the position of the government employees themselves. The 
Ministry of Economy, dealing with a number of important negotiation areas, was to a 
large extent organized according to the sectoral areas. As a remnant of the old 
communist times, personnel employed in these departments often came from particular 
sectors and naturally identified with the sectoral problems. Such a situation concerned 
mainly the 'sensitive' industries, such as mining, steel production or energy. Thus, in the 
absence of clear and transparent procedures for interest representation, the ministry 
officials themselves could play a vital role in promoting industry interests. In general, 
the insufficient administrative and analytical capacities of the Negotiation Team opened 
a rather effective channel for the interest groups to pressure for their demands to be 
considered during the negotiations119.
There were abundant examples of such informal cooperation during the later 
stages of the accession negotiations. For instance, there were just two employees of the 
Ministry of Finance, who did not speak any English, in charge of the analytical works
117 My own translation from Polish.
118 In the end, Poland (like Lithuania and Cyprus), negotiated a transition period with respect to the 
registration of pharmaceuticals.
119 Interview with a Member of the Organizers' Council of BCC in March 2006.
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on the area of Taxation. The analysis of the effects of implementation of the EU 
regulations on Polish companies was thus prepared by the National Association of the 
Tobacco Industry (whose members were the eight largest tobacco corporations in the 
Polish market). The study showed that in Poland's border regions nearly 90% of 
cigarettes would be sold without excise tax, had the rise of excise come into force 
together with accession. Such a result justified Poland's application for the transition
190period with respect to excise tax on tobacco .
Similarly, the impact assessment with regard to implementation of the EU 
environmental regulations on Poland's large combustion plants was prepared by the 
company Energoproject121, whose costs were covered by the combustion plants rather 
than Poland's government.122 Another example presented the adoption of the negotiation 
position on safety at work regulations (Social Policy and Employment chapter). Initial 
expert opinions of the Ministry of Labour did not anticipate any costs of adaptation and 
Irena Boruta (see Annex 2.3.), in charge of the chapter, even expressed her support for 
implementation of better working conditions in workplaces. However, the Business 
Centre Club prepared another analysis, which showed high costs of adaptation, 
particularly for SMEs123. Eventually, after protests by enterprises, the adopted final 
version of the negotiation position included an application for transition periods with 
regard to implementation of the Council Directives 89/655/EEC and 89/656/EEC 
(UKIE 2000: 265)124. All these cases show effective lobbying exercised by the business 
groups. Without their active position, transition periods at least in a few areas, such as 
the excise tax on tobacco, pharmaceuticals and safety and work conditions, would be 
highly unlikely.
120 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) in the Office of the Committee of European Integration in September 2008.
121 Ibid.
122 Poland received a transition period with respect to the implementation of Council Directive 
2001/80/EC on the reduction of emission of air polluting substances from large combustion plants until 1 
January 2015 for sulphur dioxide, and until 31 December 2017 for emission of dust and nitrogen oxide.
123 Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession 
Negotiations in March 2006.
124 Poland actually received a transition period until 31 December 2005 for adaptation with respect to 
hygiene and safety conditions at work (motivated by the high costs of adaptation for SME).
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Apart from the informal initiatives of the business groups, the Negotiation Team 
and the Chief Negotiator, supported by the staff at the UKIE125, launched the 
programme “Understanding negotiations”. It was based on the formula of regional 
conferences devoted to the particular negotiation issues especially important in a 
specific territory (see UKIE 2000a 59-68). However, similarly to the previous activities 
undertaken by governmental bodies, the programme was restricted to ‘informing’ 
society rather than ‘consulting’ (UKIE 1999c) and did not bring any concrete results in 
terms of formulation of the negotiation positions. Their value, however, laid in the 
dissemination of general knowledge about the ongoing political processes as well as 
increasing awareness of the changes that Poland was to encounter after accession. Thus, 
although these actions may be seen as insignificant from a particular interest group's 
perspective, it may be argued that they did contribute positively to the results of the 
accession referendum, a primary concern of the Chief Negotiator.
In the context of adaptation to the EU, the cosmetics industry and 
pharmaceuticals were perceived as the most active groups. The interviewed 
entrepreneurs, however, argued that should the branches be represented by strong 
business organizations such as Lewiatan or BCC, the chances for more favorable 
negotiation results would be higher. Poland could have won more also in such areas as 
milk quotas126. However, long transition periods in fields such as Competition policy 
and investments in the Special Economic Zones, suggest that the existence and 
perseverance of interest groups did matter for the results of the negotiations. The 
members of the Negotiation Team would, however, meet only the most determined and 
best-organized representatives of the social groups, to which employers and some 
sectoral organizations belonged. The latter would therefore have most influence in the 
accession negotiations (Marody 2001:29). The following case study chapters will 
examine these cases in greater detail.
125 The formal position in the governmental structure of the Plenipotentiary of the Government for the 
accession negotiations was under the Prime Minister, within the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The 
Chief Negotiator had at his disposal a department in the Chancellery. Apart from that, the Department of 
Support for Accession Negotiations (DONA) within the structures of the Office of the Committee of the 
European Integration also reported to the Chief Negotiator and completed a significant part of the 
analytical work related to preparation of the negotiation positions and so-called dossier of the negotiation 
problems.
126 Interview with the Deputy President of BCC in January 2006, and with a member of the Establishes' 
and Organizers' Board of BCC, member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European Union in 
March 2006.
117
Conclusions
Policy actions in the post-communist countries are shaped to a large extent by 
institutions inherited from the communist times as well as their past experiences, norms 
and ‘ways of doing things’. Due to the institutional legacies of the “socialist corporatist
177system” it has proven very difficult to establish a coherent system of interest 
representation and mediation in post-communist Poland. Dominance of the communist- 
type networks of central state bureaucracy and industry corporations has for several 
years overshadowed the need for broader Western-type interest associations and 
negotiations, which have remained underdeveloped.
The post-communist governments, locked into the compromise between NSZZ 
Solidarity (a trade union) and the communist elite, have not managed to establish a fully 
democratic Westem-style system of interest representation and mediation. Although the 
basic institutional framework developed eventually, the new civil society remained for a 
long time dominated by the trade unions with a large number of weak and dispersed 
associations and foundations.
Similarly, collective action during the first years of transition predominantly 
took the form of strikes and massive street demonstrations organized by union 
federations128. The old “socialist corporatist” bargaining forms re-emerged and 
dominated the state-society relations (Gomiak and Jerschina 1995), and the integration 
of labor into standard 'antagonistic' politics based on clashes and mediation of self- 
interested groups according to mutually accepted procedural rules had not developed 
(Ost 2005). The possibilities of effective social mediation for other interests were rather 
constrained and restricted to participation in the Tripartite Commission and 
consultations of the legal acts. The Commission, however, remained a hostage to the 
political situation and the incumbent government’s view on its role. In turn, the 
consultations of legal proposals left within discretion of the medium-level 
administrative officials129 were to a large extent a fa9ade.
127 A detailed explanation of its mechanism is provided in a further section of the paper.
128 For a detail account of social protests in the early 1990s, see Ekiert and Kubik (1999) and for 
discussion Kramer (2002).
129 Interview with a Board Member of Polish Humanitarian Action in March 2006.
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As a consequence, Poland entered negotiations with the EU unprepared in terms 
of application of a consistent approach towards social interests' demands in contentious 
policy fields. Despite these institutional predicaments, the economic interest groups 
played a vital role in the accession negotiations on Poland's membership in the 
European Union. Their activities, however, took place to a large extent beyond the 
formal channels of communication with the government. Those established at the 
beginning of the negotiation process have proven a ‘window-dressing’ rather than a real 
platform for interest mediation. The specific dynamics of the accession negotiations, 
their quasi-secret character and knowledge-intensity, contributed to the failure in 
designing a fair and transparent system of interest mediation. It promoted informal 
modes of interest mediation, which in turn seemed to endow some groups with undue 
privileges in terms of promoting their fractional interests.
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CHAPTER IY
Social  actors and  the  accessio n  negotiations
on  Taxation
Introduction
Taxation, in terms of legal and non-legal policy initiatives, belongs to one of the 
most dynamic areas of the European Union. At the same time, despite deepening 
integration elsewhere, most attempts to regulate tax competition collectively have been 
unsuccessful (Dehejia and Genschel 1998: 6). The apparent failure to achieve progress 
in tax coordination130 (Kemmerling and Seils forthcoming) has been perceived as an 
impediment to the removal of remaining distortions in the Single Market, but also as a 
factor contributing to unemployment and even creating opportunities for tax base 
erosion (CEC 1996: 10). A more comprehensive approach to tax coordination within the 
EU has been called for since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, by 2001 there were still 
fifteen separate sets of national tax rules in the EU. In the view of Commissioner 
Bolkestein, they created “costly inefficiencies and a major problem to [the] functioning 
of the internal market” (Bolkestein 2001). These difficulties are likely to become 
aggravated in the enlarged EU through the mere fact that unanimity voting remains the 
legal basis for decisions taken in the Council. Yet, the political sensitivity of the tax 
issue and conflicts of preferences between winners and losers in the tax competition 
game (Radaelli and Kraemer forthcoming: 1) prevented major qualitative change in the 
EU tax policy-making to take place prior to the 2004 enlargement.
130 While some authors argue that the EU has achieved a degree of success in curtailing ‘harmful’ targeted 
competition in the form of preferential tax regimes. See Kemmerling and Seils forthcoming.
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This chapter examines to what extent these roughly sketched features of the 
Community tax regime have determined the effectiveness of the EU in casting its 
demands for adaptation on the CEE applicants. The majority of policy prerogatives with 
respect to taxes remain within the competencies of national governments and there are 
relatively few hard Community laws in the field although the degree of tax 
harmonization in the EU varies across tax sub-areas. The harmonization in indirect 
taxation is more advanced than with respect to direct taxes.
Hence, in line with the framework outlined in the Introduction to this research 
project, the Taxation negotiation chapter represents a ‘thin’ acquis area. Nonetheless, 
the conjuncture that this should make for easy accession negotiations seems premature. 
Legal approximation in the tax field raised considerable domestic resistance, in 
particular from business environments expecting to incur its costs. Numerous economic 
interest groups opposed adaptation in taxation on the grounds that the related raise of 
tax rates (in particular in excise taxes and value added tax) would impair companies’ 
sales or even put whole sectors in jeopardy.
The case of approximation of the excise tax on tobacco analyzed here 
demonstrates how persistent lobby activities of well-organized and economically 
powerful interest groups reduced the size of win-sets of the Polish negotiators in the tax 
area. The parallel international and domestic negotiations with the interest groups 
presented Putnam’s two-level game logics at work (Putnam 1988). And yet, in spite of 
the need for domestic-level talks and political compromises, provisional closure of the 
Taxation chapter has proven easier than in several other areas, notably the Competition 
policy. While Poland’s government was able to demonstrate strong opposition at home 
impairing its adaptation abilities, the thin acquis allowed the Commission mitigation of 
its demands for special treatment. In line with Putnam’s prediction (Putnam 1988), the 
combination of the thin acquis communautaire and strong prior interests opposing 
approximation efforts created dynamics reinforcing Poland’s claims for temporary 
derogation. However, although the presence of the transition period initially weakened 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality, understood as an ability to instigate change in 
the applicant countries, it seemed also to facilitate Poland’s future adaptation. 
Remarkably, the generous negotiation deal seemed to lead to better compliance than in 
cases where the Commission managed to impose the strict version of its pre-accession 
conditionality and secure candidate’s assent for adaptation prior to accession.
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The following section discusses context of development and characteristics of 
the acquis in the tax field with particular focus on approximation of the excise tax on 
cigarettes. Further, adaptation requirements in the pre-accession period are outlined. 
The next section examines the course of accession negotiations on the adjustment of 
excise duty rates for manufactured tobacco and the role of social groups in shaping 
Poland’s negotiation position. The last section outlines the implementation record and 
fulfillment of Poland’s pre-accession commitments with respect to indirect taxation. 
The conclusions will sum up the empirical findings in the context of the theoretical 
framework utilized in this research project.
1. Tax approximation in the European Union
The long-standing objective of coordination in indirect taxation was prevention 
of excessive differences in tax systems from distorting the Single Market131. Undue 
variation in the tax rates could bring about migration of the national tax bases in search 
of the most favorable tax regime, and prompt the member countries to embark on 
‘harmful tax competition’ for capital.
The Commission has argued that the removal of regulatory and technical barriers 
to trade has left tax coordination within the EU as “an increasingly important residual 
factor” preventing full realization of the common market programme (CEC 1996: 6). 
Moreover, the introduction of the common currency has exposed differences between 
the national tax systems, increasing the role of tax rates in enterprises’ decision-making 
over capital allocation (CEC 1997: 2). Thus, since the second half of the 1990s the 
Commission has started to stress the urgency of removing hurdles to indirect tax 
coordination (Radaelli 2003: 518). On the other hand, harmonization of direct taxes 
between the EU member countries was to close the loopholes permitting tax evasion 
and to prevent double taxation.
The degree of tax harmonization in the EU varies across tax sub-areas. The 
original EEC Treaty gives the Community competence over indirect taxes only132,
131 This aspect regulates Art. 93 on VAT and excise duties.
132 Indirect taxes are levied on trade and production activities.
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leaving the decisions over direct taxation to the discretion of the member countries. 
Article 93 (ex art. 99) of the Treaty states that “the Council shall, acting unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, adopt provisions for the harmonization of legislation 
concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the 
extent that such harmonization is necessary to ensure the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market within the time limit laid down in Article 14” (until 
31 December 1992).
In turn, the national governments retain sole responsibility in the field of direct 
taxation, i.e. tax on personal incomes and company profits. Few Community regulations 
on direct taxes have been based on Article 94 (ex. 100) of the Treaty. It anticipates 
common action and approximation of merely such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions, which directly affect the common market.
The secondary laws in the field of taxation are rather sparse. Considering the 
above Treaty provisions, the bulk of legally binding common instruments concern 
indirect taxes, VAT and excise duties, which lie at the core of EU Taxation policy. Even 
in these sub-areas, however, the Community body of law is riddled with derogations 
and exemptions applicable to particular member states as well as the taxable products or 
services133. Apart from these, the acquis contains few provisions on mutual assistance 
and administrative cooperation and international travels (see Annex 4.1). The 
coordination of direct taxation has far thinner legal underpinning and bilateral 
agreements between the member countries prevail. In addition to those, the non­
legislative instruments, such as the code of conduct for business taxation, have been 
gradually gaining importance (see Radaelli 2003). They allow for achievement of some 
progress in harmonization by getting around the unanimity rule in highly sensitive tax 
areas.
In general, tax initiatives undertaken by the EU have remained to a large extent 
isolated actions, guided by political rather than better policy logic (Radaelli 2003). In 
particular the comparison with cases examined in the further chapters, Competition
133 Apart from the framework regulations, a large number of laws is applicable to the specific member 
countries.
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Policy and Fisheries, exposes the thinness of the acquis and the absence of a common 
EU policy target in this policy area. In the field of indirect taxation, where the 
legislative actions are embedded in the Treaty provisions, harmonization is relatively 
more advanced. Yet, as the Commission pointed out, some degree of success in building 
a body of legislation in indirect taxes, in particular with reference to VAT and excise 
duties, merely highlighted the absence of coherent tax policy on direct taxation (CEC 
2001a: 3).
Common regulations on excise duties on cigarettes
Common regulations with respect to excise duties were enacted in 1993 with a 
view to remove fiscal borders in the intra-EU trade and prevent possible trade 
distortions occurring due to different structures and rates of excise taxes. Excise duty 
belongs to indirect taxes applied on consumption or use of certain products but in 
contrast to VAT, these are mainly specific taxes, expressed as a monetary amount per 
quantity of the product134. The tax applies to all goods produced in the EU territory or 
imported from the third countries, which fall under the scope of the excise directives.
The key legal act in the area is Council Directive (92/12/EEC) from 25 February 
1992 regulating the holding, movement and monitoring of products subject to excise 
duty135 and is referred to as the ‘horizontal directive’. Additionally, the acquis contains 
also ‘structural’ and ‘specific’ directives regulating the approximation of excise duties 
levied on three groups of products: manufactured tobacco , alcohol and alcoholic 
drinks137 and mineral oils138. Every four years (since 2002) the Council examines excise 
tax rates, looking at their impact on the proper functioning of the single market and their 
real value. The EU member countries have retained the right to introduce or maintain 
indirect taxes on products outside the scope of the excise directives provided that those
134 The excise tax for cigarettes contains also an ad valorem component, see later.
135 With a view to simplify and liberalize the rules on the intra-Community movement of goods the 
Commission submitted on 2 April 2004 a proposal for amendment of the Directive 92/12/EEC on the 
general arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of 
such products (submitted in application of Art. 27 of Directive 92/12/CEE) [COM(2004) 227-2].
136 Council Directive 2002/10/EC of 12 February 2002 amending Directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC and 
95/59/EC as regards the structure and rates of excise duty applied on manufactured tobacco.
137 Council Directive 92/83/EEC from 19 October 1992 and Council Directive 92/84/EEC from 19 
October 1992.
138 Council Directive 92/81/EEC from 19 October 1992 and Council Directive 92/82/EEC from 19 
October 1992.
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taxes do not give rise to border-crossing formalities and do not have discriminatory 
character.
The Community regime on cigarette taxation currently in operation was 
established in 1972 and revised in 2002, right before enlargement to the East. The three 
key directives introduced since the 1970s139 assumed approximation of excise tax rates 
and structures across the member countries with a view to prevent distortion of 
competition and to safeguard free determination of the maximum retail selling price 
(Van Driessche 2006)140. The EU members were obliged to introduce the tax combining 
both specific and ad valorem elements. The specific part of excise duty represented a 
fixed amount per 1000 cigarettes of a value between 5% and 55% of the total tax (excise 
and VAT)141. The ad valorem component has been calculated as a percentage of the tax 
inclusive retail selling price (TIRSP). These two tiers apply to cigarettes of all price 
categories.
Apart from harmonizing the tax structure, the EU directives introduced a 
minimum level of excise tax incidence at the level of 57% of the TIRSP. The Most 
Popular Price Category (MPPC)142 serves as a reference for establishment of these tax 
levels. The minimum tax burden was increased during 2002 revision, which added a 
new element to the system, namely a requirement that the total excise burden also 
exceeds 64 euros per 1000 units. The states with the minimum excise incidence over 95 
euros per 1000 units (101 euros per 1000 units from 1 July 2006) were exempt from this 
additional requirement.
139 Council Directive 92/79/EEC on approximation of taxes on cigarettes, Council Directive 92/80/EEC 
on approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes and Council Directive 
95/59/EEC regulating taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured 
tobacco. They were later codified by the Council Directive 2002/10/EC of 12 February 2002.
140 These goals do not cover public health considerations.
141 Pursuant to Art. 16 (2) of Council Directive 95/59/EC of 27 November 1995.
142 The brands of cigarettes representing the MPPC vary across the Community.
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Graph 4 . 1 The structure of harmonized excise tax on cigarettes in the EU
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The 2002 reform presented a considerable revision of the system, in particular 
for those countries well below the 57% margin, such as the candidates for membership. 
The CEE applicants commenced their accession negotiations with the prospect of the 
necessary adjustments leading to achievement of 57% of excise tax incidence. This was 
already significantly higher than existent tax rates in a number of prospective members. 
The imposition of the new rules in the midst of accession talks, clearly triggered by the 
prospect of opening the single market to the CEECs, created a novel challenge. The 
Commission has conditioned the provisional closure of the negotiation chapter on 
reaching a compromise with respect to the implementation of the 2002/10/EC Directive 
(2002). Such revision of the acquis has presented an exemplary case of the ‘moving 
target’ character of the membership criteria.
Nonetheless, it is not for the first time that the EU tax regime has evolved under 
the ‘threat’ of imminent enlargement. In fact, the subsequent Community expansions 
created an institutional context against which the reforms of the tax system were 
conducted. The six founding EEC members introduced the initial framework for 
cigarette taxation on 19 December 1972, merely twelve days before accession of the 
UK, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark (Cnossen 2003: 2). After the 1973 
enlargement the reforms of the excise tax system stalled due to the political deadlock 
between the new and old member countries with divergent systemic preferences. While
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the former strongly favoured the specific taxation regime, the founding members 
inclined towards an ad valorem system. These disagreements were compounded by the 
accession of the southern countries, Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), all in 
favour of the ad valorem excise duty system. While the southern EU members produce 
their national brands from their own, cheaper national tobacco, the ad valorem system 
favors these products over cigarettes of international brands, produced with more 
expensive tobacco.
Eventually, the establishment of the single market created sufficient pressure for 
tax harmonization. It was broadly recognized that the continuation of large tax 
differentials would encourage cross-border shopping and bootlegging (Cnossen 2003: 
2). The common excise tax on cigarettes system was established as a result of a series of 
compromises struck between the southern and northern member countries. However, 
despite undertaken measures, by 2004 significant differences between the cigarette 
retail prices persisted. In 2001 the Commission stated that “[a]n analysis of the 
evolution of prices and excise rates for tobacco products in the European Union shows 
that there are still considerable differences between Member States” (CEC 200If: 3).
Graph 4.2: Retail prices of cigarettes (in EUR/MPPC) in the EU-25 on 1 January 2004
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As shown in the above graph, retail prices variation between the EU member 
countries in 2004 was still considerable. For instance, cigarettes in the UK and Ireland 
were almost twice more expensive than in Spain and Italy. Although the new members 
have consistently lower prices than the EU-15, notably Cyprus and Malta have 
maintained prices higher than some ‘old’ EU members143.
Derogations from the acquis enjoyed by the old member countries remain a 
particularly relevant feature of the Community tax regime in the context of effectiveness 
of the EU conditionality applied towards the CEE candidates for membership. The first 
transition periods for adaptation have already been incorporated in the initial Council 
Directives, which anticipated a two-year transition period (from 1993) for Spain and 
derogation for Portugal in the regions of Azores and Madeira144 ( 92/79/EEC, Article 
3,4). The directives ( 92/79/EEC; 92/80/EEC) also authorized France to prolong 
application of the reduced excise rates in Corsica until December 1997, and after its 
application for extension full compliance was deferred until December 2002. After yet 
another plea for extension of the transition period, Corsica was obligated to assure full 
compliance only by the end of 2009. Spain and Greece were also allowed to delay 
compliance with the minimum excise burden set by the new tax directive (2002) until 
31 December 2007 (Cnossen 2003: 2).
143 This lack of uniformity may be assigned to various factors, such as derogations from the acquis, 
varying VAT rates and levels of trade margins in different member countries.
144 Portugal was allowed to apply a reduced rate of up to 50% less than the 57% minimum rate set by the 
Directive to cigarettes consumed in Azores and Madeira, made by small-scale manufacturers, each of 
whose annual production did not exceed 500 tonnes.
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Graph 4.3.: Incidence of excise tax on cigarettes within the EU-25 on 1 January 2004
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Apart from lawful derogations, a number of EU countries have consistently 
failed to achieve compliance with the acquis. France, for instance, for many years 
flouted the requirement to impose a single tier excise regime for cigarettes and 
discriminated between two types (dark tobacco and Virginia tobacco) cigarettes even 
after the ECJ ruling that it was in breach of its responsibilities under the Treaty of 
Rome145 (Cnossen 2003: 7).
In some cases, non-compliance occurred due to the policy-making dilemmas 
related to implementation of the minimum excise tax incidence, as demonstrated by the 
Swedish and UK adaptation history. Sweden, upon its accession to the EU in 1995, 
obtained a three-year transition on achievement of the 57% share of the excise tax until 
the end of 1998146. In a move towards alignment in 1997 the excise duty was raised to
145 France complied with the acquis only in 2003.
146 From the initial level of 49.1%. While Sweden had among the most expensive cigarettes in the EU, it 
was caused by the high trade margins and VAT rather than the excise tax.
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twice its initial level, resulting in an overall retail price increase by 43% (NOMISMA 
2000: 20). However, this resulted in a drop in official sales and an increase of 
smuggling as well as escalation of organized crime. The government, unable to counter 
these effects through increasing surveillance and controls, decided in April 1998 to 
reduce the excise tax rate by 27% and take a more gradual approach to adaptation to the 
EU minimum tax incidence. Until 2004 it remained below the EU minimal threshold.
The UK encountered similar problems but its government decided to maintain 
the excise tax at one of the highest levels in the EU (KPMG 2005: 91). As the result of a 
series of excise tax hikes between 1996 and 1998 the UK experienced one of the highest 
black market shares in cigarette sales. Estimates point to the UK mainland cigarette 
smuggling and cross-border purchases of cigarettes, which increased from just 6% of 
total UK cigarette consumption in 1995 to 30% by 2001 (Cnossen 2003: 7). These cases 
demonstrate that fast adaptation to the EU through the alignment of cigarette excise 
prices may also carry the viable risk of decreasing governments’ revenues due to the 
development of trade in cigarettes from unregulated sources. For this reason the 
candidates for membership faced a challenge to achieve an optimal balance between the 
adaptation objective and the speed at which alignment occurs in order to minimize 
collateral effects and maximize income.
To sum up, the EU competencies in taxation are not extensive. The common 
solutions in this field have been hampered by a lack of consensus on the optimal level 
of tax coordination between the EU members, collective action problems of defection 
and distributive conflicts. The unanimity principle forcing “all stakeholders to 
compromise” (CEC 2007) and the political sensitivity of the tax issue have compounded 
difficulties with coordination. The disagreement about the policy content originates not 
only in widely differing tax systems, developed by the member countries as a result of 
their differences in economic and social structures. The EU member states also have 
various perceptions about the role of taxation in general or one of the taxes in particular. 
For this reason, it is difficult to define the end result of tax policy coordination (Radaelli 
2003: 516). These problems have prevented approximation even in those areas where 
the common legal framework was eventually established. However, failure to secure a
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degree of tax uniformity before enlargement147, the scope of national interpretations of 
the common rules, and numerous derogations granted to the ‘old’ members left the open 
question of viability and legitimacy of demands for policy coordination directed 
towards the CEECs prior to accession.
2. Cigarette taxation in Poland and key vested interests
As discussed in the previous section, the raising of excise tax on cigarettes may 
have negative consequences for the budgetary revenues. This is particularly important 
for Poland and more generally in the CEE case, where the role of excise taxes in the 
total budgetary revenues has been increasing (see Table 4.1.). Cnossen (2003) 
demonstrated that both in Poland and Hungary revenues from cigarette taxation (as a 
percentage of the total budgetary revenues) are higher than the EU average and 
countries such as Germany, France or even Spain (with Greece considerably above the 
average). Therefore, their loss would also be relatively more harmful for the state’s 
financial condition. This growth is even more meaningful in the context of progressing 
integration with the EU and thus decreasing the role of the customs duties, which in 
1994 provided 4.9% of budgetary revenues and in 2001 only 2.9%. These figures for 
excise tax were 14.6% and 20.5% respectively148. At the same time, as graph 4.3 in the 
previous section demonstrated, the rate of Polish excise tax on cigarettes in the wake of 
accession was the lowest in the EU with the retail prices also well below the EU 
average. The high elasticity of cigarette consumption and the practical unfeasibility of 
complete prevention of the contraband (as the cases of Sweden and UK demonstrated) 
made the sharp rises of excise tax on cigarettes related to accession a controversial 
topic.
147 The debate on the simplification of the tax structure was reassumed with renewed impetus only in the 
beginning of 2007 and coincided with the publication of the report on the reduced VAT rates in the 
member states, published by DG TAXUD (Copenhagen Economics 2007). The main conclusion of the 
study was that a single uniform VAT rate (per Member State) is the best policy choice from the economic 
perspective. See Copenhagen Economics (2007).
148 Data from the Ministry of Finance: www.mf.gov.pl
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Table 4.1.: Sources of budgetary revenues in Poland
Sources of budgetary revenues (in %)
r_ ----- ----
1994 2000 2001
VAT 24.4 38.1 37.6
Excise tax 14.6 20.1 20.5
Income tax from legal persons u . i 12.4 9.4
Income tax from physical persons 28.2 17.0 16.7
Customs 7.9 3.7 2.9
Profits of the National Bank of Poland 3.8 1.6 3.5
Revenues of the budgetary units 2.5 4.8 4.6
TOTAL 100 100 100
Source: www.mf.gov.pl
Excise tax is the main component of the cigarettes price and thus a key factor in 
the realization of sales by the tobacco industry. The transnational tobacco corporations 
have a clear interest in the prevention of cigarette price rises and have tried to influence 
governmental policies using various strategies, including the creation of new 
partnerships, use of supportive MPs, communication around tobacco tax issues and also 
the successful management of the differences in approaches used by individual 
companies regarding the taxation of tobacco products (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003). 
Szilagyi and Chapman (2003: 223) in their study of the Hungarian case of adaptation in 
the taxation area argue that these actions have been successful in delaying adaptation to 
the EU directive on the minimum tax levels of retail prices of cigarettes. The current 
and following sections discuss the strategies undertaken by the sector in Poland and 
their impact on the accession negotiations with the European Union.
Consolidation o f Poland's cigarette production sector in the 1990s
Tobacco production in Poland is highly concentrated, with the six largest players 
having 96% of the market in terms of cigarette sales (which by 2008 increased to 
99.8%). The tobacco industry represents a classic example of the small group, in which 
collective action problems, such as free riding, are less relevant due to the limited 
number of players (Olson 1965). What is more important in the context of this research 
project, enterprises in the sector managed to create an interest representation 
organization, which exerted strong pressures on the negotiators of the Accession Treaty, 
in particular with a view to prevent the steep excise tax rise after accession to the EU, 
which approximation with the acquis would entail. Tobacco industry’s success in 
imposing favored policy solution on the government and deferral of approximation with
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the tax acquis confirms the hypothesis about the impact of the prior domestic opposition 
on the terms of accession and also the quality of compliance.
The production of tobacco was nationalized in the early 1920s, when the Polish 
Tobacco Monopoly took control of the companies operating in Poland. After the war, 
the industry remained in the hands of the state with production and sales activities 
centralized under the umbrella of the Union of Tobacco Industry. The post-communist 
governments have started to transform existent tobacco factories into the limited 
liability enterprises under full control of the State Treasury since the early 1990s. In 
parallel, subsequent enterprises were signing strategic partnership agreements on 
producing cigarettes with international tobacco corporations. The multinational 
corporations, on whose license the tobacco producers operated in the 1990s, started 
successively purchasing their shares though joint-stock operations.
The privatization processes of the Polish tobacco industry carried out in the 
1990s has brought about considerable changes to the industry. By the end of the decade 
all existent factories were sold to foreign, multinational companies. Philip Morris, the 
first foreign investor, has remained the strongest player on the cigarettes market with 
nearly 36% of the market share in 2002 (see table below). Very soon after the systemic 
change (in 1992) Scandinavian Tobacco invested in Poland by taking control of the 
factory in Lodz149. Further, in 1995 British American Tobacco, with 47 factories in 40 
countries150, signed a privatization agreement for a company in Augustow in North 
Poland, followed by Reemtsma, which in 1996 bought a plant in Poznan. Meanwhile, in 
1995 the factory in Radom signed an agreement with the French tobacco concern Seita 
and was re-named Altadis151 after the merger with Spanish Tabacalera in 1999. 
Gallagher, the UK-based company (until 2007) is the most recent investor, present in 
Poland since 2002 but with the fast growing market share.
Although most of these companies have their head offices in the European 
countries, their shareholders’ structure is particularly complex. They represent
149 Scandinavian tobacco until 2003 operated under the name, House of Prince Poland.
150 http://www.bat.com.pl
151 Altadis is the acronym of Alliance du Tabac et de la Distribution.
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multinational, highly profitable businesses, employing thousands of employees 
worldwide. Also in Poland tobacco producers represent large companies with 
reasonably high employment levels and economic power accruing due to the 
contribution of tobacco sales (through excise duties) to the state budget.
Table 4.2.: Market share of tobacco producers in the Polish market in 2002 (retail sales)
Lp. Producer M arket Employment Head Office 
share (in Poland)
1. Philip Morris International, Inc152 35,9 1800 US
2. Imperial Tobacco SA 17,3 630 UK
3. British American Tobacco (BAT) Polska SA 15,2 950 UK
4.
Altadis Polska SA 13,2 850 Spain (taken over in 
2008 by Imperial 
Tobacco Group PLC -  
UK)
5. Scandinavian Tobacco SA 12,8 850 Denmark (owned by BAT -  UK)
6.
Gallaher Polska Sp. z o.o.
1 •
1,8 550 UK (taken over in 2007 
by JT International -  
Switzerland)
7. Others 3.8153
Source: AC Nielsen
The changes of ownership have also instigated change in the industry 
representation. In 1994 the presidents of the tobacco firms organized a meeting in 
Augustow, during which they concluded an agreement on enactment of the National 
Association of Tobacco Producers (KSPT)154. The organization, active since 1995, 
associates all tobacco firms operating in Poland. According to the letter of its statute, it 
represents the interests of the Polish tobacco industry, develops contacts and provides a 
forum for exchange of information between its members and authorities (central and 
regional). It also conveys the opinions of its members to the appropriate decision­
makers155.
Apart from participation in the KSPT, which is a sectoral organization, the 
tobacco producers are active members of the largest organizations representing business
152 Operates in Poland through four companies: Philip Morris Polska S.A. (production of tobacco 
products); Philip Morris Polska Distribution Sp. z o.o. (sales, distribution, marketing); Philip Morris 
Polska Tobacco Sp. z o.o. (contracting, purchase, processing); and PMI Service Center Europe Sp. z o.o. 
(service of the European branches of Philip Morris).
153 The share of ‘others’ in 2006 went down to 0.2%.
154 Krajowe Stowarzyszenie Przemystu Tytoniowego (KSPT).
155 http://www.kspt.org.pl/info.php
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interests (see Chapter III), such as the Business Center Club (BCC), the British Polish 
Chamber of Commerce (BPCC), and the Polish Confederation of Private Employers 
"Lewiatan". The BPCC and BCC are particularly strong in terms of tobacco 
representation, since in both, all but one organization (Altadis in the former and Philip 
Morris in the latter) are their members. Other business organizations represent one or a 
few producers. Thus, tobacco corporations have clearly undertaken the strategy of 
multiplying their impact on the policy-makers through membership in major business 
representatives. The lack of problems with financial resources necessary for costly 
membership fees allowed them to pursue associative activities on a large scale.
3. EU pressures on adaptation in the tax area
Due to the virtual absence of common regulations in the field of direct taxation, 
the key issue in the context of Poland’s adaptation to the EU was harmonization of 
indirect taxes. Although the Commission has envisaged some degree of flexibility in 
consideration of “candidates’ ability to take on the obligations of the acquis 
communautaire”, it also planned to consider those solely in the areas where it would not 
jeopardize the proper functioning of the single market or lead to significant distortions. 
Thus, although certain issues could be open for negotiations (CEC 2001a: 20), in cases 
assessed by the Commission as detrimental to the common market, it reserved its right 
to recommend to the Council (“in line with existing negotiation principles”) refusal of 
granting the transition periods.
Similarly, the Commission secured implementation by the prospective members’ 
soft Community measures applied in the field of direct taxation. The member countries 
agreed in the Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, convening in June 2000156, that 
no transition periods would be granted in the course of accession negotiations with 
respect to the proposal for a directive on savings taxation and that no derogation would 
be possible from the exchange of information requirements. The Commission also 
articulated its expectation that the candidates would respect the principles of the Code
156 European Council in Santa Maria Da Feira (2000). Report from the ECOFIN Council to the European 
Council on the Tax Package, Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV.
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of Conduct for business taxation, which “all of the candidates have in principles 
undertaken to do...” (CEC 2001a: 20). Thus, the negotiation mandate framed by these 
recommendations anticipated that candidates would adopt practically all key measures 
on direct taxation while some degree of flexibility could be anticipated in indirect taxes, 
if well-motivated by the candidates.
The pre-negotiation conditionality in the tax fie ld
Poland’s first post-communist governments conducted the reforms of the 
taxation regime independently from the political project of deepening cooperation with 
the Community and in the further future, joining it. The reforms aimed at the removal of 
the obsolete and complicated communist tax schemes and were guided predominantly 
by concerns about the provision of appropriate budgetary revenues for the reforming 
economy (Balcerowicz 1992: 159). On the other hand, early efforts to introduce a 
Western-modeled tax system represented an attempt to copy the know-how and the best 
European standards rather than an instance of adaptation to a concrete policy blueprint.
The tax issue in the context of Poland-EU relations appeared for the first time in 
the text of the Association (Europe) Agreement signed in 1991157. The key focus of the 
accord was the removal of barriers to trade, including customs duties, with an aim to 
“promote expansion of trade and harmonious economic relations”. The Agreement 
anticipated a successive tariff reduction, leading in the future to the establishment of the 
free trade area, after the transitional period of a maximum ten years (Article 7). Apart 
from provisions on the abolition of customs duties on imports, the Europe Agreement 
(EA) set the framework for economic, political and cultural cooperation between the EU 
and the associate country. It has also mentioned indirect taxation, among other key 
areas, where the approximation of the Polish legal system was vital (Article 69). Yet, 
since no other specific provisions on legal adaptation in this field (as a number of 
others) followed the request, its leverage remained rather insignificant159.
157 The Europe Agreement (1991) entered into force on 1 February 1994.
158 Next to banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers at the 
workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection of health and life of humans, animals and 
plants, consumer protection, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment.
Similarly as in other policy areas, such as the Competition policy area, discussed in the Chapter VI.
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In its 1995 Common Market White Paper the Commission admitted that in the 
area of taxation “the pace of harmonization will have to be related to the development 
of the different tax bases and may have to take into account the need for temporary tax 
incentives to correct inherited allocative distortions” (CEC 1995: 4.11). Vague 
conditions in the Europe Agreement and a rather permissive attitude towards adaptation 
presented by the White Paper conveyed a message of little political pressure on 
adjustment in the field of indirect taxation until the start of the accession negotiations. 
The Commission praised the candidates on their progress in introducing the value added 
tax which “in several cases appears to be broadly in conformity with Community 
requirements” (CEC 1995: 4.15). Further, the Commission assessed that:
This is an example of a sector in which more has been achieved precisely because the 
system had the advantage of starting from scratch. On excise taxes, most CEECs cover the 
principal product ranges covered by Community legislation. Some rates will need to be 
lowered, but this will be tackled cautiously in view of the revenue considerations. (CEC 1995: 
4.15)
The Commission’s Opinions (Avis) on candidates’ progress in preparation for 
membership (CEC 1997b) formulated the tasks related to adaptation in the tax field in 
greater detail. The focus has also gradually shifted towards indirect taxation, since large 
differences in rates of these taxes could potentially distort competition in the expanded 
common market. Thus, the diagnosis of discrepancies between Poland’s and the EU tax 
systems160 presented in the Avis held that key problematic issues lay in the field of 
indirect taxation161. The Commission stressed that adjustment was critical, in particular 
with regard to the value added tax and excise duties on harmonized products. Since 
then, these two types of indirect taxes received most of the Commission’s attention in 
the subsequent pre-accession documents, as well as during the accession negotiations.
160 The Tax issue is present in the Commission’s Avis under the title “ability to assume the obligations of 
membership”, section “Economic and Fiscal Affairs”.
161 Direct taxation was considered as less of a problem since, according to the Commission, adjustment 
concerns implementation of the two company taxation Directives and the Arbitration Convention 
providing for a mechanism applied on the basis of reciprocity. Respective provisions can therefore by 
definition not be expected to exist before accession.
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With regard to VAT, the Commission described the system applicable in Poland 
since 1993162 (CEC 1997b: 62) as “a solid starting point” for future alignments with the 
Community acquis. In turn, the approximation of excise duties required upward 
adjustment to the Community minimum level, in particular in the case of tobacco 
products. The Commission also requested Poland to “adapt the structure and level of its 
excise rates, so they comply with the Community principle of non-discrimination 
between national products and those originating from other member states” (CEC 
1997b: 63). Apart from that the Commission recommended Poland’s government to set 
out a plan for implementation of the provisions of the White Paper, providing a “clear 
and detailed timetable for future adjustments of Polish excise legislation....” (CEC 
1997b: 63). The Commission urged Poland to ensure the correct application of the 
acquis in this respect and create an excise suspension (warehousing) system based on 
the Community model as soon as possible.
As a response to these requests, Poland’s National Programme of Preparation for
163Membership (NPPM) anticipated reinforcement of tax authorities, reform of tax 
inventory, real estate taxation and harmonization of indirect taxes (UKIE 1998: 10-1). 
Nonetheless, the 1998 NPPM focused to a larger extent on the effective forms of real 
estate taxation and improvement of the tax administration (priority 1 and 2) than on 
removal of legal discrepancies between Poland’s and EU legal order, in particular in 
relation to VAT and excise duties. Despite the acknowledged discrepancy between the 
Polish law and the acquis in scope of excise duty for cigarettes, the National Programme 
of Preparation for Membership did not foresee an adjustment in that respect in any pre­
defined time period. The topic was just briefly mentioned among “other issues” with the 
annotation that “implementation of the EU law may produce serious social and 
economic repercussions; therefore the process of adjustment needs to be preceded by 
the analysis of socio-economic effects [...]. It is in particular important since the 
adjustment process will concern taxation of, among others, products and services 
sensitive in social terms or sectors in need for restructuring” (UKIE 1998: 10-13). The 
analysis of the mentioned socio-economic repercussion was to be prepared by the end of
162 In 1993 the VAT regulation replaced the previous Turnover Tax.
163 Abbreviation from the Polish „Narodowy Progam Przygotowania do Czlonkowstwa”.
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1999 and only after that could the preparation of a proposal for legislative changes take 
place.
Despite these deficiencies of the NPPM, the Commission 1998 Regular Report 
(CEC 1998: 28) praised Poland, in particular for its progress in aligning VAT 
legislation and adjustment of VAT rates. At the same time, however, it noted that 
“substantial efforts are still required in the field of VAT and excise duties [...] ” and 
that “the adjustment of Poland’s excise duty law and the implementation of the 
Community provisions on Excise Duty suspension require further efforts” (CEC 1998: 
28). The improvement of administrative capacity was also pointed out as a necessary 
action. Nonetheless, the Commission seemed to be concerned mainly about 
approximation of the VAT regime, and specific issues concerning the alignment of 
excise duties, such as that on cigarettes and tobacco products, had not yet been on the 
accession agenda. The Commission called for more efforts to meet the EU minimum 
levels for excise duty rates on cigarettes and motor fuels only in the 1999 Report (CEC 
1999: 37), published shortly prior to the start of the accession negotiations in the tax 
field.
Approximation o f the excise duties on tobacco as a ‘negotiation problem ’
Poland delivered to Brussels its first negotiation position in Chapter 10, 
‘Taxation’, on 7 December 1999 and provisionally closed accession negotiations after 
28 months of talks on 21 March 2002. Polish negotiators from the outset expected 
difficult talks due to the existing discrepancies between the EU and Poland’s indirect 
tax rates, in particular VAT and excise duties164. Therefore, in the first version of the 
position paper (UKIE 2000: 231) Poland had already applied for four transition periods 
and two derogations from the acquis. The requests for delayed adaptation concerned the 
application of the reduced VAT rate on gastronomic services, lower than the EU 
minimum share of excise tax on tobacco products (Council Directive 92/79/EEC), the 
zero rate VAT on books and specialist magazines as well as maintenance of the specific 
discounts in excise duties on ecological fuels. Additionally, Poland asked for derogation 
with respect to the exclusion of the right to deduct tax for passenger cars and
164 Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession, Office 
of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) in June 2006.
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maintaining the specific tax regime applied to kerosene. Polish negotiators also reserved 
the right to maintain an increased threshold for taxable legal persons exempted from 
VAT at the level of 10,000 euros, as did other EU member countries.
Table 4.3: Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 10: Taxation
PROMOTER THE MILESTONES IN NEGOTIATIONS DATE
PL Poland’s Negotiation Position 19 October 1999
EU Draft Common Position of the European Union 19 November 1999
EU European Union Common Position 30 November 1999
PL Response to the European Commission’s queries concerning the 27 April 2000 
Negotiation Position on Taxation
EU European Union Common Position 27 September 2000
PL/EU Technical consultations in Brussels 29 January 2001
PL Supplement to Poland’s Negotiation Position 6 February 2001
PL Amendment to Poland’s Negotiation Position 29 March 2001
EU Draft Common Position of the European Union 20 November 2001
PL Amendment of the Negotiation Position 23 December 2001
EU European Union Common Position 7 March 2002
The harmonization of Poland’s excise duty on manufactured tobacco presented 
one of the key negotiation problems. Approximation of the Polish law with the acquis in 
this respect required implementation of the provisions of two key EU directives, 
Council Directive 92/79/EEC and 95/59/EC. Whereas the former obliged the member 
countries to “apply an overall minimum excise duty (specific duty plus ad valorem duty 
excluding VAT)” ( 92/79/EEC), the latter set the principles for harmonization of the 
structure of excise duty levied at different stages on manufactured tobacco (95/59/EC). 
As mentioned above, according to the provisions of the acquis, Poland needed to assure 
overall excise tax incidence of 57% of the retail selling price (including all taxes) for 
cigarettes of the price category most in demand ( 92/79/EEC, Article 2).
The Polish pre-accession excise tax regime was inconsistent with the provisions 
of the EU directives in two respects. Firstly, the excise tax was calculated as a specific 
component per unit only, and secondly, the overall level of tax was lower than the EU 
minimum. During the accession talks Polish negotiators declared that whereas 
implementation of the mixed system of tax calculation was due to take place in the year 
2000, reaching 57% of the minimum tax share in the retail selling price prior to 
accession would be impossible. The major challenge in adaptation presented a high 
degree of tax rate disparity in Poland and the EU. In 1999 the rate of excise tax levied 
on the most popular price category (MPPC) brand (“Klubowe”) in Poland reached 41%.
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Bridging the sixteen point difference in such a short time would trigger, according to the 
negotiators, a series of “interrelated negative market incidents” (UKIE 2000: 245).
The estimations of Poland’s government demonstrated that approximation with 
the acquis required an increase in excise duty on cigarettes by 188.7%, which would in 
turn raise the retail price of the most popular brands by 106.9% (UKIE 2000: 245). In 
cheaper brands the upward price shift would be even bigger. The Polish position paper 
argued that such an increase could effect a serious drop in lawful sales of cigarettes and 
subsequently a large-scale expansion of illegal trade and smuggling. The apparent 
cigarettes price elasticity could result in a 33% fall in their legal sales in 2002. In turn, 
this would decrease the profitability of the tobacco industry and accompanying sectors, 
which would likely lead to a reduction in economic activity and fall in employment. 
Eventually, around 60 thousand families dependent on the cultivation of tobacco would 
pay a high price for these negative developments. Fast alignment would also lead to 
greater pressure on inflation due to the high propensity for smoking and contribute to a 
drop in budgetary revenues. These arguments underpinned the Polish application for a 
five-year transition period (until 31 December 2007) for achievement of the 57% share 
of excise in the retail price of cigarettes. According to the Polish negotiators, such a 
period would be desirable from the perspective of market stability, budgetary revenues, 
industry and trade (UKIE 2000: 245).
Notwithstanding these arguments and numerous cases of derogations and 
transition periods with respect to the alignment of excise tax regime granted in the 
past165, the Commission’s answer to Poland’s request was negative. The Commission 
argued that granting a transitional period to Poland in this field could cause serious 
disturbances to the internal market, especially that the prices for cigarettes in Poland 
were already low in comparison to EU prices. These created a risk of fraud in relation to 
imports, given that upon accession such imports become intra-Community movements 
not subject to border controls (CEC 1999c). The Council repeated the Commission’s 
arguments in the EU Common Position from November 1999, which stated that 
“significant divergences in prices between Member States would jeopardize the
165 Discussed in more detail in section 2.
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functioning of the internal market and represent a serious risk of fraud and tax evasions” 
(Conference on Accession 1999a). In addition to that, unofficially the Commission 
admitted that Poland’s request for a transition period had been weakened by the fact that 
not all applicant countries (excluding Hungary) had asked for delayed adaptation with 
respect to the excise tax approximation (KSPT 2000). Similarly, the following 
negotiation position of the EU from September 2000 argued that the member states 
attached high importance to respecting the principle of the minimum tax incidence in 
excise taxes in the cigarettes area, which allowed to avoid fraud and assure the working 
of free competition in the European single market (Conference on Accession 2000c).
4. The role of tobacco producers in shaping the negotiation process and
outcome
The role of vested interests in the accession negotiations on the Taxation chapter 
has been steadily ascertained in line with the progress of talks. The key organization 
representing the interests of the tobacco industry in Poland, the National Association of 
Tobacco Producers (KSPT), has managed to establish direct contacts and gradually 
construct a coalition of interests with the members of the Chief Negotiator Team. This 
mutually beneficial arrangement assumed the transfer of expert knowledge and 
provision of empirical input to the government’s documents from industry 
representatives in return for insistence on the transition period allowing for delayed 
adjustment of the tax rates to the minimum level required by the Community.
In the initial stages of the accession negotiations the interests of the tobacco 
industry seemed to be secured. The screening of laws concluded with classification of 
the adaptation to Council Directive 92/79/EEC on the approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes (1992) as a problem “for further negotiations” (category III) (UKIE 1999b). 
This meant that Polish negotiators would apply for a transition period with respect to 
adoption of the minimal incidence of the excise duty on cigarettes. Meanwhile, in 1999 
the structure of excise tax was adjusted to the directive by the Act on tax on goods and 
services and excise duty (1999), which introduced a single combined (specific/ad 
valorem) duty on cigarettes. Although the rate of the tax was also increased, it remained 
considerably lower than the EU minimum threshold. The Commission in its 2000 
Report (CEC 2000: 52) appraised the amendment as a positive development but also
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pointed to the need for additional efforts to meet the Community’s minimum duty levels 
(CEC 2000: 53).
The initial application for a transition period has not necessarily meant that the 
negotiators were firmly committed to defending their position in the later stages of the 
negotiation process166. In a number of areas such applications were merely tactical and 
provided a ‘currency’ for future trade-offs and concessions from the EU in the 
politically most sensitive negotiation chapters. It was unclear to external observers 
whether obtaining a transition period in taxes on cigarettes was a strategic goal or the 
application filed as just a tactical move. The lack of any expert evaluation supporting 
the arguments presented in the Polish position paper pointed rather to the latter option. 
Also the industry representatives claim that at the end of 1999, the industry received 
unofficial information on the government’s intention to resign from the transition 
period. This prompted the National Association of Tobacco Producers (KSPT) to seek
1 ffldirect contact with the decision-makers in the accession negotiations . Such 
connections were established initially with rank and file UKIE employees from the 
Department of Support for Accession Negotiations168 and later on through them with 
the members of the Negotiation Team.
In March 2000 the KSPT issued a letter to the Chief Negotiator, Jan 
Kulakowski, requesting to uphold the initial negotiation position on the transition period 
until the end of 2007. The common position of the industry was that Poland should 
optimally receive one-year longer temporary derogation, until the end of 2008169. In 
response to these claims a series of meetings was organized between industry 
representatives and UKIE officials of subsequently higher rank, starting from the Unit 
Director, Department Deputy-Director and eventually the Secretary of State Minister 
Banasinski.
In fact, the interest in cooperation between the administration officials and 
tobacco industry was mutual. During the meeting of 27 October 2000 the
166 Interview with the adviser to the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration in September 
2008.
167 Interview with the President of the National Association of Tobacco Producers in September 2008.
168 Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support of Accession 
Negotiations (UKIE) in March 2006.
169 Interview with the President of the National Association of Tobacco Producers in September 2008.
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representatives of the Chief Negotiator asked the KSPT to assist in the preparation of 
justification for Poland’s application for the transition period. It was agreed that the 
KSPT would prepare the presentation, which may be used as a supportive document for 
the negotiators (KSPT 2000).
The industry findings were presented during the following encounter on 11 
November 2000. The presentation stressed that the amendment of the Act on tax on 
goods and services (1999) almost entirely fulfilled the EU demands for adaptation. The 
tobacco producers argued that the increase of excise taxes in recent years had been very 
sharp and reflected by the growth of the budgetary revenues from this source until 2000. 
The fall in these dynamics (see table 4.1.) suggested that the policy of high excise 
growth was impossible to sustain if budgetary income was to be secured. The 
worldwide empirical data on tax policies demonstrated that policy creating access 
barriers leads to ‘negative substitutes’, such as contraband, generating substantial 
advantages for consumers and illicit traders. The KSPT argued that a transition period 
until the end of 2007 would stabilize the tobacco market (both industry and growers), 
assure sustainable increases of budget revenues and lead to a decline in contraband 
activity. The sector representatives also brought to mind that the EU had never been 
dogmatic pertaining to the adoption of its own rules when counterproductive effects of 
the implementation were apparent. The public administration interlocutors suggested 
that these arguments be supplemented with more detailed information on the negative 
social costs of the lack of derogation on the excise tax on cigarettes (KSPT 2000a).
The findings of the paper presented by the Polish branches of cigarette 
corporations coalesced with the studies published in other member countries, for 
instance, the paper of the Italian Institute of Economic Research from Bologna 
(NOMISMA 2000) on the consequences of rapid alignment to the EU’s minimum tax 
on cigarettes of five accession countries. The countries reviewed included Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. For the Polish case the report argued 
that approximation of the excise tax rate would bring a very sharp drop in demand for 
cigarettes. The authors claimed that collaterals would include increased government 
costs for controlling borders and counteracting illegal economic activities and organized 
crime as well as the associated social costs of the black market. Therefore, “in the long 
run, more government revenue could be collected under a policy of moderate excise tax
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increases" (NOMISMA 2000: 34). The only problem with such studies was that they 
were usually commissioned by the cigarette corporations, in the case of NOMISMA 
report by Philipp Morris Europe. As Szilagyi and Chapman argue, while some of the 
conclusions of these reports were leaked to the media, they usually remained known 
only to the relevant ministry officials (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003: 226). Indeed, 
NOMISMA’s report was sent by Jan Truszczynski, Poland’s Ambassador to the 
European Union170 to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kulakowski with a view to support 
Poland’s request of the transition period (Truszczynski 2000) and may be may be found 
in the Polish governmental archives.
At the same time, the Polish negotiators (or rather their UKIE back office) did 
not restrict themselves to industry expertise only. The Department of Support for the 
Accession Negotiations also commissioned an independent expert report from the 
Gdansk Institute of Market Economics (IBnGR). The policy paper aimed to assess 
Poland’s capability to approximate its excise tax regime to the EU, namely with respect 
to Art. 2 of Council Directive 92/79/EEC (IBnGR 2001). It reached quite different 
conclusions from those presented by the sector.
The study argued that by the end of January 2001 the price of the most popular 
cigarettes (MPPC) was at around 55% of the same category of cigarettes sold in 
neighboring Germany. Despite this, falling cigarette consumption, the steep rise in 
excise tax in 2000 (by 28%) and the relatively slower increase of prices, would bring 
about the excise tax incidence at the level required by the acquis already in the second 
half of 2001 or at the beginning of 2002 (IBnGR 2001: 5). The authors anticipated, 
however, that the likely increases of cigarette prices by tobacco producers willing to 
improve their profitability could result, in the longer term, in the subsequent fall of the 
tax rate to below 57%. The report, therefore, pointed to the behavior of the cigarette 
producers as an important factor in Poland’s ability to adapt to the EU minimum excise 
tax level.
Partially following these recommendations, in the following negotiation 
position from March 2001 (PM Chancellery 200Id), Poland revised the duration of the
170 In the next government the Chief Negotiator of the Accession Treaty.
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requested transition period from five to three years. At the same time, the negotiators 
claimed that the share of the excise tax in the MPPC was 51.3% against 54.4%171, as 
estimated by the IBnGR study (based on General Statistical Office (GUS) data) (IBnGR 
2001). The position paper argued that bridging the gap with the minimal EU level of 
excise tax would require a 100% increase of this tax, and that the rapid pace of excise 
tax increases led to a relative fall of budgetary revenues, which in 2000 increased only 
by 0.2% (with an average annual excise tax growth of 28%). However, if the Institute’s 
estimates were considered, the difference between the reference level and Polish tax rate 
would only amount to 2.6 points, clearly not sufficient to support the arguments for a 
transition period.
Table 4.4: The dynamics of excise tax increases and budgetary revenues on this account
1999 2000 2001
Average annual growth of the excise tax rates (in %) 27.0 28.0 20.0
. . .
Share of the excise tax in the MPPC (in %) 41.0 49.7 51.3
Source: (PM Chancellery 200Id)
The Commission once again rejected these arguments and refused to change its 
position. Interestingly, it stressed that the member countries paid particular attention to 
respect for the principle of the minimum rate of excise duty in order to minimize the 
risk of fraud and tax evasion172. The considerably lower cigarette prices in Poland could 
cause disturbance to the functioning of the single market.
On the other hand, information on the resignation from the full length of the 
transition period was received by the KSPT with huge resentment. Accompanying the 
calls of the latter, the Confederation of Polish Private Employers “Lewiatan” also 
requested access to the justification behind the resignations from the postulates for the 
transition periods and criticized the government for the hurried pace of legal works, 
which did not allow for the conducting of social consultations.
At this time Poland’s negotiators also seemed to undertake efforts to formalize 
the social consultations, ongoing for more than a year. On 23 March 2001, right after 
adoption of the Polish amended negotiation position, the Chief Negotiator, Jan
171 In January 2001.
172 Information note from the Minister of Finance to the Chief Negotiator Jan Kutakowski, on 2 February 
2001.
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Kulakowski, submitted an official note to the Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, stressing the 
need to work out more effective mechanisms of cooperation and consultation with the 
private entrepreneurs in the framework of the accession negotiations process. He noted 
a “clearly increased interest and engagement of private sector representatives in the 
process of the accession negotiations” (Kulakowski 2001). The Chief Negotiator also 
stressed that “there is a need for a bigger sensitivity of the members of Poland’s 
government and consideration -  while maintaining objective criteria of assessment -  of 
the analysis and opinions formulated by the Polish entrepreneurs”. The broader 
involvement of the business environment in the consultations during the works of 
executive branches of government would allow for avoidance of their later interventions 
in the midst of the negotiation process (Kulakowski 2001).
In the amendment of the Polish position paper from December 2001 the 
negotiators once again changed the position with respect to excise duty on tobacco 
products (PM Chancellery 200le). In the new position paper the negotiators reserved 
the right to reapply for the transition period until 31 December 2008. The formal 
motivation was the works carried out in the Council on the amendment of tax 
directives173. The assumptions of the new legal act represented a significant change of 
the ‘rules of the game’, as it imposed on the member countries an additional 
requirement: to achieve a minimum of 64 euros per 1000 cigarettes level of the excise 
tax from 1 July 2006 (apart from continually applying the 57%). The European 
Commission conditioned the provisional closure of the negotiations in the Taxation area 
on finding a compromise on the project of the Directive (PM Chancellery 200le), which 
was to become part of the acquis, and thus of Poland’s legal order after enlargement.
The unstable legal situation with respect to the minimum excise duty incidence 
created a favorable institutional context for changing the Polish negotiation position in 
line with the requests of the tobacco industry. Earlier, the independent study of IBnGR 
had not provided sufficiently strong data, which could support a request for a long 
transition period. After the redesign of the acquis, the challenge of adjustment was, 
however, considerably greater. Although by the end of 2001 Poland was already very
173 Council Directive 2002/10/EC entered into force on 12 February 2002.
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close to achieving the 57% tax incidence (around 56%), due to the considerably lower 
retail prices of cigarettes the amount of excise tax per 1000 cigarettes was still close to 
26 euros/1000 cigarettes (MPPC), which was approximately twice less than the 
minimum assumed by the new directive (PM Chancellery 200le).
In the new amendment of the position paper, Polish negotiators presented in a 
more comprehensive way the supporting arguments behind the transition period and 
also, for the first time, stressed the negative social implications from the lack of a 
transition period. Those included the “social discontent” resulting from rapid adaptation 
as well as the financial losses of the tobacco producers and relative budgetary losses 
from non-realized revenues from excise and VAT. (PM Chancellery 2001e).
In light of the changes into the acquis narrowing down the negotiation win-set of 
the European Union, achievement of the compromise was possible only with some 
concessions granted to Poland. The last amendment to the common position stated that 
“following the information provided by Poland, in particular the commitment to reach 
the duty level of 57% not later than on 31 December 2005, and in consideration of the 
economic and social consequences for Poland from bringing the excise duties on 
cigarettes to the required level by accession, the EU can accept Poland’s request 
provided that Poland provides a plan for gradual alignment with the Directive starting in 
2002” (Conference on Accession 2002).
At the same time the EU member countries were allowed to maintain restrictions 
on the quantity of cigarettes brought by private travelers arriving from Poland as those 
applied to the third countries. Apart from the transition period on excise tax on 
cigarettes, Poland received agreement for a delayed adaptation of the VAT structure in 
the construction and renovation services, agricultural production, books and scientific 
magazines, restaurant services and a one-year transition period for ecological fuel, 
application of the zero VAT rate for international passenger transport, and permanent 
derogation on the exemption threshold in VAT payments for small and medium 
enterprises, which do not exceed the equivalent of 10,000 euros in annual turnover 
(Rada Ministrow 2002: 25).
Whereas in a number of these areas an abrupt change in fiscal environment 
could lead to massive bankruptcies and severe social costs, the rise of excise tax on 
tobacco would definitely bring fewer sales to the tobacco multinationals. Other
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consequences, such as the budgetary revenues, were less certain, while consideration of 
public health protection would rather require raising cigarette prices. Thus, the strong 
defense of the application for a transition period resulted to a large extent from the 
lobbying activities of the tobacco interests. Moreover, as participants in the negotiation 
process argue, the behavior of the industry has been very professional. Apart from the 
provision of the expert study and data supporting arguments for the transition period, 
the KSPT employed professional lobbyists to exert influence on the decision-makers. 
This was in stark contrast to a number of other interest groups, notably fishermen 
discussed in the next chapter, which constrained themselves to merely opposing the 
governmental position174. The KSPT provided a ‘one-stop shop’ solution for the 
negotiators. In addition to that, the visibility of their actions allowed the negotiators to 
demonstrate consistent opposition at home to the measures imposed by the acquis, thus, 
paradoxically, strengthening their position.
The industry success in presenting its position on adaptation also resulted from 
their effective collaboration with UKIE administration officials, which provided the 
analytical back office of the Chief Negotiator. Deprived from a number of 
responsibilities to the benefit of the sectoral ministries (see Chapter IQ), the Department 
of Support for the Accession Negotiations in UKIE found social consultations and 
socio-economic analyses of the consequences of adaptation as a unique niche for 
specialization. Dynamic interest groups interested in the negotiation process and able to 
provide the necessary analytical input were valuable interlocutors for realizing this 
objective. Interestingly, the department survived the political turmoil after enlargement 
and was renamed the Department of Strategies and Analyses. The tobacco industry 
representatives claim, in turn, that communication with the government after 
enlargement has been more difficult than before, since the policy-makers use the 
membership in the EU as a scapegoat for their indecisiveness.
174 Interview with the adviser to the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration in September 
2008.
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5. Effectiveness of the EU conditionality in the tax field
The Polish case was not isolated in terms of derogations on the minimum 
incidence of the excise tax on tobacco. All acceding countries, with the exception of 
Malta, Hungary and Cyprus, were granted a transitional arrangement to postpone 
compliance with the EC legislation on the level of cigarette excise duty rates until after 
accession. The duration of the transitional arrangements ranged from the end of 2007 
for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, end of 2008 for Slovakia and Poland, to end of 
2009 for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the case of the Czech Republic and Estonia 
the transitional arrangements also covered other tobacco products and smoking tobacco 
respectively (Council of Ministers 2002: 29).
Due to the long transition period negotiated by Poland’s government, the 
tobacco producers could enjoy postulated time for adaptation of their price strategies. 
Additionally, due to the postponement of the enlargement date, the transition period was 
of the length initially proposed by the industry, that is, until the end of 2008, which was 
welcomed by industry representatives175. This enabled a relatively stable increase of the 
level of excise tax and there was no need for further special arrangements in that 
respect. Despite concerns that Poland would not manage to increase the level of excise 
tax, so to meet its accession commitment, there has been a general expectation in the 
second half of 2008 that the tax rate would reach the required minimum176. In June 2008 
the Ministry of Finance presented the ordinance to the draft Tax law, which assumes 
adaptation to the EU minimum excise tax incidence of 64 euros per 1000 units. The 
controversies about the project, in particular among the tobacco producers, concerned 
solely the distribution of ad valorem and specific components of the tax within this limit 
(Swiqder and Matyszewska 2008).
The compromise struck during the accession negotiations appeased the social 
actors and allowed all interested sides to carry out a gradual approximation with the EU, 
thus avoiding failure in compliance in the future. However, this effect has not been 
achieved in all tax subfields. In 2007 there still persisted inconsistencies with the acquis
175 Interview with the president of the National Association of Tobacco Producers in September 2008.
176 Ibid.
with respect to the VAT laws as well as some aspects of direct taxation. The key 
problems concerned the list of taxable products, special tax procedures for particular 
types of taxable persons or transactions177, and the introduction of the specific 
regulations for intra-Community trade. Three years after accession, some of these 
adjustments have still not been carried out (Ministerstwo Finansow 2003: 33). Three 
cases related to adaptation of the Polish tax system have also been referred by Polish 
citizens to the European Court of Justice (Parulski and Lis 2006). Thus far the Court has 
ruled against the practice of the Polish government levying excise duty on used cars
178 17Qbought by Polish citizens in other EU member countries (C-313/05) . Tax experts
anticipate that since Polish legal regulations remain discordant with the acquis, further 
court cases might be expected in particular with reference to the restrictions on the right 
to deduct VAT (Sachs and Namyslowski 2004; Litwinczuk 2005; Martini and 
Karpiesiuk 2006). None of these problems, however, concern the taxation of cigarettes.
Conclusions
Taxation represents the policy area of a relatively thin acquis communautaire, in 
which adaptation depended on taking appropriate administrative decisions rather than 
implementation of complex administrative solutions or structures. Numerous 
derogations from the common rules already granted to the member countries have 
undermined leverage of Community demands for adaptation from CEE candidates. 
Instead of assuring more coherence in the system applied between them, the EU 
member states have decided to impose a higher minimum excise incidence. This move 
presented a response to growing concerns that after Eastern enlargement, cheaper 
cigarettes may flood their markets. Nevertheless, this change of entry conditions mid­
negotiations allowed Poland’s government to sustain its application for a transition 
period, to which it was not equally committed throughout the negotiation process.
177 For instance, for the travel agents, sales of second-hand products, antiques, internet sales.
178 Two cases other cases were related to sanctioning the VAT (C-25/07 and C-168/07). While the first 
case has not been adjudicated, the second concerns the period prior to accession, and the Court decided it 
remained outside its competence.
179 Among others, from Baker McKenzie and Ernst & Young.
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The consistent pressures of the tobacco industry exerted upon Poland’s 
negotiators contributed to their success in obtaining a transition period with respect to 
adaptation with the acquis in the field. Tobacco industry’s success in imposing favored 
policy solution on the government and deferral of compliance with EU requirements 
confirms the hypothesis about the impact of the prior domestic opposition on the terms 
of accession.
Interventions by strong interest groups took place thanks to the tactics of 
building a partnership with the analytical unit in the back office of the Committee of 
European Integration. The expert advice and political pressures supporting their clear 
message proved successful in the upholding of Poland’s request for a transition period 
since Poland’s government was able to demonstrate the strong opposition at home 
limiting its negotiation win-set. At the same time, both negotiation sides realized that 
the thin acquis communautaire provided more room for manoeuvre than in other policy 
areas.
Although the presence of a transition period qualifies the Taxation case as an 
example of not an entirely effective conditionality, the adaptation record seems more 
successful than in other areas analyzed later on in this project. At least, Poland seems to 
be on the best course to implement the required level of the excise duty on cigarettes, 
while the tax structure, consistent with the acquis, has been adapted already during the 
accession negotiations.
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CHAPTER V
Democratization against the o dds« social
MOBILISATION IN FISHERIES
Introduction
The accession negotiations in the Fisheries chapter and adaptation to the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) presented a vivid example of the two-level game logics (Putnam 
1988) operating in negotiations on the EU membership. The thick acquis communautaire 
regulating in detail all commercial activities related to fishing created a small negotiation 
win-set on the EU side of the table. On the other hand, no active prior opposition to 
adaptation at home allowed Poland’s government to close the negotiation chapter without 
applying for the transition periods. A brief attempt by the Polish negotiators to demonstrate 
resistance to reforms from the domestic stakeholders was not credible and did not convince 
the European Commission of Poland’s need for a transition period in the area. Eventually,
Polish negotiators undertook a commitment to full adaptation to the CFP from the day of
•  180181accession
The area represents a no-prior opposition scenario although Polish fishermen, who 
were mostly affected by the policy change, have been organized in the producers’ groups 
since the pre-transition era. However, their institutional and economic weakness, combined 
with insufficient knowledge about the effects of adoption of the common fisheries acquis 
resulted in very limited involvement in the accession process in its initial stages. Although 
already during the course of the accession negotiations this attitude has gradually evolved,
180 With small amendments to the fisheries acquis consisting of the inclusion of some species specific to the 
Baltic Sea in the intervention mechanisms under the CFP, which was seen by the Commission more as a
technical than political issue.
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the opposition to the reforms has proven too weak to exert any real pressure on negotiators. 
At the same time, the real scope of problems related to adaptation to the CFP became 
apparent only after the terms of accession had been sealed and Poland became an EU 
member. Even though most of the new legal framework was already in place, Poland’s 
government was unable to assure realization of the key CFP goal to facilitate development 
of the competitive fishing industry while striking the right balance between fishing capacity 
and fish stocks182. Thus, despite an apparently positive result of the accession negotiations, 
adaptation to the EU in the Fisheries chapter neither was successful, nor cured the inherent 
problems of the Polish fisheries.
The chapter will proceed with an analysis of the scope of the Common Fisheries 
Policy and controversies linked to its application in the EU member countries. The next 
section examines the domestic context, in which the EU pressures for adaptation were 
applied. Further, the pre-accession conditionality regime in the Fisheries chapter is 
outlined. The last two sections discuss the results of these pressures in terms of policy 
adaptation and social mobilization as its ‘side effect’. The conclusions summarize the 
findings in the context of the theoretical framework utilized in this research project.
1. The Common Fisheries Policy and its dilemmas
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the European Union's instrument for the 
management of fisheries and aquaculture. It lies at the heart of the Community policy­
making, not as much due to its economic importance as because of the fact that the 
organization of the sector and conservation of marine resources remain within the exclusive 
Community competencies183. Moreover, although the fishing industry in Europe produces 
less than 1% of its member states’ GDP, it is a highly concentrated industry providing a 
large number of employment opportunities in some coastal areas.
The CFP also belongs to the most controversial areas of Community interventions, 
in particular due to the inherent tension between the need to protect aquatic resources on
182 http ://europa.eu/pol/fish/index_en.htm
183 Although the member countries represented in the Fisheries Council consistently opposed strengthening 
the Commission’s role in enforcing the CFP since major efforts to reform the policy were undertaken in 2002.
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the one hand and industry development on the other. The policy faces a challenge to secure 
a “stable and enduring balance between the capacity of fishing fleets and the fishing opportunities 
available to them in Community waters and outside Community waters”184. It aims to “provide for 
exploitation of living aquatic resources and of aquaculture in the context of sustainable 
development, taking account of the environmental, economic and social aspects in a 
balanced manner” ((EC) 2371/2002). As the Commission succinctly described it185, the 
general goal of the CFP regulations is to ensure that appropriate subjects fish the “right 
amount, the right size and the right way”. A complex regulatory framework, which is to 
facilitate the achievement of this goal, consists of hundreds of legal acts (the query in 
Eurolex hits 579 bills186, see also Annex 5.1), as well as the rich case law of the ECJ.
Since most of the voluminous CFP regulations have a status of ‘hard law’, the 
accession negotiation Chapter 8187 shows, similarly to the Competition policy case analyzed 
next, a ‘thick acquis’ policy area. The regulatory framework for activities in fishery creates 
a relatively tight win-set in negotiations with the applicant countries (Putnam 1988). In 
consequence, during the talks the Commission did not have much room for maneuver for 
accommodating candidates’ specific demands. At the same time, no consideration for 
possibly divergent domestic interests could put at risk the negotiated terms of EU 
enlargement.
Earlier experience with the vetoed accession of Norway (see Kolegium Europejskie 
1999a) revealed how sensitive an area Fisheries can potentially be. Although due to 
differences in the relative weight of the industry this example is not fully comparable, the 
Norwegian case demonstrated how the discontent of specific interest groups may 
disseminate to the larger social circles and thwart the agreement. The popular discontent 
with the terms of the accession agreement in the fishery area contributed to the ‘involuntary 
defection’ of the Norwegian government, caused by the negative result of the accession 
referendum.
184 http ://europa.eu/pol/fish/index_en.htm
185 Ibid.
186 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/legis/latest/chap0410.htm
187 See Annex 1.1 for the negotiation chapters.
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The wide-ranging scope of the Common Fisheries Policy
The role of the Community institutions in managing the CFP arises from the 
provisions of Article 3(l)(e) of the EC Treaty (1997), which lists fisheries among the 
‘Community’ activities. Those are to facilitate achievement of the general goals of the 
Community, such as creation of the Common Market, harmonious and balanced growth, 
raising standard of living and quality of life. Article 37 of the EC Treaty, together with the 
provisions of Article 102 of the 1972 Act of Accession provided the Community with 
exclusive responsibility for the matters of maritime resource conservation and management 
in both inland waters and the sea. These provisions have been specified in a number of 
European Court of Justice rulings, which on the one hand determined the range of the 
Community’s authority and on the other, ascertained that it has replaced the authority of the 
member states in Community waters and beyond them. The latter concerns international 
commitments with either individual countries (negotiation and conclusion of agreements)
i  o o
or groups of countries (Community representation in international fishery organizations) . 
Further, the scope of the Common Fisheries Policy was confirmed in the secondary 
legislation, by Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) 2371 (2002).
The first common measures concerning fisheries were introduced in 1973 with a 
view that as a principle, EU fishermen should have equal access to the member states' 
waters. The rule of non-discrimination from the perspective of nationality remains the 
fundamental principle of the CFP, defined broadly in Treaty Article 12 (1992) and 
confirmed by the ECJ in Delecta Aktiebolag (case C-43/95) case. The Court ruled that 
member countries should treat equally physical and legal persons from other members in 
the zones under the Community law. With respect to fishery, only the coastal band was 
exempted from such treatment, so to ensure that smaller vessels could continue to fish close 
to their home ports189. The Common Fisheries Policy was bom in 1983 after years of 
wrangling over its major principles and division of competencies between the Commission
188 See the Court’s judgments of 14 July 1976 (Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, ECR 1976 p.1279), 16 February 1978 
(Case 61/77, ECR1978 p. 417), 25 July 1991 (Case C-258/89, ECR 1991, p. 3977), 24 November 1992 (Case 
C-286/90, ECR 1992 p. 1-6019) and 24 November 1993 (Case C-405/92, ECR 1993, p. 1-6133).
189 http ://ec .europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en.htm
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and member states’ authorities. Eventually, the European Commission took control over the 
general management of the marine resources in waters under member states’ jurisdiction190. 
However, the member states still hold responsibility for annual adjustments of the 
management (and recovery) plans, including setting the catch limits, which is often seen as 
a ‘major setback’ of the policy (IEEP 2003).
Serious depletion of maritime resources as well as environmental distraction, 
putting at risk commercially important stocks, (see e.g. Hedley 2002; IEEP 2004) were 
pointed out as key threats to the CFP in the Commission’s 2001 Green Paper (CEC 2001d) 
and triggered a major policy redesign in 2002. The post-reform CFP covers four key areas: 
conservation and sustainable exploitation of marine resources, structural measures, market 
regulation, and relations with the outside world (CEC 2001 d; Hagan 2003).
To date, the biggest challenge for the policy-makers has been setting the fishing 
quotas at a level striking a balance between the size of catches that allow for fish 
reproduction, and such an amount of fish introduced into the market which could make a 
living for the communities dependent on the sector. In view of evidence that fish stocks 
have continued to decline191, Community conservation measures established rules limiting 
fishing efforts through the total allowable catches (TACs) and imposed obligation to record
192and report catches and landings ((EC) 2371/2002) . This set of measures, binding on
Community waters, continues to cause controversy, due to an apparent ineffectiveness in 
achievement of any of the presented goals.
The 2002 reform also aimed to introduce a strategic fisheries management 
approach into the CFP in place of the annually agreed fishing quotas. The TACs, as a result 
of such negotiations, were permanently set at a level above the fishing limits recommended 
as safe by scientists (IEEP 2004). Resignation from the ‘horse-trading’ in the Council on 
the size of quotas could introduce an element of predictability and stability into the system
190 This area, in line with international developments, was extended in 1976 from 12 to 200 nautical miles 
from the coast.
191 Despite efforts to prevent the decline of aquatic resources undertaken by the Community since 1983, that is 
implementation of the Council Regulation (EEC) 170/83 of 25 January 1983, which established a Community 
system for the conservation and management of fishery resources.
1 2 See http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en.htm
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(CEC 2001 d). According to the new guidelines the policy would be guided by the strategic 
management principles and multi-annual plans for utilization of maritime resources, based 
on the “sound scientific advice” (art. 2(2) (EC) 2371/2002). However, the member 
countries have not accepted the delegation to the Commission of the responsibility for 
setting multi-annual plans with the catch limits. Eventually, the Commission’s power was 
extended only to controlling the fishing limits of ‘endangered’ species. Even in these cases, 
however, the ‘recovery plans’ must be agreed on by the Fisheries Council. The scientists 
(IEEP 2004) argue that such a system does not solve the major problem and may continue 
to lead to overfishing.
The new CFP, in operation since 2003, has not abolished TACs193 and did not 
exclude the member countries from decision-making about fishing limits. Yet, it has also 
not eliminated the persistent tension between the Commission, member states’ governments 
and fishermen organizations194. On the one hand, the Commission, supported by the 
scientific institutes, such as the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) or 
the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP)195, raises alarm about the 
dramatically low level of fish remaining in the EU seas. On the other, the member 
countries, various domestic stakeholders and even the European Parliament continue to 
question these estimations. Fishermen organizations claim that the scientific evidence is 
produced on the political demand of the Commission and does not correspond with the 
reality, that is the true amount of fish in Community waters (Rotta 2005). At the same time, 
for instance, ICES claimed in 2001 that out of 113 stocks assessed (in the Northeast 
Atlantic), only 18% were within safe biological limits (ICES 2003).
The issue of data reliability is linked to another problem pertinent to CFP: illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Although in principle the legal origin of fish 
must be demonstrated before it is allowed to be offloaded at EU ports or imported into the
193 Until enlargement only two recovery plans, under the auspices of the Commission, were set in place, for 
cod and for northern hake (by Council Regulation 423/2004 and Council Regulation 811/2004 respectively).
194 For instance, European Mollusc Producers Association (EMPA), Federation of European Aquaculture 
Producers (FEAP), European Feed Manufacturers’ Association (FEFAC), European Association of 
Fishermen’s Organizations (Europeche), Fishing Industry Safety Group.
195 See Fuchs (2000).
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EU, the official reports estimate that more than 50% of fish catches do not fulfill these 
criteria. Polish fishermen approximate that real catches of cod in the Baltic Sea amount to 
140-160 thousand tonnes, instead of the registered 67 thousand tonnes. If these calculations 
are correct, despite the ICES methodology of adding to official data around 40% of 
unreported catches, the estimations from these two sources still do not correspond with 
each other (Polish Marine Fishery Science Center 2005). In consequence, the depletion of 
maritime resources might be even higher than assessed by the scientists, who are unable to 
produce accurate reports; a basis for further policy decisions. Hugo Andersson196 concluded 
that “[a] vicious spiral of unreported landings undermined scientific stock assessments, 
leading to lower quotas. Failed systems did immense damage to fishermen and the 
reputation of the fishing industry.”197
Furthermore, despite legal provisions obliging the member countries to set control 
systems for CFP (1993) and measures providing conservation and sustainable exploitation 
of aquatic resources (2002), the effectiveness of the national control units varies 
considerably. Between 2002 and 2004 the Commission brought legal action against several 
member states due to their apparent breach of the CFP regulations and in particular for 
“failing to ensure compliance with the Community rules on the conservation of aquatic 
marine living resources by the monitoring of fishing activities”; failing to prohibit fishing 
by the nationally registered vessels when the quotas were deemed to be exhausted; and 
failing to initiate administrative or criminal proceedings against the masters of vessels 
infringing regulations198. Until 2004 the ECJ ruled against Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain, Portugal, Finland and Sweden for such and similar wrongdoings related to 
observation of the CFP rules. These cases suggest that not only the policy assumptions but 
also the enforcement of the Common Fisheries Policy has serious shortcomings199. In 2003 
the European Commission summarized in its Communication (CEC 2003a) that the
196 A chairman of the North Sea Regional Advisory Council (NSRAC).
197 http://www.nffo.org.uk
198 Action brought by the Commission of the European Communities against Ireland (Case C-317/02 ECJ), 
against the Republic of Finland (Case C-437/02 ECJ), against the Kingdom of Sweden (Case C-271/02 ECJ), 
against the Portuguese Republic (Case C-332/02 ECJ), among the others.
199 In April 2005 the Council of Ministers agreed to set up a Community Fisheries Control Agency as a key 
part of the drive to improve compliance with the rules. It is to strengthen the uniformity and effectiveness of 
enforcement by pooling EU and national means of fisheries control and monitoring resources, and introduce 
co-ordinated enforcement activities (see http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries).
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“success of fisheries control is uneven” and that in a number of countries “the overall 
success of control will be as strong as the weakest link”.
In order to improve the implementation record, the 2002 reform has also anticipated 
broader involvement of the stakeholders into the policy-making process, seen as an 
expression of good governance principles guiding the policy in its new phase (art. 2(2) 
(EC) 2371/2002). Numerous studies demonstrated that user participation raises the 
efficiency of policy management in the fishery area (see e.g. Hanna 1995). The reform 
introduced novel structures, the Regional Advisory Councils, designed to bring together 
fishermen and all other relevant stakeholders at regional and local levels. The added value 
from their involvement was “to enable the Common Fisheries Policy to benefit from [their] 
knowledge and experience” by taking into account diverse conditions throughout 
Community waters (art. 27 (EC) 2371/2002). The Regional Advisory Councils200 comprise 
fishermen and other interest groups affected by the CFP, such as representatives of the 
fisheries and aquaculture sectors, environment and consumer interests and scientific experts 
from all member countries having fisheries interests in the sea area or fishing zone 
concerned (art. 31(2) (EC) 2371/2002). Therefore the CFP, in a similar way to the Regional 
policy discussed in Chapter VII, by design has included the element of social participation 
in the policy framework independently of the Community enlargement agenda.
Reduction of fishing capacity, either by limitation of fishing days or the 
decommissioning of vessels is inevitably linked to a worsening of the living conditions of 
communities highly dependent on fish. Thus, Community structural measures were put in 
place to assist in alleviating the costs incurred for the sake of protecting aquatic resources. 
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance co-finances the renewal and 
modernization of the fleet based on the multi-annual targets for the reduction of fishing 
capacity (1999), and provides emergency aid to support vessel decommissioning (2002). 
However, from the end of 2004 public aid for new fishing boats and export capacity was 
eliminated and tougher conditions for subsidies for the modernization of boats were put in
200 There have been seven Regional Advisory Councils established by the European Council: North Sea, 
North-Western waters, South-Western waters, Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, Pelagic stocks and High 
seas/long distance fleet.
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place. Since, projects eligible for aid were restricted to those involving installation of new 
equipment, vessel monitoring systems and safety systems. Nonetheless, as 
environmentalists feared (Hagan 2003: 4), member countries modernized their fleets prior 
to the ban coming into force. Vessels’ renovation financed by the EU Structural Funds was,
however, unavailable to the CEE fishermen (eligible for aid only after 2004), provoking
201accusation against the EU of unjust and discriminatory treatment of its future members .
Regarding the last component of the CFP, relations with ‘third countries’ (non-EU), 
the need for fisheries agreements became apparent when ‘distant-fishing vessels’ from the 
Community lost access to their traditional grounds following the extension of fisheries 
zones. Fishing rights for such vessels have been negotiated with many non-Community 
countries in return for various forms of compensation, whose nature depends on the 
interests of a third country concerned. The Community is also involved in negotiations with 
international organizations and regional fisheries groups to ensure rational fishing. This 
remains the least controversial component of the Common Fisheries Policy, also in the 
context of adaptation of the accession countries to its regulations.
2. The context for adaptation: Poland’s fishery prior to enlargement
The prospect of enlargement has created new opportunities but also challenges for 
the Polish fishery. On the one hand, the largest fishermen organizations202 as well as most 
of the public administration officers203 perceived accession to the CFP and participation in 
its structural pillar204 as a chance to alleviate, at least partially, the hardship of necessary 
reforms. On the other, due to the scale of adaptation, it was expected to pose a considerable 
strain on both, the governmental administration managing the sector and private 
stakeholders, in particular in coastal municipalities economically dependent on fishery.
201 Interview with the UKIE (Office of the Committee for European Integration) official from the Department 
of Support for Accession Negotiations in May 2003, the Presidents of the Fish Producers Organization and 
the Association of Maritime Fishermen in September 2008.
202 Interview with Maciej Dlouchy, President of the National Fishery Chamber in Gojtkowski, J. (1999).
203 Interview with Jerzy Pilczyk (member of Democratic Left Alliance, SLD), during 1997-2005 at various 
functions (from Under-Secretary of State to Minister) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
in PAP (2005a).
204 Initially under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (Council Regulation (EC) 2369/2002 and 
(EC) 2370/2002) and since 2006 under the European Fisheries Fund (Council Regulation (EC) 1198/2006).
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The key challenges constituted the introduction of the efficient management system 
of fishery and fish in the Baltic Sea, guaranteeing the balance between fishing capacity and 
available maritime resources. The second set of difficulties posed the implementation of 
modernization measures, such as renewal of the fleet, improvement of fishing equipment 
and upgrading of veterinary and sanitary standards (Ministerstwo Infrastruktury 2002: 16). 
The technical upgrade of the fleet was indispensable for making Poland’s vessels 
competitive vis-a-vis Western European trawlers expected to gain access to the Polish 
coastal zone after enlargement.
Fifteen years after the commencement of the transition processes there was no state 
program of fishing capacity reduction, which could match the size of catches with the 
aquatic resources in the Baltic Sea. A diminishing amount of fish and reduced fishing 
quotas, an aging fleet and excessive fishing led to the falling profitability of the industry 
and subsequent worsening living conditions of the coastal communities. In this context, if 
adaptation tasks conducted prior to accession to the EU were to bring policy effects, they 
had to be linked to measures decreasing fishing capacity through scrapping at least some of 
the vessels. Thus, perhaps the biggest challenge for Poland’s administration was designing 
and implementing an effective system of structural assistance for those fishermen that 
would be forced to or choose to leave the job.
The key facts about Poland’s fisheries
In communist Poland fishermen were employed by state companies and acted on the 
basis of Law on public enterprise. The state enterprises in the fishing sector, as in all other 
industries, had assured a market for whatever amount of fish caught. Fishing capacity was 
restricted by the quotas agreed annually by all Baltic states in the framework of the 
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission205.
205 The International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) was set up in 1974, based on the Convention on 
Fisheries and Protection of Maritime Resources in the Baltic Sea and Belt Straits (so-called Gdansk 
Convention). It ceased its activities on 31 December 2005 after the withdrawal of the European Union from 
the Convention. Since then, the management of resources in the Baltic Sea area has been based on the 
bilateral agreements between the EU and Russia.
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Since the collapse of the communist regime the state fishing enterprises have 
dissolved (with the exception of one) 206. The fishermen began to carry out their economic 
activities as private companies, individually taking care of the distribution channels and 
incurring all business risks associated with economic activity. In contrast to that, the EU 
has developed a highly sophisticated regulatory regime with a complex system of laws 
defining all activities, starting from fishing through distribution of resources, marketing and 
structural support. Compared to the CFP, the Polish fisheries policy at the time of accession 
represented a policy vacuum. However, perhaps the most obvious difference between 
Polish and Western European fleets prior to enlargement was the technological gap. It 
concerned both the vessels themselves and their fishing equipment. While most of the 
European countries had managed to complete extensive fleet modernization programmes 
before 2004, limited resources in the national budget precluded similar action in Poland. 
The CFP reform banned such measures after 2004, so the new member countries could not 
modernize their fleet using the EU Structural Funds’ co-financing.
In 1995 Poland’s fishing fleet consisted of 36 high-seas factory trawlers207 as well 
as 403 cutter vessels (15-50 meters) and 870 boats (less than 15 meters) of the coastal fleet 
catching in the Baltic Sea. The sector employed around 40,000 people and contributed 
0.4% to the GDP (CEC 1997b: 77). In the wake of accession the average age of the Baltic 
fleet was 30 years, with 40% of the vessels older than 36 years. The smaller fishing boats 
were in better condition, with 60% constructed after 1980. However, around 30% needed
2o»replacement engines and the general condition of their equipment had been very poor . 
The Baltic fleet catches mainly sprat, herring and cod with the latter providing 80% of 
fishermen’s income.
In 1995 Polish fishermen caught approximately 429 thousand tonnes of fish, which 
represented more or less the same level as the Netherlands. However, while in 2005 catches 
in the latter increased to around 549 thousand tonnes, Polish production went down to 156 
thousand tonnes. Such a dramatic fall occurred mainly due to a decrease in deep-sea
206 Only one company, Szkuner (the majority of shares belong to the state) from Wladyslawowo, has survived 
the transition, while the rest were sold out and parceled out.
207 Which accounted for 61% of the total catch by the Polish fleet by volume, and 90% by value.
208 Interview with the Director of the Department of Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in May 2003.
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fishing. Only four vessels remained in operation in 2004. To compare, in 1995 Poland’s 
key competitors’ catches in the Baltic Sea, Denmark, Sweden and Germany accounted for 
around 2 million tonnes, 400 thousand tonnes and 230 thousand tonnes, respectively 
(Eurostat 2007: 52). They dispose large trawlers, which carry out large-scale fishing for the 
feedstuff using technologically advanced equipment.
In contrast to fishing, the fish processing industry in Poland has been characterized 
by high growth rates since the beginning of the 1990s. It represents around 2% of Poland’s 
GDP. Three-hundred and forty fish processing enterprises were operating by the end of 
2003. Most of them base their production on imported fish and produce mainly canned fish 
and fresh and frozen fish fillets.
Polish law at the time also only indirectly referred to the producers’ groups, without 
defining in the ordinances their specific activities and roles in the market. In the EU such 
organizations form the backbone of the common market organization209. In turn, Poland’s 
Law on maritime fisheries (1996) merely imposed an obligation on the minister in charge 
of fisheries to consult producers’ organizations on issuing fishing licenses to foreign 
subjects for operating in the Polish exclusive economic zone (1996, article 4(2)). The 
amendment of the act in 2001 revoked this right but obliged a regional inspector for 
fisheries to consult producers’ organizations before taking a decision on the fishing order 
and marking system for the fishing boats (2001, article 35 (1)). However, neither these bills 
nor the secondary laws specified in detail the exact procedures applicable to these 
situations. Following the absence of specific regulations until implementation of the Act on 
the fish market organization and amendment of the maritime fisheries Law (2002), 
producers’ organizations had limited function in the management of fisheries. It was 
basically restricted to consultations with the government on the annual fishing quotas.
In the wake of accession negotiations Polish fishermen were associated in several 
organizations. None of them, however, managed to take the leadership role. The largest
209 Their role and responsibilities are defined in the Council Regulation (EC) 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 
on the common organisation of the market in fishery and aquaculture products. And the Commission 
Regulation (EC) 1924/2000 of 11 September 2000 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council 
Regulation (EC) 104/2000 as regards the grant of specific recognition to producers’ organisations in the 
fisheries sector in order to improve the quality of their products.
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one, the National Fishery Chamber (NFC) aspired to this position; however, smaller groups 
opposed it on a number of vital issues, including application for a transition period in the 
course of membership negotiations. Thus, as public administration officials admit, there has 
been no single voice of fishermen even on the most important questions concerning them, 
which prevented effective communication with the industry stakeholders210. The key 
organizations, apart from the NFC, included the Association of Fisheries Development, the 
Union of Marine Fishermen, the Polish Association of Fish Processors and the Union of 
Fishermen of Szczecin Reservoir. Throughout the 1990s and after the conclusion of the 
accession negotiations, the map of associations has been very dynamic with old 
organizations renaming and restructuring and new mushrooming (see the next section). 
Nonetheless, the majority of fishermen prior to enlargement and in the first years of 
accession did not belong to any organizations. Although some of the producers’ 
organizations have their origin in the pre-transition times, low membership rates, an 
absence of formal channels of communication with the government and no coherent vision 
of industry future contributed to their inability to play a role in the pre-accession process.
Apart from deficient regulations on fishermen organizations, the Law on maritime 
fisheries (1996), providing a regulatory basis for carrying out fishing activities in Poland, 
has not embraced a number of aspects covered by the EU directives and regulations, in 
particular concerning structural assistance and market organization. The amendment of the 
act during the accession negotiations (2001) has not closed this gap. The deteriorating 
condition of the industry since the beginning of the 1990s called in particular for the 
creation of a comprehensive sectoral assistance programme. However, regardless of 
numerous declarations, the government had not designed such a structural programme 
before Poland entered the EU and became eligible for financial assistance in the framework 
of the Cl7?  structural pillar.
Prior to that the only aid available to fishermen was in the form of exemptions from 
VAT and excise tax on fuels for fishing vessels (1993) and subsidized loans for the 
purchase and storage of sea fish (1995). The structural aid, if adapted to the EU standards, 
was supposed to additionally cover such areas as adjustment of fishing capacities,
2]0 Ibid.
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modernization of the fleet, protection of marine resources, harbour infrastructure, 
promotion of fish products, social support for fishermen and support for scientific research 
(KPRM 2000).
3. The pressures for adaptation to the Common Fisheries Policy
Adaptation of fisheries to the acquis communautaire did not seem to lie within EU 
priorities in the beginning of enlargement process. The first indication about the need for 
alignment of Poland’s fisheries to the CFP came from the Commission’s Avis published in 
1997 (CEC 1997b). Earlier accords between Poland and the Community do not contain 
requests for approximation of laws in this policy area, unlike in a number of other fields, 
notably the Competition policy (see Art 69, Europe Agreement with Poland 1991)211. The 
only reference to fisheries in the key document, the Europe Agreement, was a provision 
calling parties to “conclude as soon as practicable negotiations of an agreement on fishery 
products” (1991, article 23). The following White Paper on the Common Market (CEC 
1995), listing the first-order legislation to be adopted by the candidates, also contained no 
measures concerning fisheries. Until September 1996 no negotiations on trade liberalization 
in the area took place (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 1998: 29)212. Thus, the real pressure for 
adaptation began only after launching the Reinforced Pre-accession Strategy, announced on 
13 July 1997 in the Commission’s Agenda 2000.
The pre-negotiation phase o f relations
The key concern with regard to adaptation in the Fisheries area was effective policy 
implementation, contingent on the administrative capacity of Poland’s government. The 
Commission pointed out in its 1997 Opinion on applicant’s readiness for membership
211 Art. 69 of the Agreement requested Poland to approximate regulations in the areas of customs law, 
company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers in the 
workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection of health and life of humans, animals and 
plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment.
12 The issue of trade in fish reappeared only when in 1995 Sweden, Finland and Austria (which had 
negotiated bilateral agreements with Poland) joined the EU. Poland, as a compensation for losses accruing 
due to the annulling of these agreements (anticipating some preferential quotas of fish) was granted an 
additional duty-free contingent of some fish.
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(CEC 1997b) that Poland needed to make further progress on modernizing the sector and 
creating structures corresponding to the features of the EU fishery industry. The candidate 
lacked its basic institutions, such as first sales points and auctions, did not maintain 
satisfactory sanitary standards in fish processing plants and had deficient fisheries 
administration. The tasks of the latter after accession would considerably increase, to 
include keeping the fishing fleet register, application of the structural policy, management 
of the market schemes and collection and processing of statistical data (see also UKIE 
2001a). The Commission expected that the management of resources in the Baltic Sea, 
accomplished in the framework of the Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC), would not pose a 
major problem once the issue of access to resources and mutual trading concessions had 
been solved (CEC 1997b: 79).
The Accession Partnership (CEC 1999a) encountered adaptation in the Fisheries 
chapter into the short- and medium-term priorities and administered the elaboration of an 
integrated programme for establishing adequate institutional structures and acceleration of 
preparations for adoption of the fisheries restructuring programme. The Commission was 
not satisfied with the achievements to date and in its 1999 Regular Report noted a very poor 
level of alignment with the acquis, including an almost complete absence of progress on 
legislation, institutional capacity, market organization and implementation structures. It 
criticized public authorities for their inability to set clearly defined policy objectives 
accompanied by a realistic timetable for actions and budgetary planning (CEC 1999: 43).
The following, 2000 Regular Report, based on conclusions from the screening of 
applicant’s legislation, reiterated the request for acceleration of activities related to 
adjustment in all key CFP sectors (CEC 2000: 49). The Commission specifically pointed 
out a lack of “major legislative developments” (CEC 2000: 48) since the previous, 1999 
Regular Report.
On the positive side, the Report noted progress in institutional developments, in 
particular the establishment of the three Regional Maritime Fisheries Inspectorates in 
Gdynia, Slupsk and Szczecin, which replaced the General Inspectorate for Maritime 
Fisheries. However, since the majority of administrative personnel was simply relocated
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from old to new institutions, together with the tasks assigned, the Commission did not 
deem this move as groundbreaking. The practical fisheries control activities were 
additionally hindered by the absence of adequate regulatory framework, containing 
provisions on landing declarations and first sales notes, as well as by a lack of 
computerized retrieval of data, obstructing the performance of the crosschecks.
Some progress has been noted in the field of structural actions (including fleet 
registration), where Poland adopted a structural policy plan for the fishery sector for the 
years 2000-2006. This, in the Commission’s opinion could constitute the initial basis for 
developing programmes for the restructuring and modernization of the Polish fishing fleet 
and fish processing infrastructure (CEC 2000: 49).
In 2001 the Polish government, in line with the Commission’s recommendations, 
transferred the fisheries management from the Ministry of Transport and Maritime 
Economy to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The staffing of the 
Department of Fisheries was also increased to fifteen officials (with plans to double this 
number until the end of the year). The three Inspectorates employed by that time 78 
personnel (UKIE 2001). Poland also introduced a satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring 
system (VMS) and vessel register projected in the Law on maritime fisheries, eventually 
adopted in September 2001 (2001). The Commission noted these efforts in its last, 2002 
Regular Report (CEC 2002) but stressed that there was still considerable room for 
improvement, especially with respect to administrative capacity. Faster progress was also 
advised in the areas of inspection and market policy, as by autumn 2002 no instruments had 
been put in place (CEC 2002: 74). Their absence precluded application of the intervention 
mechanisms.
In general, the Commission assessed Poland’s progress in adaptation, since the 
publication of the Avis, as slow and inconsistent. Only a “limited degree of alignment” 
(CEC 2002: 75) had been achieved and further progress was contingent on considerable 
reinforcement of administrative capacity, in particular in the area of control.
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The course of accession negotiations in the Fisheries chapter
Both, the Regular Reports and Poland’s National Programme for Adoption of the 
Acquis (UKIE 1998) projected that alignment of the Polish fisheries to EU standards would 
pose primarily a technical problem, related to insufficient administrative capacity.
The largest anticipated benefit for Poland’s fishermen from joining the CFP was 
participation in the intervention mechanisms, assuring the market for fish at minimum price 
levels. From the government’s perspective, available Structural Funds could facilitate the 
necessary reduction of fishing efforts while assuring the social safety net otherwise difficult 
to provide from the empty national budget. The biggest challenge, on the other hand, was 
the administrative burden related to policy management and monitoring requirements, as 
well as policy reform balancing protection of maritime resources with the needs of coastal 
communities. The most contentious issue during the accession talks, however, has appeared 
to be adoption of the basic CFP principle, that of equal access to Community waters. Thus, 
only during the course of negotiations has adaptation in the Fisheries area emerged also as a 
politically-loaded question.
The accession negotiations of the Fisheries chapter commenced on 19 May 1999 
and were concluded on 10 June 2002, at the very end of negotiations. Poland’s negotiation 
position divided the area into four thematic groups: managing and control of maritime 
resources, organization of the common market, state aid and structural policy, and 
international agreements. Despite wide-ranging problems affecting the sector, pointed out 
in the previous section, the Polish government did not apply for any transition period and 
declared 31 December 2002 as a date by which alignment with the fisheries acquis would 
be completed. The negotiation position from 11 February 1998 stated that Poland “accepts 
and will implement in full the acquis communautaire in the area of ‘Fisheries’ and will not 
request derogations or transition periods” (UKIE 2000: 201).
This declaration, however, was watered down only a couple of lines later, where the 
negotiators affirmed that Poland would harmonize its law with the acquis only “whenever 
possible” (UKIE 2000: 201). Further wording of the position paper suggested that
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anticipated adaptation was by no means unconditional. Furthermore, the paper stated that 
Poland would strive to consider, in a sustainable way, the biological, social and economic 
contexts of fishermen activity. However, for achievement of this goal it deemed it 
necessary to include a protocol in the Accession Treaty extending the range of state aid 
admissible in the EU into the area of fisheries. Further, the EU should consider “specific 
economic and social characteristics of the Polish coastal zones and biological features of 
the Polish exclusive economic zone (EEZ)213 through maintenance of the existing level of 
mutual access to the resources”. Thirdly, Poland requested an “extension of the acquis” to 
include in the intervention mechanisms species of Baltic herring and sprat214. These kinds 
of smaller fish are an industrial product in EU countries and are therefore not covered by 
such measures. Polish negotiators claimed that these species belonged to “the elements of 
traditional consumer preferences in Poland”215. All of these three points constituted in fact 
indirect applications for transitional arrangements, if not derogations from the acquis.
In addition to that, Polish negotiators expressed their expectation that on accession 
to the EU Poland would maintain its historical rights for catch quotas granted within the 
framework of international fisheries organizations.
In terms of two other areas of the acquis, the organization of the common market 
and international agreements, the negotiation position made a commitment to full
i  O 1 /£
harmonization with the common fisheries market acquis by the end of 2000 . The Polish
213 Pursuant to Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 (the Hague conference) and confirmed by the Council 
Regulation (EEC) 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community system for fisheries and 
aquaculture.
In its Resolution of 3 November 1976, the Council of the European Communities decided that, from 1 
January 1977, the member states would extend the limits of their fishing zones to 200 miles off their North 
Sea and North Atlantic coasts, and the exploitation of fishery resources in these zones by fishing vessels of 
third countries would be governed by agreements between the Community and the third countries concerned. 
The acquisition of rights for Community fishermen in the waters of third countries, as well as the maintenance 
of existing rights, would also be ensured by such agreements.
214 By adding these species to Annex I of the Council Regulation (EEC) 3759/92 of 17 December 1992 on the 
common organisation of the market in fishery and aquaculture products and Annex II of the Council 
Regulation (EC) 2406/96 of 26 November 1996 laying down common marketing standards for certain fishery 
products. The initial request covered a minimum market size of the sprat of 8 cm but it was then increased to 
10 cm in the addendum to negotiation position (PM Chancellery 2001b) from 6 February 2001.
215 Similar requests were also put forward by Malta and Latvia.
216 This goal was to be achieved through upgrading regulations in force to the status of parliamentary acts and 
the introduction of an Act laying down the legal framework for the establishment and functioning of 
organizations of producers.
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government also declared that it would implement the structural programme for the 
industry until July 1999.
Table 5 . 1 Calendar of accession negotiations on Chapter 8: Fisheries
PROMOTER THE MILESTONES IN NEGOTIATIONS DATE
PL Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Fisheries 11 February 1999
EU European Union Common Position 15 April 1999
EU European Union Common Position Fisheries 4 October 2000
EU/PL Technical consultations in Brussels 15 November 2000
PL Additional explanations on the Negotiation Position 15 January 2001
PL Addendum to Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Fisheries 6 February 2001
EU European Union Common Position 14 July 2001
PL Amendment to Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Fisheries 16 October 2001
PL/Swe Bilateral consultations with Sweden 8 February 2002
PL/Den Bilateral consultations with Denmark 19 February 2002
EU/PL Technical consultations in Brussels 14 March 2002
PL Amendment to Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Fisheries 9 April 2002
Of the topics listed in the Polish position paper the most serious problem presented 
the request from the EU to recognize the ‘uniqueness’ of the applicant’s coastal zone. In 
practical terms it denoted an intention to ban Community vessels from entering Polish 
territorial waters, which would lie in clear contradiction of the CFP principles.
Until accession to the EU, Polish law applied a general rule that foreign vessels 
were not allowed to fish in waters extending 30-40 nautical miles217 from the shore. In line 
with the international Law of the sea, Poland also disposed the sovereign right to exploit 
living resources in this area (1991). Foreign fishermen would be allowed to fish in the 
Polish exclusive economic zone only as an exception to this general rule and under specific 
provision of an international agreement. In that way, Polish as well as international law has 
legitimized discrimination against EU fishermen in the Polish exclusive economic zone.
As mentioned above, the principle of non-discrimination on the national basis and 
equal access to Community waters remains the fundamental rule in the CFP. Therefore, the 
described legal situation was inconsistent with the acquis, in particular after the ECJ ruling 
of 10 June 1984 in Regina contra Kent Kirk (Case-63/83). It considered lawful only 
temporary restrictions imposed with the objective of conservation of marine resources, but
217 Depending on the route of the border.
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ruled out any discriminatory measures. Therefore, from the moment of accession the Polish 
‘exclusive economic zone’ should cease to exist and the only activities remaining within 
the scope of Polish legislation would be those carried out in the territorial sea, up to 12 
nautical miles from the shore. The rest of the economic zone would become part of the 
‘Community fishing zone’218. This, however, was not obvious from Poland’s perspective.
Polish negotiators in the position paper from February 1999 (UKIE 2000: 203) 
motivated the need for maintenance of the “existing level of mutual access” to sea 
resources by specific features of the Polish maritime areas. The South Baltic was described 
as “extremely high in biological production”, which required that “the catches carried out 
there must be balanced and at a level that is proportionate to the changing status of fishery 
resources”. The presence of foreign vessels should be limited due to the “necessity for 
rational management and conservation of living maritime resources as well as a need to 
defend economic and social interests of local communities on the Polish coast” (UKIE 
2000: 203). Although these words reflected the concerns of some fisheries experts, from 
public administration and fishermen themselves219, the negotiators decided not to file an 
official application for a transition period.
Opinion on the potentially detrimental impact of competition from Western 
European vessels (if let into the Polish EEZ) on the domestic industry has been widespread, 
in particular among Poland’s fishermen220. However, some of the Chief Negotiator’s 
staff221 have also argued that opening the South Baltic to Danish, Swedish and German 
trawlers would possibly lead to destruction of the Polish fisheries. Higher productivity of 
the Polish zone of the Baltic would encourage foreign vessels to change their fishing 
patterns. Thanks to their technological superiority and larger size they were able to operate 
in much worse weather conditions, while catching more fish at the time. Although these
218 The term was introduced by the ECJ ruling on Asociacion Profesional de Empresarios de Pesca 
Comunitarios (Apesco) v Commission of the European Communities (Case-207/86 ECJ).
219 Interview with the Key Expert in Fisheries from the Department of Support of Accession Negotiations in 
the Office of the Committee of European Integration in May 2003.
220 Interviews with the Presidents of the Fish Producers Organization and the Association of Maritime 
Fishermen in September 2008.
221 Interview with the Key Expert in Fisheries from the Department of Support of Accession Negotiations in 
the Office of the Committee for European Integration in May 2003.
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arguments were presented to the EU, the Commission has rejected suggestions from the 
first negotiation position as standing in opposition to the whole philosophy of the CFP. It 
explained that since the CFP is a fully communitarian policy, there was no space for 
individual actions and the acquis had to be observed by EU members in full. It also stressed 
that any protective measures had to remain in accordance with Regulation 3760/92 (1992), 
be non-discriminatory and supported by adequate scientific analysis.
The technical consultations in Brussels on 15 November 2000222 did not lead to a 
rapprochement of positions on the mutual access to water. The European Commission has 
not accepted the arguments of the Polish team, which this time focused on the ‘social’ 
dimension. The negotiators claimed that a lack of transitional arrangement would have a 
negative impact on the coastal communities, already suffering from structural 
unemployment. Around 30,000 jobs could be at risk as Polish fishermen, with their 
obsolete cutter vessels and fishing equipment, would not withstand competition from the 
European fleets (Jesien 2000).
In an earlier Progress Report on adaptation in Fisheries (CEC 200le) the 
Commission asked Poland (and not Malta and Latvia) to “reconsider” its position since it 
did not “fulfill several of the criteria laid down by the EU in its general negotiation 
position”. It also argued that no special measures were necessary as the “sustainable use of 
resources is already an essential objective of the Common Fisheries Policy”. The upcoming 
draft common position (DCP) was to consider whether Poland’s concerns could be 
accommodated within the framework of the EU law.
Since in formal terms Poland’s request was not an application for a transition 
period, it was also not accompanied by any scientific support. The Commission complained 
that despite several technical meetings it had not managed to obtain satisfactory answers to 
its questions and would thus continue reiterating them in the subsequent position papers. In 
consequence, during the period from May 1999 until February 2001, despite an exchange 
of correspondence and technical meetings, the negotiations did not progress.
222 The Polish group was led by Robert Gmyrek (Secretary of State from the Ministry of Agriculture) while 
Francoise Gaudenzi-Aubier (the EU Chief Negotiator) represented the European Union.
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The fishermen organizations and conclusion of the accession negotiations
Although no progress in negotiations was achieved until the adoption of Poland’s 
second position paper, a number of events on the domestic scene preceded its formulation. 
Firstly, in June 2000 the Polish government decided to publish first versions of the position 
papers (UKIE 2000). Secondly, the responsibility for administering fisheries was 
transferred from the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Agriculture. The publication 
of the position papers revealed to public opinion detailed content of the negotiations, and 
brought the attention of society at large and groups affected by the reforms to the accession 
negotiations. Also fishermen organizations, thus far uninvolved in the negotiation process, 
began to realize that without formal application for a transition period the terms of 
accession might prove particularly unfavorable to the industry. Although, similarly to other 
policy areas during the screening, key organizations received the screening lists of the 
acquis, the conducted consultations were illusory223. The impediments inbuilt into the 
social consultations system, designed for the preparation of the position papers (discussed 
in Chapter III), hindered productive participation of industry representation in this process, 
even in cases where it was better organized than in the fishermen’s case.
Nonetheless, since the end of 2000 fishermen organizations, particularly 
representatives of the National Fishery Chamber (NFC)224, began openly to demand 
admission to the negotiation process225. Yet, the organizations have not managed to work 
out a uniform position even on the key issue, namely the desirability of the transition period
99 ftwith respect to mutual access to fishing waters . While smaller groups advocated an 
application for a transition period, the largest one, NFC, opposed it by arguing that the 
Polish negotiation stance had already been defined and there was no point in changing it. 
Maciej Dlouchy, the President of the NFC, claimed that Poland’s fisheries had already
223 Interview with the Key Expert in Fisheries from the Department of Support of Accession Negotiations in 
the Office of the Committee of European Integration in May 2003.
224 Krajowa Izba Rybacka.
225 See interview with Maciej Dlouchy, the President of the National Fishery Chamber in Gojtkowski, J. 
(1999).
226 Interview with the Director of the Department of Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in May 2003.
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227embarked on the modernization process and there was no need for special arrangements . 
This lay in full opposition to the opinion of other organizations, which supported an 
application for maintaining restrictions on access for foreign vessels. Disagreement 
between the fishermen themselves considerably weakened their position and ability to 
convey their message to the government.
In response to rising fuel prices and general uncertainty about the industry future 
related also to accession to the EU, the key organizations set up the Crisis Center of 
Fisheries in the mid-2000228. The Center formulated key postulates of the environment, 
focusing on the system of exemptions from excise tax, financing for the Vessels 
Monitoring System (VMS) and protection measures against import (Barkas 2000). The 
structure has also become utilized as a platform for contacts with the Team of Negotiators.
The relocation of responsibilities related to managing fisheries to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, as in most European countries, brought about hopes for better policy 
management. However, the Department of Fisheries remained understaffed and 
underfunded. Deficient human and operational resources prevented it from tackling 
effectively the mounting problems in the industry. Additionally, it seemed marginalized 
within the structures of the ministry, which dealt with problems of much larger political 
importance. Some fishermen claimed that the weak position of the Department of Fisheries 
within the ministerial structures hampered its ability to conduct the reforms and contributed 
to legislative delays in adaptation (Gzel 2002). In the opinion of fishermen, but also some 
administration officials, the government was intellectually, technically and financially 
unprepared to carry out a reform of such scope as adaptation to the CFP229.
Nonetheless, since the amendment of the negotiation paper on 16 October 2001, the 
publication of Poland’s positions was preceded by domestic consultations with fishermen 
organizations (Truszczynski 2001). The negotiators conducted a series of meetings with 
industry representatives in February and March 2001. Following the escalating conflict and
227 Ibid.
228 National Fishery Chamber, Association of Fisheries Development, the Union of Marine Fishermen and
Union of Fishermen of Szczecin Reservoir.
229 Interview with the Political Advisor to the Secretary of State in charge of Fisheries in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, from March 2006.
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threats of protest action (Barkas 2000), the government decided to formalize the initial 
comments on the need to protect the Polish maritime zone into the formal application for a 
five-year transition period for access of foreign vessels to Polish territorial waters (PM 
Chancellery 2001c). The ban was to apply to foreign vessels longer than 30 meters and with 
engine power exceeding 611 kW. Polish vessels of these parameters (six among the fleet of 
434), however, were excluded from the ban. This time the arguments behind the application 
focused on the precarious situation of Poland’s fishermen rather than the sustainable usage 
of marine resources. Opening the waters would create unsustainable pressure on the Polish 
fishery, additionally aggravated by insufficient harbour infrastructure and poor organization 
of the market.
Apart from the access to sea zones, the amended negotiation position (PM 
Chancellery 2001c) sustained the request to expand the acquis by the inclusion of the Baltic 
sprat and smaller herring into the market intervention mechanisms of the EU. Poland has 
also postulated that the fishing quotas, which it enjoyed for the last ten years (based on the 
international agreements) remained the basis for future TAC (total allowable catch). In line 
with the fishermen’s request, Poland repeated its demand that the rules of state aid under 
articles 92-94 should be expanded to cover structural aid to fishermen in the Protocol to the 
Treaty of Accession. This request was motivated by the fact that modernization aid had 
been granted within the EU in the course of 2002 reform only until the end of 2004. As 
mentioned above, after accession the CEE members would be excluded from such 
assistance in spite of the very poor condition of their fishing fleets.
The Commission disapproved Polish government’s strategy to solve the issue and 
reiterated its earlier arguments while asking Poland to motivate the application with 
objective scientific arguments. The Commission’s officials tried to dismiss Polish claims 
by suggesting that access to territorial waters for European vessels was of psychological 
rather than economic dimension (Swieboda 2002). They maintained that Polish fishermen 
would lose out with the ban since their fishing space would also remain restricted. In fact, 
this did not matter as Polish fishermen did not have sufficiently modem equipment to fish 
in the more distant areas. The European negotiators also refused to accept Poland’s request
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for structural aid, by arguing that the acquis provides a sufficient amount of protectionist 
measures for fishermen and requested an interpretation of the provision referring to the aid
* • 230program inserted into the negotiation position .
In the course of negotiations the position of both sides seemed to toughen. From the 
amendment of the negotiation position, Poland’s government tried to present its small win- 
set to the Commission, but the latter seemed to remain unconvinced. The evolution of the 
Polish position as well as the arguments behind it undermined the credibility of the Polish 
negotiators. Further, until this time no comprehensive scientific evidence had been 
presented to back up the application231. This stood in sharp contrast, for instance, to the 
Taxation (tobacco industry) or Environment (large combustion plants) negotiation chapters. 
In these two cases the Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE) 
commissioned expert studies on the effects of adaptation in the field for the stakeholders 
and the state budget (see Chapter IV). These were presented as an ‘objective’ motivation 
behind the application for a transition period, as requested by the Commission. No such 
effort had been undertaken in the Fisheries area.
At the same time, Poland’s negotiators themselves seemed to underestimate the 
European Union’s commitment to the issue of access to waters. The Chief Negotiator 
argued that disapproval of Poland’s application had a political nature (Truszczynski 2001). 
In order to soften the EU position they embarked on a series of bilateral consultations with 
the EU member countries mostly interested in the topic: Spain, Sweden and Denmark. The 
talks took place at the beginning of 2002 but have not brought any results. In the wake of 
such tough opposition at the European table, the negotiators turned to the Polish fishermen 
with a proposal to formulate a more compromising position on the access to waters, which 
could be accepted by the EU. The new concept worked out after consultations with the 
fishing industry representatives assumed that a ban on fishing efforts in the Polish zone 
would encompass large vessels232 of EU and Polish origin for three years after enlargement 
(Swieboda 2002). Once again, however, the Commission rejected this proposal.
230 The negotiation position of 16 October 2001.
231 Such expertise was prepared by the Marine Science Institute only in December 2001.
232 Defined as vessels longer than 30 meters with main engine power over 611 kW.
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The outcome of accession negotiations
In the amended negotiation position from April 2002 (PM Chancellery 2002a) 
Polish negotiators withdrew their request for a transitional arrangement with respect to 
mutual access to fishing areas. Poland has also declared that any state aid incompatible with 
the acquis and applied in fisheries would cease to be applied from the accession date. The 
only upheld application for a special arrangement concerned extension of the acquis to 
include Baltic sprat in the market intervention mechanisms, which the Commission in any 
case considered a technical problem. Apart from that, Polish negotiators declared that 
Poland “accepts the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in the scope of access to 
resources, including the principle of relative stability233. Poland acknowledges the 
principles of the Common Fisheries Policy in the scope of mutual access of the Member 
States to exclusive economic zones.” The Polish government made a commitment to 
organize the fishery market in line with the principles of the CFP and implement structural 
policy for the sector, which would be coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture.
The Report on the Results of the Accession Negotiations presented by Poland’s 
government (Council of Ministers 2002: 22) summarized the result of the negotiations in 
the Fisheries chapter as a success. It stressed that the EU had accepted the Polish request to 
include Baltic herring and sprat in the system of the market intervention applied in EU 
territory within the framework of the Common Fisheries Policy. This implied that 
fishermen catching these species would be entitled to compensation for retreat of the 
surplus stock from the market and payments from the EU budget. Apart from that, the 
Report stressed that Poland had managed to retain existent rights to fishing quotas and gain 
access to the Community waters. Polish fishermen could also benefit from the first year of 
accession, from the financial instruments of the CFP. The latter, however, has proven not to 
be the case due to delays in preparation of the Operational Programme for Fisheries, which 
constituted the legal framework for the FIFG spending.
233 Based on the TAC for particular member countries.
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The opinion of fishermen on the terms of accession was far less positive. Around 
45% of them questioned by OBOP in 2002 negatively assessed the results of negotiations, 
while the same percentage did not have any opinion on the topic (OBOP 2002). The 
president of the Fisheries Chamber of Commerce, Maciej Dlouchy, described the 
negotiations with the EU as treason234. The majority of fishermen organizations accused 
negotiators of rushing to open the economic zone for competitors, even before the 
publication of the Commission’s Green Paper setting the major directions of the CFP 
reform (see the section above). In addition to that, fishermen complained about the lack of 
guarantees on their eligibility for the restructuring projects and delays in preparation of the 
Operational Programme (OP) for Fisheries (Gzel 2002). Local governments in the coastal 
areas complained about insufficient involvement in the preparation of the programmes and 
deficient coordination of the country-wide Regional Programme (see Chapter VII on 
Regional policy) with the sectoral Operational Programme for Fisheries235.
Poland’s application for a transition period with respect to the mutual access to 
fishing waters was bound to fail. The formulation of a request for special treatment in 
formal terms was not even an application for a transition period. It reflected either a deep 
misunderstanding of the rules of accession negotiations (highly unlikely) or rather a lack of 
serious commitment to this project. It seems that negotiators, anticipating domestic protests 
on the issue, filed a pro-forma request and did not bother about its fate. Such a peculiar 
form of presentation of Poland’s demands allowed the government to claim two 
contradictory things at the time. At the European table, that Poland put most of its efforts 
into adopting in full the CFP acquis communautaire, and at home, that the interests of the 
Polish fishermen were being taken care of. Since negotiators could always claim that the 
EU refused to accept Poland’s conditions, accession conditionality could be utilized as a 
scapegoat for politically costly reforms.
Furthermore, the incoherent argumentation behind this ‘application for a transition’ 
suggests that its key purpose was to soften potential domestic protests rather than achieve
234 During the meeting of the Parliamentary Commission for Fisheries and Agriculture on 25 September 2002.
235 Opinion of Krystyna Wroblewska, Director in the Marshal Office expressed in “Pomorskie w Unii” 
(2004).
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negotiation success. On the one hand, the negotiators claimed that the South Baltic was 
exceptionally rich in maritime resources, while on the other, asked for restriction on fishing 
activities in the area due to an apparent risk of overfishing. Additionally, no scientific 
evidence accompanied these claims for nearly two years after the start of negotiations. It 
was clear that the Commission would not treat such an application seriously.
4. Fishermen’s mobilization in consequence of accession to the CFP
As outlined above, fishermen organizations were unable to exert sufficient pressure 
on the negotiators and extort the transition period in Fisheries. Despite general 
disappointment in the end result of negotiations, industry representatives have achieved 
partial success. Their pressure led to the amendment of the negotiation position and 
inclusion of the formal application for a transition period. Industry representatives claim 
that accession negotiations were the breaking point in terms of realization of the potential 
effects of concerted action against the policy-makers236. The rules of the CFP further 
reinforced this newly acquired sense of power.
As mentioned in the first section of the chapter, one of the measures designed by the 
Commission to improve the policy implementation record of the CFP was involvement of 
the fishermen organizations in policy planning and management. Poland had to adapt to 
these requirements and formally accept participation of the interest groups in policy 
conduct. The Act on fishery market organization (2002) introduced the new category of 
‘recognized’ fishermen organizations, defined their roles in policy-making and secured 
funding of their operational activities in the framework of the Fisheries and Fish Processing 
Operational Programme (financed by the Structural Funds). Producers’ organizations 
gathering at least 20% of the ship owners specialized in particular fish or at least 25% of 
the market share in fish sales became eligible for financial support during the first years of 
operation.
236 Interviews with the Presidents of the Fish Producers Organization and the Association of Maritime 
Fishermen in September 2008.
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These provisions encouraged establishment of the new organizations, which have 
been mushrooming since 2004. As of 2007 the fishermen community, amounting to around 
30,000 people, had around twenty organizations representing its interests, among which six 
were ‘recognized’ by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development.
5.2.: Key fishermen organizations in Poland after accession
NAME YEAR OF RECOGNITION BY THE 
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
1. The Union of Marine Fishermen 2005
2. Organization of Fish Producers in Wladyslawowo 2005
3. National Chamber of Fish Producers (earlier National Fish 
Chamber) 2004
4. North Atlantic Producers Organisation 2003
5. Organization of Employers -  Producers of Inland Fish 2005
6. Kolobrzeg Group of Fish Producers 2005
Apart from the ‘recognized’ groups listed in the table above, other producer 
organizations represent Association of the Polish Fishermen, Polish Association of Fish 
Producers, the Union of Fishermen of Szczecin Reservoir and Association of Development 
of Fish Market. These groups, although not ‘recognized’ by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
have been particularly active in drawing policy-makers’ and media attention to the industry 
problems. There is a general tendency for the groups outside the register to be more radical, 
anti-CFP and its fishing quotas regulations than those organizations which benefit from the 
new order.
The easiest way of social partners’ involvement in the decision-making over 
fisheries was participation in the institutional structures in the EU funds distribution 
system, such as Steering and Monitoring Committees for the Operational Programme 
Fisheries and Fish-Processing (see Chapter VII). As in other sectoral programmes, the EU 
regional policy rules anticipate (1999) active involvement of the social actors in all stages 
of programme preparation, implementation and control. Although participation of the 
fishermen organizations have not automatically assured effective usage of the Structural 
Funds (see the next section), it institutionalized the communication with the policy-makers. 
Thus far the talks with the policy-makers were conducted in less formal fashion, as ad-hoc 
meetings focused on solving a particular problem.
181
Implementation of the CFP rules in the Polish legal order did not solve key industry 
problems. The most important challenge for the administration is creation of a system 
allowing fishermen to carry out fishing at a level of economic profitability and stability of 
income, which is contingent on the biological regeneration of the cod population. In 2007 
fishermen have managed to convince the Minister of Maritime Economy about the need for 
a special body, a Team for Marine Economy (2007). The team, to which all 21 
organizations were invited, was to advise the minister on a “strategic approach towards 
fisheries”. Nonetheless, the body did not manage to have any tangible effect and ceased to 
exist a few months later, when the responsibilities for fisheries management were moved 
back to the Ministry of Agriculture. The fishermen organizations pointed out a permanent 
institutional instability within public administration and the transfer of decision-making
•yinpowers to Brussels as key impediments to communication with the government .
They did, however, attempt to use the rights conferred upon the social partners by 
Structural Funds regulations. Despite a legal obligation to conduct a social consultation 
process, the Department of Fisheries have submitted to the Commission a project of the OP 
Fisheries 2007-2013 without such consultations. Fishermen organizations assessed the 
priorities of actions and earmarked budgets as entirely missing out the tackling of the 
industry problems238. Thus, they threatened to veto the programme in Brussels, should the 
government not withdraw it and present it for consultations with the vested interests. A 
series of meetings were conducted to make corrections to the programme in line with 
fishermen suggestions. As during the accession negotiations, the ex post corrections might, 
however, bring worse effects than if the programme were offered for consultation prior to 
its presentation to the Commission. This, however, seems to be an effect more of the lack 
of a communication culture within the government executive structures than 
disorganization of the social groups. It remains to be seen whether the latter’s confidence in 
communication with the government gained in the post-accession years will be sufficient to 
bring about the revival of a failing industry.
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5. Mixed effectiveness of the EU conditionality
As already mentioned, adaptation to the CFP encountered considerable problems. 
While the acceptance of the principle of free mutual access to Community waters was a 
merely political decision, the creation of the legal and administrative underpinning for the 
CFP has proven a formidable challenge.
Political turbulence concerning the administration of the sector at the central 
executive level and transfer of responsibilities for the sector from the Ministry of Transport 
to Agriculture, then to the Ministry of Maritime Economy and back to Agriculture over the 
course of a few years, hampered development of an efficient policy management system. 
Furthermore, in 2006 the new Minister of Agriculture, Andrzej Lepper239, dismissed the 
majority of key employees of the Department of Fisheries. The structure lost its intellectual 
capacity to prepare good quality programming documents, such as the Operational 
Programme Fisheries in the 2007-2013 budgetary perspective.
Nonetheless, the key problem with fisheries is that the policy has simply not been 
working. While eventually the formal goals related to adaptation were achieved, the most 
visible result from CFP implementation is the 40% decrease in the fishing powers of Polish 
fisheries without an accompanying increase in its profitability.
Implementation of the pre-accession commitments: legal and institutional
adaptation
Of the three framework regulations adapting Poland’s fisheries to the CFP, two 
were adopted with delay, and work on the third has been continued without effect until a 
few years after accession. In consequence, secondary acts implementing the policy and 
providing legal framework for the institutional structures also remained behind schedule. 
The encountered delays did not stay out of sight of the European Commission. It 
complained about Poland repeatedly rescheduling its implementation timetable and
239 Leader of the Self-Defense party in governmental coalition with the Law and Order party, in power from 
October 2005 until November 2007. From May to September 2006 Minister of Agriculture in the government 
of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, from October 2006 until July 2007, in the same post in the government of 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski.
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reoccurring delays in the adoption of legislation “in all key areas of the policy, resource 
management, inspection and control, and in the area of market policy”, which should be 
“urgently addressed” (CEC 2002: 76).
Particularly consequential was the deferred adoption of the Law on maritime 
fisheries (2001). The act had been passed a year later than assumed in the pre-accession 
commitments from the National Programme of Preparation for Membership (NPPM) 
(UKIE 2001). Similarly, the Act on fish market organization (2002) (also amending some 
provisions of the sea fishery act) due to be adopted by the end of March 2001 (UKIE 2001), 
eventually came into force in February 2003. Additionally, out of 22 ordinances to the 
above legal acts, which were adopted or planned to be adopted, the 2003 Report from the 
realization of the NPPM (UKIE 2003) noted that thirteen were delayed and the rest not 
specified by the NPPC, so the timing of adoption was impossible to assess.
Furthermore, the Act on the structural aid in the fisheries sector, according to the 
NPPM to be adopted in the beginning of 2001, has never come into force. The state aid in 
fisheries has been governed by the structural policy regulations, in particular the Act on the 
National Development Plan (2004) and ordinances concerning the Operational Programme 
Fisheries (2004). The adoption of the latter was also overdue (as with most of the Structural 
Funds regulations), which posed a threat to the rate of the EU funds absorption in the sector 
(Donigiewicz 2004).
Deferrals in adoption of legal acts led to delays in institutional adaptation scheduled 
in the National Programme for Preparation for Membership and accession negotiations 
documents. Delayed implementation of the maritime fishery Act (2001) postponed the 
setting of the Vessels Monitoring Control (VMS) system implementing Council Regulation 
(EEC) 2847/93 and establishing a control system applicable to the CFP (1993). Provisions 
of the law regulating the VMS system entered into force on 1 November 2002 and only 
since then could contracting the construction of the system begin. The NPPM anticipated 
the implementation of the system in the second half of 2001 but the Report from the 
realization of the NPPC (UKIE 2003) noted that the system should function in the first 
quarter of 2003. Similarly, delays occurred with respect to setting the vessels registry,
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created in February 2002 instead of the third quarter of 2001, as anticipated in the NPPC 
(UKIE 2001a), due to the absence of legal underpinning.
In fact, most of the key adaptational measures were overdue and implemented two 
years behind schedule, at the end of 2003. These included the technical fittings for the 
system of control of catches, vessel register, opening of the first sales centers as well as the 
projecting and implementation of the integrated information system for public 
administration (UKIE 2003).
In addition to that, the system of financial support for fishermen anticipated to take 
effect from the day of accession was implemented with delay due to the absence of legal 
framework. The report on the control of Fisheries’ adaptation to the EU, carried out by the 
Supreme Chamber of Control in 2004, (Donigiewicz 2004) revealed that the assistance 
programmes could not be activated due to the lack of major ordinances regulating it. The 
government had not prepared the specimen of applications for financial assistance to 
fishermen organizations, for withdrawal of fish products from the market and of co­
financing agreements for reimbursement of the modernization costs to the fishermen, 
despite the latter being available only up to the end of 2004.
Moreover, the report pointed out that despite the creation of an IT system for 
managing fisheries, due to the organizational problems within the Ministry, it was not used 
for its purposes. The Regional Inspectorates were unprepared for fulfilling their functions 
due to the technical, human resources and organizational deficiencies. The delays also 
pertained to the program of fish market organization. Out of five projected first sales 
centers, the construction of only two, located in Ustka and Wladyslawowo, has 
commenced. The reason for the delays was the incorrect specification of the project 
prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture (Donigiewicz 2004).
Poor policy results and escalating conflict with the European Commission
The Common Fisheries Policy was created to protect maritime resources but also, 
what arises from the Treaty provisions, to ensure harmonious and balanced growth and to 
raise the standard of living and quality of life for the coastal communities (Article 3(1 )(e)
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of the EC Treaty). The most evident effect of adaptation to the CFP in Poland was an 
around 40% reduction of the fishing fleet capacities due to the scrapping of the vessels with 
the Structural Funds support (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Morskiej 2006). In this sense, 
implementation of the CFP provisions, assuming a reduction of the fishing capacities, has 
proven a success.
However, although the fishing limits had been distributed among a smaller number 
of fishermen after fleet reduction, they were still insufficient to provide a living for those 
who stayed in the job. As fishermen argue, the fishing limit (for cod catches), set at the 
level of 40 tonnes, has been sufficient merely to pay the annual costs of fuel. In order to 
cover other expenditures, fishermen are forced to exceed the limits and avoid reporting all 
catches. There is a general concern among fishermen organizations that overfishing by 
Poland’s fishermen reaches around 150-200% above the legally set quotas240. They are also 
in consent that all EU countries overfish, but not all make such a noise around the issue.
If fishermen’s estimations are right, most of the Polish fish is of illegal origin. This 
would explain other industry problems, notably the poor condition of the first sales market. 
Fishermen whose fish is illegal do not sell it on the market or at auctions, but rather directly 
at the harbour, where an exchange may take place without registering. In consequence, the 
two fishing centers that were constructed partly by the EU Phare projects until 2007, in 
Ustka and Wladyslawowo, do not trade due to the lack of fish (Sandecki 2006).
Additionally, fishermen claim that control institutions, the Fisheries Inspectorates, 
do not have sufficient equipment to control fishing activities, though due to the installed 
monitoring system they are able to monitor vessels' movements. At the same time, a stricter 
control policy would force the government to implement a comprehensive assistance 
programme for most of the industry, which would remain without source of income. Since 
even the design of such a programme has proven thus far impossible, the government 
tolerates the status quo and the infringement of the acquis. As in most other policy areas, 
the EU Structural Funds applied in the fisheries since the end of 2004 finance ambitious
240 Interviews with the Presidents of the Polish Association of Fish-Processing Industry, Fish Producers 
Organization and the Association of Maritime Fishermen, in August and September 2008.
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goals, but goals that are of secondary importance in situations where the basic needs remain 
unsatisfied.
Partly due to this fact and partly due to the complexities related to funds’ 
management within public administration, the level of absorption of the EU funds in the 
Fisheries Operational Programme for 2004—2006 is around 60%, the lowest of all 
Operational Programmes realized within this budgetary perspective. The Ministry of 
Regional Development pointed out as the key problem continuously low level of 
contracting and payments, in particular concerning the funds for temporary suspension of 
fishing and vessels modernization. In the latter priority, the level of absorption reached only 
18% of available allocation and only four agreements have been signed (Ministerstwo 
Rozwoju Regionalnego 2008). The problem with such actions is that it is very difficult to 
renovate 30-year old engine without increasing its main power, for which the funds cannot 
be spent. Additionally, the funds have not filled in the key capital deficiencies, with respect 
to harbour infrastructure, storage capacities and transport infrastructure. As a result, the 
Polish fish-processing industry, in contrast to fisheries developing after accession, based 
90% of its production on foreign fish.
As mentioned above, the key point of contention regarding the functioning of the 
CFP was the observance of the fishing quotas agreed by the European Council of Ministers. 
The smouldering conflict rapidly escalated in 2007, after DG Fisheries decided to take 
action against the violation of the limits by Polish fishermen. In addition to that, some 
fishermen representatives were manifesting their insubordination in the media ( Sandecki
2006). Particularly noticeable were the actions of the president of the Association of Polish 
Fishermen (not a ‘recognized’ organization), Grzegorz Halubek, who claimed that nobody 
in Poland obeys the limits, so the controllers gave up on controlling the fishermen 
(interview in Gazeta Wyborcza 2006). Mireille Thom, the spokesperson for Commissioner 
Borg admitted that the Commission has evidence for such interviews, in which fishermen 
representatives disputed the scientific data on the amount of cod in the Baltic (see Socha
2007). Moreover, while in 2004 the fishing limit for Poland was 16 thousand tonnes, 
during this year Poland exported 52 thousand tonnes. This meant that Polish fishermen
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caught around 100 tonnes of fish241. The Commission claimed that in 2007 the Polish limit 
of 10.8 thousand tonnes was exceeded by 300% (Dziennik Baltycki 2007).
In the wake of evidence of overt infringement of the acquis, the Commission 
decided to impose a complete ban on cod catches as of July 2007 until the end of the year, 
and to decrease further the Polish TAC for the following years242 as a penalty for the 
overfished quota243. The Fisheries Commissioner, Joe Borg, threatened Poland with referral 
to the ECJ and further cuts of the quotas. In response, Poland’s government appointed in 
July 2007 Grzegorz Halubek244, the key contester of the CFP245 (see Gazeta Wyborcza
2007), to the position of deputy minister of Maritime Economy. According to the new 
minister the Commission miscalculated the Baltic fish resources, and its measures 
restricting fishing activities were ill-suited. Thus, the minister did not impose an 
unequivocal ban on fishing upon the fishermen after the Commission imposed its ban 
(Krasnicki 2007). Taking an example from the position of the minister, some fishermen 
organizations encouraged their members to ignore the ban and continue fishing. Others, 
however, such as the Association of Maritime Fishermen or the National Chamber of Fish 
Producers appealed to their members to respect the ban and charged the government with 
irresponsible behavior. Their concern was not only the consequences of over-fishing for 
cod, but also the possible retaliation from the Commission, such as the delay or suspension 
of distribution of Structural Funds for fisheries. They have seen negotiations for higher 
compensation to the fishermen a more reasonable solution to the problem than embarking 
on an open conflict with the Commission (Niklewicz et al. 2007).
However, since the ban threatened the income of all fishermen, those overfishing 
and those who were not, fishermen organizations, even those that did not break the ban, 
staged protests against the Commission’s decision. While fishermen organizations differ
241 Interview with a Commission official from DG Fisheries, Conservation Policy unit, October 2003.
242 In 2008 by a further 2000 tonnes.
243 The Commission Report from 2007 estimated that Poland exceeded its fishing limit by 48.6%, Sweden by 
21.4%, Lithuania by 15.5%, Germany by 13.6%, Denmark by 12.7% and Latvia by 7.5%.
244 Who in the meantime ran in an election for Parliament from the list of the ruling political party, Law and 
Justice.
245 As a protection measure for the population of cod in the Baltic Sea, the limits on fishing of this species 
have been gradually decreased. While in 2000 Polish fishermen could catch 16 thousand tonnes, in 2004, 
2005 and 2006 only 15 thousand tonnes. In 2007 the limit was further decreased to 13.5 thousand tonnes.
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when it comes to the strategy of dealing with the industry failure, all agree that joining the 
CFP has led to agony in the industry and the ban on cod catches would just seal its end 
(Dziennik Baltycki 2007). There is a general agreement that all Baltic countries 
consistently over-fish and scientific data based on the legal catches is inaccurate. However, 
the ‘recognized’ organizations criticized Halubek’s actions bringing international attention 
to the apparent wrongdoings of Poland. The consequence of this kind of promotion was the 
falling price of Poland’s fish, widely considered to be illegal, which further deteriorated the 
industry’s situation. The policy failure in the sector is related to the CFP but mostly has 
worsened due to the government’s inability to design such structural programmes that 
would alleviate at least part of the problems and make fishing a profitable activity for those 
few fishermen that decide to stay in the job.
Instead, the government has decided to take action against the Commission, even 
referring its decision on prohibition of fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea ((EC) 804/2007) to 
the ECJ246. The lawsuit was tacitly withdrawn by the following government, which realized 
that there was no chance to win the case (Niklewicz et al. 2007). Mireille Thom admitted to 
Gazeta Wyborcza that during ten years of her work for the European Commission, she has 
not encountered such a situation in which a member country openly dismissed the request 
of the Commission to end fishing (Chrzan and Niklewicz 2007).
Conclusions
The evolution of accession negotiations in the Fisheries area demonstrated 
particularly well Putnam’s two-level game logic operating in the international negotiations 
(Putnam 1988). A thick acquis communautaire combined with particularistic interests of the 
EU member countries stiffened the negotiation position of the European Commission. The 
aggregated preferences of the member countries and the Commission’s defence of 
inviolability of the acquis principle created a small international win-set. At the same time, 
opposition at home narrowed down the domestic win-set of Poland’s government. The
246 (2007) Poland v. Commission (Case T-379/07 ECJ)
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combination between the two made for a small or nearly non-existent overlap, which 
resulted in huge problems in implementation after Poland’s accession to the EU.
Poland’s demand for a transition period in Fisheries, presented to the Commission 
in the later stages of negotiations and representing a shift upwards from its initial stance, 
was not credible and thus not serious from the Commission’s perspective. Fishermen 
groups were too weak and too disorganized to intervene on time, unlike in the previously 
analyzed case of Taxation. Even though they did finally manage to bring about an 
amendment of the negotiation position, it was too late for these pressures to have any real 
effect. Some fishermen have argued, however, that the reason for failure was a trade-off 
between Fisheries and the politically more important question of the milk quotas (in the 
Agriculture chapter)247.
Nonetheless, as the Fisheries case demonstrated, pretending to have a small win-set 
domestically is unlikely to lead to negotiation success. Additionally, despite the uniform 
preferences of a very narrow group, which according to Olson's logic should have resulted 
in strong opposition and delays in implementation, resistance was limited. Fishermen’s 
inability to intervene in the negotiations trajectory in their initial stages squandered their 
chances for a transition period. Eventually, the only way to express their discontent with the 
negotiated terms of accession was defiance against the rules considered harmful and unjust.
As the Fisheries area demonstrates, the agreed terms of accession without any 
transition periods do not guarantee effective adaptation. Further, implementation of the 
measures against the key stakeholders may prove particularly problematic, even more so 
when they are supported by the incumbent government unwilling to recognize 
commitments undertaken by the predecessor.
Another dimension of the problem that came out among accession negotiations is 
the administrative capacity issue. Similarly to the Regional policy area discussed in another 
chapter, the implementation of complex policies proves particularly difficult without 
capable public administration, even when clear distributory benefits should guide it. 
Implementation of the partnership principle into policy-making in fisheries has further
247 Interview with the President of the Association of Maritime Fishermen in September 2008.
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complicated its realization. Industry stakeholders, who learned from the negotiations 
experience and were reinforced by the new policy design, were matched with a weak 
government. This seemed to further stall the government’s actions in the adaptation of 
Fisheries to the CFP standards.
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CHAPTER VI
Negotiation  deadlock  on the  reform  o f  th e
STATE AID SYSTEM IN POLAND
Introduction
The Competition policy has emerged as one of the most contentious policy areas 
in the context of adaptation to the EU. Since the early 1990s, the CEE applicants 
implemented a broad array of measures with a view to increasing their attractiveness as 
a potential localization for FDIs, necessary to redress trade imbalances ensuing from the 
economic transition. On the other hand, generous payoffs or tax exemption schemes 
were offered to the obsolete, still mostly state-owned factories in the sensitive sectors. 
These measures aimed to prevent their bankruptcy in the new market conditions and 
alleviate high social costs of such scenarios. Most of these incentives, however, 
remained inconsistent with the EU law as they created state-regulated frameworks 
distorting free competition. Convergence between the Polish state aid regime and the 
competition acquis was thus likely to involve high economic and political costs.
The major difficulty of approximation to the Competition policy acquis stemmed 
from the fact that it would harm numerous beneficiaries of the ‘illegal’ aid schemes. 
While massive entrenched interests have been blocking reforms in the steel, 
shipbuilding and coal industries, business environments opposed adaptation of the 
regionally oriented aid programmes applied in the Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The 
latter anticipated tax exemptions and other fiscal incentives for investors located in the 
zones.
The different nature of adjustment problems pertaining in these two sub-fields of 
state aid requires separate analyses for each issue area. Restructuring processes in the 
state-owned industries are of the most contentious and politicized fields of Poland’s 
political economy. They also involve many interests possessing powerful political
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leverage and implicit party representation in the Parliament. These properties make this 
field a less appropriate subject for analysis of entanglement between the interest groups 
and the government in the context of accession process. Consequently, this chapter 
focuses on the trajectory of adaptation to the EU applied to the enterprises located in the 
SEZ.
The Special Economic Zones were established in 1994 with an aim of 
encouraging investment in regions stricken with economic problems and high 
unemployment levels. However, from adaptation to the EU perspective, their major 
problem was that incentives offered to investors in the zones were inconsistent with the 
competition acquis. Nonetheless, investors already located in the zones and benefiting 
from favorable investment conditions had high stakes in maintaining the legal status 
quo. The companies operating in the zones belong mostly to large and foreign 
companies, whose interests are represented by strong countrywide business 
organizations. Thus, the Competition case denotes a policy area with strong prior 
interests opposing adaptation to the acquis, which would worsen investment conditions 
in the SEZ. Opposition to the reforms from the strong interest groups narrowed down 
the Polish government’s win-set in the accession negotiations. Paradoxically, in line 
with Putnam’s prediction (Putnam 1988), this should have reinforced the Polish 
negotiation position.
The Competition policy also represents a particularly regulated and politically 
important policy area, one of the pillars of the Common Market. Its three tiers constitute 
anti-trust/cartel, merger control and state aid. Each of these branches addresses an artificial 
distortion of the market that reduces efficiency and thereby harms the consumer (Bannerman 
2002: 8). The policy, based on the principle of non-discrimination, is framed by a dense 
network of legal provisions and case law. The politically ascertained role of the 
European Commission provides additional support for its implementation. 
Consequently, the European Union reluctantly admits exemptions from the acquis in 
this field, which are usually hedged with detailed conditions and timetables for 
adaptation.
These features place the Competition policy on the the thick acquis/prior 
opposition to reforms section of the grid presented in the introductory chapter to this
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research project. In line with the hypothesis presented in the Introduction, the relatively 
weak position of the Polish government at home may reinforce it internationally. This 
chapter analyzes whether the achieved terms of accession and results of adaptation 
follow such a scenario. The investigation proceeds with discussion on the features of the 
acquis communautaire, justifying its classification as a thick acquis area. The next 
section focuses on the domestic context of implementation of the acquis, outlining the 
state of the policy prior to enlargement. The following part analyzes sources of EU 
conditionality before the start of the accession negotiations, and discusses the dynamics 
of the accession negotiations. Further, the record of adaptation and the impact of interest 
groups on their eventual outcome is outlined. The conclusions summarize the findings.
1. EU competition rules and state aid regulations
Although most of the European competition policy tools are targeted at private 
sector firms, a large part of the DG Competition workload concerns regulations on 
government handouts to companies (see Annex 6.1. for acquis communautaire in the 
Competition policy area). The European Union treats state aid granted by the member 
countries as an exemption from the general rule that free competition secures a level 
playing field for enterprises operating in the Community area. It reflects a liberal 
approach to the functioning of the economy, centered on the principle that financial 
support from the state budget distorts the operation of the market. Along with the 
gradual removal of trade barriers, the control of public aid disposed by the national 
governments became one of the priorities accompanying the creation of the single 
market (Fomalczyk 1998a: 22), and one of its key pillars (Bannerman 2002).
A key objective of the EU state aid regime has been “to ensure that government 
interventions do not distort competition and intra-community trade”248 and in return do 
not counterbalance the positive effects of abolishing trade barriers (Bannerman 2002: 
5). State aid, in the form of grants, soft loans or tax benefits, is permissible in the EU 
provided that it responds to the “exceptional circumstances” and under the condition 
that its positive effects in important policy areas outbalance the possible distortions 
caused (European Commission 2007b: 2). Despite the Treaty provisions not addressing
248 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.cfm
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the potentially distortive effects of the high levels of state aid, both the Commission and 
the European Council have stressed the exceptional character of such support.
Nonetheless, the importance of the state aid instruments has been decreasing 
since the 1992 Maastricht criteria imposing public debt restrictions on countries willing 
to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Following Stockholm and Lisbon 
European Councils endowed the new rules with the “necessary political impetus” (CEC 
2007b: 7). During both meetings, the member countries agreed that the level of state aid 
in the European Union must be reduced and the system made more transparent 
(European Council in Stockholm 2001), so to assure an increase in productivity and 
sustainable economic growth. Apart from reducing the overall volume of state aid, its 
character was to shift towards horizontal objectives tackling issues such as employment, 
regional development, environment and training or research (European Council in 
Lisbon 2000). These landmarks, together with the continuous efforts of the Commission 
“to ensure a strict control of state aid throughout the Union” and pressure for redirecting 
aid from sectoral lines towards horizontal issues “of common interests, including 
cohesion objectives”, (CEC 2004b: 4) have led to a steady decrease in public aid 
throughout the EU.
Table 6.1.: Trends in the level of state aid in the EU-15, 1992-2002
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average
1998-
2000
Average
2000-
2002
'otal state aid less railways in 
illion EUR
70.4 75.2 72.4 71.0 71.5 67.1 60.5 52.5 50.9 49.5 48.8 54.6 49.7
'otal state aid less agri, fisheries 
nd transport in billion EUR
54.4 60.2 55.4 52.6 54.2 50.2 46.4 37.6 35.4 34.0 34.0 40.2 35.4
'otal aid less railways as % of 
jDP
1.09 1.18 1.11 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.77 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.67 0.57
otal aid less agri, fisheries and 
ansport as % of GDP
0.85 0.95 0.85 0.74 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.49 0.41
Source: European Commission based on the data from DG Competition (CEC 2004b)
Although the majority of member states appeared to respond positively to the 
calls for “less and better targeted State aid” (CEC 2004b), there still remained 
considerable differences between particular EU members249. Nonetheless, the 
Commission’s 2004 Report on State Aid250 confirmed that most aid discharged on the
249 The share of aid as a percentage of GDP ranged from less than 0.2% in the Netherlands, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom to around 0.55% in Germany, Spain and Portugal, and 0.72% in 
Denmark (CEC 2004b).
250 Covering development and data up to 2002.
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eve of the fifth enlargement was horizontal in character, covering such areas as research 
and development, small and medium sized enterprises, or environment and regional 
economic development. Only 27% of the aid was intended for specific sectors, with 
manufacturing, coal and financial services high on the list. In several member countries, 
notably Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Austria and Finland, virtually 
all the aid awarded in 2002 was earmarked for horizontal objectives (CEC 2004b: 5). 
These trends confirm EU member countries’ gradual achievement of the key goals of 
state aid reform, that is diminishing its absolute volume while refocusing existent 
assistance schemes onto the horizontal objectives (see CEC: 2004b).
Nonetheless, these achievements have not precluded debate on the desirability 
and sensibility of strict public aid controls exercised by the Commission. The challenges 
of the contemporary world, in particular in the context of globalization, and the 
increasing international dimension of the EU competition policy, gave new dynamics to 
these discussions. The European state aid regulations raise questions about equal 
footing for EU-based and foreign companies in the situation where EU restrictions on 
state aid concern the former. Controversies arise due to the diffusion of benefits from 
such policies and concentration of losses, in particular in terms of job losses due to the 
bankruptcies of the companies deprived of support. Equally contentious remains the 
issue of state support to sensitive industries (such as steel, coal mining, motor vehicle). 
As a response to these questions, the Commission started a process of modernization 
and simplification of state aid procedures. To this end, the Council adopted Regulation 
(EC) 994/98 (1998), which enabled the Commission to apply so-called “block 
exemption regulations'’ for state aid (CEC 2007b: 7). The need to stretch the EU rules to 
the CEECs, relatively inexperienced in practicing competitive markets, have also been 
perceived as an upcoming test for the policy, which would verify its ability to withstand 
pressures from the EU expansion.
The dense legal underpinning for the EU competition rules
The basic EU competition rules applicable to the state have been outlined in 
Articles 87-89 of the Treaty and amplified over the years by secondary legislation and 
Court rulings (CEC 2007b: 2). In general, the EU state aid regulations have three key 
dimensions. Firstly, they outline the situations in which state aid is allowed; secondly,
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they define cases in which it might be used and thirdly, they regulate the application of 
these exemptions.
The complexity of the system derives from the fact that the acquis does not ban 
government support per se, but rather targets those measures that give undue advantage 
to some firms and so distort competition within the EU. The Commission, as a 
‘guardian of the Treaties’ has developed a sophisticated system of appraisal of whether 
support provided by the member countries falls outside the frames outlined by 
paragraph 1 of Treaty Article 87 (ex Article 92) stipulating that:
... Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the common market.251
The Treaties do not provide a precise definition of state aid. It may be, however, 
inferred from the secondary law, for instance, the 1986 Commission Decision 
2064/86/ECSC, establishing Community rules for state aid to the coal industry (1986). 
It defined the concept as “aid granted by central, regional or local authorities and any 
aid elements contained in the financing measures taken by Member States in respect of 
the [coal] undertakings which they directly or indirectly control and which cannot be 
regarded as the provision of risk capital according to standard company practice in a 
market economy” (1986, Art. 1.2). A later Council Regulation (1999) defined ‘aid’ as 
“any measure fulfilling all the criteria laid down in Article 87(1) of the Treaty”.
Treaty Articles 87(2) and 87(3) specify cases in which state aid should, or could, 
be considered acceptable (the so-called exemptions). Treaty (1997, Art. 87(2)) explicitly 
allows for the application of some types of state aid. Types of assistance considered 
compatible with the common market include support having a social character, 
reimbursement of losses incurred due to the natural disasters or aid granted to East 
Germany. Additionally, the Treaty specifies the types of aid that may be considered 
lawful within the EU (1997, Art. 87(3)). These include aid to promote development in 
areas lagging behind, support the execution of projects of important European interest, 
or remedy serious disturbances in the economies of member states, as well as
251 Treaty on European Union OJ C 340 of 10 November 1997.
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facilitating development of certain economic activities or areas (provided it does not 
adversely affect trading conditions), and assistance for promoting culture and heritage 
conservation. The Treaty also gives leeway to the Council to accept other types of state 
support by qualified majority voting on a proposal from the Commission.
Based on the provisions of Treaty Article 88 (ex Article 93), the European 
Commission supervises exemptions from free competition and closely follows cases of 
state support for enterprises (1997). Member countries must notify the Commission of 
any plan to grant state aid before putting it into effect. The Commission has the power 
to decide whether the proposed aid qualifies for exemption under Article 87(2) or 87(3), 
or whether the “State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid” (CEC 2007b: 4)252. The 
Commission has also taken a leading role in overseeing the admissibility of public aid 
granted by member states’ governments and in reviewing aid systems applicable in 
member countries. Empowered with investigative and decision-making competencies, 
the European Commission holds an exclusive authority to accept exemptions from the 
general prohibition of state support.
Application of the EU state aid rules and thus the powers of the Commission is, 
however, restricted to the measures lying within Community competencies (in line with 
Treaty Art. 87(1)). These cover situations involving the transfer of state resources253, aid 
providing the economic advantage, selective in character and affecting the balance 
between enterprises254 as well as with potential effects on competition and trade 
between member countries (CEC 2007b: 3).
In order to provide transparency and legal certainty to the decision-making 
system on state aid, the European Commission has developed and established a 
consistent practice for the application of Article 88. It is based on the voluminous case 
law of the ECJ as well as procedural rules and principles, which took the form of 
secondary legislation, but also communications, notices, frameworks, guidelines and 
letters to the member states. Over the years, special rules have also been adopted for a
252 The Council Regulation (EC) 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Art. 93 of the EC Treaty set out procedural rules to be followed in the area of state aid and 
the Commission Regulation 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implemented these rules.
253 The aid may also involve the transfer of resources by a private or public intermediate body appointed 
by the State, such as in cases when, for instance, a private bank is given the responsibility to manage a 
state funded SME aid (CEC 2007b).
254 Unlike the “general measures” applied across the board to all firms, such as most of the nation-wide 
fiscal measures (Ibid.).
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number of sectors featuring specific types of problems or conditions (see Annex 6.2. on 
the acquis communautaire in the state aid area)255. Overall, the acquis communautaire in 
the state aid area includes Treaty provisions, horizontal provisions, regional aid and 
sectoral provisions as well as measures on utilization of specific aid instruments such as 
guarantees, fiscal aid, export credit insurance etc.
Regionally oriented assistance in the context o f the EU competition rules
A particularly important element of the European Union state aid regime, due to 
its wide application in the framework of the EU Cohesion policy but also within this 
research framework, is the regional type of aid. Treaty (Art. 87(3)(a)) admits regionally 
oriented assistance in the areas “where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious underemployment”. Such aid may be used “to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (Art. 87(3)(b)). The criterion for 
designation of such areas is the Europe-wide threshold of 75% of GDP per capita (PPS) 
at NUTS II level.
The rationale behind the usage of the regional type of state aid is the provision of 
some form of compensation to the enterprises, which decided to settle in ‘unfavorable’ 
locations, in order to encourage investment and hence development in disadvantaged 
regions. The relevant provisions of the acquis related to the regional aid were assembled 
in 1998 under the ‘Guidelines on national regional aid’257. The document stipulates that 
granting such aid is “conditional on the maintenance of the investment and the jobs 
created during a minimum period in the less favored region”.
Derogation from the incompatibility principle established in Article 87(3)(a) of 
the Treaty may be granted in respect of regional aid only if the equilibrium between the 
resulting distortion to competition and the advantages of aid in terms of development of 
a less favored region may be guaranteed (point 2). Fulfillment of the Commission
255 These currently include the sectors of audiovisual production, broadcasting, coal, electricity (stranded 
costs), postal services, and shipbuilding. Specific instructions have also been issued for the regional type 
of aid. Apart from that, particular restrictions pertain to aid granted to the steel and synthetic fibers 
industry. DG Competition is competent in state aid for all sectors excluding aid in agriculture and 
fisheries, transport and energy.
256 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.cfm
257 Information from the Commission -  Guidelines on national regional aid of 10 March 1998.
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guidelines for regional aid is a precondition for its positive decision on a particular aid 
programme. The Commission pays particular attention to the territorial scope, 
permissible aid ceilings and the investment and current aid, export aid, sectoral aid and 
limits applied to all forms of aid (Ambroziak 2003). The Commission has also issued 
specific guidelines for various types of aid that may be granted in disadvantaged areas. 
The categories include aid for SME, environmental aid, aid for R&D&I, support for 
rescue, and restructuring aid for enterprises. It also checks that such assistance does not 
come to offload the economic difficulties on other countries and does not in unduly 
distort competition and trading conditions (Tadeusiak 1998: 115). Overall, the extensive 
prerogatives of the European Commission combined with a dense network of mostly 
‘hard’ laws neatly delineate and narrow down the Community win-set in the 
Competition area.
2. A domestic context for implementation of the EU state aid regulations
The competition policy constituted one of the key elements of the economic 
transformation, which commenced in Poland in January 1990. The major challenges to 
tackle in the beginning of the 1990s, and stipulated in the act to ensure fair competition 
in the marketplace (1993), included the restructuring of enterprises and economic 
sectors, regulation of the infrastructural sector and introduction of a state aid monitoring 
system (Banasinski et al. 2003: 168).
The competition policy rules were not only indispensable for development of the 
free market economy, but moreover the latter was contingent on their presence in the 
reform package. Ensuring a level playing field for enterprises operating in the market 
and the introduction of transparent state aid rules aimed to encourage badly needed 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). They were hoped to reduce the dynamically 
growing level of unemployment and to maintain the balance of payment258.
An inherent feature of the communist economic system was practically 
permanent access to the state support. State-owned companies undergoing economic 
difficulties were subsidized from the central budget or internally, through financial
258 In particular in the wake of the growing deficit in foreign trade and current turnover (see e.g. 
Orlowski, W.M. 1998).
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transfers within the multi-company structures (Fomalczyk 1998a: 27). Such assistance 
was available as means of securing execution of the central production plans but at the 
same time fuelled pathologies persistent in the enterprise financing system, in effect 
reducing their self-financing capabilities.
The revision of this approach to the financing of operating activities arrived with 
the economic transformation. The Balcerowicz reform programme anticipated a 
reduction in the massive state aid for coal mining and other state-owned industrial 
sectors as one of the remedies to the excessive budgetary deficit. The measure, 
implemented in the first half of the 1990s, aimed also to facilitate the growth of 
competitiveness among the enterprises (Balcerowicz 1992). Rather than being the 
source of financing for current operations, state assistance in the new era was to be 
solely a temporary remedy targeting specific objectives, achievement of which would be 
verified by the market. These principles were also consistent with the EU competition 
policy rules.
Implementation of this plan, however, has proven only partially effective. State 
aid granted to large, chronically unprofitable enterprises has continued to stop gap 
production and employment, instead of facilitating radical and effective reforms 
(Banasinski et al. 2003: 173). For political reasons the first post-communist 
governments did not manage to resign fully from subsidies to the biggest enterprises, 
especially in the ‘sensitive’ industries. In 2001, the 40 largest beneficiaries of aid 
received almost half of the available state aid resources, with PKP (Poland’s Rail 
Company) as the record breaker (20%). While the EU countries allotted on average 70% 
of aid to the horizontal objectives, such as research and development, environmental 
protection or support for SMEs, in Poland such aid constituted in 2001 less than 7% of 
the volume of state aid (Banasinski et al. 2003: 173). The persistence of ‘unlawful’ state 
aid, in particular to the steel production industry, coal mining and shipbuilding, remains 
a source of major controversy with the European Commission, a few years after 
enlargement.
259 Complete removal was impossible due to the massive gap between domestic and international prices 
of coal, which needed to be reduced with time. Otherwise a many-fold rise of the price would be 
necessary.
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By 1994, the year the Association Agreement came into force, state aid in 
Poland, at 3.84% of GDP260, was among the highest in Europe. The only country 
distributing more support was Luxembourg (with 3.9% of GDP) (Podlasiak 1998a: 30). 
According to the Polish government’s estimates, the level of state aid in 1998 went 
down to 1.2% of GDP, but increased to 1.5% in 1999 (UOKiK 2000: 8). These 
numbers seem consistent with DG Competition data from a later period, estimating 
Poland’s state aid level in 2000 at 1% GDP vis-a-vis the EU-15 average at 0.4%. This
961difference deepened in 2003 to 2.6 points and nearly disappeared in 2006, when the 
level of state aid in Poland decreased to 0.5% of GDP (and the EU continued to grant 
0.4% of GDP aid) (Podlasiak 1998a: 30). Thus, the level of state aid in Poland shows a 
clear downward pattern after accession to the EU, which must be associated with EU 
membership and gradual alignment with the competition policy principles.
Table 6.2.: State aid in Poland as a share in GDP
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Share in 
GDP
1.5% 1.1% 1.5% 1.3% 3.5% 1.9% 0.5% 0.6%
Source: (UOKiK 2002; 2007)
Due to the notoriously empty national budgets, the structure of assistance 
granted by Polish authorities also tended to differ from that of the EU average. 
Government support to enterprises in Poland most often took the least painful forms 
from the budgetary perspective, which are tax exemptions and tax/public liabilities 
deferrals. At the same time, these are also the least transparent types of aid and thus 
only reluctantly accepted by the European Commission.
In 1998, on the eve of accession negotiations, grants and tax exemptions (See 
e.g. CEC 2000c: 29) constituted 75.9% of Polish state aid, which is similar to the EU 
(81%). However, while in the case of the EU most of this category constituted grants 
(58%), and tax exemptions only 23% , this relation was the reverse in Poland. In 1998
in Poland, the writing-off of public liabilities amounted to more than 50% of the total 
volume of state aid. In following years the share of tax exemptions was gradually 
decreasing but interestingly, just prior to accession in 2003, it plummeted to as high as
260 However, these are only approximate values due to the imperfect compatibility between statistical data 
from the EU countries and Poland in the pre-accession period (see Podlasiak, Z. 1998a).
With the EU-15 remaining constant and Poland increasing state aid to 3.0% of GDP.
262 However, some member countries make greater use of tax exemptions, in particular Germany (38%), 
Ireland (67%) and Portugal (74%) (CEC 2004b).
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66% of the total volume of state aid. It then started to fall rapidly, reaching the EU 
average already in 2005.
Table 6.3.: Percentage share of state aid in Poland according to the EU typology
% share in State aid in Poland
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001263 2002 2003 2004 2005
A -  grants and tax 
deferrals
81 79.9 75.9 86 84.5 55.2 64.8 75.3 74.9 94.9
A l -  grants 19.3 20.4 25.7 32.8 46 26.3 37.8 9.2 24.9 77.1
A2 -  tax exemptions 61.7 59.5 50.2 53.2 38.5 28.9 26.9 66.0 50.1 17.8
B -  equity participation 0.6 0.4 0.4 2.6 1.5 0.2 0.3 4.9 15.8 0.0
B 1 -  capital contribution 00 0.1 0.1 2.1 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 12.8 0.0
B2 -  conversion of 
liabilities
0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.4 3.0 0.0
C -  ‘soft loans’ 15.8 17.9 22.8 8.2 11.4 20.9 11.5 11.3 3.5 3.1
C l -  preferential loans 5.6 9.1 7.8 7.3 9.6 15.5 4.4 3.5 2.9 2.6
C2 -  tax deferrals 10.2 8.8 15.0 0.9 1.8 5.4 7.1 7.8 0.5 0.5
D1 -  guarantees 2.6 1.7 1.0 3.2 2.6 16.6 21.8 5.4 5.8 2.0
Source: (UOKiK 2000; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006)
In the post-accession period, the decreasing volumes of tax exemptions have 
been accompanied by the diminishing level of tax deferrals (“C2”). This instrument 
accounts in the EU to only 3%264 of state aid (CEC 2004b: 37) and is reluctantly 
accepted by the Commission as difficult to quantify and leaving excessive discretionary 
powers to public authorities when it comes to its application (See e.g. Commission 
Notice from 1998). In general, after Polish accession to the EU, the volume of state aid 
has decreased and the structure seemed to gradually simplify, with grants occupying the 
first position among the forms of state aid (77%) in 2005.
The Special Economic Zones as the tool o f regional aid in Poland
The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) constituted, prior to enlargement, the single 
instrument for distribution of regionally oriented assistance in Poland. They were set up 
in 1994 by the Act on Special Economic Zones (1994)265 with an objective to contribute
263 The data do not include tax exemptions granted to enterprises in the Special Economic Zones due to 
the reporting difficulties. The obligation of Treasury Offices to include reports on the volume of such aid 
in the state reporting system was included only in the amendment of the Act on conditions of 
admissibility and monitoring of state aid to enterprises from 27 July 2002.
According to the UOKiK report from 2002, the value of aid granted in the SEZ in 2001 was 3.1% of total 
state aid volume distributed in Poland in 2001.
264 Only in Italy the tax deferrals reach 14% of the volume of state aid (CEC 2004b).
265 It was amended in November 2000 (O.J. 2000.117.1228), October 2003 (O.J. 2003.188.1840) and on 
30 April 2004 (O.J. 2004.123.1291) by the Act on proceeding with matters related to state aid (regulating
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to the development of areas characterized by a high level of structural unemployment or 
where major industrial restructuring took place (see UOKiK 2003a). The key means to 
achieve this goal was the promotion of specific economic activities, increase of 
competitiveness, support for new technologies, job creation and increase of export 
(1994, Art. 3). The law defines a Special Economic Zone as a “non-inhabited area of the 
Republic of Poland where business activities can be carried out according to the rules 
designated by the Act”. They function as public companies with majority-voting rights, 
in possession of the State Treasury or the voivodship self-government (see Annex 6.4). 
However, the latter enjoys this privilege in only one: Pomorska SEZ266. The key 
rationale behind the establishment of the SEZ was to enhance the attractiveness of 
disadvantaged areas by encouraging companies to invest in their territories.
The SEZs were established by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the 
Minister of Trade267 after consultations with the Voivod and Municipality Council. The 
legal basis for operation of each zone constitutes a separate ordinance to the Act on the 
SEZ. On the basis of this law there were fourteen SEZ and two technological parks 
created between 1994 and 1998. The majority of them were bound to operate for twenty 
years (and technological parks for twelve years).
The license to act in the SEZ, issued by the Minister of Economy268, allows the 
entrepreneur established in the zone (after meeting specific conditions for each zone 
with regard to the volume of capital invested etc.) to benefit from tax exemption or tax 
relief. The most important incentive for companies to locate within the zones was 
complete tax exemption for the first ten years of operating and 50% exemption for 
another ten years. During the first years of operation enterprises were also eligible for 
exemption from real estate taxes (1991). However, automacity of this preference was 
removed with the amendment to the Act on the income of self-government territorial 
units in 1999 and 2000 (2000).
procedures of notification to the European Commission, proceeding with the European Commission, rules 
on return of unlawful state aid, monitoring and control of aid, proceeding with the ECJ, etc.)
266 It is managed by the Pomorska Regional Development Agency, with the majority of shares in the 
hands of self-government.
267 Since 2000, Minister of Economy, in agreement with the Minister of Regional Development.
268 The SEZ are managed by the join-stock companies or limited liability companies with the major share 
of the Treasury of the State represented by the Ministry of Economy.
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The legal provisions do not restrict the geographical range of the zones. Thus, 
despite declaratory statements about their contribution to the development of 
particularly disadvantaged regions, nowadays these two maps do not exactly overlap.
Of\QAlthough in the first years the zones were set up in less favored areas , with time they 
started not only to expand, but also to ‘mushroom’ into various, sometimes surprising 
locations.
As later practice has proven, branches of the SEZ were designated even within 
the most developed areas, such as the city of Warsaw (see Annex 6.3.). In particular, in 
recent years zones followed the investors and their preferable locations rather than vice 
versa (Maciejewicz 2006; 2006a). Although the Treaty of Accession restricted the
970possibility to create new zones , this practice has not ceased. The preferable locations 
of potential investors were co-opted to the existing SEZ and the same size territory 
carved out from another part of the zone, so to leave the total size intact271. The outcome 
is often absurd situations, such as the one in Warsaw, which became part of the L6dzka
979economic zone, or for instance a section of the Warminsko-Mazurska zone becoming 
part of the Suwalska zone (see Annex 6.3. for the map). Another result is that fourteen 
SEZ were spread over a territory of 79 cities and 55 municipalities (Ministerstwo 
Gospodarki 2005c: 10), with the Tamobrzeska zone taking leadership and spreading 
over six voivodships (KPMG 2007: 12). In consequence, the zones have ceased to play 
the role of regionally oriented assistance tool designed with an aim to redress regional 
differences.
Since the moment of enactment, the zones started developing rapidly in terms of 
the number of companies operating in their territories as well as the volume of 
investment and consequently, granted tax reliefs. While in 1998 the tax benefits 
amounted to 31.3 million PLN, in 2001 this was already 334.2 million (UOKiK 2003: 
7) and in 2005 more than 450 million PLN (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2007: 20). By
1999 there were 250 companies operating within the zones, which increased to 679 in 
2004 (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2005c: 13) and 924 in 2006 (Ministerstwo Gospodarki
269 However, it remains disputable whether Katowice, the largest zone, belongs to such.
270 The total area of the SEZ could not exceed 6325 ha until the end of May 2004. Such a commitment 
was undertaken in the accession negotiations on the membership of the EU (in Poland’s negotiation 
position from February 1999) and formalized in the amendment of the Act on the SEZ in 16 November
2000 (O.J. 2000.117.1228).
271 Another rationale is that the creation of a new zone would require setting up a new managing 
company, which would considerably increase the costs.
272 This location was requested by Procter & Gamble.
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2007: 11). These dynamics have not decelerated after accession. There was a 300% 
increase in investment rate in six of the zones in 2004, which suggests that accession to 
the EU, even despite the relative worsening of the financial incentives and outcries of 
investors located in the SEZ (see below), positively contributed to the development of 
the zones (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2005c: 14).
By 2001 the companies operating within the zones invested over 12 billion PLN 
(UOKiK 2002), which increased to 35 billion by the end of 2006 (Ministerstwo 
Gospodarki 2007). Consequently, there has been a dynamic increase in state aid in 
terms of tax reliefs granted to enterprises operating in the SEZ, even despite the fall in 
the rate from 40% to 19%.
Graph 6.1.: State aid in the SEZ 1997-2005 (in mln PLN).
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2007)
The SEZ have developed at their own paces273, with Katowicka holding the 
position of indisputable leader in terms of the number of issued licenses (143 until 
2006) and Slupska at the end of the line (35 licenses) (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2007: 
11). These numbers are also different in terms of volume of investments but since this 
often happens due to the presence of one large company in a particular zone, it is not 
necessarily the best performance indicator274. Notably, 45% of invested capital is 
located in two zones: Katowicka and Walbrzyska in south-west Poland, closer to 
Western Europe and with better infrastructural connection. This pattern of distribution
273 In 2001 two zones (Mazowiecka and Cz?stochowska) were closed as no enterprise had decided to 
invest in these areas.
274 For instance, Slupska zone noted a 380% increase in investment rate, but this is only thanks to the 
investment of one large company, Kronospan Polska.
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once more confirms the weak contribution of the zones to the least developed, eastern 
regions of the country.
In terms of the origin of the capital invested in the zones, companies 
from Poland and the US take first place, both with 20% of the share. However, 80% of 
investors in the SEZ are foreign companies and almost 70% of the capital originates 
from four countries, Poland, the US, Germany and Japan.
Graph 6.2.: Structure of invested capital in the SEZ
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Source: KPMG Report, based on the (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2007)
There are a number of zones with clear domination of capital from the particular 
country. For instance, German investors dominate in Kamiennogorska and Legnicka 
zones (with more than 70% of invested capital), French companies (Michelin) in 
Warminsko-Mazurska (above 60% of invested capital) and American capital in 
Krakowska zone (more than 60%).
In terms of business structure, the motor vehicle industry took the leading 
position (35% of capital), thanks to investors such as Volkswagen, Sitech, Sanden 
(dominating in Legnicka zone) and General Motors, Isuzu, Fiat-GM Powertrain, NGK 
(Katowicka) as well as Toyota, Faurecia (Walbrzyska). The processing of rubber and 
plastic occupies second place with 10% of the share and the electronic industry is in 
third place (LG Electronics, LG Philips, Sharp, Orion and their suppliers), followed by 
wood processing and paper production (BRW, BDN, RR Donnelley, ICT Poland). Of 
fourteen zones, six are dominated by one (broadly defined) industry (KPMG 2007: 15).
Although from the perspective of capital invested and the general economic 
performance of the zones, Poland’s government considered them a success, their
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operational principles stood in clear contradiction of the EU competition policy rules. 
The problematic issues were the lack of a regional map as the basis for designation of 
zones’ territories, an operational type of assistance, tax exemptions and pro-export aid. 
The principles of assistance granted in the SEZ were worked out in 1994, while the 
Polish government formally committed itself in the Association Agreement to aligning 
its state aid rules with the EU competition policy regulations. However, the inclusion of 
the provisions on competition policy in the accord, which came into force in 1992, did 
not interfere in the creation of a state aid system entirely inconsistent with the EU 
competition policy principles.
3. The mounting pressure for Poland’s adaptation to the EU Competition
policy rules
As outlined in the first section of this Chapter, Competition policy belongs to the 
most important policy areas from the common market perspective. For this reason, since 
the beginning of the pre-accession process, as well as during the accession negotiations, 
the Commission has continued to stress the importance of candidates’ adaptation to the 
EU rules in this area.
The sources o f pre-accession conditionality in the Competition policy area
The Europe Agreement (EA) (1991) was the first official document, which 
mentioned the necessity to adapt Poland’s competition policy to EU standards. The 
provisions of the accord applied to transactions affecting commerce in the EU or any of 
its members. They explicitly requested that any practices incoherent with the 
competition rules should be “assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the 
application of the rules of [the Treaty of Rome]”275. Article 68 of the Agreement reads 
that:
... [The mjajor precondition for Poland's economic integration into the Community is 
the approximation of that country's existing and future legislation to that of the Community.
275 Art. 62.2., 63.2 of Poland’s Europe Agreement
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Poland shall use its best endeavors to ensure that future legislation is compatible with 
Community legislation.216
Moreover, Article 69 has the competition rules among the policy fields 
shortlisted as the most important for the approximation of laws.277 In turn, provisions of 
the Agreement directly referring to the competition policy deem illegal “any public 
aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods” (1991, Art.63(l)(iii)). For the first five years the 
whole of Poland was to be regarded “as an area identical to those areas of the 
Community described in Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty [...]” (Art. 63(4)(a)). Thus, 
considering the difficult economic situation of Poland, aid to promote development in 
the areas lagging behind can be considered lawful. This provision, however, has not 
released Polish authorities from observation of the principles of transparency, inter alia 
by reporting annually to the EU on the amount of aid granted and on request, on aid 
schemes or individual cases of public aid (Art. 63(4)(b)) 2 7 9 In this way, the EA 
imposed on Poland very similar obligations as those pertaining to aid schemes applied 
by EU members.
Due to the absence of major discrepancies in the rules of competition applicable 
to enterprises, the pre-accession documents focus on the rules of competition applicable 
to state. While the Commission assessed Poland as “reasonably advanced” in adaptation 
to the anti-trust provisions, in the state aid area “considerable efforts would be required 
to build the necessary legal framework and ensure the functioning of the monitoring 
authority” (CEC 1997b).
In its 1998 and 1999 Regular Reports, the Commission underlined the need for 
urgent adaptation of the rules of competition applicable to state. Particular concerns 
raised were the absence of the “satisfactory State Aids law” and “independent State Aid 
Monitoring Authority” as well as incompatible aid schemes applied in the Special
276 Europe Agreement, Art. 68
277 Art. 69 of the Europe Agreement states that: “The approximation of laws shall extend to the following 
areas in particular: customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual 
property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection of 
health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
standards, transport and the environment.”
278 Title V of the Agreement devoted to “Payments, capital, competition and other economic provisions”, 
Chapter II “Competition and other economic provisions” (Europe Agreement 1991).
279 This obligation was reciprocal.
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Economic Zones (CEC 1998: 25; 1999: 33). Indirect aid granted to enterprises (social 
security write-offs, tax-relief, debt write-offs, and tax arrears write-offs and aid given by 
sub-national authorities) raised particular concerns due to the serious concerns about the 
transparency of these kinds of assistance (CEC 1999: 33).
After adoption by Poland’s parliament in June 2000 of the Law on the conditions 
of admissibility and monitoring of state aid to entrepreneurs (2000), the next Report by 
the Commission noted progress in this policy area. The law contained basic principles 
of the EU state aid regime, thus approximating the Polish system of state aid control to 
the acquis. It charged the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) with 
the responsibility to monitor public aid in Poland. However, the Commission criticized 
the fact that the legislation in force on the SEZ continues to include “elements contrary 
to the acquis and Poland’s immediate obligations under the Europe Agreement”(CEC 
2000: 42). Moreover, the Commission assessed as particularly problematic the 
‘acquired rights’ (c.f. tax holidays) of investors, which were intended to be upheld until 
2017 despite the contradiction to Poland’s earlier obligations under the EA. “The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that Polish authorities continue to deliver permits 
under the old legal basis until the entry into force of the amended Law” (CEC 2000: 
42).
The main priority now is to ensure that enforcement of the State aid rules is systematic 
and includes a swift alignment of existing aid schemes and legislation under which authorities 
at various levels grant aid. The future enforcement practice o f the OCCP and progress 
regarding the aligning of existing aid arrangements with the acquis, will be a serious test to the 
administrative capacity in the State aid field. (CEC 2000: 42)
Although numerous positive changes were introduced into the state aid legal 
system before the publication of the 2001 Report, the Commission still pointed out that 
“[t]his flurry of legal alignment has not resolved the issue of existing tax benefits 
granted in the SEZs which has not been brought into line with Poland's pre-existing 
obligations under the Europe agreement” (CEC 2001b: 50). The assessment of 
transposition of the acquis in the state aid area was not positive even in the last, 2002 
Regular Report. The Commission pointed out inadequate provisions in the restructuring 
and environmental aid, which did not fully transpose the Community guidelines. Room
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for improvement also remained in the SEZ fiscal aid schemes, in particular for permits 
granted before 2001. The less than satisfactory record was also noted in “aid arising 
from cancellation or rescheduling of public liabilities”. The quality of enforcement was 
more positive in the areas of regional and R&D aid (CEC 2002: 64). The Commission 
called for particular attention to the issues of sensitive sectors, such as the steel 
industry280. “Overall, on legislative alignment, administrative capacities and 
enforcement record Poland is reasonably advanced, except in the areas of fiscal aid and 
steel” (CEC 2002: 64).
Accession negotiations on adaptation o f Poland's rules on state aid to the acquis
Negotiations on Chapter 6, ‘Competition Policy’, commenced on 19 May 1999 
and concluded with a hard-won compromise on 20 November 2002. Similar to other 
analyzed policy areas, the applicant adopted 31 December 2002 as a timeframe for 
adaptation to the competition acquis communautaire. The Polish government declared 
full compliance with the EU competition rules applicable to undertakings already in its 
initial negotiating position; therefore the thrust of the negotiation effort focused on 
issues related to state aid. In this respect, the Polish position paper pointed out the low 
level of economic development and necessity to narrow the developmental gap, as 
arguments for assessment of the aid schemes and projects in accordance with “Articles 
92-94 of the Treaty of Rome, with due consideration given to its specific conditions” (UKIE 
2000: 101).
Apart from the rules on state aid granted to some sensitive sectors (notably coal, 
steel and the motor industry) and environmental aid , the key negotiation problem 
constituted the Polish request for exemption from the acquis with regard to some forms 
of state aid granted to entrepreneurs in Special Economic Zones (CONF-PL 2/99). The 
Polish negotiators requested a transition period until the end of 2017 allowing
280 Aid for restructuring can only be given if the national and individual restructuring programmes of the 
companies would include the necessary measures for reaching viability and the necessary cuts in 
production capacity, in line with the requirements set out in Protocol 2 of the Europe Agreement (1991).
81 The coal mining, for the sake of simplicity, was excluded from the negotiation Chapter 6 ’Competition 
policy’ and incorporated into the ‘Energy’ Chapter 14.
82 Failure to implement the last point had serious negative repercussions for the regional policy of Poland 
and the possibility to make use of the Structural Funds. The funds had not been released until the date of 
accession due to delays in implementation of the Law on the rules of public aid. It was accepted by 
parliament on 30 April 2004 but until that date lacked ordinances, which made it a dead letter of law.
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operational and export aid, exemptions from the principle of accumulation of aid, aid 
ceilings and restrictions ensuing from principles for granting aid to the motor vehicles 
sector (CONF-PL 2/99). The duration of the transition period has been justified by the 
obligation to respect the ‘acquired rights’ obtained by entrepreneurs who commenced 
business activities in the zones283.
Disparate views on implementation o f the EU  competition acquis in Poland
The European Union refused from the outset to accept transition periods with 
respect to the state aid granted to enterprises operating within the SEZ. In the Common 
Position from 19 May 1999 (CONF-PL 18/99) the Community underlined Poland’s 
commitments to respect the EU competition rules under the provisions of the 
Association Agreement. From the EU perspective, the introduction of the Act 
establishing the SEZ (1994) represented a violation of Poland’s obligations under the 
accord at the adoption of the Act, and thus an overt breach of the letter of international 
commitment. The Commission argued that since the Association Agreement came into 
force, Poland has been legally obliged to adapt its competition policy rules to the 
acquis. Thus, at the start of the negotiations the EU requested that the acquis in the 
competition policy field “has to be applied by Poland already now” and no transition 
periods could be considered in that respect (Conference on Accession 2000b).
In terms of the substantial arguments, the European Commission has pronounced 
that Poland shall adjust all competition rules to the acquis communautaire, since the 
common market is assuring a level-playing field for enterprises operating anywhere in 
EU territory. Specific concerns about the fiscal aid schemes operating through the 
system of SEZ referred to the lack of objectivity in the criteria designating particularly 
disadvantaged regions, and secondly, to the type of aid granted to enterprises, that is tax 
exemptions. These are difficult to reconcile with the principles of transparency and 
proportionality. Additionally, the EU Guidelines stipulate that there must be a close 
relation between regional aid and its effects, which refers to the ‘balance’ and 
‘effectiveness’ principles enshrined in Art. 87.1 of the Treaty.
283 These rights would expire with termination of activities of the zone, in various cases anticipated for the 
period 2009-2017, with twelve zones ceasing to operate in 2017.
212
The ordinances regulating state aid in the Polish zones did not anticipate such 
measures. In fact, up until the commencement of the accession negotiations it had been 
unclear how much aid was granted (also as a share of investment costs) and what effects 
particular SEZs had on the development of their host regions or level of
no Aunemployment . A lack of appropriate statistics hindered the monitoring of the actual 
level of state aid. As a result, it was difficult to measure the intensity of aid, its 
economic importance and more importantly, its potential impact on competition after 
enlargement.
Apart from the violating of the terms of the Europe Agreements, the 
Commission argued that Poland might have enjoyed an ‘unjustified’ high level of FDI, 
while on the other hand, some of the international firms located in the SEZ could gain a 
competitive advantage vis-a-vis enterprises located elsewhere. Maintenance of attractive 
business incentives in one EU member country, which Poland was to become after 
accession, could influence business location decisions and capital transfer to CEE, thus 
contributing, for instance, to rising unemployment levels in companies’ previous place 
of residence. The Commission seemed extremely reluctant to consider a compromise on 
Poland’s request for a transition period with respect to the ‘acquired rights’ of investors 
in the SEZ. Polish regulations stood clearly in contradiction to the acquis and approval 
for their (even temporary) operation could set a precedence for the other states. 
Moreover, it could undermine the authority of the European Commission as the 
impartial and independent ‘guardian of the rules’. Therefore, the European win-set in 
the negotiations on this policy chapter was particularly narrow, especially in 
comparison with other policy areas, notably those characterized by the thin acquis 
communautaire leaving more room for maneuver for the European Commission.
The formal arguments against these charges were cantered around the low 
income level as a criterion for aid admissibility. The Polish negotiators maintained that 
state aid granted in the framework of investment programmes realized in the SEZ was 
justified due to the low level of economic development of these areas when compared 
with the EU average. In line with the Community guidelines on national regional aid
284 Until the introduction of the Act on admissibility and monitoring of state aid to entrepreneurs in 2001, 
local governments were not even obliged to keep statistics or estimate the level of taxes not collected 
from entrepreneurs due to the tax exemptions applied.
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(1998), the whole territory of Poland should be treated as an area fulfilling conditions 
set by Article 87(3)(a) (CONF-PL 2/99). The principle of non-admissibility of the state 
aid could therefore be temporarily suspended. Moreover, the negotiators argued that 
most of the regions, in which the zones were established, fulfilled the Community 
criteria on admissibility of regional aid in ‘disadvantaged’ areas, that is income per 
capita below 85% and unemployment above 110% of the country average.
Furthermore, in economic terms, the existence of the SEZ in particularly 
disadvantaged regions was presented as having great importance for the creation of 
favourable investment conditions and opportunity for their development. Poland’s 
negotiators also argued that in a number of regions the initial investments related to 
opening a zone were already completed and their closure would involve considerable 
sunk costs. Eventually, closure of the zones would bring firm resistance from the local 
authorities, populations and social actors. In consequence it could also raise the 
necessity to redirect part of the EU Structural Funds to reinvigoration of these areas.
Additionally, the negotiators argued that aid granted in the SEZ would have a 
negligible effect on the single market. Due to the relatively small volumes of support, it 
would not qualify as state aid as defined in Article 87(1) of the Treaty insofar as it does 
not affect trade between member countries. Poland’s negotiators maintained that as of 
1997 the aid granted amounted to around 4 million euros while export aid had been 
admissible only for one SEZ and could potentially concern 22 entrepreneurs285 (CONF- 
PL 2/99).
Finally, the length of the transition period was justified by the necessity to 
respect the acquired rights of investors operating in the SEZ. These rights would 
terminate within 2009-2017, with twelve SEZ ceasing their operation in 2017. 
Adjustment of the Polish law to the acquis in that respect would mean the necessity to 
pay retributions to investors, who would lose guaranteed benefits. Such treatment would 
diminish trust in Poland as a country governed by law. Poland’s negotiators also
285 Export aid facility was established only in Mielec SEZ and ceased to be applied on 20 October 1997 
when there was an amendment to the regulations governing the zone. At the time of issuing the 
negotiation position only four enterprises took advantage of export aid.
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complained about the double standards in treatment of the candidates and EU members, 
since the SEZ functioned also in ‘old’ Community members .
The negotiation dynamics
Poland has commenced accession negotiations in the field with application for a 
transition period until 2017 in respect of operational and export aid, exemptions from 
the principle of aid accumulation, aid ceilings and restrictions ensuing from principles 
for granting aid to the motor industry (CONF-PL 2/99). However, Polish negotiators 
made a commitment in the first negotiation position that the Act on the SEZ would be 
amended by the end of 1999, which would harmonize the principles of granting aid in 
the zones with the acquis. The acquired rights of investors who started their operations 
before amendment of the Act would, however, be respected (CONF-PL 2/99); 
otherwise, indemnities to the investors would have to be paid. As mentioned above, the 
EU has dismissed this argument and requested immediate adaptation to the acquis, 
pointing out that Poland remains in breach of her international commitments (CONF- 
PL 18/99).
Table 6.4.: Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 6, Competition policy
PROMOTER THE MILESTONES IN NEGOTIATIONS DATE
PL Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Competition 
policy
26 January 1999
EU European Union Common Position 12 May 1999
EU Draft Common Position of the European Union 28 January 2000
EU European Union Common Position 7 February 2000
IWWMIMMIBMI1 Technical consultations in Brussels 10 July 2000
w a g m m Technical consultations in Warsaw 22 May 2001
Technical consultations in Warsaw 21 September 2001
EU European Union Common Position 21 November 2001
PL Amendment to Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area 
of Competition policy
21 May 2002
Technical consultations in Brussels 6 June 2002
Technical consultations in Brussels 28 June 2002
Bilateral meeting of OCCP and DG Competition Brussels 26 July 2002
EU Draft Common Position of the European Union 
European Union Common Position 14 November 2002
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Officially, until the summer of 2002" , Polish negotiators did not consider any 
alternative solution to the SEZ problem other than a temporary derogation. In response
286 The most important are Madera in Portugal, Canary Islands, Shannon in Ireland and British zones 
lying in proximity to La Manche.
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to the Commission’s charges, they presented a legal interpretation of the provisions of 
the Accession Agreement, according to which adaptation of Poland’s state aids to the 
EU rules was obligatory only after laying down the Implementing Rules288 on 
‘assessment of compatibility’ of aid, that is after 2001. Therefore, the Polish 
government accepted its responsibility to harmonize state aid rules only from that date 
onwards (UOKiK 2002a). As expected, the Commission rejected such interpretations, 
reiterating that “Poland can be considered to be ready for EU membership only if its 
companies and public authorities have become accustomed to a competition discipline 
such as that of the Community well before accession, as already now required under the 
Europe Agreement” (CONF-PL 102/01).
The relations with the Commission deteriorated further after Poland’s adoption 
in 2000 of the amendment to the Act on the Special Economic Zones (2000), which 
came into force in January 2001. Although the law adjusted the provisions of aid 
distributed in the SEZ to the European rules, Polish authorities have continued issuing 
permissions for investments in the SEZ based on the old rules throughout the year 2000. 
The government has not been discouraged by warnings from the Commission, which 
charged Polish authorities with acting with ‘wrong intentions’ and questioned the 
legality of the new licenses (PM Chancellery 2000a), also noting this fact as a failure in 
the 2001 Regular Report.
Since spring 2000, however, it became clear that searching for some sort of 
compromise would be necessary if the chapter on Competition was to be provisionally 
closed. Such a solution would unavoidably involve the worsening of investment 
conditions in the SEZ.
The compromise proposed by the Commission was “to convert, in collaboration 
with the beneficiaries, the incompatible benefits granted under the Law on the Special 
Economic Zones of 1994 into compatible aid arrangements. This could be achieved by 
way of transforming the operating aid into regional investment aid i.e. by limiting the 
tax exemptions to a percentage of the initial investment”. The member states upheld this 
view of the Commission in the common position of 21 November 2001 (CONF-PL
287 Although the UKIE had already worked on such scenarios before commencement of the negotiations 
in 1998 (UKIE 1998).
288 The rules were adopted by the Association Agreement on 23 May 2001 and therefore the Polish 
government accepted this day as a ‘cut-off date for all cases of state aid in Poland.
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102/01). In answer to this proposal, the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (OCCP) analyzed alternative solutions to the problem of unlawful aid 
schemes, considering, among others, exclusion of some types of enterprises from the 
programme, such as SME or large companies. Instead, the UKIE (UKIE 2002c), being 
the government agenda in almost permanent contact with the Commission and likely 
better aware of the restricted scope of its flexibility, proposed to focus on the qualities 
of state aid granted in the SEZ.
Responding to the positive developments on the Polish side, the Commission 
decided to narrow down the negotiation problem to only those undertakings that began 
their investment prior 2001. In return, Poland resigned from the transition period “with 
regard to those investors who started their activities after 1 January 2001” (PM 
Chancellery 2001a). At this moment, the solution needed to be drawn up only with 
respect to enterprises that started operating prior to 2001.
Similarly as in the Taxation chapter, the accession negotiations on the SEZ were 
conducted in parallel on two separate, domestic and international tables. Investors in the 
SEZ were clearly interested in the outcome of negotiations, as it defined their future. 
Their discontent could also have had serious political repercussions, in the case of 
triggering wider debate on the insufficient defense of the national interest by Poland’s 
negotiators.
Despite advanced talks with the Commission on the resignation or amendment to 
the application for a transition period, at the domestic table Poland’s negotiators kept 
reassuring investors about the government’s commitment to protect their interests. In an 
answer to the parliamentary enquiry on guarantees and tax exemptions in the SEZ289, 
the representative of the Ministry of Finance assured that according to the principles at 
work in any law-abiding state, citizens could not be deprived of their acquired rights. 
Similarly, answering to the subsequent interpellation in 1999, the representative of the 
same ministry once more reiterated this argument, pledging to investors that 
“undertakings acting in the SEZ will be able to use legally protected preferences also 
after accession of Poland to the EU”.290 As had happened in other negotiation chapters, 
the government, after initial denial of any intentions to compromise to the demands of 
the Commission, did not quite know how to withdraw from such promises.
289 Interpellation to the Minister of Finance No. 1024 of 13 October 1998.
290 Interpellation to the Minister of Finance No. 1489 of 25 February 1999.
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The agreement reached by the end of the negotiation process was a hard-won 
compromise from the perspective of both Poland and the EU. The Commission 
eventually agreed to grant a transition period for the public aid in SEZ, although not of 
the initially requested length and not for all undertakings. Poland received allowances 
for the phase-out period for small and medium enterprises until 2011 and 2010 
respectively. The aid for large companies was to be converted into ‘regional aid’ in the 
understanding of the acquis, with the aid ceiling at 75% of the eligible investment costs 
if the company obtained it after 1 January 2000. In the motor vehicle industry the aid is 
limited further, and set at a level that corresponds to 30% of the eligible costs. However, 
this is still higher than the EU standard of 20%, so could be interpreted as a triumph by 
the Polish negotiators.
To sum up, the core of the ‘state aid’ discussion between the Polish government 
and the EU Commission concerned interpretation of the obligations imposed on the 
accession countries by the Europe Agreements. Poland’s negotiators presented the dire 
consequences of a lack of accession period: among others, the threat to survival of 
whole industrial sectors and of a number of small and medium (SME).
4. The role of the social actors in (non)adaptation to the EU competition
acquis
Notwithstanding the relatively weak institutional structures for consultations 
with social partners interested in the outcome of accession talks in particular policy 
areas (see Chapter HI), the outcome of the Competition policy negotiations was 
contingent on social consultations. Polish authorities could not impose the worsening of 
investment conditions in the Special Economic Zones without giving notice to the
9Q1entrenched interests . Moreover, as section 2 demonstrates, many of the beneficiaries 
of the tax-holiday in the zones were large, foreign or multinational enterprises, whose 
opinion was difficult to discard. Mishandling of this matter by the government could 
undermine Poland’s position internationally as an attractive investment location. The 
EU seemed to follow this rationale and somewhat cynically advised Poland to convert
291 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European Integration, in September 2008.
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incompatible aid granted in the SEZ into compatible aid arrangements “in collaboration 
with the beneficiaries” (Conference on Accession 2001). However, at the same time, the 
Commission’s officials292 were concerned about the possible impact of interest groups’ 
lobbying activities on the accession negotiations. Particular concerns were raised on the 
beneficiaries of aid in the SEZ and their potentially detrimental impact on 
harmonization of Poland’s competition laws with the acquis. They were also vocalized 
during technical consultations on the Competition chapter (PM Chancellery 2000a).
Similarly to other policy areas, no formal structures created 
(theoretically) with a view to open the negotiation process to a wider audience have 
been effectively used for seeking a socially acceptable solution to such contentious 
issues as state aid in the SEZ. The two basic institutions, the Partnership Groups and 
the National Council for European Integration, failed to fulfill their roles, as by design 
they could not serve as much more than a discussion forum about general issues related 
to accession. In the case of the former, the shortcomings outlined in Chapter HI either 
prevented the social partners from active participation or their impact ceased with 
completion of the screening stage of the accession negotiations294. The National 
Council, created in autumn 1999, was too large and too politically involved for 
conducting often very technical consultations on specific matters. Thus, most of the 
contacts between the Chief Negotiator’s Team and the interest groups took place on an 
ad hoc basis and in an informal fashion.
The genuine consultations with entrenched interests on Poland’s negotiation 
position with respect to the issue of the Special Economic Zones commenced, however, 
not earlier than summer 2002. Prior to that, the investors notoriously complained about 
their lack of involvement or even basic information about the Polish negotiation 
position (Rzeczpospolita 2002; Niklewicz 2002c). The common concern expressed by 
the companies once the meetings with negotiators were finally organized, was the 
absence of concrete proposals in the government’s presentations (Niklewicz 2002d). 
Some investors argued that had the consultations been organized at an earlier stage, the
292 Interview with a DG Enlargement official in October 2003.
293 See Chapter ffl.
294 Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession 
Negotiations in March 2006.
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government could have avoided ‘ridiculing itself by promising ‘the golden mountains’ 
and later failing to deliver on these promises (Niklewicz 2002c).
The companies operating in the SEZ acted not only individually (see e.g. 
Niklewicz 2002c) but also via countrywide business organizations, such as the Business 
Center Club (BCC) and the Polish Confederation of Private Employers (PKPP)295 as 
well as the Club of Investors in the SEZ. In the concerted opinion of these 
organizations, the government’s negotiation position was too soft. Business 
organizations argued that a change of the ‘rules of the game’ for investments in the SEZ 
would undermine Poland’s position as an investment location, induce a prompt 
relocation of some of the companies to other countries, and represent a general 
worsening of investment conditions due to an apparent legal instability (Club of 
Investors 2002). Similar concerns were expressed by individual companies, which also 
exerted pressure on government representatives for maintenance of the status quo in the 
zones. For instance, Fiat-GM Powertrain argued in a letter to the Minister of 
Economy that the stability of legal order and rules of conduct for economic activity 
stood among the key reasons behind its decision to locate in Poland.
Similar in tone was the correspondence exchanged between the Club of 
Investors in the SEZ and the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration, 
Jaroslaw Pietras297. The organization expressed its “deepest concern” about the prospect 
of resignation from the transition period on state aid granted in the SEZ. It warned that 
a change in regulations might provoke withdrawal, especially of foreign investors, and 
would impede the economic development of Poland. At the same time, investors 
considered the “uncompromising stance of the European Commission” as an 
unconvincing reason for change of the rules. “The EU has no right to force the 
government to break the principle of acquired rights protection, which EU countries 
observe in their own territories in a rigorous way”. The entrepreneurs assessed as 
“inexcusable” the argument that the inflexible stance of the Commission might force the 
government to compromise on its initial claims. This act was depicted as a sign of
295 Interview with the Deputy President of the Business Centre Club in January 2006 and a member of the 
Establishes' Board of the Business Centre Club in March 2006.
296 The letter from Fiat GM Powertrain to the Minister of Economy, Jacek Piechota, 8 July 2002.
297 The letter was sent on 13 March 2002 and signed by investors from EURO-PARK Mielec and EURO- 
PARK Wislosan. Jaroslaw Pietras held the position of UKIE representative in the Negotiation Team and 
at the same time was Secretary of the Negotiation Team.
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“complete defeat”, without the slightest attempt to defend the SEZ, an “offspring of the 
governing coalition”. Furthermore, entrepreneurs demanded that the EU pay from the 
common budget indemnities for the breach of the principle of acquired rights 
protection”298.
In response to increasing pressure from the interests groups, summer 2002 
brought about an intensification of their contact with the government. As pointed out in 
the previous section, this was, however, after Poland’s publication of its amended 
negotiation position (in May 2002), in which the negotiators had already taken a 
decision to compromise on the initial application for a transition period and requested 
derogation until 2011 instead of 2017. At this point, the issue at stake was the number 
of investors that would be deprived of the privileges after accession to the EU, rather 
than whether to maintain the benefits or not. While the Commission suggested that all 
large companies employing more than 50 persons should belong to this group, the 
Polish government pressed for reducing the number of negatively affected firms to 120 
(out of around 700 that had invested in the SEZ) (Bielecki 2002).
A series of meetings with investors from the SEZ, their representative 
organizations, the Club of Investors in the SEZ and countrywide business organizations 
took place. These included conferences organized by the Office of Competition and
Consumer Protection, the Ministry of Economy, and even a meeting of the
Parliamentary Commission of Economy in one of the zones. A number of meetings 
were also organized on the initiative of the investors and their organizations as well as 
by the zones (XIII Conference on SEZ 2002).
In order to finalize the talks on the Competition policy chapter Poland’s 
government had to agree to the Community proposal to transform the aid schemes for 
companies, which invested in the SEZ prior to 2001, into measures compatible with the 
acquis. This would involve the worsening of investment conditions, which went 
contrary to the provisions of licenses obtained by the enterprises. Since the government 
wanted to avoid lawsuits from companies operating in the zones, the change of
conditions had to be negotiated individually with each investor. Additionally, as
mentioned above, the European Commission also pressured the Polish authorities to
298 Ibid.
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conduct such consultations299 prior to the formal modification of Poland’s position 
paper in summer 2002, and after defining the scope of flexibility on both sides of the 
negotiation table during the visit of Alexander Schaub, Director General of DG 
Competition.
Prompted by the Commission, the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (UOKiK) indeed organized such a meeting on 19 June 2002 (UOKiK 2002a). 
It presented the key provisions of the amended negotiation position on the SEZ (from 
May 2002), arguing that adopted solutions were not final but rather proposals for 
consultations with enterprises, their organizations and the European Commission, with a 
view to come up with the optimal solution. Similarly, during an earlier conference in the 
SEZ300, which convened on 3-5 June 2002, Minister Hiibner claimed that the “absolute 
priority for the negotiators should be to maintain the ‘acquired rights’ of investors from 
the SEZ”.
The latter were, however, disappointed with the proposal to set up an aid ceiling 
at the level of 75% (for large companies), proposed in the amendment of the negotiation 
position, and asked for a restriction of the qualification criteria for the SME only on 
employment and annual turnover. The motor industry in particular complained about 
the insufficient representation of its interest by the government during the accession 
talks.
Leading business organizations were not satisfied with the consultation process 
conducted in the context of negotiations on the SEZ. They complained about their 
insufficient involvement in drafting the negotiation position and participation in the 
dialogue with the government in general. The Polish Confederation of Private 
Employers (PKPP) even claimed that the “environment directly interested in the 
problem is omitted in the process of preparation of the Polish negotiation position. 
Moreover, investors are not sufficiently informed about the directions of conducted 
works and the only source of information constitutes press publications” (PKPP 2002). 
Furthermore, when the meetings with social partners did take place, it was after the 
formulation of the Polish government’s proposals for the European Commission, as in
299 Letter of 10 June 2002 from Eneko Landaburu to Jan Truszczynski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the EU.
300 The Conference was located in the Katowice SEZ, particularly important for the motor industry.
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May 2002. In a way, the goal of such meetings seemed to be rather a ‘window 
dressing’, aiming to increase the legitimacy of the government’s proposals in front of 
the Commission. Business organizations, instead, expected a discussion about the 
negotiation problems concerning them, ex ante formulation of the formal government 
proposals (PKPP 2002; XIII Conference on SEZ 2002). Only such proceedings would 
provide them with due chance to take part in the substantial negotiations.
However, in an anonymous poll conducted among investors operating in the 
zones301 (see Annex 6.4.), most of them positively assessed the performance of the 
Polish negotiators during the talks. Around 70% of the questioned companies admitted 
that members of the Negotiation Team did their utmost to achieve favourable terms of 
accession for the investors that had decided to locate in the zones. The eventual 
outcome of the negotiations was perceived as equally satisfactory. This is less surprising 
when one considers that most of the companies were aware of the upcoming change in 
the operational conditions due to accession, but nonetheless decided to invest in Poland. 
Moreover, business environments were the largest proponents of Poland’s accession to 
the EU, thus theoretically willing to accept more concessions than other social groups.
At the same time, the majority of respondents were unaware of any institutional 
methods of contacting the government on matters concerning adaptation to the EU and 
had not taken part in any social consultations. This is unsurprising. As the interviewed 
KIE302 representative admitted, most active in the negotiations were large companies, 
which acted via the biggest business organizations or directly through their head offices
' J A 'J
in European countries . He assessed this last strategy as the most successful from all 
strategies undertaken by various sectoral interests in different negotiation areas. 
Pressures on the EU member governments from their own companies led to the member 
states insisting on the Commission to soften its negotiation position. Thus, the actions of 
the Polish branches of the Europe-based companies led to a widening of the initially 
narrow win-set of the European Union in the Competition policy field. This may
301 Most of which, however, were smaller companies.
302 The Committee for European Integration.
303 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European Integration, in September 2008.
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explain the surprisingly positive eventual outcome of the accession negotiations in the 
area, and the high number of temporary derogations granted to Poland304.
5. The effectiveness of EU conditionality in the state aid area
EU conditionality in the Competition policy field has not been entirely effective. 
The number and length of the transition periods negotiated by Poland’s government, the 
disregard of the Polish government for provisions of the Association Agreement, and 
the legal delays in adoption of the relevant acts seem to confirm the hypothesis on the 
ineffectiveness of EU conditionality in the Competition policy area. On the positive side 
lies the fact that once the legal provisions were adopted, the state aid regime in Poland 
has been gradually approximated to the Community rules.
The legal provisions, which came into force after accession, and in particular the 
Act on proceeding with matters related to state aid (2004), the amendment of the Act on 
the Special Economic Zones (2003) and earlier Act on the conditions on admissibility of 
state aid (2002), adapted Poland’s legal system to the EU competition rules. The 
government negotiated with each of the operators in the SEZ, which started operating 
prior to 2001, on the basis of the provided data on investment and aid received, and the 
new license agreement adjusting the type of aid received to a scheme compatible with 
the single market. The compromise solution was achieved with all investors since no 
lawsuits followed the change of the investment conditions after accession. Thus, 
although the Competition policy has appeared to be one of the most difficult negotiation 
chapters, in the area of the SEZ no major problems with adaptation after accession 
occurred305.
Nonetheless, although formal adaptation may be considered to have been 
successfully carried out, the policy outcomes are less certain. As discussed in the 
previous sections, the Special Economic Zones were spread around massive territories 
and have long ceased to fulfill their role of investment encouragement in the worst-off 
regions. Although the Commission has tried to limit such development by banning
304 Interview with Cezary Banasiriski, the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer 
Protection in Apanowicz (2002).
305 Which cannot be said about other sub-fields, notably the restructuring of state-owned sensitive 
industries.
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extensions of the existent zones, Poland’s government continues to tamper with their 
territories. Once potential investors point to a preferable location for their investment, 
an area of equal size is simply carved out from one of the zones. In this way, their total 
area remains intact. These developments confirm the viability of the initial arguments 
of the European Commission refusing to accept the zones as regional policy tools. 
However, from Poland’s perspective, success in attracting an increasing number of 
investors to Poland is equated with the success of the SEZ.
Conclusions
The Competition policy chapter vividly illustrates the conflict between domestic 
priorities and exigencies of accession to the EU. The Commission pressed on the timely 
adjustment in the field, perceived as one of the cornerstones of the common market. On 
the other hand, the delays in implementation seem to reflect the weak incentive of the 
government to comply with EU rules, which in turn was based on strong opposition 
from domestic industries to the EU competition rules. There has also been broad 
support for these claims from society, which was explicated in the fact that 65% of the 
population supported maintaining the aid system operating according to Polish rules 
beyond the date of accession306.
During the accession negotiations, the Chief Negotiator’s Team came under 
considerable pressure from a number of groups, in particular representing business 
environments, which demanded transition periods in various areas. Jan Truszczynski 
pointed out in a press interview (Warzecha 2003) that only in some cases were these 
postulates well motivated. Entrepreneurs frequently prepared economic analyses of their 
situation, which anticipated grave consequences of resignation from the transition 
period, usually for the country as a whole. Sometimes the negotiators faced difficulties 
with distinguishing between the real problems and the “exaggerated” ones.
Nonetheless, particularly in the Competition policy area, the negotiators had to 
consider such concerns. The economic power of the enterprises investing in the SEZ 
might have produced a backlash against EU accession if their claims were ignored. The 
Commission has also seemed to have concerns over whether Poland’s government was
306 OBOP 2001.
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able to deliver socially acceptable solutions. It encouraged the Polish authorities to work 
out its negotiation position in cooperation with investors.
In line with Putnam’s prediction (Putnam 1988), strong domestic opposition to 
the reforms has reinforced the Polish government’s claims internationally. The strategy 
of the domestic interests has proven even more successful due to the interventions 
aimed at softening the EU position ‘from within’. In effect, the results of the accession 
negotiations in the thick acquis field have been surprising. Poland, and Hungary, were 
granted several transition periods, also concerning large companies operating within the 
zones and producing most of their output for export. At the same time, the economic 
impact of the Polish zones on the functioning of the common market has been 
negligible. Thus, it would be difficult for the European Commission to oppose the 
arguments about the desirability to maintain the legally acquired rights of investors. 
Nonetheless, despite the difficult accession negotiations, adaptation in the Competition 
policy field may be assessed as partially successful. The transition periods granted to 
Poland allowed for gradual adjustments, prevented social mobilization against accession 
and have proven part of the solution to the challenges of conditionality.
At the same time, there has been no evidence of the long-lasting activation of the 
economic actors as a result of the hardship of the accession process. The social interests 
remained mostly passive, with the largest operators in the zones taking the leading roles 
in consultations with the government. Most of the smaller actors were unaware of any 
formal possibilities to influence the negotiators and Poland’s negotiation position. Other 
actors have used existing structures of business organizations as a transmission belt for 
their demands. However, their modes of operation have not radically changed because 
of the negotiations and the social mobilization around the negotiation problem of the 
SEZ seems to represent only a one-off action.
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CHAPTER VII
Th e  flaw ed  adaptation  of Po la n d ’s regional
AID SYSTEM TO THE EU COHESION POLICY
Introduction
Poland’s regional reform commenced well before accession to the EU, at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It was triggered by the mounting need for detaching from the 
‘democratic centralism’ and democratisation of the governance system to accompany 
sweeping changes in the economic and political spheres. The reforms were conducted 
also in view of future participation in the EU regional policy.
Nonetheless, by the year 2000, when the accession negotiations on the Regional 
policy chapter commenced, Poland’s administrative system was certainly unprepared to 
benefit from the EU cohesion policy in a way ensuring respect for its rules and 
principles. Incapacitated territorial structures, inadequate financial resources of the 
voivodships as well as poorly demarcated competencies between various administrative 
tiers did not guarantee successful adaptation.
Nevertheless, it was commonly anticipated that Poland would manage to ensure 
timely adjustment to the EU acquis in the cohesion policy field. These expectations had 
been based on a few premises. First of all, positive distributional consequences made 
participation in the EU regional policy popularly seen as part of the rationale for 
membership. Tangible financial benefits from the Structural and Cohesion Funds were 
also expected to outbalance the potential costs of adaptation incurred in other fields. 
Unlike in previously analysed cases307, the link between conditionality and reward in 
this policy area has been particularly clear.
307 With the exception of the Fisheries policy, where financial retributions were also expected.
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Furthermore, ensuring appropriate absorption level of the EU Structural and 
Cohesion Funds was a political requisite, since failure would make Poland a net payer 
to the EU budget right after accession. Such risk guaranteed sufficient political focus on 
adaptation in this particular policy field. Finally, since the circle of potential policy 
beneficiaries was very wide and included state administration at various levels as well 
as economic and social actors, there has been practically no domestic opposition to 
implementation of the EU rules.
Despite the presence of all these elements, implementation of the EU cohesion 
policy in Poland came across serious difficulties. The difficulties were shown to be 
delays in the adoption of the legal framework, low absorption level and eventually the 
uncertain impact of the funds on evening out regional differences. Neither a decision to 
implement a centrally-managed system for funds’ distribution, set with a view to 
increase its accountability and efficiency, nor the potential negative consequences of 
suspension of the funds’ flow in case of non-compliance, have proven sufficient to 
secure timely adaptation.
This chapter analyses the reasons behind the weak capability of the EU in 
promoting policy change in the area on the surface holding properties, which should 
make the pre-accession conditionality most effective. As claimed in the Introduction to 
this thesis, counter to common knowledge, the combination of the thin acquis 
communautaire and the absence of prior domestic opposition to the reforms may, 
paradoxically, prove detrimental to the effectiveness of the EU conditionality.
The regional policy is referred to in the academic sources as a thin acquis policy 
area (see e.g. Hughes et al. 2003). It embodies scarce legal provisions on the 
institutional framework for policy conduct, which leaves a large part of decision-making 
to the discretion of the member countries. The regional acquis focuses on the outcome 
rather than processes. As such, it is also to some extent ambiguous, having several 
consequences for the accession negotiations and conditionality itself. The scarcity of 
legal provisions creates large win-sets (see Chapter I) on the international side (Level I) 
of the negotiation table (Putnam 1988). Hence, there is theoretically a relatively broad 
array of institutional solutions, which could be adopted by the candidate and still 
conform to the acquis. On the other hand, the virtual absence of domestic opposition to 
the institutional reform designed to facilitate funds’ inflow, denoted in this work as ‘no­
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prior opposition’ scenario, has also created a large win-set at the domestic table (Level
n).
The combination between the two elements created potentially favourable 
conditions for striking an accession agreement. However, as Putnam argues (1988), 
larger win-sets at Level II may also provoke stronger pressures on the negotiators from 
their international partners (see Chapter II). In case of accession negotiations, the broad 
domestic win-set combined with the thin and partly ambiguous regional acquis allowed 
the Commission to wield its asymmetric power for change to a greater extent than in 
other policy areas. It also permitted a shift of priorities for adaptation presented to the 
candidates in response to unfolding internal dynamics within the EU or changing 
political contexts in the CEE. However, as earlier studies on regional adjustments in the 
CEECs demonstrate (Hughes et al. 2003; Hughes et al. 2004), such changes were often 
interpreted by the applicants as inconsistency in demands and in effect tended to be 
detrimental to the workings of the pre-accession conditionality.
As this chapter argues, pressures by the Commission, not firmly anchored in the 
acquis have less causative power than in the policy areas with detailed legally-binding 
prescriptions for adaptation. Additionally, the shifting emphasis of the Commission has 
added to the general confusion among Poland’s decision-makers about the rules of the 
game in the cohesion policy area. Paradoxically, the absence of a clear blueprint for the 
ultimate funds distribution system intensified competition between the rent-seeking 
non-governmental and governmental agents and further delayed adaptation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section presents the motivations 
behind qualification of the Regional policy as a thin acquis policy. It outlines key points 
in the academic debate on the EU cohesion policy and its impact on the governance 
system and economies of the member countries. The second section traces the origins 
and evolution of the regional development policy in Poland, demonstrating the 
prevalence of domestic over international sources of the policy reform. Further, the 
tools of EU conditionality are examined. The third part analyses the scope and 
dynamics of the accession negotiations and the role of the social partners both, before 
accession and during implementation of the first budgetary perspective 2004-2006 in 
Poland. The final section examines the results from the application of EU conditionality 
in the Regional policy field. Conclusions summarize the findings.
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1. The Cohesion policy of the EU as the ‘thin’ acquis area
The EU regional policy aims to ‘strengthen the unity’ of the economies of EU 
Member States and to “ensure their harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured 
regions.”308 These goals are realised through interventions of the EU ‘regional funds’309 
in the least advantageous areas of the Community. Since the Maastricht Treaty these 
funds were complemented by the Cohesion Fund for the least prosperous member 
countries supporting projects in the fields of environment and transport. After the 
designation of economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Treaty on the European 
Union310 as one of the key Community objectives, alongside the Economic and 
Monetary Union and the Single Market, it has received considerable political silence. 
On the other hand, the economic importance of the policy area derives from its position 
in the EU budget, where it is the second largest item, after the Common Agriculture 
Policy.
Despite its economic and political weight, the EU regional policy is not 
uniformly applied across the member countries. The institutional system for its 
implementation varies considerably between the EU members. It is largely by dint of 
sparse and in some respects even vague (Hughes et al. 2003: 9) regulations and
311guidelines on the policy institutional requirements. Apart from the treaty basis , the 
legal underpinning for these actions provide in particular the framework Council 
Regulation (EC) 1260/1999312 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds
TI T(1999) , specific regulations governing each of the funds as well as Commission
decisions, communications, guidelines for programming, evaluation and monitoring
308 European Commission, Treaty of Rome, 1957.
309 Until 2007 the EU regional funds comprised the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
European Social Fund (ESF), Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (F1FG), Guidance Section of 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Cohesion Fund. In the 2007- 
2013 budgetary perspective the means of the EU Cohesion policy were amended to include the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), Solidarity Fund, Instrument of Pre- 
accession Assistance (IPA) and the Cohesion Fund (see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy).
310 European Commission, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.
311 The area of social and economic cohesion is governed by Art. 158-162 (Title XVII: economic and 
social cohesion), Art. 146-148 (European Social Fund) and Art. 33 (objectives of CAP) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
312 Prior to the fifth enlargement.
313 Substituted by the Council Regulation (EC) 1083/2006.
230
(see Annex 7.1). Most of these, however, are ‘soft laws’, which do not require 
transposition into the domestic legal systems. The acquis communautaire, which is 
largely based on one framework regulation, outlines only the key principles of the EU 
cohesion policy, without specification of the mode of its implementation in particular 
member countries314. The EU’s emphasis is on the process and outcome rather than on 
particular institutional models (Hughes et al. 2004: 5).
Even in cases where a common prescription for particular aspect of funds’ 
operation exists, the EU regulations stress the national context of its application. The 
framework law for the Structural Funds (EC 1260/1999) specifically stated that “the 
implementation of assistance shall be the responsibility of the Member States, at the 
appropriate territorial level according to the arrangements specific to each Member 
State”315. Similarly, when it comes to implementation of the partnership principle, 
bodies to be consulted shall be designated “within the framework of [...] national rules 
and current practices” (Art. 8(1), (EC) 1260/1999). The decision on the management 
system of funds distribution was also left to the discretion of the EU member countries, 
and the managing authorities are expected to “act in full compliance with the 
institutional, legal and financial systems of the Member States concerned” (Art. 34 (EC) 
1260/1999).
In line with the acquis, the EU countries manage the Structural Funds through 
the Sectoral and Regional Operational Programmes organized into the so-called 
Community Support Framework (CSF). The shape and content of the programmes is set 
by the member states according to domestic administrative arrangements and 
developmental needs, but requires the approval of the European Commission. The CSF 
Managing Authority coordinates all processes related to funds’ absorption and 
monitoring, while each programme is governed by the assigned Programme Managing 
Authority (MA).
There are considerable differences in the organization of the system among 
various member states. In some countries structures managing EU assistance function 
within the government, while others set up for this purpose separate, parallel institutions
314 With the exception of the Council Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural 
development from the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and 
repealing certain Regulations.
31* Council Regulation (EC) 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999, Art. 8(3).
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(or they delegate the tasks to existing ones). The former solution has been applied in 
Ireland, Spain and Germany and the latter in Portugal. The scope of the tasks assigned 
to the Managing Authorities and their resources and capacities also differ. For instance, 
a Managing Authority may perform the functions of a Paying Authority (the drawing up 
and submission of payment applications) or the tasks are split between two separate 
institutions.
There has also been no standardized system of NUTS territorial classification, 
serving as a statistical basis for funds disbursement. The member countries used to 
designate the regions at various levels (NUTS I, II, IE, IV, V) in line with existent 
territorial divisions and drawing on historical and political idiosyncrasies rather than EU 
pressures. The Commission has not intervened in the process of drawing regional 
boundaries, rather its role was restricted to giving a pro forma agreement on member 
states’ proposals for regional divisions. Some accounts, however, point to the 
Commission’s efforts to influence the designation of NUTS areas in the CEECs (see 
Hughes et al. 2003: 18). However, even in these cases, the impact of the Commission 
was limited to blocking candidates’ attempts to manipulate the statistical units to 
maximize funding opportunities (for instance by designating a separate region for a 
capital city). The acquis communautaire did not furnish the Commission with any 
powers to play an active role in the process of designation of the regions.
Another feature of the thin regional acquis is its fragmentary character. The 
Community actions in the regional policy complement or correspond to the national 
operations (Art. 8, (EC) 1260/1999). Unlike in the Fisheries or Competition policies, the 
regional acquis provides, albeit not precise, premises only for a distribution system for 
the funds originating in the Community budget. It leaves all other ‘regional’ issues 
within the sole competencies of the member states317. The latter decide on other types of 
regionally-oriented aid, for instance from the national or regional budgets, and an 
institutional system of their distribution (under the condition that it complies with the 
competition acquis).
316 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics.
317 There is, however, broad academic discussion on its impact upon the regional policies and governance 
system in the member states, outlined in the following part of this section.
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Thus, the degree of decentralization of the management functions also tends to 
be a derivative of specific historical and political idiosyncrasies. It might be traced 
through the relative volume of EU assistance distributed between the Sectoral and 
Regional Programmes. Federal countries generally opt for more a regionalized version 
of the system. In turn, the majority of key decisions concerning regional policy-making 
in centralized countries with relatively weak local administrations, such as Greece 
(Getimis and Economou 1996) or Ireland, remain within the remit of the central 
government. This choice, however, does not seem necessarily to predetermine whether 
funds’ absorption and impact on economic development is a success or failure, as these 
two cases present (see e.g. Grosse 2000). With the multitude of solutions adopted by the 
EU member countries, there has been no single unambiguously most effective system 
that the candidates for EU membership could use as a template for their own adaptation. 
There exists, at least in formal terms, no clear blueprint of the regional policy the EU 
could offer to the candidates for membership.
The impact o f the EU regional policy on the countries and regions benefiting
from funding
A considerable part of the literature on the EU regional policy focuses on its 
impact on the governance of the countries participating in aid programmes (Keating 
1995; Kohler-Koch 1996; Keating 1998; Goetz and Hix 2000; Hughes et al. 2001) and 
in particular the ‘regionalizing effects’. The key argument holds that application of the 
principles attached to the EU-funded regional programmes, in particular partnership and 
programming, contribute to the empowerment of the regions vis-a-vis central 
authorities. A number of authors argued that such systemic design coalesced with the 
Commission’s preference for involvement of the sub-national actors in regional policy 
making. This view is derived for instance from the 1985 speech by Jacques Delors318, 
who claimed that the goal of economic and social cohesion could be achieved through 
active participation of the regions themselves in all stages of regional policy-making.
The Commission’s actions (Smyrl 1997) in practical terms have been driven by 
the search to decrease resource-dependence of the regional actors vis-a-vis their national 
governments. “In explicit recognition of the fact that many sub-national units did not
318 Jacques Delors’s speech to the European Parliament, OJEC 1985, 95.
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possess the means to play the role expected of them, the Community’s reformed 
regional policy provided technical and political resources to the regions concerned” 
(Smyrl 1997: 291). Strong regional authorities were an indispensable element for such 
systems and the Commission is seen as searching for the means of promoting them, not 
least in order to strengthen its own position over the policy-making vis-a-vis national 
governments. Arguably, distributional and political logics of compensation for the 
poorer states likely to lose out on the Single Market Programme (Keating 1998: 172) 
have underpinned the Council assent for the Commission’s leading position within the 
policy.
The ‘bottom-up’ explanations of the apparent power devolution in the EU 
member countries (Keating 1995: 2) are based on the evidence showing regional 
political and economic mobilization. The cohesion policy of the EU encouraged the 
member states “to establish planning authorities at the regional level, which in turn 
produce demands for democratisation of these new structures, and hence the creation of 
elected regional assemblies and governments” (Goetz and Hix 2000). Goetz and Hix 
(2000: 11) argue that in countries with existent regional institutional structures, such as 
Italy and Spain, the EU regional policy has reinforced “demands of regional bodies for 
further delegation of policy competences away from central governments”. On the other 
hand, in member states without these structures, or with ‘statist’ public administration, 
such as France, it acted as a catalyst of change. Thus, it is expected that accession to the 
EU and establishment of the new links between EU-level, national and sub-national 
administrative tiers over regional policy-making is likely to forge radical transformation 
in regional and local governance in post-communist Europe.
These views were contested by proponents of the opinion that, paradoxically, 
participation in the EU cohesion policy has been detrimental to the emancipation of the 
regions and further reinforces central governments (see Keating and Hooghe 1996; 
Urwin 1998; Grosse 2000). This concerns in particular countries with more centralized 
governance structures (as most of the EU members)319 and follows from the dominance 
of central authorities in the decision-making process. Legally, the Commission’s 
partners in decision-making over the policy and financial issues related to regional
319 With the notable exception of the federal countries, such as Austria, Germany, Belgium and 
regionalized Spain.
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assistance are member countries’ executives. The organization of the social dialogue at 
the regional level enforced by the partnership principle also remains at their sole 
discretion, as well as the disposal of the whole envelope of the Cohesion Fund (Keating 
and Hooghe 1996).
Furthermore, as Marks et al. argue (1996) the policy in a number of cases has 
contributed to the exacerbation of rivalry and conflicts at the territorial level, either 
between the regional and central authorities or their representatives in the regions. 
Central governments control financial resources in countries with weak regional 
structures, where most of the EU funds are distributed in the framework of sectoral 
rather than regional programmes. It may thus be viably argued that the occurrence of 
power devolution is fully contingent on domestic factors, such as pre-existent 
administrative structures and culture.
Equally contentious is the issue of economic and social performance resulting 
from the application of EU funds in the least-developed regions. While there have been 
numerous accounts of the successful application of the policy, in economic terms its 
results are uncertain. The empirical data presents an increasing convergence between 
development levels of rich and poor countries, however, redressing these differences is 
too procrastinate and brings differing effects (CEC 1999b). While some countries, such 
as Ireland, managed to catch up or even exceed the richest Community members in 
terms of income level (and other indicators), others, such as a number of Greek, 
Portuguese, South Italian and Spanish regions stayed behind in their laggards position 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999). The highest pace of decreasing regional differences 
took place between the 1950s and 1970s, when the role of the EU cohesion policy was 
negligible (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999). Some studies claim that the EU regional 
policy is ineffective in terms of fostering convergence or that it even preserves the 
marginal position of the least-developed, mostly peripheral regions (Martin 1998; CPB 
2002). Since it is difficult to isolate the effects of the funds’ application from other 
factors influencing economic performance, it remains questionable whether the success 
stories are owing to the general state policies or the EU financial assistance.
The outlined properties of the regional acquis qualify it as a thin acquis area, in 
line with criteria outlined in Chapter I, namely the stress on the achievement of specific 
policy objectives rather than processes, the sparse volume of hard laws, and the leeway
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left to the member countries with respect to implementation of specific provisions and 
fragmentary character. The high political sensitivity of regional issues, related to 
questions of territory and governance, restricted the decision-making powers of the EU 
to the issues of EU funds. In this sense, however, there is a direct link between the 
volume of the funds granted for a particular country and the scope of Community 
involvement. This relation is particularly relevant for the CEE case, in which the bulk of 
regionally-oriented financial flows come from the EU budget. The implications for the 
Community power to structure regional policy-making in the applicant countries are 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
1. The domestic context for implementation of the EU cohesion policy rules 
in Poland
The institutional model of regional policy established in Poland has been shaped 
by historic path dependancy and endogenous forces rather than EU conditionality. Prior 
to the start of accession negotiations the EU exerted little pressure on Poland’s 
authorities with respect to territorial issues. If any, they were restricted to informal 
recommendations and experts’ participation in the common study projects, realized 
frequently with other international institutions, in particular OECD .
On the other hand, the process of Poland’s regional policy reform commenced 
already in the early 1990s, well prior to the pre-accession phase of relations with the 
EU. The direct trigger provoked concerns that the regional deficit may impair the 
positive results of the sweeping changes taking place in the economic and political 
spheres since 1989. Although formulation of Poland’s regional policy assumptions took 
place largely ‘with a view’ of accession to the EU and future adaptation to the European 
regional policy, its direct impact on the reforms trajectory was limited. The thin regional 
acquis is nebulous enough on the fundamental institutional solutions to be filled in with 
various mixtures of substance. Hence, in absence of direct and focused pressures its 
guiding role was very limited. The pace and shape of the regional changes implemented 
in Poland throughout the 1990s coincided more closely with the timetable of domestic 
rather than international political events, with the key role of the election calendar.
320 Mostly in the framework of the SIGMA project, a joint initiative of the OECD Center for Co- 
Operation with non-member economies and the European Union Phare programme.
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Should the post-Solidarity forces have lost the 1998 elections, realization of the reform 
in its present shape would likely have been postponed indefinitely.
The evolution o f Poland’s regional policy prior to the start o f the accession
negotiations
The communist regime left behind a fragmented territorial administrative 
structure based on forty-nine ‘voivodships’ and sectorally oriented public finance flows. 
The ‘national councils’ governing these small regions remained entirely subjugated to 
the communist party rule and did not play any role in designing structural policies at 
their areas. The concept of regional policy understood as a bulk of territorially oriented 
policy actions321 appeared in this institutional context redundant.
Nevertheless, the political and economic challenges that Poland faced in the 
wake of systemic transformation put regional and administrative reforms back on the 
political agenda. Rising regional differences, unemployment levels and the abrupt 
impoverishment of large sections of the society reinforced the debate about regional 
policy as a remedy to the negative effects of the ‘shock therapy’. An additional stimulus 
for change came from the national councils, which, as the repository of the old 
communist elites, seemed at most unsuitable partners for putting the modernization 
reforms into effect.
The post-communist government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki took the first modest 
step towards devolution of some central government’s powers and democratization of 
Poland’s governance. The local government Act (1990) adopted in March 1990 
introduced the two-tier administrative system restituting self-governing municipalities. 
Although around 2500 gminas were too small to conduct any regional policy, the 
reform lent importance to the notion of local interest and created nascent structures 
willing to pursue it. At the same time, the forty-nine voivodships remained the 
repository of the state’s powers in the regions.
Although the 1990 reform fell way short of the fully fledged democratization of 
the Polish governance system, it constituted an important advancement in the direction 
of the institutional model postulated by Poland’s academics since the 1970s. The
321 Law of 12 May 2000 on the principles of support for regional development.
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leading experts in the regional policy field, Jerzy Regulski322 and Michal Kulesza323 
enacted in 1978 the “Experience and the Future” seminar324, which formulated the key 
principles of self-governance reform to be carried out in Poland. They anticipated 
splitting from the “democratic centralism” of the single state authority and conferring 
legal status upon the communes (,gminas) (Emilewicz and Wolek 2002: 27-30). The 
systemic change in the late 1980s presented a tremendous opportunity to put these 
theoretical postulates into practice.
Rationalization of the territorial policies by transfer of some state powers to the 
sub-national structures was the key objective of the awaited reform. A country the size 
of Poland with forty million inhabitants simply could not be effectively managed solely 
from the central level. On the one hand, territorial reform was expected to facilitate 
economic growth and increase Poland’s attractiveness to the foreign capital (Szomburg 
2001: 12). On the other, decentralization was seen as potentially contributing to further 
democratization by mobilizing social energy and activating local communities (Grosse 
2003: 9). The advocates of change, in particular academics, representatives of the newly 
created local units and some politicians, emphasized the positive effects of institutional 
reform spilling over to the political and social domains.
Yet, the political turmoil of the 1990s impeded further progress on the territorial 
issues involving the decentralization of state’s power. The incumbent governments 
focused on restoring economic equilibrium and putting the country on the path of 
economic growth325 while regional development was seen as having secondary 
importance (Hausner and Marody 2000: 97). Additionally, decentralization was 
associated frequently with the threat to the unity of the country and thus remained a
322 Jerzy Regulski, a professor of the Lodz University co-chaired the negotiations on the local government 
reform during the Round Table talks. Government Plenipotentiary for Self-government Reform in 1989— 
1991. In 1998-1999 Chair of the Council for the Systemic Reform at the Prime Minister’s Office.
323 Michal Kulesza, a professor at Warsaw University, in 1992-1994 Government Plenipotentiary for 
Public Administration Reform, from December 1997 until January 1999 Government Plenipotentiary for 
Systemic Reform, Under-Secretary of State in PM Chancellery until April 1999.
324 Although communist authorities banned the seminar after its first session, it continued to work as an 
informal gathering. After martial law was introduced in December 1981, research on self-governance in 
Poland was carried out by three major academic institutions: the Polish Academy of Science Institute of 
Economic Science, the Lodz University, Institute of Cities’ Development, and the team of Michal 
Kulesza at the University of Warsaw.
325 The question of self-governance and state decentralization, however, appeared on the Round Table 
agenda. Jerzy Regulski, together with Kulesza and Jerzy St?pien represented the “Solidarity” side at the 
sub-table on pluralism of social organizations, later on replaced by the sub-table on self-governmental 
reform.
238
politically contested topic. None of the major political forces showed particular resolve 
towards broader application of the self-governance principle, the key component of
326 327academics’ proposals . The attitude of political heirs of the Solidarity movement 
was, however, generally more pro-reformist. On the other hand, post-communist parties, 
the Democratic Alliance and the Polish Peasants Party, which formed the governing 
coalition in 1993-1997, outwardly opposed power devolution and territorial 
decentralization. There was thus no chance for progress in this sphere until the shift in 
political representation took place in October 1997.
The reinstatement of political activities in the regional policy field became
329 tfeasible with the coming to power of the post-Solidarity Jerzy Buzek government . It 
won the elections on the premise of systemic changes330, which would complete the 
country’s transition efforts. They included the reform of the health system, pensions and 
insurance, education and territorial administration. Earlier, the post-Solidarity 
environments had managed to ensure the insertion of provisions on self-governance into 
the Constitutional Act (1997).
After plenty of political wrangling over the size and number of provinces, which 
dominated political discourse on the territorial issues, the government adopted a 
compromise solution assuming the division of Poland into sixteen self-governing 
provinces (voivodships). The key premises of the reform331 were the introduction of a 
tri-level territorial administrative system, devolution of central government’s powers to 
the voivodships and the introduction of self-governance at all levels of territorial 
administration. The voivodship marshals appointed by the elected regional parliaments 
were to assume a substantial part of the competencies thus far executed by central 
administration. In each province the Minister of Internal Affairs also appointed the
326 Interview with Michal Kulesza, Government Plenipotentiary for Territorial Reform in May 2003.
327 Liberty Union and small fractions of the Election Action “Solidarity” (AWS).
328 The major political players of the time were post-communist Left Democratic Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej, SLD), Polish Peasants Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe PSL), Democratic Union 
(Unia Demokratyczna, UD) Election Catholic Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka, WAK), Confederation 
of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, KPN), Civic Agreement Centre (Porozumienie 
Obywatelskie Centrum, PC), Christian Democrats (ChrzeScijanska Demokracja, ChD), “Solidarity” Trade 
Union and others.
329 Jerzy Buzek led the coalition between the Election Action “Solidarity” (AWS) and the Liberty Union 
(UW).
330 The AWS-UW government introduced major health, education and pension system reforms.
331 Introduced in legal terms by the Act of 18 December 1998 on amendment of the act on the 
governmental departments; Act of 5 June 1998 on Voivodship self-government; Act of 26 November 
1998 on income of territorial self-government units; Act of 26 November 1998 on public finance.
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voivod, in charge of guarding the ‘national (central government’s) interests’ in the 
region. In practice, the voivods’ offices formed parallel regional bureaucratic structures.
The territorial reform aimed at the introduction of the rational division of public 
tasks and competencies between the central and regional administration and enhancing 
social integration by strengthening local communities and citizens’ participation in 
public life at the local level. Strong provinces were expected to facilitate pro- 
developmental actions in the regions but also in the future to become players at the EU 
level (Klasik 2001: 183). However, the capacity of regional self-governments to act was 
constrained by weak financial safeguards based on their own limited financing 
(Gilowska and Misiag 2000; Gilowska 2001b). The regional contracts, designed as the 
key instruments for the regional policy conduct have also not fulfilled their roles 
(Pyszkowski et al. 2000: 120; Grosse 2003: 17). Experts argue that the Law on 
supporting regional development (2000) set the model of the subtle steering of self- 
governments’ expenditures and that regional contracts substituted the factual 
decentralization of public finances (Gilowska 2001b: 145). Poor demarcation of 
competencies between governmental and self-governmental administration in the 
regions provided yet another platform for the conflict. The unwillingness of the voivods 
to relinquish their role in the regional development process was its main source 
(Hausner and Marody 2000: 100). This exacerbated the conflict with the self- 
governmental administration, in particular in those regions where the leaders had 
differing political affiliations.
Nonetheless, the creation of the institutional framework allowed regional and 
local actors to associate and mobilize in a (more or less successful) struggle to remove 
the above impediments. The municipalities since their creation had undertaken 
numerous such initiatives, which resulted in the establishment of several organizations 
as early as autumn 1990. These included the Union of Polish Metropolies333, the 
Association of Polish Cities or the National Convention of Territorial Self­
332 Substantiation of the resolution of the Council of Ministers in the matter of the principles of 
preparation and implementation of the public administration reform.
333 Set up in October 1990, in 2006 it included the twelve largest cities: Bialystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdansk, 
Katowice, Krakow, Lublin, L6dz, Poznan, Rzeszow, Szczecin, Warszawa, and Wroclaw. All of them are 
members of the Eurocities represented in the Committee of the Regions.
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governments334. Transfer of some of state’s powers to the local level has also 
contributed to the mobilization of NGOs, which had easier access to influencing 
decision-makers on issues of their concern335. As mentioned above, these two types of 
local entities represented the biggest proponents of further decentralization and creation 
of the territorial self-governments of counties (poviats) and provinces (voivodships) 
(Sepiol 2001: 247; Grosse 2003: 9).
In 1999, after the introduction of the voivodships, their representatives joined the 
mobilization trend. The voivodship marshals were quick to establish their own 
representative body, the Marshals Council (1999). In 2002 the territorial self- 
governments set the Association of Poland’s Voivodships with the clearly defined 
objective of “defense of the common interests of the voivodships”337. However, the 
capability of these environments to exercise pressures on the central executive increased 
only after Poland’s accession to the EU338 (see the next sections).
The socio-political context of Poland’s adaptation to the Regional acquis was 
clearly not a vacuum. However, numerous actors involved in policy-making or 
potentially benefiting from the regional funds had a variety of expectations related to 
adaptation to the EU regional acquis and EU funds’ absorption. It is thus impossible to 
define the coherent set of pressures exerted upon the government prior to accession. 
While the territorial self-governments were interested predominantly in increasing 
financial flows into their regional budgets, the voivods fought for decision-making 
powers on the choice of projects, NGOs pressed for increased budgets earmarked for the 
spheres of their activities, private enterprises postulated simplified access to funding 
and commercial banks lobbied for the introduction of the credit component into the 
financing structure, which would complicate the procedures. Meanwhile, all ministries 
were competing for retaining the maximum amount of finance and power under their 
own sectoral programmes. These various and often contradictory pressures do not
334 Established in September 1990. The Act on financing the counties from 10 December 1993 lists, apart 
from these organizations, the Union of Polish Towns and the Union of Rural Communes of the Republic 
of Poland as members of the self-governmental side of the Common Commission of the Government and 
the Territorial Self-government, enacted by the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 5 February 2002 
on the enactment of the Common Commission of the Territorial Self-Government and Government.
335 Interview with the Public Relations Director of the Polish Humanitarian Action in April 2006.
336 V Regional Forum, Warsaw, 4 September 1998.
http://www.zwrp.pl/
338 While it did not solve the conflict between the marshals and the voivods, which in many voivodships 
was even exacerbated.
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qualify as ‘prior opposition’ as defined in Chapter I. On the contrary, in theoretical 
terms the mixture of pressures should neutralize themselves and thus widen a 
government’s win-set in the accession negotiations, making adaptation in the field less 
challenging. Even more so that none of the groups involved actually opposed adaptation 
in the regional policy field but rather the opposite.
The EU had little direct impact on the transition in the regional policy until the 
start of the accession negotiations. Nonetheless, Poland’s reforms were not conducted in 
disconnection from the international standards and know-how. The most important 
benchmarks and guidance provided the European Charter of Local Self-government, 
informal recommendations of the European Commission, OECD339 and the Open 
Society Institute340.
All of these sources pointed in the general direction of reforms delineated by the 
principles of power devolution to the regions, the introduction of self-governance at the 
sub-national level and territorial decentralization. However, direct linkage between 
concrete policy solutions and these pressures would be difficult to trace. The authors of 
Poland’s reform claim that decentralization had purely domestic sources. Both the 1990 
and 1998 decentralizing reforms were conducted without financial contribution from the 
EU. The Commission merely observed the changes and modestly criticised Poland for 
‘superficial’ decentralization341. During the accession negotiations, however, this 
position shifted and the EU inclined towards a more centralized system of funds
' l A ' J
distribution , laying itself open to criticism from domestic actors and undermining the 
leverage of the EU conditionality regime.
2. The EU pre-accession conditionality in the thin policy area
Regional policy has occupied an important position on the Community priority 
list for adaptation owing to the presence of the administrative capacity issue on the pre­
339 Mostly in the framework of the SIGMA project, a joint initiative of the OECD Center for Co-operation 
with non-member economies and the European Union’s Phare programme.
340 Through the publications of the ‘Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative’, established 
in 1997 with the aim to promote democratic and effective local government and public administration, 
and by advancing policy analysis as a tool for decision-making in public affairs.
341 Interview with the Government Plenipotentiary for Territorial Reform in May 2003.
342 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) in the Office of the Committee of European Integration in September 2008.
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accession agenda since the 1985 Madrid summit. However, there has been relatively 
little intervention by the European institutions into the policy-forming processes in the 
field prior to 1998. Apart from informal meetings, communications from the 
Commission and conclusions from the study projects343, the Commission had not 
formulated any concrete demands with respect to adaptation344 until the publication of 
the Accession Partnerships.
The formal basis for such potential pressures was very weak since thin acquis 
had not provided any concrete policy blueprint, which could have guided the systemic 
reforms, such as conducted in Poland until 1999. This is not to say that the Commission 
did not have any preferences about the principles of the system constructed in Poland. 
Prior to engaging in more intense contact with Polish authorities (during the accession 
talks), Commission officials opted for implementation of a decentralized model of 
Structural Funds distribution345. However, upon increasing realization of an insufficient 
administrative capacity at the regional level, this position started to shift towards a 
preference for a more centralized system346, which was indeed instated.
The sources o f conditionality in the pre-accession framework
Since the publication of Avis (CEC 1997b) on the candidate countries, EU 
involvement in the domestic processes and scrutiny of applicants’ progress in adaptation 
has considerably increased. The initial monitoring documents of the European 
Commission (CEC 1998; CEC 1999) convey cautious optimism about the state of 
Poland’s territorial reform, with appeals to a candidate’s government, focusing on the 
supply of more or better quality information about the progress in adaptation achieved 
to date. Underlining Poland’s good chances for membership, Agenda 2000 summarized 
that “Poland [...] should be able in the medium term to [...] establish the administrative 
structure to apply [the acquis]” (CEC1997c: 46). Also in the 1999 Regular Report on 
Poland’s progress towards accession (CEC 1999: 13) the Commission described the
343 Realized with the participation of Polish and Community regional policy experts in 1995 and 1996 
(see Task Force for the Regional Development in Poland 1996; 1997).
344 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) in the Office of the Committee of European Integration in September 2008.
345 Such postulates were also included in the study reports of European and Polish experts. Although 
some formal changes followed their recommendations (such as setting the structures in charge of regional 
development within the PM Chancellary), the central postulate for power and fiscal devolution has not 
been included in the 1998 reform (see Task Force for the Regional Development in Poland 1996).
346 Ibid.
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undertaken administrative reorganization as “impressive” and “fundamental” reform of 
the state administration, leading to a “genuine policy approach in Poland”. This positive 
tone, however, seems to gradually fade away in the subsequent Commission Reports.
The 1999 Accession Partnership with Poland (CEC 1999a) already listed 
pertaining problems with adaptation in the field and short and medium-term347 actions 
needed to rectify them. The Commission asked Poland’s government to prepare the 
“national policy for economic and social cohesion”, clarify the division of competencies 
between institutions responsible for carrying structural policies, organize efficient inter- 
ministerial co-ordination and improve the budgetary system according to Structural 
Funds standards (CEC 1999a: 10). These recommendations followed observation of the 
Commission from the 1998 Regular Report that Poland’s “regional development 
strategy is still at a conceptual stage” with weak fiscal procedures and inadequate 
financial instruments for regional intervention (CEC 1998: 34). It corroborated with 
deficiencies of the regional reform pointed out by the domestic critiques outlined above.
In the context of financial arrangements for funds distribution, early pre­
accession documents noted in particular the need for “adequate allocation of financial 
revenues and of revenue raising powers” to the new administrative structures (CEC 
1999: 13). Nonetheless, analysis of subsequent Regular Reports suggests that the 
position of self-governments in this system was gradually less ascertained. Contrasting 
with the 1999 Report, more than a year after opening the negotiations in Chapter 21, the 
2001 paper (CEC 2001b: 79) explicitly called for “careful consideration” of the role of 
the regions in funds management in the period up to the end of 2006. This subtle 
attitudinal change seems to reflect the increasing concerns of the Commission about the 
administrative capacity of the newly established regional structures to process vast 
volumes of the regional funding from the EU budget. The 2001 Report expressed it 
directly by pointing out that “above all, the administrative capacity of the units within 
the ministries and/or other bodies which will be designated as future managing 
authorities, [...] needs to be considerably strengthened in order that they will effectively 
be able to take on the responsibility for the efficiency and correctness of the 
management and implementation of the Structural Funds” (CEC 2001b: 80). In that way
347 Medium-term signifies more than a year from publication, but work should have started during 2000.
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the document openly suggests that the managing roles should be taken up by the central, 
rather than sub-national administrative structures.
The European Commission officially refrained from giving specific advice on 
the division of competencies in the funds’ allocation system between different 
administrative tiers and monitored solely “compliance with the acquis”348. It also 
asserted that “for Structural Funds key issues concerning the distribution of 
responsibilities remain open” (CEC 2001b: 79). However, while the initial 
recommendations advocated endowment of the regional authorities with appropriate 
fiscal tools for the regional policy conduct, the Commission seemed gradually to 
recognize its misconceptions about Poland’s regional reform. The Commission’s 
officials appointed in the Delegation in Warsaw rather openly casted their doubts about 
the capability of regional authorities to ensure funds absorption. The basis for such 
concerns was apparently the inconsistent performance of the regions in the context of 
Phare institution-building projects349. These views were also known to the Polish 
officials, in particular from the Office of the Committee of European Integration 
(UKIE)350. Similarly, academic accounts on adaptation in the regional policy area 
pointed to the Commission’s preference for a centralized funds’ distribution model (see 
e.g. Hausner and Marody 2000: 103; Grosse 2003: 67), in which the Ministry of 
Economy would have undertaken an ultimate responsibility for the programming and 
implementation of aid programs. The Commission considered the single structure for 
funds disbursement more trustworthy, transparent and easier to monitor.
Moreover, the design of the system for distribution of pre-accession assistance, 
certified by the Commission, confirms its ‘centralization’ preferences. The pre­
accession programmes applicable to Poland, Phare351, ISP A and SAPARD352, were 
managed centrally, practically without involvement of regional authorities. The only
348 As the interviewed official of the Commission Delegation in Warsaw stressed. Interview with Phare 
Task Manager in the Commission Delegation in Poland in September 2003.
349 Ibid.
350 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) in the Office of the Committee of European Integration in September 2008; Interview 
with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession Negotiations in 
March 2006.
351 Initiated by Council Regulation (EEC) 3906/89.
352 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) and Special Accession Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) introduced by Agenda 2000 (CEC 1997c).
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exceptions were two regional components of Phare, the Socio-economic Cohesion and 
Cross-border Co-operation (Phare CBC)353. However, also in these last two cases the 
role of regional authorities, by law responsible for development policy in their 
territories (1998, Art. 11.2), was limited. They were involved in the programming 
phase, albeit central administration (UKIE or sectoral ministries) and the Commission 
(through Steering Committees354) overlooked closely even the preparation of the 
voivodship developmental programmes. The project selection was affirmed by the 
Ministry of Economy and the European Commission while regional authorities’ role in 
programme implementation was negligible. The voivods or governmental agencies 
organized concours for the projects, monitored programme implementation and 
discharged funding.
The subsequent versions of the programmes anticipated a gradually progressing 
centralization of the management functions (with ISPA and SAPARD management 
centralized from the beginning). The regional institutions had been deprived of the few 
responsibilities initially within their competencies (Grosse 2003: 73). While in 2000 
regional financing institutions could finance small infrastructural projects, from 2001 no 
such decisions could be taken independently without the involvement of the central 
administration. Similarly, the competencies related to the human resources schemes 
were transferred from the regional job centers to the central agency.
Generally, more recent versions of the programme (Phare 2002) anticipated 
more extensive involvement of the central ministries (Grosse 2003: 72). This has 
resulted from the pressures of the Commission Delegation in Poland, which responded 
to the evidence of increasing delays with programme accreditation, implementation and 
cases of inability of regional structures to develop quality projects. At the same time, 
centralized procedures for implementation of pre-accession aid have complemented the 
centralized logics of the public finance system in Poland and even reinforced it. The 
pre-accession funds management system was used by the central administration in 
attempts to recentralize regional development policy (Hausner and Marody 2000: 103). 
Full control of the EU funds management functions constituting its key financial pillar 
would assert the leading role of the sectoral ministries.
353 Although share of these components was increasing, reaching by 2002 up to 60% of the Phare budget 
for Poland,
354 Consultative bodies on Phare programming enacted in each voivodship benefiting from Phare 
assistance.
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The underlining issue in the discussions on the operation of the regional funds in 
Poland was the administrative capacity necessary to absorb the funding. The 2001 
Report noted that “notwithstanding significant progress made in previous years in 
developing the necessary structures for the implementation of the Structural Funds, 
developments in [the regional policy] area have largely stalled. Considerable additional 
efforts are needed to establish operational bodies and to increase administrative capacity 
for the implementation of the Structural Funds” (CEC 2001b: 79). The Commission 
concluded that “variable progress” was achieved in imposing programming at the 
regional level, while no positive developments occurred at the national one (CEC 
2001b: 79), which raised concerns about Poland’s ability to establish the National 
Development Plan. The Commission also complained about the lack of a clear idea as to 
the structure of the future programming documents. Until the last, 2002, Report, 
published after the start of accession negotiations, Regional policy remained among the 
policy areas where progress in adaptation was inadequate (CEC 2002: 138).
All of the evidence discussed pointed to the inconsistent behavior of the 
Commission in the first (pre-negotiations) and second (after Avis) stages of the pre- 
accession process. The thin acquis could well accommodate both, the claim for 
decentralization as well as centralization of the funds’ management system. The 
attitudinal shift of the Commission’s position was noted by all the important players, 
policy-makers, academics and territorial self-governments. However, a clear message 
was not conveyed by any of the formal documents. The concrete demands and the 
European vision of Poland’s regional policy were formulated only in the EU position 
paper.
Key problems in the accession negotiations about the terms o f accession in
Chapter 21
The accession negotiations on Chapter 21 ‘Regional policy and co-ordination of 
structural instruments’ focused on two aspects. Firstly, Poland sought an agreement for 
the highest possible allocation of funding in the framework of Structural and Cohesion 
Funds. Secondly, in order to activate the transfers Polish authorities had to demonstrate 
sufficient administrative capacity to assure absorption. The talks commenced in April
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2000 and were finalized in December 2002 (provisionally closed in October 2002). Due 
to the serious financial implications and need for inter-governmental compromise on 
budgetary matters, the final closure of the chapter was left to the very end of the 
negotiation process. Such a decision by the Commission was in line with the 
undertaken strategy of negotiations (CEC 2000b: 27). The opening of the most difficult 
or controversial policy chapters was envisaged for the end of the negotiation process 
(see Annex 7.2), so the time pressure could mitigate the negotiation stance of the 
applicants for membership.
Table 7 . 1 Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 21: Regional Policy
PROMOTER THE MILESTONES IN NEGOTIATIONS DATE
PL Poland’s Negotiation Position in the area of Regional policy 23 November 1999
. ...
EU European Union Common Position 22 March 2000
EU/PL Opening of the negotiations on Chapter 21 (Conference 6 April 2000 
meeting at deputies level)
PL Response to the EU questions included in the Common 26 May 2000 
Position
PL Reply to the Common Position 6 July 2000
EU Draft Common Position 23 November 2000
EU Common Position 1 December 2000
PL Reply to the Common Position 5 February 2001
EU Information Note on Chapter 21 30 November 2001
Technical Consultations on Chapter 21 18 February 2002
EU Additional questions of the Commission 26 February 2002
PL Draft objectives and priorities of the NDP for 2004-2006 7 March 2002
PL Action Plan on Improvement of Administrative Capacity 8 September 2002
EU European Commission’s comments on the Draft 
Operational Programmes
: 12 November 2002
EU/PL Provisional closure of the negotiations on Chapter 21 1 October 2002
As stated above, the subject of accession negotiations, Regional policy acquis, is 
covered by the framework regulation laying down general provisions on the Structural 
Funds (EC 1260/1999) and a series of implementing regulations and decisions, which 
do not require transposition into the national legislation. Nonetheless, the European 
Union’s Guide to the Negotiations (CEC 2004a: 67) listed concrete measures to be 
adopted upon accession, including setting out legislative framework allowing for 
implementation of the specific EU provisions, NUTS classification and assuring 
programming capacity.
On the other hand, negotiations of the financial envelope were 
intergovernmental in character and not contingent upon the candidates’ preparations on 
the ground. The Commission has restricted the room for maneuver by a few working 
assumptions (see Mayhew 2002a) outlined in the Berlin financial framework (CONF-
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PL 13/00), the main one being the ceiling of assistance at the level of 4% of a country’s 
GDP level (CONF-PL 75/00). The Commission has also proposed an increased share of 
the Cohesion Fund in the total volume of the structural funding. Furthermore, although 
the Commission anticipated that the initial rate of absorption, in terms of both payments 
and commitments may be limited, it did not anticipate any special arrangements for the 
candidates (Mayhew 2002a: 8).
The analysis of the negotiation documents shows first of all considerable 
dissonance when it comes to the expectations of the two sides about the subject of talks. 
While Polish negotiators attempted to focus on the availability of funding and their 
volume, emphasizing Poland’s expectation to “fully benefit from the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds from the day of accession” (UKIE 2000: 309), the Commission 
underlined conditionality of aid flows upon the creation of appropriate and capable 
administrative structures for processing the funds. Eventually, the Commission, by 
gradual specification of its demands for adaptation in the course of the negotiation 
process, has imparted the tone of the negotiation process. It reasserted in its 2003 
Communication (CEC 2003) that candidate countries could only benefit from project 
and expenditure eligibility from 1 January 2004 “if all appropriate legislation has been 
aligned and fully transposed by 31 December 2003. Otherwise the Commission will not 
be able to approve Community funding upon accession”. Thus, the inflow of funding, 
whichever volumes eventually were agreed upon, was conditional upon the second, 
administrative capacity aspect.
The European Commission took a leading role in guiding the candidates in their 
adaptation efforts since thin acquis did not provide concrete prescription on the 
institutional structures for funds’ absorption. The common position (CP) requested 
specific information on Poland’s management system for funds’ distribution (CONF-PL 
13/00). The Commission was particularly interested in procedures concerning 
processing of the Structural and Cohesion Funds and division of competencies between 
governmental tiers. The CP also criticized Poland for insufficient information on the 
application of the key principles of the EU cohesion policy, partnership, multi-annual 
programming and additionality. With respect to the efficiency of funds’ operations, the 
Commission requested more information on the “working capacity of Poland’s 
administration”, in particular at regional and local level as well as evaluation and
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monitoring of the programs’ financial management, budgetary procedures and financial 
control.
On the other hand, the Commission proposed to leave negotiations on a financial 
envelope until the end of negotiations, so as to ensure coherence between various 
negotiation chapters with important budgetary implications and to respect the Berlin 
financial framework (CEC 2001c). In turn, this was the key point of interest for the 
Polish negotiators. Both in the first position paper (PM Chancellery 1999) and later 
reply to the common position from July 2000 (PM Chancellery 2000) Poland’s 
government stressed its willingness “to fully adjust the principles of structural policy to 
EU requirements and to prepare an efficient system of programming, monitoring and 
financial control of structural instruments by 31 December 2002” (PM Chancellery
1999), so as to benefit from the funds from the day of accession. Poland’s government 
presented estimates of per capita GDP and NUTS division awaiting concrete response 
with regards to financial appropriations.
The European Commission, however, remained uncertain about the Polish 
administration’s capacity to process the funding, and subsequent versions of the CP 
reiterated requests for more information on systemic solutions. At the same time, some 
improvements were noticed, in particular adoption of the NUTS system in the 
Regulation on introduction of nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (CONF-PL 
75/00). The undertaken territorial division was compatible with post-1998 
administrative structures and the NUTS III level was the only ‘new’ tier of regional 
division.
Table 7.2.: NUTS division in Poland
LEVEL NUMBER NOMENCLATURE
NUTS I 1 COUNTRY - POLAND
NUTS n 16 PROVINCES - VOIVODSHIPS
NUTS in 44 SUBREGIONS - MACROREGIONS
NUTS IV 373 COUNTIES - POVIATS
NUTS V 2489 MUNICIPALITIES - GMINAS
Source: Reply to the Common Position of the EU from July 2000 (PM Chancellery 2000).
Poland’s negotiators, in turn, presented legal adaptation as a key achievement in 
terms of realization of the negotiation commitments (PM Chancellery 2000). However,
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all policy actions listed in the Polish position paper355 as well as the key legislation were 
anticipated rather than already implemented. Similarly, the National Strategy for 
Regional Development drafted in September 1999 was only ‘to be aligned’ with the 
new legal acts adapting Poland’s regional assistance to the EU requirement. 
Furthermore, the government forecasted adoption of the National Development Plan 
(NDP) “containing strategy and priorities for action of the Funds and the Member State, 
their specific objectives, the contribution of the Funds and the other financial resources” 
only by the end of 2001. The compilation of the NDP was indispensable for approval of 
the Community Support Framework (EC 1260/1999) and thus its adoption was one of 
the key issues in the negotiations.
Although Poland’s position papers were rather detailed in listing institutions and 
administrative personnel involved in regional policy management, they were deficient 
when it came to provision of information on concrete procedures and tasks assigned to 
these structures. In turn, such information was crucial from the Commission’s 
perspective as it defined the real policy content. Thus the Commission reiterated its 
requests for more exhaustive explanations. Apart from institutional issues, the 
Commission was mostly concerned about the financial capability of Poland’s 
government to co-finance the interventions but also to assure appropriate multi-annual 
integration of the national budget expenditures and anticipated public spending in the 
context of preparation for the full participation in the EMU (CONF-PL 75/00). The 
Commission’s enquiries about the budgetary expenditures on regional interventions, co­
financing capacity and estimates of public finance or equivalent structural expenditures 
for 2000-2006 were rather intrusive. Polish negotiators often seemed to be not prepared 
to provide such detailed but extensive in scope information.
As they admitted during the technical consultations (PM Chancellery 2002), 
Poland’s public finance system has indeed not guaranteed appropriation of certain 
amounts in the long term horizon as planned in the CSF and Operational Programmes 
(according to which the aid was to be disbursed). Implementation of the multi-annual 
perspective required changes to the structure of the state budget and transfer of the
355 Such as the creation of the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction endowed with 
responsibility to coordinate regional policy, of the State Council for Regional Policy as its advisory body 
and introduction of the clear division of competencies between administrative tiers.
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special funds to the territorial self-governments’ budgets. The key problem appeared to 
be the correlation of the EU funds planned as budgetary appropriations for three years 
with the domestic resources spent in one year. It was not certain that the agreed funds 
for co-financing would be eventually included in the state budget. Insufficient statistical 
data also made uncertain the ability to implement the additionality principle. Moreover, 
as pointed out by the Commission, provision of the appropriate co-financing level 
required an increase of budgetary resources, particularly controversial in the context of 
maintaining fiscal discipline.
Since 2001 the focus of negotiators has been shifting from institutional 
structures to policy programming, namely the drafting of the strategic documents, which 
provided a framework for funds’ disbursement. The National Development Plan (NDP) 
consisting of the Operational Programmes (OPs) defined the organization of the co­
financing system and mapped out the strategy, priorities and areas of interventions 
under the Structural and Cohesion funds. The Commission in its Information Note to 
the candidate countries published in November 2001 (CEC 2001c), while urging not to 
underestimate the challenge in adaptation in this field encouraged the candidates to 
maximally simplify the structures of the framework documents and limit the number of 
programming documents to be prepared. Objective 1 countries (like Poland) were 
advised to prepare a development plan, an integrated regional operational programme 
and (as far as possible) monofund sectoral operational programmes each covering 
eligible regions (CEC 2001c). In principle such system assumed central level 
management but “where an appropriate level of administrative capacity exists, the 
designated managing authorities may decide to sub-delegate part of implementation of 
an operational programme to the sub-national level” (CEC 2001c). At this stage, already 
incurred delays in setting the structures and procedures for funds confined Poland to the 
maximally simplified funds system.
There were three major problems pertaining during the preparation of Poland’s 
NDP. The key issue was the delay in adoption by the Committee of European 
integration of the OPs. This occurred due to delays in provision of their contents by the 
sectoral ministries, which complained about insufficient resources to put up with the 
schedule. Thus, the deadline for preparation of the first draft documents, initially 
planned for the end of 2001, was postponed until November 2002 (PM Chancellery
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2000). Secondly, the assumptions of the draft programmes were broadly contested 
during the inter-ministerial consultations. The sectoral ministries and government’s 
agencies competed for playing the roles of the Managing and Implementing Authorities. 
General underfunding of the public administration presented EU Structural Funds as an 
occasion to finance operational activities with the technical aid assigned to each of the 
OPs for its management . Thus, determination of responsibilities remained for a long 
time unsettled, partially due to political reasons and competition between the structures 
about the leading role in the programming and management of the funds.
The quality of the programming documents appeared equally problematic. The 
Commission pointed out that the proposed drafts “do not sufficiently identify 
performance indicators and quantified objectives” (CEC 2002c: 3). They also suffered 
from the imprecise demarcation of tasks between administrative tiers, insufficient detail 
on the content of measures and implementation structures as well as inadequate 
information about compliance with other Community policies and operations (in 
particular environment and gender-equal opportunities). Other critical points included 
insufficiently justified measures, containing a shopping list of projects rather than 
objective criteria and poor matching between programme objectives and means to 
achieve them. The Commission pointed to the poor diagnosis of the socio-economic 
situation in some of the programs357, which largely failed to provide any coherent 
analysis. In consequence, the role of these proposals in defining developmental 
objectives addressing regional disparities was limited (CEC 2002c: 34).
Eventually, the negotiations were provisionally closed on 5 October 2002 and 
volume of the appropriations from the EU Structural and Cohesion budgets finally 
agreed upon during the Copenhagen IGC in December 2002. Poland was to receive for 
the 2004-2006 perspective 7,635.3 billion Euro from the Structural Funds and 3,733.3 
billion Euro from the Cohesion Fund budget. This constituted 57,6% and 52,8% of the 
whole sum for the ten new member countries for the Objective 1 areas and Cohesion 
Fund respectively (Council of Ministers 2002: 32). Additionally, Poland was allowed to 
activate the OPs from January 2004 (prior to accession). The NDP (basis for the
356 Each Operational Programme has a certain budget for ‘technical assistance’ for the institution in 
charge of its implementation and management.
357 For instance the Integrated Regional Development Programme.
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Community Support Framework, CSF) submitted to the Commission in January 2003 
anticipated, in line with Commission’s recommendations, the introduction of six 
sectoral programs (single fund) and one Integrated Regional Development Programme 
(double fund), managed by the Ministry of Economy. The Community Support 
Framework was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 23 December 2003 (and by the 
College of High Commissioners on 10 December 2003).
The time pressure and asymmetric interests allowed the European Commission 
to wield its negotiating powers during the accession negotiations in the Regional policy 
area. Poland’s request for eligibility for funding on equal terms with other member 
countries combined with its weak administrative capacity validated engagement of the 
Commission in detailed policy-planning after the start of negotiations. The expertise in 
the topic gradually acquired by the Commission’s officials forced them, however, to 
revise earlier assumptions about the optimal organization of the funds’ distribution 
system in Poland. At the same time, problems with the timely adoption of legal 
framework and institutional set-up provided additional justification for the 
Commission’s intervention in the policy-making process, even if not embedded into the 
acquis. Thus, there is evidence for application of extensive pre-accession conditionality 
in the Regional policy case, in its most classic version, when compliance is rewarded 
with financial benefits. However, as the last section demonstrates and the IFIs’ ample 
experience with conditionality confirmed, it does not necessarily guarantee a timely and 
quality adaptation.
3. Social mobilization as the result of implementation of the Regional 
policy acquis
The specific dynamics of the accession negotiations in the Regional policy field 
and in particular the declaration about the absence of negotiation problems in the area 
practically excluded non-governmental actors from participation in the talks. The EU 
officially did not dictate what kind of policy model should be implemented in Poland, 
so the self-governments as subjects of such decisions had nothing to oppose. The 
controversies linked to implementation of the EU demands, for instance on 
administrative capacity, concerned the division of competencies within the government 
and most of them were not interesting enough to the public to raise media attention. In
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this context the only issue worth noticing was the volume of funding destined to Poland 
in the framework of the Structural and Cohesion Funds.
Moreover, as Hughes at al. argue, the general paradox of CEECs’ adaptation in 
the Regional policy field lay in the fact that despite “critical importance of 
regionalization in the CEECs for the EU, and despite the Commission’s language about 
institutionally embedding ‘partnership’ in regional policy, the participation of sub­
national elites in the pre-accession strategy was marginal” (Hughes et al. 2003: 13). 
Since the beginning of the enlargement process the Commission focused on bilateral 
negotiations and communicated predominantly with candidates’ national governments 
(Hughes et al. 2003: 13) Similarly, the studies of Polish authors point out that regional 
self-governments had far insufficient knowledge about the shape of the system of the 
funds’ distribution (Grosse 2004), which impeded their capabilities to cope with future 
challenges related to the funds’ absorption. The haste of legal and institutional 
preparations practically excluded the social and sub-national partners from participation 
in the decision-making on the content of the NDP and OPs. The formal requirement to 
conduct social consultations in the course of programming was fulfilled only formally 
while non-governmental actors had practically no chance to provide any substantial 
contribution. The key domestic negotiations took place between the central executive 
agendas and concerned the roles of particular central level institutions in the funds’ 
management system358. In practice the self-governments were excluded from decision­
making on the system of Structural and Cohesion Funds distribution in the 2004-2006 
budgetary perspective.
The situation of the social and economic partners has, however, diametrically 
changed after accession. The cohesion policy acquis differs from other studied cases 
(apart from Fisheries) in that EU legal provisions explicitly demand inclusion of the 
social and economic partners in the policy-making process. In line with EU regulations 
(1999) programming, implementation and evaluation of assistance were supposed to be 
conducted with participation of sub-national, social and economic actors. Thus, creation 
of the formal platforms for such consultations became one of the conditions for closure
358 Interview with the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of European Integration 
(in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European Integration, in September 2008; Interview 
with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of Support for Accession Negotiations in 
March 2006.
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of accession negotiations. These structures could be gradually filled in with the content 
in a similar way as the formal introduction of municipalities in 1990 led to social 
mobilization at the local level.
Implementation o f the partnership principle in the pre-accession phase
The European Commission criticized the insufficient involvement of the social 
partners in drafting the programming documents, NDP and OPs prior to their 
presentation to the EU. The 2001 Regular Report noted the limited progress on 
application of the partnership principle (CEC 2001b) and the Commission asked for 
detailed information on the practical implementation of the rule in the course of 
negotiations (CONF-PL 13/00). At the same time, the Polish government tried to 
convince the Commission on its resolve to conduct social consultations, which were 
formally ascertained by the administrative reform from 1999, the constitutional 
provisions and the Law on the principles of support for regional development (PM 
Chancellery 2000). The apparent proof of social partners’ involvement was the fact that 
voivodship development strategies “cannot be effected before opinions are provided by 
as broad as possible a group of representatives of social and economic partners” (PM 
Chancellery 2000). However, Polish law did not specify a mode of conduct for social 
consultations and in reality the choice of partners was contingent on a particular 
government department or regional office.
Despite these declarations, Poland’s position paper from 2001 (PM Chancellery
2001) admitted that there was yet no effective mechanism of social consultations but 
therefore, “special attention was devoted to building private-public partnerships 
between public authorities and representatives of the business environments and 
NGOs”. In response to the Commission’s pressure, until November 2002, the 
government (mostly the Ministry of Economy), making the “utmost effort to fulfill the 
partnership principle”, conducted more than fifty consultations on NDP/CSF and OPs 
with around seven thousand participants (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2002b). The impact 
of these consultations has been, however, limited, a fact which has been stressed by 
both the regional environments (Ministerstwo Gospodarki 2002b) and administration
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officials . The most problematic issue was the timing of preparation and adoption of 
the programmic documents imposed by the negotiations calendar. In most cases it left 
not more than few days for consultations (Grosse 2004). Therefore, a great majority of 
these ‘consultations’ represented presentations of the programmic assumptions to the 
interested actors and ‘window dressing’ rather than consultations in the true meaning of 
the word. This situation has considerably changed after accession, in the 
implementation stage of the policy, when social groups and regional representatives 
were formally included in works of the Steering and Monitoring Committees . This 
gave them the legal basis for demanding a say on the way the funds were spent and a 
basis for extending their powers.
Social mobilization as the result o f implementation o f the EU cohesion policy
rules
The first occasion to practice application of the partnership principle prior to 
enlargement was the process of preparation of the regional contracts between the central 
administration and the voivodship self-governments, introduced by the Law on 
supporting regional development (2000). The procedure was designed as a continuation 
of the 1998 territorial reform, in principle to create conditions for the self-governments 
to play a more independent role as the ‘regional hosts’ (Grosse 2003: 29). As discussed 
above, inclusion of the regional self-governments was not entirely effective due to the 
dominance of the central executive departments in the process of financing regional 
investments and their disregard for regional particularities. Significant sections of the 
contracts were non-negotiable as they anticipated realization of a priori defined goals. 
Nevertheless, the drafting of the regional development plans was the first exercise of the 
provincial self-governments in creation of the programming documents.
Although preparation of the NDP and OPs during the accession negotiations 
provided the next chance for territorial self-governments to participate in programming 
activities, as mentioned above, this occasion has not been utilized. Thus, from the self- 
governments perspective, the new era of policy-making commenced with the setting up 
of the Steering and Monitoring Committees for each OP. They served as formal
359 Ibid.
360 However, ordinances regulating their work also came into force in the second half of 2004.
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consultation platforms endowed with the responsibility to establish criteria for granting 
assistance and to select the projects (Steering), and for programme assessment and 
projects’ implementation (Monitoring). The representatives of the social partners, 
broadly defined in the Law on supporting regional development as “entrepreneurs, 
employers and their organizations, trade unions, NGOs and academic institutes, which 
in the scope of their actions have regional development” (2000, Art. 2) possessed the 
right to participate in the committees.
The Report on implementation of the Integrated Regional Development 
Programme commissioned by the Ministry of Regional Development revealed that in 
general, Regional Steering Committees play an important role in the funds’ 
management system. However, they were also stricken with some problems that needed 
to be addressed. There was an uneven contribution to the meetings by the actors. While 
the self-governmental actors tended to participate actively in discussions (where also the 
majority of discussed projects were authored) within the groups, the social and 
economic players seemed less involved. Inadequate procedural arrangements for the 
choice of social partners did not ensure their optimal number in the committees. 
Additionally, a lack of transparent and objective criteria of participants’ selection 
resulted in differing representations in various voivodships and incoherent results of the 
committees’ works throughout the country (MRR 2005a).
Similar results revealed the study on another OP, the Increase of 
Competitiveness of Enterprises (Sienna 2005). The report additionally pointed to the 
insufficient preparation by most of the social partners for working on the committees, 
which often required specialized knowledge. The overall assessment of the committees’ 
activities was positive although the report did not point to any concrete contribution to 
programme modifications. Both reports note that some members of the committees used 
them predominantly as a lobbying platform for their particularistic interests. The PKPP 
Lewiatan, one of the largest business organizations in Poland, was a positive exception.
While the participation of the social and economic actors in the programming of 
the policy in the 2004-2006 budget, due to the time pressure, was minimal, this
361 The Steering Committees were enacted based on the Act on the NDP from 20 April 2004 and included 
marshal, voivod, representative of the Managing Institutions, Ministers in charge, municipal and county 
self-governments, social and economic partners. Their key task was to give opinions and formulate 
proposals on the lists of projects eligible for co-fmancing from the EU funds.
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considerably changed in the following 2007-2013 budgetary perspective. In particular 
the example of the banking environment shows how the formal provisions for social 
consultations may under the pressure of interested organizations evolve to empower 
sectoral interest groups.
Although banking sector representatives were not invited to co-operate on the 
programming of the 2004-2006 perspective, after activation of the programmes, the 
Polish Banks Association (ZBP) enacted two groups of experts delegated specifically to 
deal with the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds (ZBP 2006). Their key achievement 
during the first budgetary perspective was the amendment of the Law on the European 
Guarantee Fund aiming to streamline the credit action among the enterprises willing to 
benefit from EU funding. Commercial banks have managed to reassert involvement in 
programme preparations and setting the access criteria to the funding on the grounds 
that banks’ specialists are best suited to assess the qualities of the projects submitted for 
financing. Moreover, the banks have secured mandatory financing from the commercial 
loan as an element from project financing structure (in some programmes).
Encouraged by the positive result of the lobbying activities in 2004-2006, the 
commercial banks thoroughly prepared for the following budgetary perspective. This 
time, no programming document was adopted without prior consultation with the 
banking environment362. The key postulate was to extend application of the mandatory 
credit element to all the OPs and their sections directed to enterprises. This proposal 
was taken seriously by the decision-makers in the government, and the Ministry of 
Regional Development even commissioned a study on the concept of implementation of 
the SME programmes with the credit component managed by the banks as the 
Managing Institutions (WYG International 2006). However, due to immediate 
opposition from other social partners, in particular enterprises and self-governments 
(Convent of Marshals 2006), for which access to funding would be hindered, the 
government eventually rejected the proposal. Although a number of other proposed 
solutions was rejected, the commercial banks have managed to ascertain their role as a 
viable social partner, which needed to be consulted on all vital matters related to the EU 
funds’ distribution system.
362 Interview with the EU Funds expert from the Polish Banks Association in December 2006.
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On the other hand, banking environment, together with other economic interest 
groups, has lobbied for inclusion in the 2007-2013 perspective the measures providing 
financing from the EU funds for the ‘business representation’ for dissemination of 
information about available funding opportunities. This time, concerted pressures were 
successful and such programmes were anticipated. Other examples of co-operation 
between various potential beneficiaries of the EU funds represent the series of 
conferences initiated by the banking environment, the ‘Corporate Forum’, ‘Self- 
governments Forum’, ‘Rural Areas Development Forum’ and the ‘Academic Forum’.
As the examples of activities of interest groups associating enterprises 
demonstrate, the EU funds’ contribution to social mobilization took place not only 
through participation in the formal bodies realizing the partnership principle. It has also 
created a wide range of issues around which various actors and their representations 
could coalesce. The mere availability of the volume of funds, far exceeding any funding 
thus far devoted to regional development, created problems requiring common 
solutions. The regional governments, even if their function in the system was restricted, 
had an important role in assessing the developments taking place in their territories. The 
activities of the regional representative bodies confirm such a proposition. The Convent 
of Marshals, which in 1999-2003 formulated 130 positions on various issues (mostly 
concerning financial matters related to the income of territorial self-government units 
and division of competencies between regional administrative tiers), in 2004-2006 
presented as many as 230 positions, mostly concerning issues related to EU Structural 
Funds disbursement363.
The territorial self-governments have also had tangible successes in exerting 
pressures on the government. They managed to prevent an amendment of the Law on 
the rules of supporting regional development, giving more powers to the central 
authorities by allowing for withhold of the financing for the part of a regional 
programme assessed as inconsistent with the NDP. Eventually, a compromise solution 
was struck, assuming that the self-government can finance investments outside the 
operational programmes (agreed as regional contracts) within the wider regional 
development strategy (Kuzmicz 2006a). Furthermore, the Convent of Marshals has
363 http://www.zwrp.pl/
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managed to play an active role in the programming of the Structural Funds for the 
2007-2013 perspective. Among other issues, the organization managed to prevent the 
abandonment of the social consultations on agricultural programmes (Axis IV 
LEADER) and successfully passed the proposal for an amendment of the Law on the 
initiation of the resources from the state budget.
The partnership principle at the initial stages of implementation of the regional 
policy acquis was a purely formalistic matter, applied to satisfy the demands of the 
Commission. The time pressure for adoption of framework documents combined with 
the reluctant attitude of the sectoral ministries to share the power with other bodies has 
also hindered its implementation. However, initially fa$ade structures for the social 
consultations formed the basis for increasing the involvement of social partners in 
regional policy-making. There is evidence for mobilization of the various social groups 
aiming to capture the benefits from the EU Funds. A considerable increase in the 
available funding in the 2007-2013 perspective made these efforts economically 
profitable, even if just a small fraction of postulates is eventually considered. At the 
same time, the self-governments seem to gradually assert their systemic role and it can 
be viably expected that this trend will continue in the future.
4. The effectiveness of EU conditionality in promoting regional policy 
change
The EU conditionality in the cohesion policy field has not been consistently 
effective. Community pressure neither assured fulfillment by Poland of its pre-accession 
commitments nor guaranteed that the candidate attains key regional policy goals. The 
applicant encountered three main types of problems with adaptation. The first 
constituted delays in adoption of legal acts and setting institutional structures for funds’ 
processing. Owing to these, there has been relatively little time left for drafting the 
programming documents, such as NDP or OPs, impairing their quality. Moreover, the 
time pressure was partially the reason for the conducting of fagade-like social 
consultations or just skipping them, putting into question the implementation of the 
partnership principle.
Secondly, there have been relevant questions about the absorption capacity, 
namely whether the Polish government manages to program, transfer and account for
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expenses from the EU cohesion policy budget. Although Polish negotiators achieved 
assent from the Commission to start operating the assistance programmes even before 
accession, from January 2004 until the end of December the same year no tender for the 
projects was announced. To a large extent this situation also followed from delays in the 
implementation of the legal framework and the poor quality of legal provisions, part of 
which had to be re-designed right after enforcement.
Last, but not least, there have been serious doubts about Poland’s capability to 
use the funds in such a way as to meet the EU regional policy goals, namely redressing 
regional differences, strengthening unity and ensuring the harmonious development of 
the Polish economy364. Thus, questions rise not only with regard to the administrative 
absorption capacity but also its structural aspects, namely the contribution of the EU- 
funded programmes towards solving the structural problems, increasing cohesion 
between the regions and EU member countries and thus promoting effective European 
integration (Hausner 2001: 177). The answer to any of these questions is 
unambiguously positive with the largest doubts pertaining to the third, perhaps the most 
significant issue. Their critical assessment may be less harsh, however, when one 
considers that the effects of implementation of the EU regional policy in most of the 
‘old’ EU member countries remain equally unequivocal.
The system of distribution of EU funding in Poland in 2004-2006 has been 
almost entirely centralized. The CSF was implemented through the Operational 
Programmes (OPs). The NDP divides the funding from Structural Funds into six single­
fund sectoral programmes and one multi-fund (ERDF and ESF) Integrated Regional 
Development Programme (IRDP)365. The centralization of management concerns all 
stages of the policy-making. The programming is initiated by the Managing 
Authorities , which for all programs are central government ministries (see Annex 
7.3).
364 European Commission, Treaty of Rome, 1957.
365 In parallel to these, large infrastructural and environmental investments are co-financed from the 
Cohesion Fund and smaller projects are realized within the framework of the Community Initiatives.
366 Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) 1620/1999.
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Graph 7.1: Budgetary appropriations for the operational programs (in bln EUR in current prices)
*  Amount of the EU funds E3 Amount of the domestic funding
2968,5
11634-
Integrated OP Increase of OP Human OP Agriculture OP Transport OP Fisheries OP Technical 
Regional Competitiveness Resources Assistance
Development of Enterprises Development 
Program
Source: CSF 2003
The operational functions related to the funds’ disbursement are carried out by 
the government’s specialised agencies367, such as the Polish Agency for 
Entrepreneurship Development or the Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of 
Agriculture. Solely in the case of the Integrated Regional Programme, the implementing 
functions were transferred to the regional authorities, the Marshal offices. However, 
even in this latter case they have to share the responsibilities with the Voivodship 
Offices, representatives of the central governments in the regions. The payments are 
executed by the Ministry of Finance (Paying Authority). According to the Council 
Regulation ((EC) 1260/1999 Article 9) the member countries may assign
responsibilities of the Managing Authorities to various types of bodies, either public or 
private. In Poland this function is assigned in the case of all Operational Programs to the 
sectoral ministries.
Delays in adoption o f  legal fram ework and setting the institutional structures
Most of Poland’s commitments to adjustments to the EU cohesion policy rules 
comes from the reply to the common position published on 6 July 2000 (PM 
Chancellery 2000). The key deadlines considered the establishment of an efficient 
system of programming, monitoring and financial control of structural instruments by
367 Responding to the sectoral Ministers.
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the end of 2001, adjustment of regional statistics by the end of 2002, adoption of the 
National Strategy for Regional Development and Support Programme by the end of 
2000 and completion of works on the National Development Plan by the end of 2001. 
The administrative structures for fiscal control and certification of EU funds were to be 
put in place during the first quarter of 2001. Such a tight schedule followed from the 
time-frame for the process of harmonization and implementation of the Community 
legislation set for the end of 2002 (UKIE 2000: 309). Due to the slower than expected 
pace of negotiations, a consequence of international rather than domestic political 
circumstances, this deadline was soon revised.
However, even the timely implementation of the number of commitments has 
posed considerable problems. Polish negotiators, after the consultative meeting with the 
Commission representatives in February 2002 (PM Chancellery 2002), declared that 
legislative arrangements in view of the provision of co-financing in the multi-annual 
horizon would be ready by 2002, an institutional system (defining the target structure of 
the institutions involved) by the beginning of 2003 and the layout of NDP together with 
the number and type of OPs by the end of February 2002 (Ministry of Economy 2002). 
Eventually, the NDP was submitted to the Commission at the end of 2002 and the 
Act on the National Development Plan was adopted by the Parliament only on 24 May 
2004 (2004), preventing activation of the programmes before accession.
The delay in submission of the Draft NDP to the Commission (in September 
2002) underlined the key problem with adaptation in the Regional policy area, that is, 
the inability to produce quality programmic documents through the policy process 
reflecting provisions of the Council Regulation (EC) 1260/1999.
Whereas the implementation of the framework legal acts establishing the overall 
administrative structure and rules for the policy conduct proceeded more or less 
according to the schedule, the actual enforcement of the EU-financed programs posed a 
true challenge. To grasp the complexity of the task one needs to consider that there have
368 It then required thorough revisions by the group of experts. They carried out ex-ante evaluation in 
accordance with Article 40 and Article 41 of the Council’s Regulation (EC) 1260/1999. Its subjects were 
the draft of the National Development Plan for years 2004-2006 (version dated November of 2002), 
separate projects of sectoral operational programmes, the Integrated Regional Operational Programme 
and the Technical Assistance Programme.
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been 179 legal acts, ordinances to the Law on the NDP369 for 2004-2006, which 
regulated in detail the mode of distribution of the EU structural assistance. The NDP 
was adopted only in May 2004 and there has been huge political pressure to activate the 
programmes before the end of the year in order to demonstrate the increasing absorption 
rate of the funds. Therefore, most of these regulations were enacted during a few 
months proceeding activation of the programmes.
Following the delays in legal adaptation were delays in the activation of the 
programmes. The first Operational Programmes were launched in December 2004 but 
some were still not open before the end of 2005370. Similar problems appeared even 
while launching the pre-accession aid, in particular Phare and SAPARD371. 
Furthermore, the government encountered serious difficulties in the implementation of 
the IT system for Structural Funds management (SIMIC)372, which was not been 
completed on time and did not become fully operational until the end of the 2006 
perspective (Kuzmicz and Kostrzewski 2006).
Another consequence of hastily prepared legal acts was the poor quality 
of adaptation. The rules governing the distribution of money had to be permanently 
amended. For instance, there were fourteen amendments of documents guiding the 
distribution of grants in the framework of the OP Increase of Competitiveness of 
Enterprises (the measure for SMEs) during the first year of operation of the programme. 
The unstable legal environment presented a serious procedural barrier for the potential 
beneficiaries of the funding. It constrained their availability since they had to keep up 
with all the changes and invest considerable administrative resources to prepare 
applications. The enterprises encountered procedural barriers to the most serious 
deficiencies of the system of Structural Funds’ allocation373.
The complications with the institutional system and the high number of agents 
involved in processing the applications have also led to serious prolongation of the 
application process. The average timing since the moment of submission of application 
for assistance until the financial payment was nine months during the first year of the 
funds’ operation. In light of these difficulties and growing complaints about the way the
369 http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/index.htrnl
370 Such as the Increase of Competitiveness of Enterprises, measure 1.3
371 The first re-designed 1998 tranche of Phare was actually activated only in 2000.
372 Co-financed by Phare projects PL 9904.02, PL 0003.04, PL 2002/000-605.01.03
373 Report of the Foundation of SMEs (FMiSP 2006 :9)
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system operates, but also low levels of absorption in the majority of the programs, the 
government decided to implement in 2006 the “Renovation programme”, aimed at 
simplifying the procedures for absorption.
The uncertain absorption capacity
Following formal problems with adaptation, there were no payments from the 
programme accounts to the final beneficiaries by the end of 2004. By May 2005 the 
value of the contracts and the actual absorption was still unsatisfactory and varied 
considerably among particular programs374. The average rate of absorption, that is funds 
actually committed and disbursed, was around 9,3% of the programmes’ budgets 
(Ministry of Economy 2005:51).
Some improvements were noted in the following year, although also in this case 
progress was uneven in different programs. At the beginning of 2006 the value of 
financial agreements for projects signed with the final beneficiaries reached 68%375. 
However, the rate of actual payments to the beneficiaries from the programme accounts 
transferred by the end of March 2006 did not exceed 12% of the allocation for 2004- 
2006 (close to 1 billion Euro). By March 2006 there were still measures in which no 
payments at all were executed or where allocation was below 2% of available funding 
(Ministry of Regional Development 2006). Particularly notable was the minimal 
progress in assigning projects for transport infrastructure, with better results in the only 
(to some extent) decentralized programme, the Integrated Regional Development 
Programme. These results seem to confirm the better ability of the regions to deal with 
the EU funding. Such reasoning has also been accepted by Poland’s government, 
planning to implement a far more decentralized system of funds’ distribution in the 
following budgetary perspective of 2007-2013.
374The operational program Human Resources Development had the best rate in terms of agreements 
signed (reaching 28 percent of available budget) and the worst results were observable in the operational 
program Transport, with 0,1 percent of funding assigned to the concrete projects (Ministry of Economy 
2005:51)
375The highest rate is noted in Community Initiative Equal (95%) and in Integrated Regional 
Development Program (76%) and in Operational Program Technical Assistance (75%). In other 
programs the allocation oscillates between 60 and 70% (Ministry of Regional Development 2006).
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The pace of absorption has had important consequences. Firstly, failure to 
contract the funding by the end of the programming period (2006 for the first budgetary 
perspective that Poland participated in), in accordance with the so-called N+2 principle, 
signifies the loss of appropriated sums that have not been earmarked for concrete 
projects. Secondly, an inability to actually absorb the funding from the EU could make 
Poland a net contributor to the EU budget, a situation difficult to understand for the 
majority of Polish constituents.
The key problems behind the relatively low level of absorption during the first 
years of funds operation were linked to the inefficient institutional structures, and 
secondly, the problems with co-financing. Delays in the adoption of the framework 
documents and legal acts, in particular the Act on NDP (2004) and Act on public 
procurement rules (2004) resulted in deferrals in the designation of institutions in 
charge of the management of funding, but also in insufficient knowledge about the exact 
responsibilities of these institutions. The lack of legal basis prevented the timely 
enactment of the Steering and Monitoring Committees at both central and regional
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levels. Moreover, late implementation of the basic legal documents created possibilities 
to make last-minute changes to the programmes.
In line with expectations, the administrative capacity, in particular at regional 
level, posed considerable problem. The territorial self-governments were not prepared 
for setting up the structures taking some of the funds’ management functions (Grosse 
2004), and eventually contributed to the delays in processing the financial flows. The 
institutional chaos was augmented by the separate sets of institutions and procedures for 
funds’ management, depending on their source. There were three disconnected systems 
of processing regional funds’ flows, those from the national budget (within regional 
contracts), pre-accession funds and the Structural and Cohesion Funds. In that sense, 
implementation of the pre-accession assistance, paradoxically, may have been 
counterproductive to fostering administrative capacity. As the Minister of Regional 
Development admitted, multiple rules regulating in detail all aspects of the programme 
management were in line with the interests of the administration officials, as being 
allowed to get rid of responsibility for decisions taken. The complexity of the 
institutional and procedural rules was broadly considered as the key problem related to 
EU funds’ absorption (PAP 2005).
Another type of problem with absorption resulted from an absence of procedures 
and criteria for receiving state co-financing. Although the Act on NDP points to the 
necessity to provide own co-financing, there was no legal basis for application for such 
funding from the state budget. Only during the 2004-2006 perspective did the BGK, the 
state-owned bank, start to prepare financial instruments, which would allow weaker 
self-governments to apply for funding. A lack of resources for realization of 
investments by the self-governments prevented those in a disadvantaged economic 
situation from applying for EU funding (which requires a self-financing component). 
The poorest regions have not been active in terms of finding their own financing, such 
as through the emission of bonds of public-private partnerships. The latter was difficult 
due to the lack of laws on PPP. Insufficient own resources constituted a serious barrier 
to applications for funding for the self-governments (Sejm RP 2005). The second reason 
behind the poor absorption level, the co-financing requirement, privileged financially 
stronger regions in accessing EU funding.
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The doubtful contribution to redressing regional differences
The focus on the uncertain rate of absorption has arguably had a negative impact 
on the quality of solutions on funds distribution and has dominated public discourse 
about the EU funds in general. This is particularly disturbing in situation when regional 
differences have been deepening in the transition period, and EU Funds could have 
provided a trigger for a revamp in the former model of regional policy guided by 
‘evening-out’ the payments to various regions. The EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 
were to become the basic source of financing Poland’s regional policy from the date of 
accession. The programs co-financed from the EU budget amounted to 95% of the 
structural policy budget determined in the National Development Plan 2004-2006 
(NDP 2004). Thus, the organization of the system of their distribution entirely 
determines the way in which Poland’s regional policy will function.
The algorithm of distribution of funding from the EU among the regions took 
into consideration first of all the population of the provinces with the most populated 
areas in privileged positions. The economic or social factors had secondary importance 
and therefore the EU funds were directed first of all to large agglomerations or the 
richest cities and counties, where the rate of development even without the external 
support exceeded the country average (Sejm RP 2005). Similarly, the majority of 
resources from the Increase of the Competitiveness of Enterprises programme were 
distributed among large rather than small companies, and most of the funding in the 
framework of the Integrated Regional Development Programme was accrued to the 
richest voivodships376. Although there are varying scholarly opinions about the most 
effective model of distribution of financial transfers, with some authors supporting the 
assistance for the strongest regions as the ‘engines of development’377, this distribution 
pattern in Poland is not an effect of the intended policy. Rather, the systemic design of 
the programmes encouraged large companies and financially strong voivodships to 
compete more successfully for a share in the EU co-financing of their investment 
projects. This poses questions about the fulfilment of the policy’s intended goals.
376 Own calculations based on the data from Polish Agency for Regional Development and the Ministry 
of Economy.
377 For instance, Grzegorz Gorzelak (see interview in Gazeta Wyborcza, Maciejewicz 2006b).
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Conclusions
Large financial transfers and the need to adopt the EU principles for their 
management have triggered the process of major change in regional policy-making in 
Poland. The regional governments, stripped of funding for investments in the result of 
the 1998 reform have welcomed the arrival of EU funds, which could potentially fill 
this vacuum. Although disappointed with the insufficient support of the Commission for 
decentralization of the programs in the first budgetary perspective, they were actively 
involved in the implementation stages of the policy with a view of the increased role in 
the future budgetary perspective. The exercise from the Steering and Monitoring 
Committees and drafting the regional development programmes is likely to reassure 
self-governments’ role in the future. The establishment of planning authorities at the 
regional level contributed to the production of demands for democratization of these 
new structures (Goetz and Hix 2000) and mobilization of social interests.
With respect to the economic impact, it is far too early to conclude decisively 
about the contribution of the EU funds to Poland’s development. The first programmes, 
due to their hasty implementation and the driving need for securing absorption, 
reinforced both stronger regions and financially stronger enterprises. In the case of the 
former, this effect seems to go counter to the general goal of the EU cohesion policy, 
which aims to redress regional differences. In the case of the latter, it goes against the 
basic principle of the common market, prevention of market distortion. It remains to be 
seen whether following programming periods bring a qualitative change in that respect.
The hasty but nonetheless overdue implementation of the EU regulations has 
arguably undermined the capacity of Poland’s public administration to process EU 
funding in an efficient way. Although massive financial transfers are likely to have a 
positive overall impact on Poland’s economy and the rate of investment, their 
contribution to redressing regional differences seems also uncertain. In this context, 
mobilization of the sectoral and regional stakeholders, incorporated into the policy­
making process through realization of the partnership principle may appear to be the 
most significant effect of policy reform. In the longer perspective it is likely to add new 
quality to the social dialogue and impact upon relations between the central and regional 
authorities.
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However, considering, on the surface, favourable conditions for application of 
the pre-accession conditionality, the adaptation to the acquis in the Regional policy field 
has not been successful. Legal delays, inefficient administrative structures, the relatively 
poor absorption rate and very uncertain policy results leave a series of open questions 
about the efficiency of regional policy-making in Poland. In the Regional policy case, 
thin acquis and a lack of strong interests seemed to work to the detriment of the 
effectiveness of the EU pre-accession conditionality. The lack of a policy blueprint 
allowed for inconsistent recommendations from the European Commission, applied in 
the context of an absence of other guidance or coherent domestic pressures for a 
particular mode of adaptation.
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CHAPTER VIII
Conclusions
The process of enlargement to the East, concluded in 2004 with the accession of 
ten new countries, involved an unprecedented scope of EU conditionality applied to the 
prospective members. For the first time in Community history the candidates were 
expected to adopt the acquis communautaire in full prior to accession. Unlike in the 
previous enlargements, no comprehensive temporary derogations were anticipated. The 
general negotiating position of the EU assumed that any transitional measures offered to 
the applicants would be “exceptional, limited in time and scope, and should be 
accompanied by a plan with clearly defined stages for the application of the acquis. 
They must not involve amendments to the rules or policies of the EU, disrupt their 
proper functioning, or lead to significant distortion of competition” (Conference on 
Accession 1998).
Combined with the asymmetric bargaining power of the European Union 
(Grabbe 2002) and the absence of alternative ideological or systemic paradigms (Hughes 
et al. 2004a), such an approach should have brought a prompt and effective adaptation. 
And yet, as the findings of this research demonstrate, the results of the grand European 
project of policy transfer to its new members from Central and Eastern Europe have 
been mixed. Moreover, the findings from the case studies challenge the conventional 
static approach to conditionality and demonstrate that application of the external 
measures may trigger social mobilization, which in turn leads to changes in the political 
context of application of EU conditionality.
1. Summary of the findings of the case studies
As the close examination of the pre-accession conditionality and adaptation 
processes in four policy fields, Taxation, Fisheries, Regional policy and Competition,
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carried out in this research project demonstrates, the impact of the EU across issue areas 
has varied. At the same time, in none of the chapters was conditionality fully effective, 
that is, fulfilling the criteria set out in the introductory chapter. ‘Fully effective’ would 
mean the absence of temporary derogations, timely legal transposition378 and 
achievement of declared policy results. Admittedly, in some fields the accession 
negotiations ran relatively smoothly and only minor delays in approximation and 
implementation of the EU rules occurred. In others, however, had serious adjustment 
deficits and even cases of overt reneging from the negotiation commitments, at times 
finalized in the European Court of Justice.
This thesis argues that the combination of two variables, properties of the acquis 
such as the detail and volume of rules, and prior domestic opposition to the EU-inspired 
reforms, were critical for the working of EU conditionality and thus predetermined 
candidates’ success in approximation to the European Union. While the former 
delineates the content of conditions, the latter defines the domestic context in which 
they have been applied. The results of the analysis conducted within this framework 
revealed some unexpected contingencies, which may allow for reconciling various 
scholarly approaches to conditionality.
The analyzed case studies presented various realizations of these two variables, 
conceptualized as thin/thick acquis and prior opposition to adaptation or its absence (see 
table 1.1. in Chapter I). While the Taxation and Regional policies represent a thin acquis 
area, a dense network of Directives and Regulations regulate policy-making in the 
Fisheries and Competition policies. In consequence, whereas the acquis in the former 
two chapters leaves substantial leeway for the member countries to decide upon the 
mode of achievement of policy results, there is considerably less space for national 
interpretations in the latter two.
The categorization of the negotiation chapters along the absence/presence of 
domestic prior opposition axis is, however, different. The prospect of adaptation to the 
EU in Taxation policy and Competition instigated social protests and active opposition 
from the strong social interests instituted prior to accession. In Regional policy and 
Fisheries, at least in the wake of the accession negotiations, such opposition either did 
not exist or was marginal.
378 Which denoted formalistic fulfilment of the pre-accession commitments.
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However, one of the relevant findings in my research is that the domestic socio­
political situation in the country subjected to EU conditionality has not remained static. 
The shifting political context, triggered by the pre-accession processes, has also 
contributed to changes in interest representation and organization, which impacted upon 
the quality of adaptation after enlargement. In particular in the Fisheries chapter, 
increasing awareness of the inevitably high costs for the industry incurred due to 
adaptation to the EU instigated collective action against accession. A study of the 
political economy of pre-accession carried out in this thesis confirmed the existence of 
the mutual influences between collective action and its political contexts (Edmondson 
1997). Therefore, EU conditionality should not be perceived as merely a technocratic 
tool of the policy transfer but, and somewhat ironically, also a politicizing mechanism 
able to instigate social mobilization.
When it comes to the results of the research in terms of the effectiveness of EU 
conditionality, the analyzed policy areas present varying degrees of Community 
success. The table below presents the summary of the findings.
Table 8.1.: Outcomes in terms of effectiveness (normative analysis)
Independent
Variables
Thin acquis Thick acquis
Prior opposition Straightforward adaptation, barring 
for problems during the accession 
negotiations reflecting capture 
capacity of existent interest groups. 
The field in which conditionality 
appears most effective.
Ch. TV Taxation
Partial adaptation following 
extended transitional 
arrangements granted during the 
accession negotiations.
Ch. VI Competition/state aid
No prior opposition Adaptation happens 
irregularly/randomly without much 
coherence. Insufficient 
administrative capacity 
additionally impedes adaptation. 
Conditionality appears partially 
effective.
Ch. VTI Regional policy
Limited adaptation due to the 
social mobilization effect. 
Problems compounded by weak 
administrative capacity. The field 
in which conditionality appears 
least effective.
Ch. V Fisheries
Poland’s adaptation record has proven to be the worst in the area of Fisheries. 
Difficult accession negotiations in the chapter were, however, concluded without any 
transition periods and the Polish government made a commitment to adopt and
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implement all Common Fisheries Policy regulations prior to enlargement. However, this 
apparently positive outcome followed serious delays in legal transposition and non­
implementation of a few key legal acts. Additionally, the reforms conducted with a view 
to approximation of the Polish fisheries to the EU triggered considerable social 
discontent and did not prevent a steady increase in illegal fishing, eventually resulting in 
overt non-compliance with the acquis. The conflict with the Commission ended with 
Polish litigation in the ECJ. As a result, the policy outcome has been far from 
satisfactory. Poland has neither managed to set up a fish market infrastructure, nor 
adapted the size of catches. It has also secured a poor absorption level of the EU 
Structural funds for fisheries objectives. The problems with administrative capacity 
within the executive led to the inefficient management of fish resources and fisheries 
activities.
The second ‘worst’ result from the perspective of effectiveness of conditionality 
was the Regional policy negotiation chapter. This position on the list was rather 
unexpected considering the, on the surface, favorable context for adaptation, a thin 
regional acquis communautaire and absence of opposition to the EU-inspired reforms. 
In addition to these, participation in the regional policy implied large tangible benefits 
from the EU Cohesion funds accruing to wide social circles, i.e. NGOs, enterprises, 
public administration at all levels etc. These features, however, have appeared 
insufficient to secure an equally promising adaptation outcome. Although Poland did 
not apply for any transition periods and most of the controversial negotiation topics 
were discussed in the framework of the Financial and budgetary affairs chapter, 
adaptation proceeded randomly and without much coherence. The key problems 
concerned delays with the implementation of the legal framework and drawing up the 
framework documents. The subsequent difficulties in setting the project pipelines 
resulted in uncertain absorption (to varying degrees in different operational 
programmes) and questionable policy results. Similarly to the Fisheries chapter, despite 
the thin regional acquis, adaptation to the EU in the Regional policy field involved a 
considerable workload on the side of public administration, which has not entirely 
coped with this challenge.
The results of adaptation in the Competition policy area, encountered 
from the outset to the most contentious fields, have been in turn a positive surprise.
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Although the compromise with the EU was struck after lengthy and difficult 
negotiations, eventually the Community granted to Poland long transition periods for 
adjustment of its state aid regime in the Special Economic Zones. The domestic 
opposition to adaptation contributed to the arrival at a negotiation deal based on 
temporary derogations in the field, which not only lies at the heart of EU policy-making 
but also constitutes one of the pillars of the internal market. They allowed Poland’s 
government to appease social actors ex ante opposing accession. Although, due to the 
extended derogations, the competition case may not be depicted as a full success of EU 
conditionality, still there were less problems with the timely legal transposition (within 
the agreed limits) than in the two preceding negotiation chapters. The transition periods 
contributed to forging a consensus between the authorities and initially anti-acquis 
elites, which prevented anti-EU social mobilization after accession.
In terms of adaptation, Taxation has appeared the least problematic of all four 
policy areas. Similarly to the Competition policy, approximation of the Polish regime 
on excise tax on tobacco has been facilitated by a lengthy transition period. Reaching a 
compromise on the transitional arrangement has been, however, less challenging than in 
the Competition chapter. Although initially the EU fiercely opposed such derogation, 
the thin acquis communautaire, on the one hand, and powerful domestic interest groups 
on the other, provided the context facilitating temporary derogation for approximation 
in this field. The Community excise tax system, riddled with exemptions and 
derogations, could not give sufficient formal backing for the Commission’s and some 
member countries’ demands. On the other hand, strong domestic pressures allowed the 
Polish government to stress its inability to deliver on any agreement not involving 
temporary derogation. Eventually, after the sides agreed on the transition period, 
adaptation proceeded according to the negotiated (delayed) schedule, reflecting the 
capture capacity of existing interest groups.
The counter-intuitive finding therefore is that negotiating chapters with the 
strongest domestic opposition, namely Taxation and Competition policy, produced 
better results in terms of implementation of the EU rules than those without prior 
opposition. Among the more successful cases, however, application of EU 
conditionality in the policy area with a thin acquis (Taxation) was more effective. 
However, of the two chapters with the worst results in terms of approximation to the
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EU, one is characterized by thin (Regional policy) and one by thick acquis (Fisheries). 
This outcome suggests that a thin/thick acquis variable alone does not have an 
explanatory value for the effectiveness of conditionality. This finding goes counter to 
the conclusions of some studies on conditionality which assign the limitations in 
producing the desired policy outcome to the construction of the acquis (e.g. Hughes et 
al. 2004a; Grabbe 2006). Hughes et al. (2004a) argued in their examination of 
adaptation in the regional policy field across CEE that a thin acquis communautaire 
allowed for greater (incoherent) informal pressures of the Commission, and as a result 
diminishing EU leverage. By analogy, the study implies that in the areas of thick acquis, 
EU conditionality should have been more effective. In turn, Grabbe explicitly points 
out that the impact of the Community is greatest where it has a detailed policy setting as 
well as clear and certain requirements (Grabbe 2006: 206). The results of my research 
question such inference and suggest that properties of the acquis alone cannot explain 
the differentiated impact of the EU.
2. Accession negotiations as a two-level game
The two level-game framework (Putnam 1988) has been used in this thesis to 
capture the dynamics of the accession negotiations and their results. Putnam’s model of 
international negotiations conceptualizes the entanglement between domestic and 
international contexts (Putnam 1988) by disaggregating international talks into two 
parallel games. According to the model, the (implementable) international deal might be 
struck only when the two negotiating sides reach an agreement within their overlapping 
‘win-sets’. A broader range of domestically acceptable solutions makes the compromise 
at international level easier. However, the relative size of the win-sets also affects the 
distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. Larger win-sets at the 
domestic level provoke stronger pressure on the negotiators from the international 
counterparts. Thus, paradoxically, smaller domestic win-sets give the negotiators 
bargaining advantage (Putnam 1988: 440) and a country, which is more flexible will not 
be able to drive the best bargain in the international negotiations. The size of the 
domestic win-set is predetermined by the domestic opposition to the terms of 
agreement, and thus domestic political games shape the outcomes of international 
negotiations. Where such opposition is stronger, the win-set gets smaller, but as Putnam 
argues, the possible terms of an international deal are more favourable.
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As Poland’s negotiators openly admitted, the government, during negotiations 
on membership in the EU, conducted talks simultaneously at the international and 
domestic levels. The negotiators strived to satisfy domestic pressures for particular 
solutions, while trying to “minimize adverse consequences of foreign developments” 
(Putnam 1988: 434). In turn, the domestic interest groups pressured the government to 
adopt favorable policies, which most often denoted the possibility of delayed 
adaptation. Interplay between these two games may explain the apparent success of 
Poland’s government in obtaining agreements on temporary derogations in such 
sensitive areas as, for instance, the Competition policy.
Furthermore, in two cases, where EU conditionality worked more effectively, 
that is Taxation and Competition policy, there was organized domestic opposition to 
compliance with EU demands, narrowing down negotiators’ win-sets. In both policy 
fields entrenched interests demanded derogations from the acquis and eventually such 
transition periods were granted, which confirms the working of the Putnam paradox 
about domestic weakness contributing to international empowerment.
However, from the two policy chapters, the search for a compromise in the 
accession negotiations appeared easier in the Taxation policy area. The thin acquis in 
this policy domain allowed for greater flexibility of the Commission in adapting its 
pressures to the particular domestic contexts of the candidate countries. This finding 
goes in line with the claims of Hughes et al. (2004a) about the properties of the acquis 
structuring EU conditionality. However, my research arrives at different conclusions 
about the overall impact of a thin acquis on the effectiveness of EU conditionality. 
Similarly as in the studies on the application of conditionality by the IFIs towards 
countries benefiting from international financial assistance, greater flexibility has 
seemed to facilitate rather than obstruct change (IMF 2001a; IMF 2001c). The record of 
adaptation in Taxation policy, where the acquis itself is riddled with exemptions, 
despite the presence of powerful opposition to adaptation, has been the most positive 
from all assessed policy fields. The explanation of such an outcome is assigned to the 
co-existence of a thin acquis with strong domestic interests. If applied in the domestic 
context with a firm policy agenda, a thin acquis may accommodate actors’ preferences 
easier than a thick one. The higher density and strictness of the EU rules, in turn, more 
likely aggravates the conflict with domestic stakeholders, weakening the government’s 
ability to comply with external pressures. This outcome challenges the argument that
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the EU may effectively shape public policy in the candidate countries “only where it 
already had a clear set of rules or an institutional model” (Grabbe 2006: 202). The 
accession negotiations in the Competition policy chapter, where such a model exists, 
have been more difficult, with direct intervention by Commission officials in 
negotiations with domestic vested interests. Nonetheless, the talks also concluded with 
Poland’s success in obtaining the temporary derogations. It later on facilitated 
compliance with the acquis according to this delayed schedule, positioning the 
Competition policy high on the ‘effectiveness of conditionality’ list. In turn, the 
Common Fisheries Policy, with an equally if not more detailed policy and institutional 
model, has not been effectively implemented in Poland during the first few years of 
membership, despite the Polish government’s commitment about adaptation undertaken 
during the accession negotiations. These empirical results do not allow for appraisal of a 
thick acquis as a generally better tool for EU rules transfer.
At the same time, as the results of the empirical research demonstrate, broad 
domestic win-sets based on the absence of strong opposition to adaptation in Regional 
policy and Fisheries have not assured timely adaptation. The lack of a clear reform 
agenda in the Regional policy field has left the mode of adaptation contingent upon 
domestic power struggles. Multiple and weak social actors, whose role in the policy­
making became augmented through implementation of the partnership principle, have 
competed for power over the funds’ allocation with an overall detrimental effect on 
adaptation. In Fisheries, in turn, the vested interests’ increasing realization of the 
genuine costs of adaptation contributed to their mobilization, narrowing the government 
win-set already during the accession negotiations. A thick acquis did not leave room for 
manoeuvre for particularistic solutions and eventually Poland’s negotiators, despite 
increasing resentment from the entrenched interests, consented on full approximation 
with the CFP acquis prior to accession. Fishermen organizations, less well-organized 
and with little economic clout compared to, for instance, business organizations, did not 
manage to effectively pressure for temporary derogations from the acquis. However, the 
continuously worsening circumstances of the industry after accession to the EU and 
mounting social pressures decreased the government’s ability to deliver on its EU 
commitments. Eventually, the chapter presents the worst case from the analyzed areas in 
terms of effectiveness of EU conditionality. Despite the apparent failure to impact on 
the terms of accession, the fishermen organizations, which, similarly to the stakeholders
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in Regional policy, have been endowed with new roles by the Common Fisheries 
Policy, have remained empowered after accession.
Both these scenarios also demonstrate the dynamic evolution and potential for 
strategic use of the win-sets in structuring the negotiations. While Putnam’s original 
concept (Putnam 1988) focuses on the politics of the negotiation process, political- 
economic accounts need to consider how it affects the policy. The process of accession 
has changed the logic of behavior of domestic actors not only through the transfer of 
European norms and practices (Grabbe 2006: 2) but also through changing the 
institutional setting, structure of the veto points and calculations of the material 
interests. The social (de)mobilization may have a positive or negative impact on the 
substance and outcome of a policy, although most often it has instigated social 
mobilization in the areas where adaptation has been perceived as detrimental to 
particular social groups. Paradoxically, the transition periods perceived also in this 
research as signs of failure of the conditionality, have helped to mediate potential social 
discontent and thus facilitate adaptation.
Conceptualization of the accession negotiations as a two-level game process 
based on the domestic consensus may explain the paradox of better adaptation in the 
Competition policy area than in the Fisheries policy. It shows that accounts on the 
approximation processes in response to the external pressures should take into 
consideration social mobilization and the contribution of interest groups to the policy­
making through the delineation of win-sets as important elements of the puzzle. The 
empirical studies demonstrate that in this context the transition periods should not be 
seen so much as an indicator of problems but rather as part of the solution.
3. Social mobilization as a side-effect of EU conditionality
Social mobilization proved to be a relevant ‘side-effect’ of the application of EU 
conditionality in the accession countries. In two policy areas, Competition and 
Taxation, the social interests prior to accession were already organized into strong 
lobbies opposing the prospect of ‘deterioration’ of the regulatory framework. These 
groups played an important role in structuring the negotiations’ trajectory and outcome. 
In two other fields, Regional policy and Fisheries, such prior opposition did not exist,
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either due to the multiplicity of relevant actors, their insufficient organization potential 
and resources, or simply a lack of knowledge about the consequences of upcoming 
changes. And yet, increasing awareness of the costs of adaptation, as in Fisheries, or 
accruing tangible benefits, as in the Regional policy, also triggered the activation of 
social actors. Thus, while the presence of strong domestic interests determined how the 
domestic context responds to external pressures, these pressures also impacted the 
domestic scene. In that sense, the implementation of EU conditionality has served as a 
catalyst of social change and even shifts in the governance systems in those policy areas 
where there was initially no prior opposition to reforms. In that sense, the EU has 
indeed became a transformative power in CEE (Grabbe 2006) but the effects of its 
impact are not obvious or easy to predict.
EU conditionality has instigated social mobilization mostly in those fields where 
adaptation involved considerable costs for the vested interests. Such an unexpected 
democratization effect was not accounted for in the static approaches to EU 
conditionality as a force impacting the trajectory of negotiations and the ability to 
comply with the acquis. This research demonstrates that the weak effectiveness of EU 
conditionality might be assigned not only to the external factors, such as the thin acquis, 
incoherent actions of the European Commission or lack of a policy or institutional 
model (Hughes et al. 2004a; Grabbe 2006) but also to social processes that the 
application of the acquis has triggered. The unprecedented influence of the EU on the 
restructuring of domestic institutions of the candidate countries that some authors stress 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004), has been in a number of areas different than 
expected. In particular, the poor effectiveness of conditionality in the Fisheries and 
Regional policy may be explained neither by the domestic costs of compliance nor the 
credibility of EU conditionality. The utility-maximizing actors should have been 
particularly interested in adaptation to both policies as it implied tangible financial 
benefits. The weak results of the working of conditionality in these fields also question 
the effectiveness of the policy of reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003). 
The array of tools at Community disposal has been much richer in the distributory 
policy areas than in other domains and still it has not secured compliance. The threat of 
delays in funds disbursement, possibly making Poland the net payer to the EU budget 
since the first year of accession, did not prevent a serious postponement in the set-up of 
an institutional framework for EU funds disbursement. One of the problems of the EU
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incentives for compliance with the acquis (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) was 
that they were offered for the governments, while the cost-benefit balance for particular 
social groups may have been entirely different.
At the same time, in both discussed cases collective action in response to the EU 
pressures appeared, albeit in different ways, detrimental to adaptation. Fishermen’s 
protests against the adoption of EU catch limits directly impaired the fulfillment of 
Poland’s pre-accession commitments. On the other hand, conflicts between 
governmental and sub-national administration over leadership in funds’ distribution 
system contributed to delays in the implementation of the legal framework, 
indispensable for the programmes’ operation.
Paradoxically, in both policy areas the involvement of the social actors was also 
sanctioned by the acquis. While the CFP reform secured the broader involvement of the 
stakeholders through the Regional Advisory Councils, the social and sub-national actors 
play role in managing of the EU Cohesion policy through membership in the 
Monitoring and Steering Committees. Formalization of interests’ participation in the 
policy-making system and easier access to funding considerably strengthened existent 
groups and encouraged establishment of the new ones.
This phenomenon has already been studies in the accounts analyzing the impact 
of the political context upon collective action. Some scholars argue (Hyvarinen 1997: 
34) that changing political surroundings shapes possibilities for collective action as it 
influences “the expectational structure” of what is possible for the activists. 
Examination of the adaptation dynamics of the applicant country illustrates how the 
shifting political context due to the application of EU conditionality has generated prior 
interests in those policy areas where they had not existed or were marginal. So, far from 
conditionality being a technocratic commitment device, it may actually politicize a 
policy area that was not salient before. This perspective differs from the ‘ownership’ 
concept, broadly applied in the studies of the IFIs’ conditionality as a remedy to its 
failures (e.g. Khan and Sharma 2001). The latter is based on the idea that once the public 
is properly consulted about the government’s plans, it will support them.
Nonetheless, possible social mobilization as the result of external pressures 
additionally vindicates the inclusion of the ‘prior opposition’ variable in the research 
design. It also allows better explanation of the link between the pre-accession period 
and terms of the accession agreement and the anti-EU movements in its domestic
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politics after enlargement, which some studies on conditionality have already noted 
(Grabbe 2004).
4. Areas for further research
This research contributes to the stream of literature on conditionality trying to 
establish how the EU matters for its candidate countries. The key claim is that external 
pressures must be matched with the specific domestic context since none of these 
variables alone can explain the dynamics of adaptation. Although the results of the close 
tracing of four policies revealed how different matching of the variables may produce 
various outcomes, there are other factors coming into play.
Notably, both areas with the worst record of adaptation involved significant 
administrative effort. Inadequate financial, administrative and personnel resources 
required to perform the assigned roles after enlargement have imperilled legal 
transposition and policy implementation in both Regional policy and Fisheries. The 
study demonstrated how incumbent governments were unable to apply policy measures 
permissible under the acquis that could have alleviated high social costs of adaptation. 
This concerns in particular Fisheries, where funding of vessels scrapping remained to a 
large extent unused and was transferred to financing of other objectives (fish 
processing). Administrative capacity denoting the ability of the government to comply 
is thus a factor that merits further theoretical attention in conceptualizing the effects of 
the application of the EU pre-accession conditionality regime. It plays possibly a greater 
role than it had been assigned in the literature, which can be assessed with the benefit of 
the hindsight, a few years after enlargement.
The effectiveness of EU conditionality, as presented in this research, has been 
deeply embedded into the domestic context. Apart from the fiscal costs and benefits 
from compliance, the so-called social costs matter for the results of adaptation. This 
study added another layer to the analyses of EU conditionality and demonstrated impact 
of the domestic variables on effects of the external pressures. It pointed out that external 
factors are insufficient as explanatory variables of the effectiveness of conditionality. 
Although thickness of the acquis has a relevance for its working (Hughes et al. 2004; 
Grabbe 2006) it has insufficient explanatory value in itself. The further research will
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need to consider domestic context for conceptualizing EU conditionality, be it social 
interests, public opinion, administrative capacity etc.
The study also shows that principal-agent framework conventionally used for 
conceptualization of the IFIs conditionality has serious limitations for explaining broad 
political processes. While the principal-agent model may successfully explain 
particular, narrow issues in the international negotiations, such as for instance 
adaptation to the request about increasing the interest rates in the country benefiting 
from aid, it cannot account for shifting domestic contexts, which this study 
demonstrates. This thesis demonstrated that socio-political realities of the country 
subjected to conditionality are dynamic as actors respond to pressures throughout the 
process of adaptation, not merely ex ante or after it is completed. While the goal of this 
thesis was to demonstrate that such dynamics exist, further research should focus on the 
conceptualization of social mobilization in response to external pressure and try to 
answer questions such as: Under which international conditions do social groups 
mobilize? Which institutional or political context facilitates or impedes such 
mobilisation? The investigation should thus focus on conceptualization of the links 
between the social actors, social mobilization and record of adaptation, driving away 
from the government-centric perceptions of conditionality. The same exercise as 
conducted in this research could be carried out in the other countries, which recently 
joined the European Union, which could bring other theoretical inputs.
On the other hand, this thesis has to a large extent left out the other side of the 
negotiation table, namely that of the EU. The interplay between the ‘domestic interests’ 
on the EU side, the member states’ governments, European institutions or even 
departments, has arguably played a role in structuring EU conditionality. Due to the 
deliberate domestic focus of this research, the external variable was restricted to the 
acquis communautaire. While EU conditionality involved an array of both formal and 
informal pressures by the Commission, member states and even the candidate countries 
themselves, there is even more space for debate left on the external side of EU 
conditionality.
Last, but not least, this thesis demonstrated that from the domestic perspective of 
the applicant country the accession negotiations were foreign policy rather than a matter 
of domestic politics. The costs of related adaptation reforms were seen as imposed from
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outside and thus triggered domestic opposition. Such a view is not obvious from the 
perspective prevailing in Brussels, which is exemplified by the fact that EU 
conditionality has been applied in strict, ex ante fashion throughout the CEE. This 
underlines the elusiveness of the European project. The common institutions and in 
particular the Parliament do not secure the commonality of interests and the accession 
negotiations have most vividly demonstrated the inter-state character of the integration 
process. Considering this in the future enlargements may prevent some of the negative 
repercussions of accession to the EU, such as growth of anti-EU sentiments in the new 
member countries.
285
LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS
Table 2.1.: The level of social support for integration with the European
Union...................................................................................................................................77
Table 3.1.: Number of NGOs in Poland in 2004..............................................................99
Table 3.2.: Economic organizations associated in the Entrepreneurship Council 100
Table 4.1.: Sources of budgetary revenues in Poland......................................................132
Table 4.2.: Market share of tobacco producers in the Polish market in 2002 (retail
sales).................................................................................................................................... 134
Table 4.3.: Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 10: Taxation.......................................140
Table 4.4.: The dynamics of excise tax increases and budgetary revenues on this 
account................................................................................................................................. 146
Table 5.1.: Calendar of accession negotiations on Chapter 8: Fisheries.......................171
Table 5.2.: Key fishermen organizations in Poland after accession............................. 181
Table 6.1: Trends in the level of state aid in the EU-15, 1992-2002............................ 195
Table 6.2: State aid in Poland as a share in GDP 202
Table 6.3.: Percentage share of state aid in Poland according to the EU typology 203
Table 6.4.: Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 6: Competition policy.......................215
Table 7.1.: Calendar of negotiations on Chapter 21: Regional Policy..........................248
Table 7.2.: NUTS division in Poland............................................................................. 250
Graph 3.1.: Organizations’ declarations about the year of establishment..................... 99
Graph 4.1.: The structure of harmonized excise tax on cigarettes in the EU...............126
Graph 4.2: Retail prices of cigarettes (in EUR/MPPC) in the EU-25 on 1 January
2004......................................................................................................................................127
Graph 4.3.: Incidence of excise tax on cigarettes within the EU-25 on 1 January 
2004..................................................................................................................................... 129
Graph 6.1.: State aid in the SEZ 1997-2005 (in mln PLN)...........................................206
Graph 6.2.: Structure of invested capital in the SEZ..................................................... 207
Graph 7.1: Budgetary appropriations for the operational programs (in bln EUR in
current prices)..................................................................................................................... 263
Graph 7.2.: The rate of funds absorption as a percentage of total budgetary allocation 
for 2004-2006 ................................................................................................................... 267
286
Annex 1.1.: List of the negotiation chapters
No. POLICY AREA
1. Free movement of goods
2. Free movement of persons
3. Freedom to provide services
4. Free movement of capital
■
5. Company law
6. Competition Policy
7. Agriculture
8. Fisheries
9. Transport Policy
10. Taxation
11. Economic and monetary union
12. Statistics
13. Employment and social policy
14. Energy
15. Industrial policy
16. Small and medium-sized enterprises
17. Science and research
18. Education, training and youth
19. Telecommunications and information technologies
20. Culture and audiovisual policy
21. Regional policy and  co-ordination of structural instruments
22. Environment
23. Protection of consumer and health
24. Justice and Home affairs
25. Customs union
26. External relations
27.
...............  ........................ . -
Common foreign and security policy
28. Financial control
29. Financial and budgetary provisions
....
30. Institutions
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Annex 2.1.: The applicant countries in the fifth enlargement of the EU
“The Luxembourg group”
In December 1997 the Luxembourg European Council agreed to open accession negotiations
with:
1. Czech Republic
2. Estonia
3. Hungary
4. Poland
5. Slovenia
6. Cyprus
“The Helsinki group”
In December 1999 Helsinki European Council took a decision to commence the negotiations 
with remaining candidates:
1. Latvia
2. Lithuania
3. Slovakia
4. Malta
5. Bulgaria
6. Romania
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Annex 2.2.: The transition periods negotiated by the CEECs
Cyprus Lithuania Slovenia Poland
1.
Free Movement of 
Goods
1. Until 
31.12.2005- 
registration of 
pharmaceuticals
1. Until 01.01.2007 - registration of 
pharmaceuticals and veterinary 
pharmaceutical products (Dir.65/65/EEC, 
75/318/EEC, 75/351/EEC, 81/852/EEC).
1. Until 01.01.2007- implementation of 
laws on registration of pharmaceuticals 
(Dir.201/83/EEC).
1. Until 31.12.2008- 
registration of pharmaceuticals 
(Dir. 65/65/EEC) - under certain 
conditions
Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Slovakia Slovenia Poland
2. Freedom of 
Movement for 
Persons
Up to 7 
years, 
formula 
2+3+2
Up to 7 years, formula 
2+3+2
Up to 7 years, formula 
2+3+2
Up to 7 years, 
formula 2+3+2
Up to 7 years, 
formula 2+3+2
Up to 7 years, 
formula 2+3+2
Up to 7 years, 
formula 2+3+2
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Poland
3. 1. Until 1. Until 1.01.2008- 1. Until 1.01.2008- 1. Until 1. Until 2. Until 1. Until
31.12.2007- lower guarantees for the implementation of the 31.12.2007- 31.12.2006- 31.12.2009- 31.12.2007-
implementation Investors' Protection system of investors' harmonization of implementation achieving increase of the
of the system Fund; protection; the insurance of the system of compliance with initial capital
of investors' 2. Until 1.01.2008- 2. Until 1.01.2008 - system (Dir investors' the banking (to 1 mln euro)
protection (Dir. increase of the initial lower guarantees of 94/19/EC). protection (Dir. directives. for co­
94/19/EC); capital (to 1 mln euro) banks' deposits (Dir. 2. Until 97/9/EC). 2. Until operation
Freedom to
provide
services
2. Until for co-operation banks; 94/19/EC) 31.12.2007- 31.12.2005- banks;
31.12.2007- 3. Exclusion of 3. Permanent exemption guarantees for the guarantees of 2. Exclusion of
guarantees for EXIMBANK S.A. and of the co-operative credit institutions banks' deposits SKOK, BGK
the credit MFB S.A. (similarly to saving and credit unions in case of (Dir. 94/19/EC) from
institutions in similar institutions in from the financial bankruptcy (Dir. provisions of
case of the MS) from provisions directives. 97/9/EC). the Banking
bankruptcy of the Banking 3. Permanent Directive
(Dir. 97/9/EC). Directive. exemption for the 
co-operative 
saving and credit 
unions from the
(77/780/EEC) 
and KUKE 
from 
Dir.
289
provisions of 
finance directives.
73/239/EEC.
Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Poland
4.
Free
Movement of 
Capital
1. 5-year 
for 'second- 
houses' 
purchase 
by
foreigners.
1. 5-year for 'second- 
houses' purchase by 
foreigners.
2. 7-year for purchase 
of forest and 
agricultural land.
1. 7-year for 'second- 
houses' purchase by 
foreigners.
1.Until 1.01.2008 
for 'second- 
houses' purchase 
by foreigners
2. Until 
1.01.2010- 
purchase of 
agricultural land 
by foreigners.
1.7- year (with 
possibility of 
3-year 
extension) -  
restrictions on 
purchase of 
agricultural 
land by 
foreigners.
1.7- year (with 
possibility of 3- 
year extension) 
-  restrictions on 
purchase of 
agricultural 
land by 
foreigners.
7- year 
(with
possibility 
of 3-year 
extension) -  
restrictions 
on
purchase of 
agricultural 
land by 
foreigners.
1.5-year for 
purchase of 
'second 
houses' by the 
EU citizens.
2. 12-year for 
purchase of 
agricultural 
and forestry 
land.
Cyprus Hungary Slovakia Poland
6.
Competition
Policy
1. Until 31.12.2005-tax 
exemptions for the “offshore” 
companies.
1 .Transition period 
for tax exemptions 
for foreign investors 
(for investments prior 
1.01.2003):
- in non-sensitive 
sectors 75% of 
invested capital for 
investments prior 
2002 and 50% for 
later investments
- in sensitive sectors 
30% of the capital 
costs for investments 
older than 2002 and 
20% for investments 
started after 2000.
1.Until 31.12.2008 - state aid to 
Volkswagen in Bratislava;
2. Until 31.12.2009 - state aid for 
US Steel Koszyce.
l.SEZ - Until 2011 and 2010 higher aid ceiling for 
SMEs
2. SEZ - Increased ceiling for public aid (75%) for 
large enterprises, which invested in SEZ before 2000 
and 50% for those, which invested in SEZ during 
2000. The aid is counted from 2001.
3. SEZ -  State aid for car industry at 30% of 
investment costs;
4. Increased level of state aid for investments 
adapting Poland to requirements of environmental 
protection (Dir 76/464/EC)
5. Gradual reduction of production capacities and 
employment in steel industry.
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Czech Republic Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Poland
7. 1.Until 2013- 1. Until 31.12.2006 1. Until 1.01.2006 - 1. Until 31.12.2006 1. Until 1. Until 1.5-year -
gradual increase - structural veterinary requirements -  adaptation of 31.12.2008- 31.12.2009- setting
of the direct adaptation of 44 on milk quality. meat, dairy and adaptation of 2 adaptation to the producers'
payments slaughter houses 2. Until 1.01.2005 - fish processing fish processing Dir. 1999/74/EC organizations;
2. Derogation on (Dir. 64/433). adaptation of milk industry to the EU plants to the on minimal 2. 2. Until
achievement of 2. Until 31.12.2009 processing facilities to veterinary sanitary standards of 31.12.2006-
Agriculture the EU level of -adoption of the hygienic standards (11 standards; requirements. hens’ cages. structuraldirect payments minimal standards plants); 2. Until 31.12.2006 2. 5-year on adjustment of
for the potato of hens’ cages 3. Until 1.01.2005 - - adaptation of the direct payments 113 dairy and
starch; 3. Until 31.12.2007 adjustment of the fish dairy industry to to oleaginous 40 fish
3. Until - production of milk processing factories to veterinary plants; processing
31.12.2006- of 2,8% fat content hygienic standards of standards; 3. 1-year on factories to the
adaptation of 52 (Dir. 2597/97). the EU (29 plants); 3. Until 31.12.2005 adaptation of EU veterinary
plants to the 4. Until 31.12.2008 4. Until 1.10.2006- - implementation milk quotas; requirements.
sanitary for using the name adaptation of the meat of the rules on the 4. 1-year on the 2.Until
requirements; Riesling-Szilvanyi, processing plants to EU potato waste bonus for the 31.12.2007-
4. Until (Dir. 3201/90). hygienic standards (77 utilization (Dir dairy cows structural
31.12.2009- plants); 93/855/EEC). breeders; adjustment of
adaptation to the 5. Until 1.01.2005- 4. Until 31.12.2011 5. 1-year on the 332 meat
Dir. 1999/74/EC adaptation of animal - differentiation of bonus for sheep processing
on minimal waste utilization plants; timing of payments and goats factories;
standards of hens’ 6. Until 1.01.2009 - fat by farmers and breeders; 3. Until
cages. content in milk;
7.Until 1.01.2006- 
using seeds on
other persons to 
owners of various 
plant species (Dir
6. Derogation 
with respect to 
regulations on
31.12.2006- 
adaptation of 
the dairy
Agriculture production farms with certificate (Dir. 
2092/91/EEC).
8.Until 1.01.2006- 
using non-certified sugar 
for feeding farm bees 
(Dir. 2029/91/EEC);
9. 18 months after
2100/94/EEC).
5. 3-year for 
implementation of 
the criteria for milk 
cows.
6. Until 1.01.2009 f 
fat content in milk; 
(Dir 2597/97/EC)
the alcohol level 
in wine.
industry to 
veterinary 
requirements 
4. Until 
31.12.2009- 
adaptation with 
regard to the 
cages for hens;
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accession for using 
potasium 
permanganante in 
organic farms.
7. Until 1.01.2006 
using seeds on 
production farms 
with certificate;
8. Until 1.01.2006 
for using non- 
certified sugar for 
feeding farm bees.
5. Until 
31.12.2006 for 
adaptation to 
minimal 
standards of 
hens’ cages.
6. 10-year -  
restriction on 
the legally 
grown types of 
potatoes._____
Czech
Republic
Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Poland
9.
Transport
policy
5-year 
(“2+2+1” 
formula) on 
cabotage 
(for the 
EU).
1.3-year - road cabotage 
(may be extended for 
another 2 years);
2. 3-year - minimal EU 
tax for cabotage tracks;
3. 6-year - system of fees 
and allowances for the 
trucks with high pressure 
on the axis.
4. Until 31.12.2006 on 
access of the EU rail 
companies to the TERFN 
(Trans-European Rail 
Freight Network);
5. Until 31.12.2004- 
restrictions in air 
transport (higher noise 
emission for some 
airlines) (Dir. 
92/14/EEC).
1. Until 1.01.2007- 
lower financial 
indicators for domestic 
rail companies (Dir. 
98/76/EC).
2. Until 1.01.2006 on 
registry equipment in 
road transport (Du- 
3821/85/EC).
1. Until 1.01.2007 
lower financial 
indicators for 
domestic rail 
companies
2. Until 1.01.2006 
registry equipment 
in road transport;
3. Until 31.12.2004 
on restrictions In 
air transport
4. 5-year (“2+2+1” 
formula) on 
cabotage (for the 
EU).
1. 2-year for cabotage 
(for the EU).
1.Until 31.12.2010- 
maximal standards of trucks 
(weight and size) (Dir. 
96/53/EC);
2. 3-year for cabotage 
transport (mutual 
arrangement for Polish and 
EU transport companies).
. Tax
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Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Poland
10 Until 1. Until 31.02.2007 1. Until 1.Until 1. Until 1. Until 1. Until 1. Until 1. Until
• 31.12.2007-0% - lower VAT on 30.06.2007 - 31.12.2007- 31.12.2010- 31.12.2009 31.12.2008- 31.12.2007 31.12.2007-
VAT for thermal energy lower VAT on reduced lower excise lower reduced VAT - reduced reduced VAT
pharmaceutical; supply; heating ; VAT for on cigarettes; excise on on thermal VAT on rate in
Taxation 2. 2. Until 2. Until 31.12.2007 2. Until combustible 2. Derogation cigarettes; energy; gastronomi construction31.12.2007-5% lower VAT on 31.12.2009- materials; - 0% VAT in 2. 2. 1-year c services; sector (7%);
VAT for construction; lower excise tax 2.Until passenger sea Permanent reduced VAT 2. Until 2. 4-year -  3%
gastronomic 4. Permanent on cigarettes; 31.12.2007- and air derogation on electric 31.12.2007 VAT for
services; derogation from 3Until reduced transport; from VAT energy; - reduced means and
3. 1-year VAT for taxpayers 31.12.2008- VAT on 3. Until for 3. 1-year - VAT on services
exemption from with turnover below legal adaptation gastronomic 1.01.2005- taxpayers reduced VAT some types related to
excise tax on 35 000 EURO; of income taxes; services; reduced VAT with rate on gas; of agricultural
mineral oils for 5. Special excise 4. Permanent 3. Until for heating; turnover 4. Until constructio production;
cement rate on traditional derogation from 31.12.2008- 4. 1-year - below 31.12.2007 n; 3. Until
production (Dir. fruit alcoholic VAT for lower excise reduced VAT 100.000 reduced VAT 3. 31.12.2007-
92/81/EEC); drinks. taxpayers with on vodka for LTL. on Permanent 0% VAT for
4. 1-year on turnover below produced by construction construction; derogation some books
additional 16 000 EUR. small private wood; 5. Permanent - 0% VAT and scientific
excise tax levied producers; 5. Derogation derogation on magazines;
on all types of 4. Until - exclusion of from VAT for internation 4. Until
fuels in the local 1.01.2008- authors and taxpayers with al 31.12.2007-
passenger lower excise artists from turnover passenger reduced VAT
transport; on VAT; below 35 000 transport rate of for
5. Until cigarettes. 6. Permanent EUR; services; gastronomic
31.12.2007- derogation 6. 5-year 4. Until services;
VAT exemption from VAT for lower excise 5. 1-year -
from sales of taxpayers with on cigarettes; lower excise
land for turnover 7. Permanent tax on
Taxation construction. below 100.000 derogation on ecologicalLVL. adaptation of 
excise system 
on alcoholic 
drinks.
fuels;
6. Until 
31.12.2008- 
lower excise 
on cigarettes.
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7. Permanent 
derogation 
from VAT for 
taxpayers with 
turnover 
below 10 000 
EUR;
8.Derogation - 
0% VAT on 
international 
passenger 
transport 
services.
Hungary Latvia Slovenia Poland
13.
Social Policy 
and
Employment
1.Until 31.12.2005 -  content of 
some substances in cigarettes 
(90/23/EEC)
1. Until 1.01.2005- 
adaptation to the appropriate 
standards in place of work 
(Dir.89/654/EEC);
2. Until 1.01.2005 - 
equipment in monitors (Dir. 
90/270/EEC).
1. 3-year - adaptation of legal regulations 
with respect to minimum safety at work 
requirements.
1. Until 31.12.2005 - adaptation to the 
hygienic and safety conditions at 
work.
Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Slovenia Poland
14.
Energy
1. Until 
31.12. 2007- 
obligatory 
fuel oil stocks 
(Dir.
68/414/EEC 
amended by 
72/425/EEC)..
1. Until 3.12.2005- 
obligatory fuel oil 
stocks;
2. Until 31.12.2004 on 
liberalization of the gas 
market.
1. Until 31.12. 2009- 
obligatory fuel oil 
stocks;
2. Until 31.12.2012 on 
liberalization of the 
electric energy market.
1. Until 1.01.2010 
- obligatory fuel 
oil stocks..
1. Until 
1.01.2010- 
obligatory fuel 
oil stocks.
1. Until 31.12. 
2005 - obligatory 
fuel oil stocks 
(Dir.
68/414/EEC, 
amended by Dir 
98/93/EC).
1. Until 
31.12.2008- 
obligatory fuel 
oil stocks.
Poland
19. Telecommunication and Information 1. Until 31.12.- liberalization of postal services.
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Technologies
Cyprus Czech
Republic
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Slovakia Slovenia Poland
22. Environment 1. Derogation 1.Until 1. Until 1. Until 1. Until 1. Until 1.Until 1.Until 1. Until
on reduction 31.12.2005- 31.12.2013- 31.12.2005- 1.01.2009- 31.12.2007 31.12.2007- 31.12.2007- 31.12.2008-
of the sulphur recycling adoption of EU package control of - control of control of recycling 31.12.2015-
contain in packaging; drinking water recycling; organic organic organic packaging; municipal waste
some fossil 2. Until standards; 2. Until emissions emissions emissions water treatment
fuels (Dir. 31.12.2010 on 2. Until 31.12. 30.06.2005 - related to related to related to 2. Until (depending on the
1999/32/32); waste treatment 2010- building utilization of storage and storage and storage and 31.12.2015- size of the city);
2. Until plants for the sewage hazardous distribution distributio distribution municipal 2. Until
31.12.2012- agglomerations system waste; of petrol n of petrol of petrol; sewage; 31.12.2010-
municipal (Dir. 3. Until 3. 6-year on (Dir. 2. Until 2. Until integrated system
waste 91/271/EEC); 31.12.2004 or on municipal 94/63/EC); 31.12.2009 31.12.2006- 3. Until of prevention and
treatment 3. Until 31.12. 31.12.2007- water waste 2. Until - on utilization of 31.12.2011 - control of
(Dir. 2007 on construction of treatment 1.01.2008- municipal hazardous integrated pollution
91/271/EEC); emission of air controlling (Dir.91/272/ package waste materials - system of 3. Until
3. Until polluting systems of EEC); recycling; water (Dir. prevention 31.12.2007-
31.12.2005- substances by emission of gases; 4. Until 3. Transition treatment; 94/67/EC); and control recycling
packaging plants in 4. Until 31.12.2004- period on 3. Until 3. Until of pollution packaging ;
and recycling PFerovS and 16.07.2009 air pollution landfill sites; 31.12.2006 31.12.2006- 4. Until 1.07.2012
of packaging Nova Hut’. utilization of rests and 4. Until -packaging drinking -modernization
waste (Dir. from the functioning 31.12.2015 waste; water quality and construction
94/62/EC); transformation of of large on municipal 4. Until (Dir. of new landfill
bituminous power water waste 31.12.2015 98/83/EC); sites (Dir.
materials; plants. treatment; - large 4. Until 99/31/EC);
5. Until (Dir. 5. Until combustio 31.12.2015 5. Until
Environment 31.12.2015 on 
reduction of air 
polluting 
substances;
88/609/EEC) 31.12.2015 
on drinking 
water quality 
(Dir.
98/83/EEC); 
7. Until 
1.01.2006-
n plants in
Wilno,
Kowno
and power
station in
Mo2ejki.(
Dir
on
municipal
sewage
(different
length of
transition
depending
31.12.2007- 
water pollution 
(Dir.
76/464/EEC);
6. Until 
31.12.2006 
reduction of the
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Environment
protection 2001/80/E on the size sulphur contain in
against C of the city). some fossil fuels
radiation 5. Until 7. Until
from 31.12.2006- 31.12.2005-
medical to water control of organic
sources; pollution, emissions related
(Dir. (Dir. to storage and
97/437EUR 76/464/EEC) distribution of
ATOM). 6. Until petrol;
31.12.2007- 8. Until 1.01.2006
water - protection
pollution by against ion
nitrates from radiation from
agricultural medical sources
sources (Dir. 9. Until
91/676/EEC) 31.12.2007-
7. Until control of transfer
31.12.2011 - of waste within
integrated and outside EU
system of territory (Dir
prevention 93/259/EEC);
and control 10. Until
of pollution 1.01.2008-
(Dir. 31.12.2017 on
96/61/EC); reduction of
8. Until emission of air
31.12.2007- polluting
new substances from
installations large combustion
of large plants (different
combustion length for
plants (Dir. different
88/609/EEC substances).
9. Until
30.10.2007-
emission of 
air polluting 
organic 
substances; 
10. Until 
31.12.2007 
recycling 
packaging.
Hungary
10. Customs
union
1. Until 31.12.2007 for reduced customs rate on crude aluminum
Czech Republic
30. Others 1. 5-year for gradual increases of the base capital and reserves of the EIB.
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Annex 2.3.: The actors involved in the accession negotiations
POLAND
1. Political leadership (adopting guiding decisions relating to the negotiation 
process) - Prime Minister, supported by the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, 
the Secretary of the Committee for European Integration and Government 
Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations.
2. Preparation of the position papers - the Negotiation Team
3. Recommendation of the position papers to the Council of Ministers -  the 
Committee for European Integration.
4. Approval of the position papers -  the Council of Ministers
> Chief Negotiator
Appointed by the Decree of the Polish Council of Ministers of 24 March 19981, in the 
rank of Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister2.
The tasks:
conceptual preparation and co-ordination of the negotiation process,
- preparation of the Accession Treaty,
- negotiating of the Treaty on behalf of the government of Poland.
> Negotiation Team:
The tasks:
Formulation and implementation of the negotiation strategy.
The Negotiation Team headed by the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s 
Accession Negotiations with the European Union (Chief Negotiator). The Chief 
Negotiator’s deputy is a Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3
1 Official Journal (Dz.U.) No 39, 26 March 1998
2 Jan Kulakowski and Jan Truszczynski subsequently held the position.
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The Negotiation Team consist of 12 negotiators in the ranks of the Secretaries and 
Under-secretaries of State (put forward by the ministers but appointed personally by the 
Prime Minister) representing subsequent ministries; the Representative of the President 
of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (in the rank of vice-president); 
the Government Plenipotentiary for the Family Affairs; the Representative of the 
Republic of Poland to the European Union, the Secretary of the Team; the 
Representative of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister; Under-secretary of State in the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education.
> The Inter-Ministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession Negotiations 
with the European Union (hereinafter referred to as Inter-Ministerial 
Team)4
The head -  the Prime Minister
The deputy head -  the Government Plenipotentiary for Poland’s Accession Negotiations
Task Sub-groups (within the Inter-ministerial Team structure) prepare the 
documentation and proposals of negotiation positions presented to the Negotiating 
Team. Comprised from representatives of the individual ministries representing 
ministerial positions at the Sub-groups’ forums (around 40 Sub-groups).
> Committee for European Integration5
Tasks:
- programming and coordinating the policy of Poland’s integration with 
the EU;
- resolution of issues relating to the process of Poland’s integration with 
the EU;
3 Until March 1999 the position of the Deputy Chief Negotiator was held by the secretary of state in the 
Office of the Committee for European Integration.
4 Advisory body to the Prime Minister (appointed under Prime Ministerial Ordinance No. 53 of 16 July 
1998).
5 Established under the Law of 8 August 1996.
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- presenting to the Council of Ministers the programs of legal and 
economic adjustments to the EU and reporting on their implementation 
to the Council of Ministers;
- drafting legal acts underlying those actions;
approving the proposals referring to allocation of the EU grants;
- presenting to the Council of Ministers reports on the implementation of
program adapting Polish economy and legal system to the EU standards;
- recommendation of adoption of the position papers to the Council of
Ministers.
Chaired by the Prime Minister
Comprises of:
Chairman (Prime Minister), Secretary, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and 
Administration, Economy, Finance, Labor and Social Policy, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, and Justice.
The Chairman can additionally appoint three experts whose experience and performed 
actions may have an impact on the implementation of tasks relating to the process of 
European integration. The Committee meetings may also be attended by the President 
of the National Bank of Poland and the President of the Government Center for 
Strategic Studies as well as other invited ministers and MPs.
The Secretary of the Committee for European Integration is the Head of the Office of 
the Committee for European Integration (Jacek Saryusz Wolski performed this function 
in 2000-2001).
> Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE)6
Tasks:
Administrative support for the Committee for European Integration.
6 Established under the Law of 8 August 1996.
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The Office also took over tasks, which had previously lied within the competence of the 
former Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign 
Assistance (functioning from 26 January 1991 until 15 October 1996).
The Accession Negotiations Department within the OCEI has been designed to serve 
directly the Chief Negotiator.
Table 1: Member of the Negotiation Team for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union
Jerzy Buzek Government Leszek Miller Government
Head of
Negotiation Team
Jan KULAKOWSKI, Jan  TRUSZCZYNSKI Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of the Foreign Affairs
1. Free movement of 
goods
Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
2. Free movement of 
persons
Irena BORUTA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Policy
Krystyna TOKARSKA- 
BIERNACIK,
Under-Secretary of State in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy
3. Free movement of 
services
Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
4. Free movement of 
capital
Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
5. Company law Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of the 
Negotiation Team, Secretary of State 
in the Office
of the Committee for European 
Integration
Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of 
the Negotiation Team, Secretary of 
State in the Office 
of the Committee for European 
Integration
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
6. Competition policy Elzbieta MODZELEWSKA- 
WACHAL, Vice-President of the 
Office for the Protection of 
Competition and Consumers 
Protection
Ewa KUBIS,
Vice-President of the Office for 
the Protection of Competition and 
Consumers Protection 
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
7. Agriculture Jerzy PLEWA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development
Jerzy PLEWA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
Jerzy PILARSKI, Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development
8. Fisheries Leszek DYBIEC, Counselor to the 
Minister in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development
Jerzy PILARSKI, Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development
9. Transport Andrzej GRZELAKOWSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Transport and Marine Economy
Sergiusz NAJAR,
Under-Secretary of State in the 
Ministry of Transport and Marine
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Economy
10. Taxation Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
11. Economic and 
Monetary Union
Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
12. Statistics Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of the 
Negotiation Team, Secretary of State 
in the Office
of the Committee for European 
Integration
Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of 
the Negotiation Team, Secretary of 
State in the Office 
of the Committee for European 
Integration
13. Social policy and 
employment
Irena BORUTA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Maria SMERECZYNSKA, 
Government Plenipotentiary for the 
Family Affairs, Secretary of State 
in the Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister
Krystyna TOKARSKA- 
BIERNACIK,
Under-Secretary of State in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy
14. Energy Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
15. Industrial policy Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek W EJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
16. Small and Medium 
Enterprises
Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek W EJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
17. Research and 
Development
Wilibald WINKLER, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry of 
National Education
Wilibald WINKLER, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of National Education
18. Education and youth Wilibald WINKLER, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry of 
National Education
Wilibald WINKLER, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of National Education
19. Telecommunication 
and information 
technologies
Marek RUSIN, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications
Marek RUSIN, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications
20. Culture and 
audiovisual policy
Marek RUSIN, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications
Marek RUSIN, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications
21. Regional Policy and 
Co-ordination of 
Structural 
Instruments
Jerzy PLEWA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
Marek POTRYKOWSKI, Director 
of the Department of Regional and 
Spatial Policy in the Government 
Centre for Strategic Studies and 
Director of the Department of 
Programming Regional Policy in the 
Ministry of Regional Development 
and Housing
Jerzy PLEWA, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
M arek W EJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
22. Environment Janusz RADZIEJOWSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Environment
Janusz RADZIEJOWSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Environment
23. Consumers and 
health protection
Elzbieta MODZELEWSKA- 
Wj\CHAL, Vice-President of the 
Office for the Protection of 
Competition and Consumers 
Protection,
Andrzej RYS, Under-Secretary of
M arek WEJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
302
State in the Ministry of Health
24. Justice and Home 
Affairs
Janusz NIEDZIELA, Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Justice,
Piotr STACHANCZYK, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Administration
Zenon KOSINIAK-KAMYSZ,
Under-Secretary of State in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Administration
25. Customs union Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
26. External relations Teresa MALECKA, Under-Secretary 
of State in the Ministry of the 
Economy
M arek W EJTKO, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Economy
27. Common Foreign 
and Security Policy
Andrzej ANANICZ, Deputy Head of 
the Negotiation Team,
Secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Andrzej ANANICZ, Deputy Head 
of the Negotiation Team,
Secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
28. Financial control Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
29. Financial and
Budgetary
provisions
Krzysztof NERS, Under-Secretary of 
State in the Ministry of Finance
Ryszard MICHALSKI, Under­
secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Finance
30. Institutions Andrzej ANANICZ, Deputy Head of 
the Negotiation Team,
Secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Andrzej ANANICZ, Deputy Head 
of the Negotiation Team,
Secretary of State in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
31. Other Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of the 
Negotiation Team, Secretary of State 
in the Office
of the Committee for European 
Integration
Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of 
the Negotiation Team, Secretary of 
State in the Office 
of the Committee for European 
Integration
Jan TRUSZCZYNSKI, Ambassador, 
Head of the Representation of the 
Republic of Poland 
to the European Union
M arek GRELA,
Ambassador, Head of the 
Representation of the Republic of 
Poland
to the European Union
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The key role in preparation and conduct of negotiations within the European 
Commission played the Enlargement Directorate-General (DG ELARG) comprising 
from the units of the former Directorate-General 1A and the Task Force for the 
Accession Negotiations (TFAN) , formerly a separate unit in the structures of the 
European Commission.
Key persons:
7 TFAN is an administrative unit established within the European Commission and responsible for 
support for the accession negotiations with the Luxembourg Group in 1998-1999. Nicolaus G. Van der 
Pas, in charge of the Swedish negotiations, held the post of the Head of the Group. During the structural 
reforms of the European Commission in November 1999 Task Force was absorbed into a new 
administrative body in charge of handling the enlargement, the Enlargement Directorate-General.
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Gunter Verheugen - the Commissioner in charge of enlargement,
Eneko Dlaramendi Landaburu - General Director of DG Enlargement
Francoise Gaudenzi - directly responsible for the negotiations with Poland - the Head of
Directorate A.
In cooperation with other DGs (special units for enlargement), DG ELARG carried out 
the preparation of the Draft Common Position (DCP). After internal consultations, DCP 
discussed within the Enlargement Group in the Council of the European Union and in 
the COREPER.
The positions had to be adopted by unanimity in the Council. After amendments 
presented to the candidates as the Common Positions of the European Union (see UKIE 
2000a).
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Annex 3.1.: The post-communist governments in Poland
1. Tadeusz Mazowiecki government - 24 August 1989 -  25 November 1990 (coalition 
between the Solidarity, United Peasants Party -  ZSL, Democratic Alliance -  SD, the 
Communist Party - PZPR)
2. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki government - 12 January 1 9 9 1 - 5  December 1991 (Liberal 
Democratic Congress -  KLD, United Christian-National Party -  ZChN, Democratic 
Alliance -  SD)
3. Jan Olszewski government -  23 December 1991 -  5 June 1992 (coalition between the 
United Christian-National Party -  ZChN, ‘Center’ Agreement -  PC)
4. Waldemar Pawlak government -  5 June 1992 -  7 July 1992 (the government was not 
established)
5. Hanna Suchocka government -  11 July 1992 -  18 October 1993 (coalition between 
the Democratic Alliance -  UD, United Christian-National Party -  ZChN, Polish 
Peasants’ Party - Peasants Agreement -  PSL, Liberal Democratic Congress - KLD, 
Christian Peasants Party - SLCh)
6. Waldemar Pawlak government -  26 October 1993 -  1 March 1995 (coalition between 
the Left Democratic Alliance and the Peasants Party, Non-party Block for Reforms’ 
Support - BBWR)
7. Jozef Oleksy government -  7 March 1995 -  26 January 1996 (coalition between the 
Left Democratic Alliance- SLD and the Peasants Party - PSL)
8. Wtodzimierz Cimoszewicz government -  7 February 1996 -  31 October 1997 
(coalition between the Left Democratic Alliance - SLD and the Peasants Party - PSL)
9. Jerzy Buzek government -  31 October 1997 -  19 October 2001 (coalition between the 
Election Action Solidarity -  AWS and the Liberty Union -  UW)
10. Leszek Miller government -  19 October 2001 -  2 May 2004 (coalition between the 
Left Democratic Alliance - SLD, Workers’ Union -  UP and the Peasants Party -  PSL)
11. Marek Belka government -  2 May 2004 -  19 May 2004 (coalition between the Left 
Democratic Alliance -  SLD and the Workers’ Union - UP)
12. Second government of Marek Belka -  11 June 2004 -  19 October 2005 (Left 
Democratic Alliance - SLD government)
13. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz government -  31 October 2005 -  10 July 2005 (Law and 
Justice -  PiS government)
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14. Jaroslaw Kaczynski government -  14 July 2006 -  5 November 2007 (Law and Justice 
- PiS, Self-Defense Party, League of the Polish Families - LPR)
15. Donald Tusk government -  16 November 2007 -  (coalition between the Civic 
Platform - PO and the Peasants Party - PSL).
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Annex 4.1.: The acquis communautaire in the Taxation area1
I. VAT
1.1 Community legislation applicable to all Member States
77/388/EEC: Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws 
of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  Common system of value added tax: 
uniform basis of assessment
Amendments:
1) 80/368/EEC: Eleventh Council Directive of 26 March 1980 on the harmonization 
of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  exclusion of the French 
overseas departments from the scope of Directive 77/388/EEC
2) 83/181/EEC: Council Directive of 28 March 1983 determining the scope of Article 
14(1) (d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as regards exemption from value added tax on the 
final importation of certain goods
3) 84/386/EEC: Tenth Council Directive of 31 July 1984 on the harmonization of the 
laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, amending Directive 77/388/EEC -  
Application of value added tax to the hiring out of movable tangible property
4) 85/346/EEC: Council Directive of 8 July 1985 amending Directive 83/181/EEC 
determining the scope of Article 14 (l)(d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as regards 
exemption from value added tax on the final importation of certain goods
5) 88/331/EEC: Council Directive of 13 June 1988 amending Directive 83/181/EEC 
determining the scope of Article 14 (1) (d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as regards 
exemption from value-added tax on the final importation of certain goods
6) 89/219/EEC: Commission Directive of 7 March 1989 amending Council Directive 
83/181/EEC determining the scope of Article 14 (1) (d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as 
regards exemption from value added tax on the final importation of certain goods, to 
take account of the introduction of the combined nomenclature
7) 89/465/EEC: Eighteenth Council Directive of 18 July 1989 on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Abolition of certain 
derogations provided for in Article 28 (3) of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC
8) 91/680/EEC: Council Directive of 16 December 1991 supplementing the common 
system of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view to the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers
9) 92/77/EEC: Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992 supplementing the 
common system of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC 
(approximation of VAT rates)
1 Source: On the basis of the Screening A-list Chapter 10 Taxation
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10) 92/111/EEC: Council Directive of 14 December 1992 amending Directive 
77/388/EEC and introducing simplification measures with regard to value added tax
11) 94/5/EC: Council Directive of 14 February 1994 supplementing the common system 
of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC -  special arrangements 
applicable to second-hand goods, works of art, collectors’ items and antiques
12) 95/7/EC: Council Directive of 10 April 1995 amending Directive 77/338/EEC and 
introducing new simplification measures with regard to value added tax -  scope of 
certain exemptions and practical arrangements for implementing them
13) 96/42/EC: Council Directive of 25 June 1996 amending Directive 77/338/EEC on 
the common system of value added tax
14) 96/95/EC: Council Directive of 20 December 1996 amending, with regard to the 
level of the standard rate of value added tax, Directive 77/338/EEC on the common 
system of value added tax
15) 98/80/EC: Council Directive of 12 October 1998 supplementing the common 
system of value added tax and amending Directive 77/338/EEC -  Special scheme for 
investment gold
67/227/EEC: First Council Directive of 11 April 1967 on the harmonization of 
legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes
68/221/EEC: Council Directive of 30 April 1968 on a common method for calculating 
the average rates provided for in Article 97 of the Treaty
79/1072/EEC: Eighth Council Directive of 6 December 1979 on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Arrangements for the refund 
of value added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country
86/560/EEC: Thirteenth Council Directive of 17 November 1986 on the harmonization 
of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  Arrangements for the 
refund of value added tax to taxable persons not established in Community territory
16) 98/527/EC: Commission Decision of 24 July 1998 on the treatment for national 
accounts purposes of VAT fraud (the discrepancies between theoretical VAT receipts 
and actual VAT receipts)
1.2 Community legislation applicable to specific Member States or which have 
over time ceased to have effect
98/198/EC: Council Decision of 9 March 1998 authorizing the United Kingdom to 
extend application of a measure derogating from Article 6 and 17 of the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes
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98/161/EC: Council Decision of 16 February 1998 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to apply a measure derogating from Article 2 and 28a (1) of the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes
398/23/EC: Council Decision of 19 December 1997 authorizing the United Kingdom to 
extend application of a measure derogating from Article 28e (1) of the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes
98/20/EC: Council Decision of 19 December 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to extend the application of a measure derogating from Article 21 of the 
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes
97/511/EC: Council Decision of 24 July 1997 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to conclude with the Czech Republic an Agreement containing measures 
derogating from Articles 2 and 3 of the Sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/510/EC: Council Decision of 24 July 1997 authorizing Ireland to apply a measure 
derogating from Article 21 of the Sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/375/EC: Council Decision of 9 June 1997 authorizing the United Kingdom to apply 
an optional measure derogating from Article 17 of the sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on 
the harmonization of the Laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/214/EC : Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the 
Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes
97/213/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of Sweden to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/212/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Republic of Finland to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/211/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Portuguese Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/210/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Republic of Austria to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
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97/209/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes
97/208/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg to apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes
97/207/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Italian Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/206/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing Ireland to apply a measure 
derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/205/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the French Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/204/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of Spain to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/203/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Hellenic Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/202/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 
7/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes
97/201/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of Denmark 
to apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
97/200/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Kingdom of Belgium to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 9 of the Sixth Directive
77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes
97/189/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic to apply a measure derogating from Article 3 of the 
Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes
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97/188/EC: Council Decision of 17 March 1997 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to conclude with the Czech Republic two agreements containing measures 
derogating from Articles 2 and 3 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
96/432/EC: Council Decision of 8 July 1996 authorizing the Netherlands to apply a 
measure derogating from Article 11 of Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (Sixth VAT Directive)
96/402/EC: Council Decision of 25 June 1996 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to conclude an agreement with the Republic of Poland containing measures 
derogating from Articles 2 and 3 of Council Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
95/435/EC: Council Decision of 23 October 1995 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to conclude an agreement with the Republic of Poland containing measures 
derogating from Articles 2 and 3 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
95/252/EC: Council Decision of 29 June 1995 authorizing the United Kingdom to apply 
a measure derogating from Articles 6 and 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 
(77/388/EEC) on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes
95/115/EC : Council Decision of 30 March 1995 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to conclude with the Republic of Poland an agreement containing measures 
derogating from Articles 2 and 3 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
95/114/EC: Council Decision of 30 March 1995 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to apply a measure derogating from 
Article 3 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes
94/76/EC: Council Directive of 22 December 1994 amending Directive 77/388/EEC by 
the introduction of transitional measures applicable, in the context of the enlargement of 
the European Union on 1 January 1995, as regards value added tax
93/609/EC : Council Decision of 22 November 1993 authorizing the United Kingdom 
to apply a particular measure in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) of the Sixth 
Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes
93/110/EEC : Council Decision of 15 February 1993 authorizing the French Republic to 
extend the application of a measure derogating from Article 2 of the sixth Directive 
(77/388/EEC) on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes
93/109/EEC : Council Decision of 15 February 1993 authorizing the French Republic to 
extend the application of a measure derogating from Article 17 (2) of the sixth Directive
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(77/388/EEC) on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes
92/621/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the United Kingdom 
to apply a particular measure in accordance with Article 22 (12) (b) of Directive 
77/388/EEC
92/620/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to apply particular measures in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) and (b) 
of Directive 77/388/EEC
92/619/EEC : Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg to apply particular measures in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) and (b) 
of Directive 77/388/EEC
92/618/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Italian Republic to 
apply a particular measure in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) of Directive 
77/388/EEC
92/617/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing Ireland to apply 
particular measures in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) and (b) of Directive 
77/388/EEC
92/616/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Kingdom of Spain 
to apply a particular measure in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) of Directive 
77/388/EEC
92/615/EEC : Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Kingdom of 
Denmark to apply particular measures in accordance with Article 22 (12) (a) and (b) of 
Directive 77/388/EEC
92/614/EEC: Council Decision of 21 December 1992 authorizing the Federal Republic 
of Germany to apply a particular measure in accordance with Article 22 (12) (b) of 
Directive 77/388/EEC
92/544/EEC : Council Decision of 23 November 1992 authorizing the French Republic 
to apply measures derogating from Article 17 and Article 22 (3), (4) and (5) of the Sixth 
Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes
92/543/EEC: Council Decision of 23 November 1992 authorizing the Federal Republic 
of Germany to apply a measures derogating from Article 2(1), read in conjunction with 
Article 13 B (d) (1) and (2), of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
90/640/EEC: Council Decision of 3 December 1990 authorizing the Federal Republic of 
Germany to grant an exemption from Articles 14 and 15 of the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes for Soviet armed forces stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany
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89/683/EEC : Council Decision of 21 December 1989 authorizing the French Republic 
to apply a measure derogation from Article 2 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the 
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
89/534/EEC: Council Decision of 24 May 1989 authorizing the United Kingdom to 
apply, in respect of certain supplies to unregistered resellers, a measure derogating from 
Article 11 A (1) (a) of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws 
of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
89/488/EEC : Council Decision of 28 July 1989 authorizing the French Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 17 (2) of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC on 
the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes 
89/487/EEC : Council Decision of 28 July 1989 authorizing the French Republic to 
apply a measure derogating from the second subparagraph of Article 17 (6) of the Sixth 
Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes
89/466/EEC: Council Decision of 18 July 1989 authorizing the United Kingdom to 
apply a measure derogating from Article 11 (A) (1) (b) of the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes
88/498/EEC: Council Decision of 19 July 1988 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to apply a measure derogating from Article 21 (1) (a) of the Sixth Council 
Directive (77/388/EEC) of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes
86/247/EEC: Twenty-first Council Directive of 16 June 1986 on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  Deferment of the 
introduction of the common system of value-added tax in the Hellenic Republic
86/356/EEC: Council Decision of 21 July 1986 authorizing the United Kingdom to 
apply flat-rate measures in respect of the non-deductible value added tax charged on 
fuel expenditure in company cars
85/361/EEC: Twentieth Council Directive of 16 July 1985 on the harmonization of the 
laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added 
tax: derogation’s in connection with the special aids granted to certain farmers to 
compensate for the dismantlement of monetary compensatory amounts applying to 
certain agricultural products
84/87/EEC: Council Decision of 6 February 1984 authorizing the Italian Republic to 
derogate until 31 December 1983 from the value added tax arrangements in the context 
of aid to earthquake victims in southern Italy
84/468/EEC : Council Decision of 10 September 1984 application of Article 27 of the 
Sixth VAT Directive of 17 May 1977 on value added tax -  authorization of a measure 
derogation from the Directive in the context of a draft agreement between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.
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84/469/EEC : Council Decision of 15 April 1984 Application of Article 27 of the Sixth 
VAT Directive of 17 May 19977 on value added tax - authorization of a derogation 
requested by the United Kingdom, with a view to avoiding certain types of fraud or tax 
evasion.
83/648/EEC: Fifteenth Council Directive of 19 December 1983 on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  deferment of the introduction 
of the common system of value added tax in the Hellenic Republic
83/333/EEC: Council Decision of 18 March 1983 application of Article 27 of the Sixth 
VAT Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on value added tax -  Authorization of a 
derogation under a draft agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Luxembourg
78/583/EEC: Ninth Council Directive of 26 June 1978 on the harmonization of the laws 
of the Member States relating to turnover taxes
72/250/CEE: Cinquieme directive du Conseil, du 4 juillet 1972, en matiere 
d'harmonisation des legislations des etats membres relatives aux taxes sur le chiffre 
d'affaires. Introduction de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutee en Italie
71/401/EEC: Fourth Council Directive of 20 December 1971 on the harmonization of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes -  Introduction of value added 
tax in Italy
69/463/EEC: Third Council Directive of 9 December 1969 on the harmonization of 
legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes -  introduction of value added 
tax in Member States
II. Excise duties
II.l. Community legislation applicable to all Member States
79/32/EEC Second Council Directive of 18 December 1978 on taxes other than 
turnover tax, which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco
92/12/EEC Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general 
arrangements for products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and 
monitoring of such products as amended by
1) Directive 92/108/EEC
2) Directive 94/74/EC
3) Directive 96/99/EC
92/79/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes
92/80/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes
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92/81/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the harmonization of the structures 
of excise duties on mineral oils as amended by
1) Council Directive 92/108/EEC and
2) Council Directive 94/74/EEC
92/82/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of rates of 
excise duties on mineral oils as amended by Council Directive 94/74/EEC
92/83/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the harmonization of the structures 
of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages
92/84/EEC Council Directive of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of 
excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages
92/2719/EEC Commission Regulation of 11 September 1992 on the accompanying 
administrative document for the movement of goods under duty-suspension 
arrangements of products subject to excise duty as amended by Regulation 
93/2225/EEC
92/3649/EEC Commission Regulation of 17 December 1992 on a simplified 
accompanying document for the intra-Community movement of products subject to 
excise duty which have been released for consumption in Ms of dispatch
93/3199/EEC Commission Regulation of 22 November 1993 on the mutual recognition 
of procedures for the complete denaturing of alcohol for the purposes of exemption 
from excise duty, amended by Commission Regulation 95/2546/ EC and by 
Commission Regulation 
98/2559/EC
95/59/EC: Council Directive of 27 November 1995 on taxes other than turnover taxes 
which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco
95/60/EC: Council Directive of 27 November 1995 on fiscal marking of gas oils and 
kerosene
96/31/EC Commission Regulation of 10 January 1996 on the excise duty exemption 
certificate
II.2 Community legislation applicable to specific Member States or which have 
over time ceased to have effect
98/617/EC Commission Decision of 21 October 1999 denying authority to Italy to 
refuse grant of exemption to certain products exempt from excise duty under Council 
Directive 92/83/EC on the harmonization of the structures of the excise duties on 
alcohol and alcoholic beverages (notified under document number Commission 1998) 
3154)
98/275/EC Council Decision of 21 April 1998 authorizing the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to apply to certain mineral oils when used for specific purposes reductions
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in or exemptions form excise duty, in accordance with the procedure provided for in 
Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81/EEC
98/274/EC Council Decision of 21 April 1998 authorizing the Kingdom of Denmark to 
apply or to continue to apply reductions in or exemptions from excise duties on certain 
mineral oils used for specific purposes, in accordance with the procedure provided for 
in Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81/EEC
397Y1122 (01) Resolution of the ECSC Consultative Committee on the proposal 
submitted by the Commission for a Council Directive restructuring the community 
framework for the taxation of energy products
Council Decision of 30 June 1997 authorizing Member States to apply and to continue 
to apply to certain mineral oils, when used for specific purposes, existing reduced rates 
of excise duty or exemptions from excise duty, in accordance with the procedure 
provided for in Directive 92/81/EEC
III. Mutual assistance and administrative co-operation
76/308/EEC Council Directive of 15 March 1976 on mutual assistance for the recovery 
of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and of the agricultural levies and 
customs duties amended by
1) Directive 79/1071/EEC and
2) Directive 92/1081/EEC
77/794/EEC Commission Directive of 4 November 1977 laying down detailed rules for 
implementing certain provisions of Directive 76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the 
recovery of claims resulting from operations forming part of the system of financing the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and of agricultural levies and 
customs duties amended by
1) Directive 85/4791/EEC
2) Directive 86/489/EEC
77/799/EEC: Council Directive of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by 
the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation
79/1070/EEC Council Directive of 6.12.79 amending Directive 77/799/EECAs repealed 
by Directive 92/12/EEC of 25.2.92
92/218/EEC Council Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 of 27 January 1992 on 
administrative co-operation in the field of indirect taxation (VAT)
98/888/EC European Parliament and Council Decision of 30 March 1998 establishing a 
programme of Community action to ameliorate the indirect taxation systems of the 
internal market (Fiscalis programme)
98/467/EC Commission Decision of 2 July 1998 establishing certain implementing 
provisions for European Parliament and Council Decision No 98/888/EC establishing a
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programme of Community action to improve the indirect taxation systems of the 
internal market (Fiscalis programme)
98/532/EC Commission Decision of 8 July 1998 concerning certain measures necessary 
for carrying out activities related to communication and information exchange systems 
and to linguistic training tools under the Fiscalis programme (European Parliament and 
Council Decision No 98/888/EC establishing a programme of Community action to 
improve the indirect taxation systems of the internal market)
IV. 1 Travellers’ allowances and other exemptions
69/169/EEC: Council Directive of 28 May 1969 on the harmonization of provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to exemption from turnover 
tax and excise duty on imports in international travel. Amended by:
1) Council Directive 72/230/EEC
2) Council Directive 78/1032/EEC
3) Council Directive 78/1033/EEC
4) Council Directive 81/933/EEC
5) Council Directive 82/443/EEC
6) Council Directive 84/231/EEC
7) Council Directive 85/348/EEC
8) Council Directive 88/664/EEC
9) Council Directive 89/194/EEC
10) Council Directive 89/220/EEC
11) Council Directive 91/191/EEC
12) Council Directive 91/673/EEC
13) Council Directive 91/680/EEC
14) Council Directive 92/12/EEC
15) Council Directive 92/111/EEC
16) Council Directive 94/4/EC
78/1035/EEC: Council Directive of 19 December 1978 on the exemption from taxes of 
imports of small consignments of goods of a non-commercial character from third 
countries as amended by:
1) Council Directive 81/933/EEC and latest
2) Council Directive 85/576/EEC
83/181/EEC: Council Directive of 28 March 1983 determining the scope of Article 14 
(1) (d) of Directive 77/388/EEC as regards exemption from value added tax on the final 
importation of certain goods as amended by:
1) Council Directive 85/346/EEC
2) Council Directive 88/331/EEC
3) Commission Directive 89/219/EEC
4) Commission Directive 91/680/ EEC
5) Commission Directive 92/111/ EEC
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83/182/EEC: Council Directive of 28 March 1983 on tax exemptions within the 
Community for certain means of transport temporarily imported into one Member State 
from another as amended by Commission Directive 91/680/EEC
83/183/EEC: Council Directive of 28 March 1983 on tax exemptions applicable to 
permanent imports from a Member State of the personal property of individuals as last 
amended by
1) Dir. 89/604/EEC
2) Commission Directive 91/680/EEC
3) Commission Directive 92/12/EEC
IV.2 Community legislation applicable to specific Member States or which have 
over time ceased to have effect
98/94/EC: Council Directive of 14 December 1998 amending Directive 94/4/EC and 
extending the temporary derogation applicable to Germany and Austria
94/75/EC: Council Directive of 22 December 1994 amending Directive 94/4/EC and 
introducing temporary derogation measures applicable to Austria and to Germany
91/191/EEC: Council Directive of 27 March 1991 amending Directive 69/169/EEC on 
tax-paid allowances in intra - Community travel and as regards a derogation granted to 
the Kingdom of Denmark and to Ireland relating to the rules governing travelers' 
allowances on imports
87/198/EEC: Council Directive of 16 March 1987 amending Directive 69/169/EEC as 
regards a derogation granted to the Kingdom of Denmark relating to the rules governing 
turnover tax and excise duty on imports in international travel
83/651/EEC: Council Directive of 22 December 1983 prolonging the derogation 
accorded to Ireland relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty 
applicable in international travel
83/2/EEC: Council Directive of 30 December 1982 on a derogation accorded to 
Denmark relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty applicable in 
international travel
77/800/EEC: Council Directive of 19 December 1977 on a derogation accorded to the 
Kingdom of Denmark relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty 
applicable in international travel
77/82/EEC: Council Directive of 18 January 1977 on a derogation accorded to the 
Kingdom of Denmark relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty 
applicable in international travel
76/134/EEC: Council Directive of 20 January 1976 on a derogation accorded to the 
Kingdom of Denmark relating to the rules governing turnover tax and excise duty 
applicable in international travel
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V. Direct Taxation
69/335/EEC: Council Directive of 17 July 1969 concerning indirect taxes on the raising 
of capital
390/434/EEC: Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning 
companies of different Member States
90/435/EEC: Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States
90/436/EEC: Convention n the elimination of double taxation in connection with the 
adjustment of profits of associated enterprises
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Annex 4.2.: Accession negotiations on Chapter 10: Taxation
Table 1: Poland’s postulates in the accession negotiations in the field o f Taxation
Position Paper of 19 
October 1999
Supplement to the Position 
Paper of 6 February 2001
Amendment of the Position 
Paper of 29 March 2001
Amendment of the Position 
Paper 28 December 2001
Transition periods granted
VAT:
Art. 12 p. 3 Sixth Council 
Directive on the harmonization 
of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes 
(Gastronomic services -  lower 
- 7 % VAT) in the period of 5 
years after accession, that is 
until 31 December 2007
until 31 December 2007 for 
reduced VAT rate of 7% for 
restaurant services
Art. 12 p. 3 Sixth Council 
Directive on the harmonization 
of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes 
(0% VAT on some categories 
of books and scientific 
magazines) in the period 5 
years, until 31 December 2007
Poland retreats from the request 
of 5-year transition period for 
implementation Art 12 p.3 of 
the Sixth Council Directive -  
0% VAT rate on some 
categories of books and 
scientific magazines. Instead, 
Poland requests 5-year 3% 
VAT for some books and 
magazines
Poland reiterates request for the 
transition period until 31 
December 2007 on application 
of depreciated to 0%  rate of 
VAT on books and scientific 
magazines.
until 31 December 2007 for 
application of 0% VAT for 
some books and scientific 
magazines
Art 17 of Sixth Council 
Directive on the harmonization 
of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes 
-  derogation about exclusion of 
right to deduct tax for passenger 
cars of 500 kg capacity and 
services related to renting or 
lease of these cars.
Art. 2-6 of the Sixth Council 
Directive on the harmonization
permanent derogation on 
exemDtion threshold small end
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of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes 
-  derogation on 10 000 EUR 
turnover limit for exemption 
from VAT
medium sized enterprises not 
exceeding equivalent in national 
currency 10 000 EUR of annual 
turnover -  discharge from VAT.
Excise taxes:
Art. 2 of Council Dir.
92/79/EEC on the 
approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes
(Minimal level of excise for 
cigarettes, Excise level lower 
than 57 % of the maximal 
retail price) for 5 years, until 
31 December 2007
Poland reserves the right to 
apply for transition period with 
respect to implementation of: 
Council Dir. 99/81/EC 
amending Directive 
92/79/EEC on approximation of 
taxes on cigarettes, Directive 
92/80/EEC on the 
approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than 
cigarettes and Directive 
95/59/EEC on taxes other than 
turnover taxes which affect the 
consumption of manufactured 
tobacco.
In that way Poland confirms its 
reservations expressed in the 
first Position Paper with regard 
to the minimum 57% excise tax 
level
Poland retreats from 5-year 
transition period in application 
Council Directive 99/81/EC 
(lower than 57% of the retail 
price turnover tax on cigarettes) 
and applies for 3-year transition 
period in this matter.
Poland applies for 3-year 
transition period (from the date 
of technical readiness for 
accession that is until 
31.12.2005) with respect to 
implementation of Art. 2 of the 
Council Directive 92/79/EEC 
on minimal excise tax level of 
57% of the maximal retail price 
of cigarettes.
In respect of the project of the 
Council Directive amending 
Directive 92/79/EEC, Directive 
92/80/EEC and Directive 
95/59/EC under preparation, 
Poland reserves the right to 
change its negotiation position 
and apply for the transition 
period until 31 December 2008 
with respect to requirement of 
minimal excise tax level of 64 
EUR for each 1000 cigarettes (if 
the Directive becomes part of 
the acquis communautaire).
until 31 December 2008 for 
lower excise tax share in the 
retail Drices of cigarettes 
(with commitment to 
gradually raise the excise tax 
level from 2002 onwards);
Art. 8 p. 4 of the Council Dir. 
92/81/EEC on the 
harmonization of the structures 
of excise duties on mineral oils 
(reductions on excise for
Poland retreats from 5 year 
transition period (reductions on 
excise for ecological fuels) with 
respect to application of the Art. 
8 p.4 of the Directive
1-year technical transition 
period for reduced VAT rate for 
ecological fuel (admissible on 
the basis o f the Art. 8.4 o f the 
Council Directive 92/81/EEC)
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ecological fuels) for 5 years, 
until 31 December 2007.
92/81/EEC and applies for 
reductions on excise on 
ecological fuel during 1 year 
technical transition period.
Art 8 p. 11. b of Council Dir.
92/81/EEC on the
harmonization of the structures 
of excise duties on mineral oils 
-  derogation about the 
possibility to tax air fuels (with 
possibility of tax return).
until 31 December 2007 for 
reduced VAT of 7% in 
construction sector for supply 
of new flats, construction 
and renovation services;
4-year transition period for 
extra reduced VAT level of 
3% for means for agricultural 
production, agricultural 
products and services
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Annex 5.1.: The acquis communautaire in the Fisheries area
1 393D0619 / OJ L 297 02.12.93 p.25 / 93/619/EC: Commission Decision of 19 November 
1993 relating to the institution of a Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
2 396R0788 / OJ L 108 01.05.96 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 788/96 of 22 April 1996 
on the submission by Member States of statistics on aquaculture production
3 386R2930 / OJ L 274 25.09.86 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 of 22 September 
1986 defining characteristics for fishing vessels
4 387R3252 / OJ L 314 04.11.87 p. 17 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3252/87 of 19 October 
1987 on the coordination and promotion of research in the fisheries sector
5 392D0598 / OJ L 401 31.12.92 p.63 / 92/598/EEC: Commission Decision of 21 December 
1992 on a multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Portugal for the period 1993 
to 1996 pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4028/86 (Only the Portuguese text is 
authentic)
6 393R2018 / OJ L 186 28.07.93 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2018/93 of 30 June 1993 
on the submission of catch and activity statistics by Member States fishing in the Northwest 
Atlantic
7 393R2080 / OJ L 193 31.07.93 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/93 of 20 July 1993 
laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the financial 
instrument of fisheries guidance
8 393R2847 / OJ L 261 20.10.93 p.l /  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 
1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy
9 393R3699 / OJ L 346 31.12.93 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 3699/93 of 21 December 
1993 laying down the criteria and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in 
the fisheries and aquaculture sector and the processing and marketing of its products
10 394D0929 / OJ L 364 31.12.94 p.51 / 94/929/EC: Commission Decision of 22 December 
1994 on the adoption of the Community programme for structural assistance in the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector and the processing and marketing of its products in Germany (Objective 5a 
outside Objective 1 regions - the period 1994 to 1999)
11 394D0930 / OJ L 364 31.12.94 p.54 / 94/930/EC: Commission Decision of 22 December 
1994 on the adoption of the Community programme for structural assistance in the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector and the processing and marketing of its products in Spain (Objective 5a 
outside Objective 1 regions - the period 1994 to 1999) (Only the Spanish text is authentic)
12 394R0109 / OJ L 019 22.01.94 p.5 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 109/94 of 19 January 
1994 concerning the fishing vessel register of the Community
13 394R0897 / OJ L 104 23.04.94 p. 18 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 897/94 of 22 April 
1994 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 as 
regards pilot projects relating to continuous position monitoring of Community fishing vessels
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394R1275 / OJ L 140 03.06.94 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 1275/94 of 30 May 1994 
on adjustments to the arrangements in the fisheries chapters of the Act of Accession of Spain 
and Portugal______________________________________________________________________
395D0084 / OJ L 067 25.03.95 p.33 / 95/84/EC: Commission Decision of 20 March 1995 
concerning the implementation of the Annex to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 defining 
the characteristics of fishing vessels___________________________________________________
395R1796 / OJ L 174 26.07.95 p. 11 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1796/95 of 25 July 
1995 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of assistance granted by the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) for schemes defined by Regulation (EC) No 3699/93
395R2636 / OJL271 14.11.95 p.8 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2636/95 of 13 
November 1995 laying down conditions for the grant of specific recognition and financial aid to 
producers' organisations in the fisheries sector in order to improve the quality of their products
397D0292(01) / OJ L 121 13.05.97 p.20 /  97/292/EC: Council Decision of 28 April 1997 on 
a specific measure to encourage Italian fishermen to diversify out of certain fishing activities
397D0413 / OJ L 175 03.07.97 p.27 /  97/413/EC: Council Decision of 26 June 1997 
concerning the objectives and detailed rules for restructuring the Community fisheries sector for 
the period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001 with a view to achieving a balance on a 
sustainable basis between resources and their exploitation_________________________________
397R1292 / OJ L 176 04.07.97 p.21 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1292/97 of 3 July 
1997 laying down, pursuant to Article 10 (2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 
establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy, notification deadlines 
for fishing vessels flying the flag of, or registered in, certain third countries__________________
398D0119 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.l /  98/119/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of France for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_______________________________________
398D0120 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.9 /  98/120/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Belgium for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_______________________________________
398D0121 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p. 15 / 98/121/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of the Netherlands for 
the period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001____________________________________
398D0122 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.21 / 98/122/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Germany for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_______________________________________
398D0123 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.27 / 98/123/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Italy for the period 
from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_____________________________________________
398D0124 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.34 / 98/124/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of the United 
Kingdom for the period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_________________________
398D0125 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.41 /  98/125/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Ireland for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_______________________________________
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398D0126 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.47 / 98/126/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Denmark for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001____________________________________
398D0127 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.53 / 98/127/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Greece for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_____________________________________
398D0128 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.59 /  98/128/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Spain for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_____________________________________
398D0129 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.65 / 98/129/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Portugal for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001____________________________________
398D0130 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.73 /  98/130/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Finland for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_____________________________________
398D0131 / OJ L 039 12.02.98 p.79 /  98/131/EC: Commission Decision of 16 December 
1997 approving the multiannual guidance programme for the fishing fleet of Sweden for the 
period from 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001_____________________________________
374R1985 / OJ L 207 29.07.74 p.30 / Regulation (EEC) No 1985/74 of the Commission of 
25 July 1974 laying down detailed rules of application for the fixing of reference prices and 
free-at-frontier prices for carp________________________________________________________
376R0105 / OJ L 020 28.01.76 p.39 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 105/76 of 19 January 
1976 on the recognition of producers' organizations in the fishing industry__________________
382R1772 / OJ L 197 06.07.82 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1772/82 of 29 June 1982 
laying down general rules concerning the extension of certain rules adopted by producers' 
organizations in the fisheries sector___________________________________________________
382R3140 / OJ L 331 26.11.82 p.7 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3140/82 of 22 November
1982 on granting and financing aid granted by Member States to producers' organizations in the 
fishery products sector______________________________________________________________
382R3190 / O JL 338 30.11.82 p.l 1 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3190/82 of 29 
November 1982 laying down detailed rules for the extension of certain rules adopted by 
producers' organisations in the fisheries sector to non-members____________________________
382R3510 / O J L 368 28.12.82p.27 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3510/82 of 23 
December 1982 fixing the conversion factors applicable to tuna___________________________
383R1452 / OJ L 149 07.06.83 p.5 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1452/83 of 6 June
1983 defining the administrative expenses of producers' organizations in the fishery products 
sector
383R1501 / OJ L 152 10.06.83 p.22 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1501/83 of 9 June 
1983 on the disposal of certain fishery products which have been the subject of measures to 
stabilize the market
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42 384R0671 / OJ L 073 16.03.84 p.28 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 671/84 of 15 
March 1984 on applications for the financing of aids granted by Member States to producers' 
organizations in the fishery products sector
43 384R3611 / OJ L 333 21.12.84 p.41 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3611/84 of 20 
December 1984 fixing the conversion factors for frozen squid
44 385R3703 / OJ L 351 28.12.85 p.63 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3703/85 of 23 
December 1985 laying down detailed rules for applying the common marketing standards for 
certain fresh or chilled fish
45 388R4176 / OJ L 367 31.12.88 p.63 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4176/88 of 28 
December 1988 laying down detailed rules of application for the granting of flat-rate aid for 
certain fisheries products
46
389R2136 / OJ L 212 22.07.89 p.79 /  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2136/89 of 21 June 
1989 laying down common marketing standards for preserved sardines
47 390R3599 / OJ L 350 14.12.90 p.50 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3599/90 of 13 
December 1990 remedying the prejudice caused by the halting of fishing for common sole by 
vessels flying the flag of a Member State in 1989
48 390R3600 / OJ L 350 14.12.90 p.52 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3600/90 of 13 
December 1990 remedying the prejudice caused by the halting of fishing for cod by vessels 
flying the flag of a Member State in 1989
49 391R3863 / OJ L 363 31.12.91 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3863/91 of 16 
December 1991 determining a minimum marketing size for crabs applicable in certain coastal 
areas of the United Kingdom
50 392R1536 / OJ L 163 17.06.92 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1536/92 of 9 June 1992 
laying down common marketing standards for preserved tuna and bonito
51 392R3759 / OJ L 388 31.12.92 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92 of 17 December 
1992 on the common organization of the market in fishery and aquaculture products
52 392R3901 / O J L 392 31.12.92p.29 / Commission Regulation (EEC)No 3901/92 of 23 
December 1992 introducing detailed rules for granting carryover aid on certain fishery products
53 392R3902 / OJ L 392 31.12.92 p.35 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3902/92 of 23 
December 1992 setting detailed rules for granting financial compensation on certain fishery 
products
54 393R1658 / OJ L 158 30.06.93 p.9 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1658/93 of 24 June 1993 
setting up a specific measure in favour of cephalopod producers permanently based in the 
Canary Islands
55 393R2038 / OJ L 185 28.07.93 p.7 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2038/93 of 27 July 
1993 laying down rules for implementing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1658/93 setting up a 
specific measure in favour of cephalopod producers permanently based in the Canary Islands
56 393R2210 / OJ L 197 06.08.93 p.8 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2210/93 of 26 July 
1993 on the communication of information for the purposes of the common organization of the 
market in fishery and aquaculture products
57 393R3516 / OJ L 320 22.12.93 p.10 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 3516/93 of 20 
December 1993 establishing the operative events for the conversion rates to be applied when 
calculating certain amounts provided for by the mechanisms of the common organization of the 
market in fishery and aquaculture products
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58 393R3690 / OJ L 341 31.12.93 p.93 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3690/93 of 20 December 
1993 establishing a Community system laying down rules for the minimum information to be 
contained in fishing licences
59 394R0858 / OJ L 099 19.04.94 p.l /  Council Regulation (EC) No 858/94 of 12 April 1994 
introducing a system for the statistical monitoring of trade in bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) 
within the Community
60 394R1093 / OJ L 121 12.05.94 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 1093/94 of 6 May 1994 
setting the terms under which fishing vessels of a third country may land directly and market 
their catches at Community ports
61 394R1690 / OJ L 179 13.07.94 p.4 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1690/94 of 12 July 
1994 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3759/92 as regards the granting of private storage aid for certain fishery products
62 394R2211 / OJ L 238 13.09.94 p.l / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2211/94 of 12 
September 1994 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3759/92 as regards the notification of the prices of imported fishery products
63 394R2939 / OJ L 310 03.12.94 p.12 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2939/94 of 2 
December 1994 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
105/76 on the recognition of producers' organizations in the fishing industry
64 394R3237 / OJ L 338 28.12.94 p.20 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 3237/94 of 21 
December 1994 laying down detailed rules for the application of the arrangements for access to 
waters as defined in the Act of Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden
65 395R2337 / OJ L 236 05.10.95 p.2 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2337/95 of 2 October 1995 
establishing a system of compensation for the additional costs incurred in the marketing of 
certain fishery products from the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands and the French 
department of Guiana as a result of their very remote location
66 395R2918 / OJ L 305 19.12.95 p.54 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2918/95 of 18 
December 1995 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2337/95 establishing a system of compensation for the additional costs incurred in the 
marketing of certain fishery products from the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands and the 
French department of Guiana as a result of their very remote location
67 396R0347 / OJ L 049 28.02.96 p.7 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 347/96 of 27 February 
1996 establishing a system of rapid reporting of the release of salmon for free circulation in the 
European Community (Text with EEA relevance)
68 396R0523 / OJ L 077 27.03.96 p.12 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 523/96 of 26 March 
1996 adjusting the maximum annual fishing effort for certain fisheries
69 396R2272 / OJ L 308 29.11.96 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 2272/96 of 22 November 
1996 fixing the guide prices for the fishery products listed in Annex I (A), (D) and (E) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92 for the 1997 fishing year
70 396R2273 / OJ L 308 29.11.96 p.4 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2273/96 of 22 November 
1996 fixing the guide prices for the fishery products listed in Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No 
3759/92 for the 1997 fishing year
71 396R2274 / OJ L 308 29.11.96 p.6 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2274/96 of 22 November 
1996 fixing the Community producer price for tuna intended for the industrial manufacture of 
products falling within CN code 1604 for the 1997 fishing year
327
72 396R2406 / OJ L 334 23.12.96 p .l / Council Regulation (EC) No 2406/96 of 26 November 
1996 laying down common marketing standards for certain fishery products
73 396R2427 / OJ L 331 20.12.96 p.4 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2427/96 of 17 
December 1996 fixing, for the 1997 fishing year, the withdrawal and selling prices for fishery 
products listed in Annex I (A), (D) and (E) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92 (Text with 
EEA relevance)
74 396R2429 / OJ L 331 20.12.96 p. 16 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2429/96 of 17 
December 1996 fixing the amount of the carry-over aid for certain fishery products for the 1997 
fishing year (Text with EEA relevance)
75 396R2430 / OJ L 331 20.12.96 p.18 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2430/96 of 17 
December 1996 fixing the amount of the flat-rate premium for certain fishery products during 
the 1997 fishing year
76 396R2431 / OJ L 331 20.12.96 p. 19 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2431/96 of 17 
December 1996 fixing the reference prices for fishery products for the 1997 fishing year
77 397R0712 / OJ L 106 24.04.97 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 712/97 of 22 April 1997 
setting up a specific measure in favour of cephalopod producers permanently based in the 
Canary Islands
78 397R0887 / OJ L 126 17.05.97 p.9 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 887/97 of 16 May 
1997 setting detailed rules to apply Council Regulation (EC) No 712/97 setting up a specific 
measure in favour of cephalopod producers permanently based in the Canary Islands
79
397R2445 / OJ L 340 11.12.97 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2445/97 of 8 December 
1997 fixing, for the 1998 fishing year, the guide prices for the fishery products listed in Annex I 
(A), (D) and (E) of Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92
80 397R2446 / OJ L 340 11.12.97 p.6 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2446/97 of 8 December 
1997 fixing, for the 1998 fishing year, the guide prices for the fishery products listed in Annex 
II to Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92
81 397R2447 / OJ L 340 11.12.97 p.8 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2447/97 of 8 December 
1997 fixing, for the 1998 fishing year, the Community producer price for tuna intended for the 
industrial manufacture of products falling with CN Code 1604
82 397R2572 / OJ L 350 20.12.97 p.36 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2572/97 of 15 
December 1997 fixing, for the 1998 fishing year, the withdrawal and selling prices for fishery 
products listed in Annex I (A), (D) and (E) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92
83
397R2573 / OJ L 350 20.12.97 p.46 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2573/97 of 15 
December 1997 fixing the reference prices for fishery products for the 1998 fishing year
84 397R2574 / OJ L 350 20.12.97 p.55 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2574/97 of 15 
December 1997 fixing the amount of the carry-over aid for certain fishery products for the 1998 
fishing year)
85 397R2575 / OJ L 350 20.12.97 p.57 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2575/97 of 15 
December 1997 fixing the amount of the flat-rate premium for certain fishery products during 
the 1998 fishing year
86 397R2576 / OJ L 350 20.12.97 p.58 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2576/97 of 15 
December 1997 fixing the standard values to be used in calculating the financial compensation 
and the advance pertaining thereto in respect of fishery products withdrawn from the market 
during the 1998 fishing year
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87 398R0142 / OJ L 017 22.01.98 p.8 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 142/98 of 21 January
1998 laying down detailed rules for granting the compensatory allowance for tuna intended for 
the processing industry_____________________________________________________________
88 387R0055 / OJ L 008 10.01.87 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 55/87 of 30 
December 1986 establishing the list of vessels exceeding eight metres length overall permitted 
to use beam trawls within certain coastal areas of the Community
89 387R0493 / OJ L 050 19.02.87 p.13 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 493/87 of 18 
February 1987 establishing detailed rules for remedying the prejudice caused on the halting of 
certain fisheries
90 387R1381 / OJ L 132 21.05.87 p.9 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1381/87 of 20 May 
1987 establishing detailed rules concerning the marking and documentation of fishing vessels
91 387R1382 / OJ L 132 21.05.87 p.l 1 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1382/87 of 20 May 
1987 establishing detailed rules concerning the inspection of fishing vessels
92 389D0631 / OJ L 364 14.12.89 p.64 / 89/631/EEC: Council Decision of 27 November 1989 
on a Community financial contribution towards expenditure incurred by Member States for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with the Community system for the conservation and 
management of fishery resources
93 391R3499 / OJ L 331 03.12.91 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3499/91 of 28 November 
1991 providing a Community framework for studies and pilot projects relating to the 
conservation and management of fishery resources in the Mediterranean
94 392R3760 / OJ L 389 31.12.92 p.l /  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 
1992 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture
95 393R3680 / OJ L 341 31.12.93 p.42 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3680/93 of 20 December 
1993 laying down certain conservation and management measures for fishery resources in the 
Regulatory Area as defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North 
West Atlantic Fisheries
96 394R1626 / OJ L 171 06.07.94 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 of 27 June 1994 
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the 
Mediterranean
97 394R1627 / OJ L 171 06.07.94 p.7 / Council Regulation (EC) No 1627/94 of 27 June 1994 
laying down general provisions concerning special fishing permits
98 394R3317 / OJ L 350 31.12.94 p.13 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3317/94 of 22 December 
1994 laying down general provisions concerning the authorization of fishing in the waters of a 
third country under a fisheries agreement
99 395D0527 / OJ L 301 14.12.95 p.30 / 95/527/EC: Council Decision of 8 December 1995 on 
a Community financial contribution towards certain expenditure incurred by the Member States 
implementing the monitoring and control systems applicable to the common fisheries policy
100 395R0685 / OJ L 071 31.03.95 p.5 / Council Regulation (EC) No 685/95 of 27 March 1995 
on the management of the fishing effort relating to certain Community fishing areas and 
resources
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101 395R2597 / OJ L 270 13.11.95 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 2597/95 of 23 October 
1995 on the submission of nominal catch statistics by Member States fishing in certain areas 
other than those of the North Atlantic
102 395R2943 / OJ L 308 21.12.95 p.15 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2943/95 of 20 
December 1995 setting out detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1627/94 
laying down general provisions concerning special fishing permits
103 395R3069 / OJ L 329 30.12.95 p.5 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3069/95 of 21 December 
1995 establishing a European Community observer scheme applicable to Community fishing 
vessels operating in the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO)
104 395R3070 / OJ L 329 30.12.95 p. 11 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3070/95 of 21 December 
1995 on the establishment of a pilot project on satellite tracking in the NAFO Regulatory Area
105 396D0286 / OJ L 106 30.04.96 p.37 / 96/286/EC: Commission Decision of 11 April 1996 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Decision No 95/527/EC on a 
Community financial contribution towards certain expenditure incurred by the Member States 
in implementing the monitoring and control systems applicable to the common fisheries policy
106 396D0299 / OJ L 114 08.05.96 p.35 / 96/299/EC: Commission Decision of 17 April 1996 on 
the eligibility of expenditure to be incurred by certain Member States in 1996 for the purpose of 
introducing monitoring and control systems applicable to the common fisheries policy
107 396D0358 / OJ L 138 11.06.96 p.21 / 96/358/EC: Commission Decision of 30 May 1996 on 
the eligibility of expenditure planned for 1996 by certain Member States for the training of 
national officials connected with control activities applicable to the common fisheries policy
108 396R0414 / OJ L 059 08.03.96 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 414/96 of 4 March 1996 
laying down certain monitoring measures applicable to fishing activities carried out in the 
waters of the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound
109 397D0297 / OJ L 122 14.05.97 p.24 / 97/297/EC: Commission Decision of 28 April 1997 on 
the eligibility of expenditure to be incurred by certain Member States in 1997 for the purpose of 
introducing monitoring and control systems applicable to the common fisheries policy
110 397R0391 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.49 / Council Regulation (EC) No 391/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down, for 1997, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Norway
111 397R0393 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.61 / Council Regulation (EC) No 393/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down, for 1997, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Faroe Islands
112
397R0397 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.76 / Council Regulation (EC) No 397/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Estonia
113 397R0399 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.85 / Council Regulation (EC) No 399/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Latvia
114 397R0401 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.94 / Council Regulation (EC) No 401/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down, for 1997, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Lithuania
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115 397R0403 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p. 103 / Council Regulation (EC) No 403/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Poland
116 397R0405 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.l 12 / Council Regulation (EC) No 405/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable in vessels flying the flag of certain non- member countries in the 200- 
nautical-mile zone off the coast of the French department of Guiana
117 397R0406 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.l 19 /  Council Regulation (EC) No 406/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain conservation and management measures for fishery 
resources in the Regulatory Area as defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the North-West Atlantic Fisheries
118 397R0407 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p. 133 / Council Regulation (EC) No 407/97 of 20 December 
1996 laying down for 1997 certain conservation and management measures for fishery 
resources in the Convention Area as defined in the Convention on future Multilateral 
Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries
119 397R0894 / OJ L 132 23.05.97 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 894/97 of 29 April 1997 
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources
120 397R0954 / OJ L 139 30.05.97 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 954/97 of 27 May 1997 
laying down, for 1997, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation
121 398D0002 / OJ L 001 03.01.98 p.8 /  98/2/EC: Council Decision of 18 December 1997 fixing 
the amount of the Community financial contribution for 1997 to expenditure incurred by the 
Swedish authorities for the release of smolt
122 398R0046 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.50 / Council Regulation (EC) No 46/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down, for 1998, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Norway
123 398R0048 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.62 / Council Regulation (EC) No 48/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down, for 1998, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Faroe Islands
124 398R0054 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.86 / Council Regulation (EC) No 54/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Latvia
125 398R0056 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.95 / Council Regulation (EC) No 56/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down, for 1998, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Lithuania
126 398R0058 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.104 / Council Regulation (EC) No 58/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Poland
127 398R0060 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.l 13 / Council Regulation (EC) No 60/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down, for 1998, certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of the Russian Federation
128 398R0062 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.121 / Council Regulation (EC) No 62/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain conservation and management measures for fishery 
resources in the Regulatory Area as defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the North West Atlantic Fisheries
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398R0063 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.136 / Council Regulation (EC) No 63/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain conservation and management measures for fishery 
resources in the Convention Area as defined in the Convention on future Multilateral 
Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries_________________________________________
398R0064 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p. 138 / Council Regulation (EC) No 64/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable in vessels flying the flag of certain non- member countries in the 200- 
nautical-mile zone off the coast of the French department of Guiana______________________
293A1231(10) / OJ L 346 31.12.93 p.20 / Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland concerning fisheries
293A1231(11) / OJ L 346 31.12.93 p.26 / Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway relating to the 
Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of 
Norway_________________________________________________________________________
383D0653 / OJ L 371 31.12.83 p.39 /  83/653/EEC: Council Decision of 20 December 1983 
on the allocation of the possibilities for catching herring in the North Sea as from 1 January 
1984
383R2166 / OJ L 206 30.07.83 p.71 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2166/83 of 29 July 
1983 establishing a licensing system for certain fisheries in an area north of Scotland (Shetland 
area)____________________________________________________________________________
383R2807 / OJ L 276 10.10.83 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2807/83 of 22 
September 1983 laying down detailed rules for recording information on Member States' 
catches of fish
386R1866 / OJ L 162 18.06.86 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1866/86 of 12 June 1986 
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the waters of 
the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound________________________________________________
387D0277 / OJ L 135 23.05.87 p.29 / 87/277/EEC: Council Decision of 18 May 1987 on the 
allocation of the catch possibilities for cod in the Spitsbergen and Bear Island area and in 
Division 3M as defined in the NAFO Convention
387R0954 / OJ L 090 02.04.87 p.27 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 954/87 of 1 April 
1987 on sampling of catches for the purpose of determining the percentage of target species and 
protected species when fishing with small-meshed nets__________________________________
395R0515 / OJ L 053 09.03.95 p.10 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 515/95 of 7 March 
1995 concerning the stopping of fishing for mackerel by vessels flying the flag of the United 
Kingdom_________________________________________________________________________
395R0516 / OJ L 053 09.03.95 p.l 1 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 516/95 of 7 March 
1995 concerning the stopping of fishing for saithe by vessels flying the flag of the United 
Kingdom_________________________________________________________________________
395R0737 / OJ L 073 01.04.95 p.66 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 737/95 of 30 March 
1995 concerning the stopping of fishing for Greenland halibut by vessels flying the flag of a 
Member State
395R0891 / OJ L 092 25.04.95 p.l /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 891/95 of 21 April 
1995 concerning the stopping of fishing for salmon by vessels flying the flag of Finland
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143 395R2027 / OJ L 199 24.08.95 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/95 of 15 June 1995 
establishing a system for the management of fishing effort relating to certain Community 
fishing areas and resources
144 396R0847 / OJ L 115 09.05.96 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 847/96 of 6 May 1996 
introducing additional conditions for year-to-year management of TACs and quotas
145 397R0390 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 390/97 of 20 December
1996 fixing, for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, the total allowable catches for
1997 and certain conditions under which they may be fished
146 397R0392 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.57 / Council Regulation (EC) No 392/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, certain catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in the 
Norwegian exclusive economic zone and the fishing zone around Jan Mayen
147 397R0394 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.69 / Council Regulation (EC) No 394/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, certain catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in 
Faroese waters
148 397R0395 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.71 / Council Regulation (EC) No 395/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, Community catch quotas in Greenland waters
149 397R0396 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.74 / Council Regulation (EC) No 396/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Icelandic 
waters
150 397R0398 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.83 /  Council Regulation (EC) No 398/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating for 1997 catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Estonian 
waters
151 397R0400 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.92 /  Council Regulation (EC) No 400/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Latvian 
waters
152 397R0402 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p. 101 / Council Regulation (EC) No 402/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Lithuanian 
waters
153 397R0404 / OJ L 066 06.03.97 p.l 10 / Council Regulation (EC) No 404/97 of 20 December 
1996 allocating, for 1997, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Polish 
waters
154 397R0582 / OJ L 087 02.04.97 p. 14 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 582/97 of 1 April 
1997 concerning the stopping of fishing for salmon by vessels flying the flag of Sweden
155 397R0779 / OJ L 113 30.04.97 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 779/97 of 24 April 1997 
introducing arrangements for the management of fishing effort in the Baltic Sea
156 397R0953 / OJ L 139 30.05.97 p.l /  Council Regulation (EC) No 953/97 of 27 May 1997 
allocating, for 1997, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in the zone of the 
Russian Federation
157 397R1059 / OJ L 154 12.06.97 p.26 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1059/97 of 11 June 
1997 adjusting the maximum annual fishing effort for certain fisheries
158 397R2268 / OJ L 313 15.11.97 p.l / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2268/97 of 14 
November 1997 adjusting the maximum annual fishing effort for certain fisheries
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159 397R2493 / OJ L 343 13.12.97 p.14 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2493/97 of 12 
December 1997 adjusting the maximum annual fishing effort for certain fisheries
160 397R2503 / OJ L 345 16.12.97 p.23 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2503/97 of 15 
December 1997 adjusting the maximum annual fishing effort for certain fisheries
161 398R0045 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 45/98 of 19 December
1997 fixing, for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, the total allowable catches for
1998 and certain conditions under which they may be fished
162 398R0047 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.58 /  Council Regulation (EC) No 47/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, certain catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in the 
Norwegian exclusive economic zone and the fishing zone around Jan Mayen
163 398R0049 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.70 /  Council Regulation (EC) No 49/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, certain catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in 
Faroese waters
164 398R0050 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.72 / Council Regulation (EC) No 50/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, Community catch quotas in Greenland waters
165 398R0051 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.75 / Council Regulation (EC) No 51/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Icelandic 
waters
166 398R0052 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.77 / Council Regulation (EC) No 52/98 of 19 December 
1997 laying down for 1998 certain measures for the conservation and management of fishery 
resources applicable to vessels flying the flag of Estonia
167 398R0053 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.84 / Council Regulation (EC) No 53/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating for 1998 catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Estonian 
waters
168 398R0055 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.93 / Council Regulation (EC) No 55/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Latvian 
waters
169 398R0057 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.102 / Council Regulation (EC) No 57/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Lithuanian 
waters
170 398R0059 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.l 11 / Council Regulation (EC) No 59/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in Polish 
waters
171 398R0061 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.l 19 / Council Regulation (EC) No 61/98 of 19 December 
1997 allocating, for 1998, catch quotas between Member States for vessels fishing in the zone 
of the Russian Federation
172 398R0065 / OJ L 012 19.01.98 p.145 / Council Regulation (EC) No 65/98 of 19 December 
1997 fixing, for certain stocks of highly migratory fish, the total allowable catches for 1998, 
their distribution in quotas to Member States and certain conditions under which they may be 
fished
173 398R0088 / OJ L 009 15.01.98 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 88/98 of 18 December 
1997 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the 
waters of the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound
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174 377R2115 / OJ L 247 28.09.77 p.2 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2115/77 of 27 September 
1977 prohibiting the direct fishing and landing of herring for industrial purposes other than 
human consumption
175 384R2108 / OJ L 194 24.07.84 p.22 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2108/84 of 23 July 
1984 laying down detailed rules for determining the mesh size of fishing nets
176 384R3440 / OJ L 318 07.12.84 p.23 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3440/84 of 6 
December 1984 on the attachment of devices to trawls, Danish seines and similar nets
111 385R1899 / OJ L 179 11.07.85 p.2 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1899/85 of 8 July 1985 
establishing a minimum mesh size for nets used when fishing for capelin in that part of the zone 
of the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the north-east Atlantic fisheries which 
extends beyond the maritime waters falling within the fisheries jurisdiction of Contracting 
Parties to the Convention
178 385R3531 / OJ L 336 14.12.85 p.20 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3531/85 of 12 
December 1985 laying down certain technical and control measures relating to the fishing 
activities of vessels flying the flag of Spain in the waters of the other Member States, except 
Portugal
179 385R3561 / OJ L 339 18.12.85 p.29 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3561/85 of 17 
December 1985 concerning information about inspections of fishing activities carried out by 
national control authorities
180 385R3715 / OJ L 360 31.12.85 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3715/85 of 27 
December 1985 laying down certain technical and control measures relating to the fishing 
activities of vessels flying the flag of Portugal in the waters of the other Member States except 
Spain
181 385R3716 / OJ L 360 31.12.85 p.7 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3716/85 of 27 
December 1985 laying down certain technical and control measures relating to the fishing 
activities in Spanish waters of vessels flying the flag of another Member State except Portugal
182 385R3717 / OJ L 360 31.12.85 p.14 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3717/85 of 27 
December 1985 laying down certain technical and control measures relating to the fishing 
activities in Spanish waters of vessels flying the flag of Portugal
183 385R3718 / OJ L 360 31.12.85 p.20 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3718/85 of 27 
December 1985 laying down certain technical and control measures relating to the fishing 
activities in Portuguese waters of vessels flying the flag of Spain
184 385R3719 / OJ L 360 31.12.85 p.26 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3719/85 of 27 
December 1985 laying down certain technical measures and control measures relating to the 
fishing activities in Portuguese waters of vessels flying the flag of another Member State except 
Spain
185 385R3781 / OJ L 363 31.12.85 p.26 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3781/85 of 31 
December 1985 laying down the measures to be taken in respect of operators who do not 
comply with certain provisions relating to fishing contained in the Act of Accession of Spain 
and Portugal
186 387R1638 / OJ L 153 13.06.87 p.7 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1638/87 of 9 June 1987 
fixing the minimum mesh size for pelagic trawls used in fishing for blue whiting in that part of 
the area covered by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries which extends beyond the maritime waters falling within the fisheries 
jurisdiction of Contracting Parties to the Convention
335
187 387R2241 / OJ L 207 29.07.87 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2241/87 of 23 July 1987 
establishing certain control measures for fishing activities
188 388D0307 / OJ L 136 02.06.88 p. 14 / 88/307/EEC: Commission Decision of 2 May 1988 on 
the eligibility of expenditure for the development of monitoring and supervision facilities 
necessary for applying the Community arrangements for the conservation of fishery resources 
(Only the Spanish, Danish, English, French, Dutch and Portuguese texts are authentic)
189 390R3554 / OJ L 346 11.12.90 p.l 1 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3554/90 of 10 
December 1990 adopting provisions for the establishment of the list of vessels exceeding eight 
metres length overall which are permitted to fish for sole within certain areas of the Community 
using beam trawls of an aggregate length exceeding nine metres
190 392R0189 / OJ L 021 30.01.92 p.4 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 189/92 of 27 January 
1992 adopting provisions for the application of certain control measures adopted by the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
191 394D0502 / OJ L 202 05.08.94 p.28 / 94/502/EC: Commission Decision of 27 July 1994 on 
the eligibility of expenditure to be incurred by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on the implementation of pilot 
projects involving the use of continuous position monitoring systems for fishing vessels (Only 
the Spanish, Danish, German, Greek, English, French and Dutch texts are authentic)
192 394D0645 / OJ L 249 24.09.94 p.20 / 94/645/EC: Commission Decision of 19 September 
1994 on the eligibility of expenditure to be incurred by Italy on the implementation of pilot 
projects involving the use of continuous position monitoring systems for fishing vessels (Only 
the Italian text is authentic)
193 395R3071 / O J L 329 30.12.95 p.14 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3071/95 of 22 December 
1995 amending, for the 19th time, Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources
194 396R2113 / O J L 283 05.11.96p.l / Council Regulation (EC)No 2113/96of 25 October 
1996 laying down certain conservation and control measures applicable to fishing activities in 
the Antarctic
195 396R2332 / OJ L 317 06.12.96 p.3 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2332/96 of 3 
December 1996 establishing, for 1997, the list of vessels exceeding eight metres length overall 
and permitted to fish for sole within certain areas of the Community using beam trawls whose 
aggregate length exceeds nine metres
196 398R0044 / OJ L 005 09.01.98 p.24 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 44/98 of 8 January 
1998 establishing, for 1998, the list of vessels exceeding eight metres length overall permitted 
to fish for sole in certain Community areas using beam trawls whose aggregate length exceeds 
nine metres
197 398R0066 / OJ L 006 10.01.98 p.l / Council Regulation (EC) No 66/98 of 18 December 
1997 laying down certain conservation and control measures applicable to fishing activities in 
the Antarctic and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2113/96
198 390D0554 / OJ L 314 14.11.90 p.13 / 90/554/EEC: Commission Decision of 14 February 
1990 on the Spanish draft ministerial order on logistic support for the fishing fleet in 198
199 395D0195 / OJ L 126 09.06.95 p.32 / 95/195/EC: Commission Decision of 14 February 
1995 concerning aid granted by the Region of Sardinia (Italy) in the fisheries sector (temporary 
withdrawal of vessels) (Only the Italian text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)
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396R2374 / OJ L 325 14.12.96 p.l / Commission Regulation (EC) No 2374/96 of 13 
December 1996 on applications for financing of the aid granted by the Member States to 
producers' organizations in the fisheries sector in order to improve the quality and marketing of 
their products_____________________________________________________________________
201 277A0315(01) / OJ L 226 29.08.80 p.12 / Agreement on fisheries between the European 
Economic Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home 
Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part
202 278A1024(01) / OJ L 378 30.12.78 p.2 / Convention on future Multilateral Cooperation in 
the North-West Atlantic fisheries
203 279A0615(02) / OJ L 226 29.08.80 p. 17 / Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the Coast of 
Senegal
204 280A0227(05) / OJ L 226 29.08.80 p.48 / Agreement on fisheries between the European 
Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway
205 280A1118(01) / OJ L 227 12.08.81 p.22 / Convention on future multilateral cooperation in 
North- East Atlantic fisheries
206 282A0302(01) / OJ L 378 31.12.82 p.25 / Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the 
North Atlantic Ocean
207 283A0427(01) / OJ L 111 27.04.83 p.2 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea on fishing 
off the Guinean Coast
208 283A0826(02) / OJ L 237 26.08.83 p.5 / Convention on fishing and conservation of the 
living resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts
209 283A0826(03) / OJ L 237 26.08.83 p.9 / Protocol to the Conference of the representatives of 
the States Parties to the Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources in the Baltic 
Sea and the Belts (Warsaw, 9 to 11 November 1983)
210 284A0225(01) /  OJ L 054 25.02.84 p.2 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe on 
fishing off Sao Tome and Principe - Protocol between the European Economic Community and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
211 284A0716(01) /  O JL 188 16.07.84 p.2 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on fishing off the coast 
of Equatorial Guinea - Protocol between the European Economic Community and the 
Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea
212 285A0201(01) / OJ L 029 01.02.85 p.9 / Agreement on fisheries between the European 
Economic Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local 
Government of Greenland, on the other
213 285A0507(01) / OJ L 122 07.05.85 p.2 / Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
between the European Economic Community, on the one hand, and the Government of 
Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, on the other hand, concerning salmon 
fishing in Faroese waters
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214 286A0318(01) / O JL 073 18.03.86 p.26 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off 
Madagascar
215 286A0618(01) / OJ L 162 18.06.86 p.34 /  International Convention for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas
216 286A0618(02) / OJ L 162 18.06.86 p.39 / Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries of 
the States Parties to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
217 286A0618(03) / OJ L 162 18.06.86 p.41 / Protocol attached to the Final Act of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the States Parties to the International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
218 286A1122(09) / OJ L 328 22.11.86 p.77 / Agreements in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway concerning 
agriculture and fisheries
219 286A1122(11) / OJ L 328 22.11.86 p.99 / Agreements in the form of Exchanges of Letters 
between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning 
agriculture and fisheries
220 287A0410(04) / OJ L 098 10.04.87 p.l 1 /  Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the provisional application of the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fishing off the 
coast of Mozambique, initialled in Brussels on 11 December 1986, for the period starting 1 
January 1987
221 287A0410(05) / OJ L 098 10.04.87 p.12 /  Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fisheries relations
222 287A0606(01) / OJ L 146 06.06.87 p.3 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of the Gambia on fishing off the Gambia
223 289A0610(01) / OJ L 159 10.06.89 p.2 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of Mauritius on fishing in Mauritian waters
224 290A0515(01) / O JL 125 15.05.90 p.28 /  Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Sierra Leone on fishing off Sierra Leone
225 290A0515(02) / OJ L 125 15.05.90 p.36 /  Protocol on the fishing rights and financial 
contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Republic of Sierra Leone on fishing off Sierra Leone
226 290A0809(01) / OJ L 212 09.08.90 p.3 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the coast of Cape Verde
227 290A1231(03) / O JL 379 31.12.90 p.3 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire
228 290A1231(06) / OJ L 379 31.12.90 p.25 / Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the United Republic of Tanzania on fishing off Tanzania
229 290A1231(07) / OJ L 379 31.12.90 p.32 / Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and 
financial payments provided for under the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the United Republic of Tanzania on fishing off Tanzania
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230 293A0309(01) / OJ L 056 09.03.93 p.2 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of Estonia
231 293A0309(02) /  OJ L 056 09.03.93 p.6 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of Latvia
232 293A0309(03) / OJ L 056 09.03.93 p. 10 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of Lithuania
233 293A0702(01) / OJ L 161 02.07.93 p.2 / Agreement on fisheries and the marine environment 
between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland
234 293A1204(01) / OJ L 299 04.12.93 p.2 / Agreement on fisheries between the European 
Economic Community and the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominicia - Protocol 
between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Commonwealth of 
Dominica on conditions relating to reciprocal access for fishing vessels of both Parties
235 293A1220(01) / OJ L 318 20.12.93 p.2 / Agreement on relations in the sea fisheries sector 
between the European Economic Community and the Argentine Republic - Protocol I 
establishing the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement 
on relations in the sea fisheries sector between the Argentine Republic and the European 
Economic Community
236 293A1231(09) / OJ L 340 31.12.93 p.3 / Agreement in the form of exchanges of letters 
between the European Community and the Government of Canada concerning fisheries 
relations
237 294A1231(01) /  OJ L 351 31.12.94 p.2 / Third protocol laying down the conditions relating 
to fishing provided for in the Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic 
Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local Government of 
Greenland, on the other
238 294A1231 (02) / OJ L 351 31.12.94 p. 16 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the amendment to the Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic 
Community, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark and the local Government of 
Greenland, on the other
239 295A1005(01) / OJ L 236 05.10.95 p.25 /  Agreement for the establishment of the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission
240 295A1124(01) / OJL 282 24.11.95 p.22 /  Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the provisional application of the Protocol defining, for the period 21 May 1995 to 
20 May 1998, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic 
of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar
241 296A0127(02) / OJ L 021 27.01.96 p.70 / Amendment to Article VII of the Convention on 
fishing and conservation of the living resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts
242 296A0323(01) /  OJ L 075 23.03.96 p.2 / protocol defining, for the period 21 May 1995 to 20 
May 1998, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic 
of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar
339
243 296A0629(03) / OJ L 157 29.06.96 p.18 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the provisional application of the Protocol defining, for the period from 18 January 
to 17 January 1999, the fishing oppportunities and financial contribution provided for by the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on 
fishing off Seychelles
244 296A0629(04) / OJ L 157 29.06.96 p.19 / protocol defining, for the period from 18 January 
1996 to 17 January 1999, the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for by 
the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on 
fishing off Seychelles
245 296A0716(01) / OJ L 177 16.07.96 p.26 / Agreement to promote compliance with 
international conservation and management measures by fishing vessels on the high seas
246 296A1002(01) / OJ L 250 02.10.96 p.16 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
on the provisional application of the Protocol defining, for the period from 3 May 1996 to 2 
May 1999, the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the agreement 
between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of 
Angola on fishing off Angola
247 296A1031(01) / OJ L 279 31.10.96 p.32 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the provisional application of the protocol establishing the fishing opportunities and 
the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome e Principe on fishing 
off the coast of Sao Tome e Principe for the period 1 June 1996 to 31 May 1999
248 296A1220(01) / OJ L 332 20.12.96 p.2 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Community and the Republic of Latvia
249 296A1220(02) / OJ L 332 20.12.96 p.7 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Community and the Republic of Lithuania
250 296A1220(03) / OJ L 332 20.12.96 p.l 1 / PROTOCOL laying down the conditions relating 
to temporary joint ventures and joint enterprises provided for in the Agreement on fisheries 
relations between the European Community and the Republic of Lithuania
251 296A1220(04) / OJ L 332 20.12.96 p. 17 / Agreement on fisheries relations between the 
European Community and the Republic of Estonia
252 297A0217(01) / OJ L 046 17.02.97 p.57 / Protocol defining, for the period from 3 May 1996 
to 2 May 1999, the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's 
Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola
253 297A0217(02) / OJ L 046 17.02.97 p.76 / Protocol establishing the fishing opportunities and 
the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome e Principe on fishing off the coast of 
Sao Tome e Principe for the period 1 June 1996 to 31 May 1999
254 297A0527(01) / OJ L 135 27.05.97 p.6 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
on the provisional application of the Protocol fixing, for the period 1 December 1996 to 30 
November 1999, the fishing opportunities and the financial consideration provided for in the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of Mauritius on 
fishing in Mauritian waters
340
255 297A1105(01) / OJ L 302 05.11.97 p.3 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the provisional application of the Protocol establishing the fishing rights and 
financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal 
for the period from 1 May 1997 to 30 April
256 297A 1204(01) / OJ L 332 04.12.97 p.20 / Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters 
concerning the amendment to the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between 
the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania initialled in Brussels on 20 
June 1996
257 297A1212(02) /  OJ L 342 12.12.97 p.4 / Protocol establishing the fishing possibilities and 
the financial compensation provided for in the agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of 
Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 1997 to 15 June
258 298A0117(02) / O JL  011 17.01.98 p.33 / Protocol establishing, for the period from 1 July 
1997 to 30 June 2000, the fishing rights and financial compensation provided for in the 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic 
of Equatorial Guinea on fishing off the coast of Equatorial Guinea
259 298A0128(02) /  OJ L 021 28.01.98 p.20 / Protocol establishing the fishing rights and 
financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the coast of Cape Verde
260 298A0131(02) /  OJ L 025 31.01.98 p.85 / Protocol establishing the fishing rights and 
financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire
261 378R3179 / OJ L 378 30.12.78 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3179/78 of 28 December 
1978 concerning the conclusion by the European Economic Community of the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
262 380R2213 / OJ L 226 29.08.80 p.33 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 2213/80 of 27 June 
1980 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Guinea 
Bissau and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Guinea Bissau, and 
of the two exchanges of letters referring thereto
263 381R0654 / OJ L 069 14.03.81 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 654/81 of 10 March 1981 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 3179/78 concerning the conclusion by the European Economic 
Community of the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries
264 385R0225 / OJ L 029 01.02.85 p. 18 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 225/85 of 29 January 
1985 laying down certain specific measures in connection with the special arrangements on 
fisheries applicable to Greenland
265 388R1956 / OJ L 175 06.07.88 p.l /  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1956/88 of 9 June 1988 
adopting provisions for the application of the scheme of joint international inspection adopted 
by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
266 388R2868 / OJ L 257 17.09.88 p.20 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2868/88 of 16 
September 1988 laying down detailed rules for the application of the Scheme of Joint 
International Inspection adopted by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
267 394D0317 / OJ L 142 07.06.94 p.30 / 94/317/EC: Council Decision of 2 June 1994 
authorizing the Kingdom of Spain to extend until 7 March 1995 the Agreement on mutual 
fishery relations with the Republic of South Africa
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268 394D0318 / OJ L 142 07.06.94 p.31 / 94/318/EC: Council Decision of 2 June 1994 
authorizing the Portuguese Republic to extend until 7 March 1995 the Agreement on mutual 
fishery relations with the Republic of South Africa
269 394R3359 / OJ L 356 31.12.94 p.3 / Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/94 of 22 December 
1994 declaring that Council Regulation (EC) No 2905/94 establishing detailed rules for the 
application of the trade monitoring system for certain fishery products coming from Norway has 
lapsed
270 397R2615 / OJ L 353 24.12.97 p.7 / Council Regulation (EC) No 2615/97 of 18 December 
1997 on the conclusion of the Protocol establishing the fishing possibilities and the financial 
compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau for 
the period 16 June 1997 to 15 June
ADDENDUM TO SCREENING A LIST OF CHAPTER 8, FISHERIES
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397R0150\ OJ L030 31.01.1997 p.l \  Council Regulation (EC) No. 150\97 of 12 December 
1996 on the conclusion of an Agreement on Co-operation in the sea fisheries sector between the 
European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco and laying down provisions for its 
implementation
272
297A0131\OJ L030 31.01.97 p.5\ Agreement on co-operation in the sea fisheries sector 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco
273 295A1219 / OJ No. L030 p.30, 1997/01/31
Protocol setting out fishing opportunities and the financial compensation and financial 
contributions.
Source: Screening list A \08PL
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Annex 6.1.: Acquis communautaire in Chapter 6: Competition Policy
Table 1: Key legal provisions of the acquis communautaire in Chapter 21
1 354S0024 / OJ 009 11.05.54 p.345 / ECSC High Authority: Decision No 24-54 of 6 May 1954 
laying down in implementation of Article 66 (1) of the Treaty a regulation on what constitutes 
control of an undertaking
2 354S0026 / OJ 009 11.05.54 p.350 / ECSC High Authority: Decision No 26-54 of 6 May 1954 
laying down in implementation of Article 66 (4) of the Treaty a regulation concerning information 
to be furnished
3 362R0017 / OJ 013 21.02.62 p.204 / EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
4 362R0026 / OJ 030 20.04.62 p.993 / EEC Council: Regulation No 26 applying certain rules of 
competition to production of and trade in agricultural products
5 362R0141 / OJ 124 28.11.62 p.2751 / EEC: Regulation No 141 of the Council exempting 
transport from the application of Council Regulation No 17
6 363R0099 / OJ 127 20.08.63 p.2268 / Regulation No 99/63/EEC of the Commission of 25 July 
1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17
7 365R0019 / OJ 036 06.03.65 p.533 / Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 March of the Council on 
application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted 
practices
8 367S0025 / OJ 154 14.07.67 p. 11 / ECSC High Authority: Decision No 25-67 of 22 June 1967 
laying down in implementation of Article 66 (3) of the Treaty a regulation concerning exemption 
from prior authorisation
9 368R1017 / OJ L 175 23.07.68 p.l /  Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of the Council of 19 July 
1968 applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway
10 369R1629 / OJ L 209 21.08.69 p.l /  Regulation (EEC) No 1629/69 of the Commission of 8 
August 1969 on the form, content and other detail of complaints pursuant to Article 10, 
applications pursuant to Article 12 and notifications pursuant to Article 14 (1) of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of 19 July 1968
11 369R1630 / OJ L 209 21.08.69 p.l 1 / Regulation (EEC) No 1630/69 of the Commission of 8 
August 1969 on the hearings provided for in Article 26 (1) and (2) of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1017/68 of 19 July 1968
12 371R2821 / OJ L 285 29.12.71 p.46 / Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 of the Council of 20 
December 1971 on application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices
13 374R2988 / OJ L 319 29.11.74 p.l /  Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of the Council of 26 
November 1974 concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions 
under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competition
14 378S0715 / OJ L 094 08.04.78 p.22 /  Commission Decision No 7 15/78/ECSC of 6 April 1978 
concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
15 380L0723 / OJ L 195 29.07.80 p.35 / 80/723/EEC: Commission Directive of 25 June 1980 on 
the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings
343
16 383R1983 / OJ L 173 30.06.83 p.l /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 of 22 June 
1983 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution 
agreements
17 383R1984 / OJ L 173 30.06.83 p.5 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22 June 
1983 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing 
agreements
18 384S0379 / OJ L 046 16.02.84 p.23 / Commission Decision No 379/84/ECSC of 15 February 
1984 defining the powers of officials and agents of the Commission instructed to carry out the 
checks provided for in the ECSC Treaty and decisions taken in application thereof
19 385R0417 / OJ L 053 22.02.85 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 417/85 of 19 December 
1984 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements
20 385R0418 / OJ L 053 22.02.85 p.5 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of 19 December 
1984 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development 
agreements
21 386R4056 / OJ L 378 31.12.86 p.4 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 
1986 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime 
transport
22 387R3975 / OJ L 374 31.12.87 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 
1987 laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in 
the air transport sector
23 387R3976 / OJ L 374 31.12.87 p.9 /  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 
1987 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the air transport sector
24 *388L0301 / OJ L 131 27.05.88 p.73 / 88/301/EEC: Commission Directive of 16 May 1988 on 
competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment*
25 388R4087 / OJ L 359 28.12.88 p.46 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 
November 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise 
agreements
26 388R4260 / OJ L 376 31.12.88 p.l / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4260/88 of 16 
December 1988 on the communications, complaints and applications and the hearings provided for 
in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 
85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport
27 388R4261 /  OJ L 376 31.12.88 p.10 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4261/88 of 16 
December 1988 on the complaints, applications and hearings provided for in Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3975/87 laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to 
undertakings in the air transport sector
28 389R4064 / OJ L 395 30.12.89 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 
1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
29 *390L0388 / OJ L 192 24.07.90 p.10 / 90/388/EEC: Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on 
competition in the markets for telecommunications services
30
(A55)
390L0684 / OJ L 380 31.12.90 p.27 / 90/684/EEC: Council Directive of 21 December 1990 on 
aid to shipbuilding
31 391R1534 / OJ L 143 07.06.91 p.l / Council Regulation (EEC) No 1534/91 of 31 May 1991 on
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the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in the insurance sector
32 392R0479 / OJ L 055 29.02.92 p.3 / Council Regulation (EEC) No 479/92 of 25 February 1992 
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia)
33 392R3932 / OJ L 398 31.12.92 p.7 / Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92 of 21 
December 1992 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector
34 393R1617 / OJ L 155 26.06.93 p.18 /  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 of 25 June 
1993 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint operations, 
consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports
35 393R3652 / OJ L 333 31.12.93 p.37 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 3652/93 of 22 
December 1993 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements between undertakings relating to computerized reservation systems for air transport 
services
36 394D0810 / OJ L 330 21.12.94 p.67 /  94/810/ECSC, EC: Commission Decision of 12 
December 1994 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in competition procedures before the 
Commission (Text with EEA relevance)
37 ♦394L0046 / OJ L 268 19.10.94 p.15 / Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 
amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite 
communications *
38 394R3385 / OJ L 377 31.12.94 p.28 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 3385/94 of 21 
December 1994 on the form, content and other details of applications and notifications provided for 
in Council Regulation No 17 (Text with EEA relevance)
39 *395L0051 / OJ L256 p. 49, 1995/10/26 / Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18 October 1995 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable 
television networks for the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services *
40 395R0870 / OJ L 089 21.04.95 p.7 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 870/95 of 20 April 1995 
on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) pursuant to Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 479/92
41 395R1475 / OJ L 145 29.06.95 p.25 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 
1995 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle 
distribution and servicing agreements
42 395R3094 / OJ L 332 30.12.95 p.l /  Council Regulation (EC) No 3094/95 of 22 December 1995 
on aid to shipbuilding
43 *396L0002 / OJ L 020 26.01.96 p.59 / 96/2/EC: Commission Directive of 16 January 1996 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal communications*
44 *396L0019 / OJ L074 p. 13, 1996/03/22 / Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full competition in 
telecommunications markets *
45 396R0240 / OJ L 031 09.02.96 p.2 /  Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 
1996 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer 
agreements (Text with EEA relevance)
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46 396R1523 / OJ L190 31/7/96, p .l 1 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 1523/96 of 24 July 1996 
amending 16/17/93 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint 
operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services and slot 
allocation at airports
47 . 396S2496 / OJ L 338 28.12.96 p.42 / Commission Decision No 2496/96/ECSC of 18 December 
1996 establishing Community rules for State aid to the steel industry (Text with EEA relevance)
48 *397D0114 / OJ L 041 12.02.97 p.8 / Commission Decision of 27 November 1996 concerning 
the additional implementation periods requested by Ireland for the implementation of Commission . 
Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition in the telecommunications markets 
(Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)*
49 *397D0310 / OJ L 133 24.05.97 p.19 / 97/310/EC: Commission Decision of 12 February 1997 
concerning the granting of additional implementation periods to Portugal for the implementation of 
Commission Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards full competition in the 
telecommunications markets (Only the Portuguese text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)*
50 397D0568 / OJ L 234 26.08.97 p.7 / 97/568/EC: Commission Decision of 14 May 1997 on the 
granting of additional implementation periods to Luxembourg for the implementation of Directive 
90/388/EEC as regards full competition in the telecommunications markets (Only the French text is 
authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)
51 397D0603 / OJ L 243 05.09.97 p.48 / 97/603/EC: Commission Decision of 10 June 1997 
concerning the granting of additional implementation periods to Spain for the implementation of 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC as regards full competition in the telecommunications markets 
(Only the Spanish text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)
52 397R1013 / OJ L 148 06.06.97 p.l /  Council Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 of 2 June 1997 on aid 
to certain shipyards under restructuring
53 398R0447 / OJ L61 2/3/98, p. 1 / Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of 1 March 1998 on 
the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (including annex concerning form CO 
relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and 
Guidance Notes I-III)
54
(B63)
597PC0396
Proposal for a Conucil Regulation (EC) on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty 
to certain categories of horizontal aid, OJ C 262,28.8.1997, p.6.
55
(A30)
98/L202/01
Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding
Source: Based on the screening list A from 21 October 1998
Table 2: Additional provisions to be implemented in the framework of Chapter 21
1 384Y0413 (1)
Commission Notice concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No 1983/83 and (EEC) No 1984/83, 
OJ C 101, 13.4.1984, p. 2 (as amended by Commission Notice 92/C 121/02, OJ C 121, 13.5. 1992, p. 
2).
2 362X1224(01)
Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents, OJ 139, 24.12.1962, p. 2921/62.
3 368Y0729 (01)
Notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field of cooperation between 
entreprises, OJ C 75, 29.7.1968, p. 3; corrected by OJ C 84, 28.8.1968, p. 14.
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4 379Y0103 (01)
Notice concerning its assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85(1) of 
the EEC Treaty, OJ C 1, 3.1.1979, p. 2.
5 • Notice concerning imports into the Community of Japanese goods falling within the scope of the 
Rome Treaty, O JC  111,21.10.1972, p. 13.
6 397Y1209 (02)
Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty, 
O JC  372, 9.12.1997.
7 93/C39/05
Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39, 13.2.1993, p. 6.
8 93/C43/02
Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty, OJ C 43, 16.2.1993, p. 2.
9 95/C251/03
Notice on the application of the EC competition rules to cross-border credit transfers, OJ C 251, 
27.9.1995, p. 3.
10 96/C207/04
Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 207, 18.7.1996, p. 4.
11 397Y1015 (01)
Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in handling 
cases falling within the scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 313, 15.10.97, p. 3
12 97/C23/03
Notice on internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council 
Regulation No 4064/89, OJ C 23, 23.1.1997, p. 3.
13 398Y0114 (01)
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and 
Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, OJ C 9, 14.1.1998.
14 397Y1209 (01)
Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ 
C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5.
15 397Y0930 (01)
Commission Communication on clarification of Commission recommendations on the application of 
competition rules to new transport infrastructure projects, OJ C 298, 30.9.1997.
16 Notes on Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, published in Merger control law in the European 
Union, Brussels - Luxembourg, 1995.
17 94/C3 85/01
Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66, 
2.3.1998, p. 1.
18 94/C385/02
Commission Notice on the notion of a concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 
21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66, 2.3.1998, p. 5.
19 94/C385/03
Commission Notice on the notion of undertakings concerned under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66, 
2.3.1998, p. 14.
20 94/C385/04
Commission Notice on calculation of turnover under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66, 2.3.1998, p. 25.
21 90/C203/05
Commission Notice regarding restrictions ancillary to concentrations, OJ C 203, 14.8.1990, p. 5.
22 Commission letter to Member States of 2 May 1997 concerning the amendment of the notification 
thresholds for aid for EUREKA projects
23 396Y0217(01)
Community framework for State Aid for Research and Development, OJ C 45, 17.2.1996 (including 
three annexes : Annex I - Definition of the stages of R&D for the purposes of Article 92 of the EC 
Treaty; Annex II - Eligible R&D costs for the purpose of calculating the aid intensity; Annex II -
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Additional information normally to be supplied in the notification provided for by Article 93(3) of 
the EC Treaty of State aid for R&D).
24 94/C72/03
Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ C 72, 10.3.1994, p. 3.
25 94/C368/05
Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJ C 368, 
23.12.1994
26 96/C213/04
Community guidelines of 16 July 1996 on state aid for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
OJ C 213, 23.7.1996 (including authorized range of aid for SMEs, by size of company and location).
27 396X0280
Commission recommendation of 3 April 1996 concerning the definition of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (including annex concerning the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises 
adopted by the Commission), OJ L 107, 30.4.1996
28 95/C334/04
Guidelines on aid to employment, OJ C 334, 12.12.1995, p. 4.
29 97/C 1/05
Monitoring of State aid and reduction of labour costs, OJ C 1, 3.1.1997, p. 10.
30 96/C218/04
Accelerated procedure for processing notifications of employment aid - Standard notification form, 
OJC  218, 27.7.1996.
31 97/C 146/08
Guidelines on State aid for undertakings in deprived urban areas, OJ C 146, 14.5.1997.
32 471Y1104 (01)
Council Resolution of 20 October 1971, OJ C 111,4.11.1971, p. 1 (with annex on procedure for 
application of the principles of coordination of general systems of regional aid).
33 Commission letter to Member States of 17 January 1994 (Reference rates for the assessment of 
regional aid - amendment to the mechanism for setting and revising the rates).
34 96/Cl 86/07
Commission communication on the method of application of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty to 
national regional aid, OJ C 186, 26.6.1996, p. 6.
35 97/C 198/06
Commission communication on the method of application of Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty to 
national regional aid, OJ C 198, 28.6.1997.
36 Commission letter to Member States of 24 February 1998 concerning Guidelines on national 
regional aid (adopted by the Commission on 16.12.1997, not yet published).
37 97/C273/03
Communication notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates, OJ C 273/3, 
9.9.1997.
38 Multisectoral Framework on regional aid for large investment projects (adopted by the Commission 
on 16.12.1997, not yet published); will not enter into force until 1.9.1998.
39 96/C94/07
Code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry, OJ C 94, 30.3.1996.
40 397Y0915 (01)
Community framework on State aid to the motor vehicle industry, OJ C 279, 15.9.1997, p. 1.
41 Commission letter to Member States SG (88) D/6181 of 26 May 1988.
42 Commission letter to Member States SG (89) D/311 of 3 January 1989, as amended by Commission 
letter SG (97) 4345 of 10 June 1997.
43 Commission letter to Member States SG (92) D/06981 of 19 March 1992.
44 95/C355/01
Agreement respecting normal competitive conditions in the commercial shipbuilding and repair 
industry (with Annex I - Measures of support inconsistent with normal competitive conditions in 
commercial shipbuilding and repair industry; Annex II - Special provisions relating to measures of 
support; Annex III - Injurious pricing charges), OJ 355, 30.12.1995, p. 1.
45 97/C51/03
Review of production aid ceiling for shipbuilding, OJ C 51, 21.2.1997, p. 5.
46 Framework for certain steel sectors not covered by the ECSC Treaty, OJ C 320, 13.12.1988, p. 3).
47 The notification of State aid to the Commission pursuant to Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty : the
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failure of Member States to respect their obligations, OJ C 252, 30.9.1980, p. 2.
48 Commission communication, OJ C 318, 24.11.1983.
49 385Y0105 (01)
Commission communication, OJ C 3, 5.1.1985.
50 Commission letter to Member States SG (89) D/5521 of 27 April 1989.
51 Commission letter to Member States SG (91) D/4577 of 4 March 1991 (Communication to Member 
States concerning the procedures for the notification of aid plans and procedures applicable when aid 
is provided in breach of the rules of Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty; with annex on information to 
be supplied in an Article 93(3) notification).
52 Guidance note on use of the de minimis facility provided for in the SME aid guidelines (letter of 23 
March 1993, IV/D/6878 from DGIV to the Member States, with annex concerning the calculation of 
. the cash grant equivalent of a soft lo a n ) . .....................
53 Commission letter to Member States of 22 February 1995 concerning interest rates to be applied 
when aid granted unlawfully is being recovered.
54 95/C 15 6/05
Commission communication on the recovery of aid granted unlawfully, OJ C 156, 22.6.1995, p. 5.
55 Commission letter to Member States of 2 August 1995 replacing the annexes of the Commission 
letter to Member States of 22 February 1994- D/20506 - with Annex I : Joint annual reporting format 
on existing State aid under the EC Treaty and subsidies under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and Annex I I : Format for standardized notification 
under Art. 93(3) of the EC Treaty and under Art. 8.3 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)
56 Commission letter to Member States SG (81) 12740 of 2 October 1981.
57 Commission letter to Member States of 30 April 1987.
58 92/C213/03
Commission communication to the Member States of 2 July 1992 on the accelerated clearance of aid 
schemes for SMEs and of amendments of existing schemes, OJ C 213, 19.8.1992, p. 10.
59 96/C218/04
Notice on the accelerated procedure for processing notifications of employment aid (standard 
notification form), OJ C 218, 27.7.1996.
60 Commission letter to the Member States of 27 June 1989.
61 Commission letter to the Member States of 11 October 1990.
62 95/C312/07
Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in the State aid field, OJ C 312, 
23.11.1995, p. 8.
63 597PC0396
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty to 
certain categories_of horizontal aid, OJ C 262, 28.8.1997, p. 6.
64 97/C209/03
Commission communication concerning aid elements in land sales by public authorities, OJ C 209, 
10.7.1997, p. 3.
65 397Y0917 (01)
Commission communication concerning the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty to 
short-term export credit insurance, OJC 281, 17.9.1997, p. 4.
66 Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty to public authorities’ holdings, Bulletin EC 9- 
1984.
67 93/C307/03
Commission communication to the Member States on application of art. 92 and 93 of the Treaty and 
art. 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC for public enterprises in food-processing sector, OJ C 
307, 13.11.1993, p. 3.
68 Commission letter to Member States SG (89) D/4328 of 5 April 1989.
69 Commission letter to Member States SG (89) D/12772 of 12 October 1989.
70 96/C68/06
Commission notice on the de minimis rule for State aid, OJ C 68, 6 March 1996, p. 9.
71 91/C233/02
Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 
6.9.1991, p. 2.
72 97/C76/06
Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications
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sector, OJ C076 p.9 1997
73 Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint provision of 
telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the abolition of restrictions on 
the provision of cable TV capacity over telecommunications networks, OJ C71, 7 March 1998, p.4
74 596DC0443
Communication from the Commission concerning services of general interest in Europe, COM(96) 
443 final, 11.9.1996.
75 595DC0113
Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the status and 
implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services, OJ C 275, 20.10.1995, p. 2.
76 398Y0110 (01)
Notice concerning the Status of voice communications on Internet under Community law, in 
particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC, OJ C 6, 10.1.1998, p. 4.
77 597IP0270
596DC0608
[Assessment criteria for national schemes for the costing and financing of universal service in 
telecommunications and guidelines for the Member States on Operation of such schemes, 
COM(96)608, 27.11.1996.][?]
78 398Y0206 (01)
Notice on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of 
certain state measures relating to postal services, OJ C39, 6 January 1998
79 Statements on Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97, not published, available from the Council 
9296/97 ADD 1; Commission Notice on the alignment of procedures for processing mergers under 
the ECSC and EC-Treaties, OJ C 66,2.3.1998, p. 36
80 Request for transitional period (Ireland)
Commission notice to Member States and other interested parties concerning the additional
implementation period requested by Ireland
OJ No C l69 p. 5, 1996-06-13 Notice 96/C 169/05 *
Source: Screening list B for Chapter 6
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Annex 6.2.: Map of the Special Economic Zones in Poland
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4 -  Krakowski Park Technologiczny 11 - Suwalska
5 - Legnicka 12 - Tarnobrzeska
6 -  Lodzka 13 - Walbrzyska
7 -  Euro-Park Mielec 14 -  Warminsko-Mazurska
Source: KPMG (2007: 12)
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Annex 6.3.: The questionnaire for entrepreneurs in the Special Economic Zones
Zone............................................................
Field of operation.......................................
YES NO COMMENTARY
1. Did Polish government represent your interest in 
appropriate way during the accession 
negotiations with the EU?
90%
2. Did members of the Negotiation Team do their 
utmost to achieve the most favorable (for you) 
results in the accession negotiations?
75% 25%
3. Are you aware of any institutional (formal) ways 
of contacting your government in the matters 
concerning you (in the context of accession 
negotiations)?
75% No answers
4. Have you had a chance to express your opinion 
on the issues concerning you during the 
accession negotiations? (If yes, how often)?
5% 90% No answers
5. If the answer to question four is positive, were 
these opinions taken into consideration?
30% No answers
6. Did Polish government make effort to keep you 
informed and updated about the developments in 
the in the accession negotiations with the EU?
85% No answers
7. Were you aware (prior to investing in the SEZ) 
of the fact that conditions governing public aid in 
the zones are not in accordance with EU law and 
may be changed after accession?
75% 25%
8. Are the final results of accession negotiation 
satisfactory for you?
75% 25%
9. Does the result of accession negotiations in any 
way have an impact on your investment 
decisions (current and planned ones)?
20% 80%
10. Do you think that the change of conditions for 
investments in the SEZ will cause any decrease 
of interest of potential investors?
5% 95%
Around 45 questionnaires were sent to investors in different economic zones and 21 
answers received. The questionnaire was anonymous; therefore it is difficult to group 
the results according to the branches (majority of the interviewees left blank the 
appropriate place).
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Annex 7.1.: The acquis communautaire in the Regional policy area
Table 1: Key legal provisions of the acquis communautaire in Chapter 21
1
388R2052 / OJ L 185 15.07.88 p.9
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and 
their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the 
operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments
2
388R4253 / OJ L 374 31.12.88 p.l
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different 
Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and 
the other existing financial instruments
3
388R4254 / OJ L 374 31.12.88 p. 15
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4254/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Regional Development Fund
4
388R4255 / OJ L 374 31.12.88 p.21
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4255/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Social Fund
5
388R4256/ OJ L 374 31.12.88 p.25
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the EAGGF Guidance Section
6
390R1865 / OJ L 170 03.07.90 p.35
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1865/90 of 2 July 1990 concerning interest on account of late 
payment to be charged in the event of late repayment of assistance from the Structural Funds
7
390R1866 / OJ L 170 03.07.90 p.36
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1866/90 of 2 July 1990 on arrangements for using the ecu for the 
purposes of the budgetary management of the Structural Funds
8
390D0589 / OJ L 280 13.11.93 p.30
93/589/EEC: Commission Decision of 28 October 1993 fixing an indicative allocation between 
Member States of the commitment appropriations of the Structural Funds and the financial 
instrument for fisheries guidance (FIFG) under Objective 1, as defined in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2052/88
9
390R0792 / OJ L079 1/4/93, p. 74
Council Regulation (EEC) No 792/93 of 30 March 1993 establishing a cohesion financial instrument
10
393R2080/ OJ L 193 31.07.93 p.l
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/93 of 20 July 1993 laying down provisions for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the financial instrument of fisheries guidance
11
394D0169 / OJ L 081 24.03.94 p.l
94/169/EC: Commission Decision of 20 January 1994 establishing an initial list of declining 
industrial areas concerned by Objective 2 as defined by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
12
394D0176 / OJ L082 25/3/94, p. 35
94/176/EC: Commission Decision of 11 February 1994 fixing an indicative allocation by Member 
State of Structural Fund commitment appropriations under Objective 2 as defined in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
13
394D0197 / OJ L 096 14.04.94 p.l
94/197/EC: Commission Decision of 26 January 1994 establishing, for the period 1994 to 1999, the 
list of rural areas under Objective 5b as defined by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
14
394D0203 / OJ L 097 15.04.94 p.43
94/203/EC: Commission Decision of 28 February 1994 establishing the indicative allocation by 
Member State of the commitment appropriations from the Structural Funds for Objective 5b as 
defined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 for the period 1994 to 1999
15
394D0342 / OJ L 152 18.06.94 p.39
94/342/EC: Commission Decision of 31 May 1994 concerning information and publicity measures 
to be carried out by the Member States concerning assistance from the Structural Funds and the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)
16
394R0566 / OJ L072 16/3/94, p. 1
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 566/94 of 10 March 1994 extending Regulation (EEC) No 
792/93 establishing a cohesion financial instrument
394R1164/O J L  130 25.05.94 p.l
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17 Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund
18
394R1628 / OJ L 171 06.07.94 p. 14
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1628/94 of 4 July 1994 concerning the implementation of a 
programme for cross- border cooperation between countries in central and eastern Europe and 
Member States of the Community in the framework of the Phare programme
19
398R2760 / OJ L 345 19.12.98 p.49
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2760/98 of 18 December 1998 concerning the implementation of a 
programme for cross-border cooperation in the framework of PHARE programme
20
394R1681 / OJ L 178 12.07.94 p.43
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 of 11 July 1994 concerning irregularities and the recovery 
of sums wrongly paid in connection with the financing of the structural policies and the organization 
of an information system in this field
21
394R1831 / OJ L 191 27.07.94 p.9
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1831/94 of 26 July 1994 concerning irregularities and the recovery 
of sums wrongly paid in connection with the financing of the Cohesion Fund and the organization of 
an information system in this field
22
395D0037 / OJ L 049 04.03.95 p.65
95/37/EC: Commission Decision of 17 February 1995 establishing, for the period 1995 to 1999 in 
Austria and Finland, the list of rural areas under Objective 5b as defined by Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2052/88
23
395D0143 / OJ L 092 25.04.95 p.29
95/143/EC: Commission Decision of 18 April 1995 establishing, for the period 1995 to 1999 in 
Sweden, the list of rural areas under Objective 5b as defined by Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2052/88 (Text with EEA relevance)
24
396D0455 / OJ L 188 27.07.96 p.47
96/455/EC: Commission Decision of 25 June 1996 concerning information and publicity measures 
to be carried out by the Member States and the Commission concerning the activities of the 
Cohesion Fund under Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94
25
396D0468 / OJ L 192 02.08.96 p.29
96/468/EC: Commission Decision of 19 July 1996 fixing an indicative allocation by Member State 
of Structural Fund commitment appropriations for the period 1997 to 1999 under Objective 2 as 
defined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
26
396D0472 / OJ L 193 03.08.96 p.54
96/472/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 1996 establishing the list of declining industrial areas 
concerned by Objective 2 for the programming period from 1997 to 1999, as defined by Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 and amending Decision 94/169/EC
27
397D0237 / OJ L094 9/4/97, p. 20
97/237/EC: Commission Decision of 14 March 1997 amending the list of declining industrial areas 
concerned by Objective 2 as defined by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
28
397D0349 / OJ L148 6/6/97, p. 29
97/349/EC: Commission Decision of 27 May 1997 amending the list of areas in industrial decline 
under Objective 2 as designated in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
29
397D0352 / OJ L151 10/6/97, p. 39
97/352/EC: Commission Decision of 20 May 1997 amending the list of declining industrial areas 
covered by Objective No 2 as defined by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88
30
397R2064 / OJ L 290 23.10.97 p.l
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 of 15 October 1997 establishing detailed arrangements 
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 as regards the financial control by 
Member States of operations co-financed by the Structural Funds
31
394R2687 / OJ L 286 05.11.94 p.5
Council Regulation (EC) No 2687/94 of 31 October 1994 on Community financial contributions to 
the International Fund for Ireland
32
397R2614 / OJ L 353 24.12.97 p.5
Council Regulation (EC) No 2614/97 of 15 December 1997 on Community financial contributions 
to the International Fund for Ireland
33
395R0852 / OJ L 086 20.04.95 p. 10
Council Regulation (EC) No 852/95 of 10 April 1995 on the grant of financial assistance to Portugal 
for a specific programme for the modernization of the Portuguese textile and clothing industry
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Added to the Screening List on 13 July 1999:
34
399R1260 / OJ L 161 ,26/06/1999 p.l
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Fund
35
399R1261 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.43
Regulation (EC) No 1261/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 June 1999 on 
the European Regional Development Fund
36 399R1262 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.48Regulation (EC) No 1262/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 June 1999 on 
the European Social Fund
37
399R1263 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.54
Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999 of 21 June 1999 on the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance
38 399R1264 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.57Council Regulation (EC) No 1264/1999 of 21 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 
establishing a Cohesion Fund
39
399R1265 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.62
Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/1999 of 21 June 1999 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 
1164/94 establishing a Cohesion Fund
40
399R1266 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.68
Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant 
countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending Regulation (EEC) No 
3906/89
41
399R1267 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.73
Council Regulation (EC) No 1267/1999 of 21 June 1999 establishing an Instrument for Structural 
Policies for Pre-accession
42
399R1268 / OJ L 161 , 26/06/1999 p.87
Council Regulation (EC) No 1268/1999 of 21 June 1999 on Community support for pre-accession 
measures for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries of central and eastern 
Europe in the pre- accession period •
Source: Based on the screening list A from 04.02.1999, as amended by Corrigendum to Screening List 
from 12.04.99 and Addendum to Screening List from 13.07.99 (taking into account changes caused by 
the adoption of ’’Agenda 2000”).
Table 2: Additional provisions to be implemented in the framework of Chapter 21
1
Detailed guidelines on the treatment of leasing in the framework of the Community structural 
financial instruments
OJ No C250 p. 5, 1993-09-14 Notice 93/C250/03
2
Notice of the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member 
States are invited to establish within the framework of a Community initiative for regions heavily 
dependent on the textiles and clothing sector 
OJ No C142 p. 5, 1992-06-04 Notice 92/C142/04
3
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member 
States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning urban areas 
(URBAN)
OJ No C l80 p. 6, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C 180/02
4
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes or global grants 
which they are invited to propose in the framework of a Community initiative concerning the 
adaptation of small and medium-sized enterprises to the single market (SMEs INITIATIVE)
OJ No C l80 p. 10, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C180/03
5
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for the initiative concerning the modernization 
of the Portuguese textile and clothing industry 
OJ No C l80 p. 15, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C 180/04
6
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for the Retex initiative 
OJ No C 180 p. 17, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C 180/05
7
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes or global grants 
which Member States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning
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«defence conversion (KONVER)
OJ No C180 p. 18, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C180/0
8
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes or global grants 
which they are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning the 
economic conversion of steel areas (RESIDERII)
OJ No C180 p. 22,1994-07-01 Notice 94/C180/07
9
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes or global grants 
which they are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning the 
economic conversion of coal-mining areas (RECHAR II)
OJ No C l80 p. 26, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/Cl 80/08
10
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member 
States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning the most 
remote regions (REGIS II)
OJ No C180 p. 44, 1994-07-01 Notice 94/C180/11
11
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member 
States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning border 
development, cross-border cooperation and selected energy networks (INTERREGII)
OJ No C180 p. 60,1994-07-01 Notice 94/C 180/13
12
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas for assistance in the framework of a 
Community initiative concerning the economic conversion of coal-mining areas (Rechar II) 
OJ No C337 p. 4, 1994-12-01 Notice 94/C337/04
13
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas for assistance in the framework of a 
Community initiative concerning the economic conversion of steel areas (Resider II)
OJ No C338 p. 3, 1994-12-02 Notice 94/C338/03
14
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas for assistance in the framework of a 
Community initiative concerning defence conversion (Konver)
OJ No C402 p. 5, 1994-12-31 Notice 94/C402/02
15
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for an initiative in the framework of the special 
support programme for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the border counties of 
Ireland
OJ No C l86 p. 3, 1995-07-20 Notice 95/Cl86/04
16
Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which Member 
States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning border 
development, cross-border cooperation and selected energy networks (INTERREGII)
OJ No C304 p. 5, 1995-11-15 Notice 95/C304/05
17
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas eligible for aid under a Community 
initiative concerning the economic conversion of coal-mining areas (Rechar II)
OJ No C330 p. 10, 1995-12-08 Notice 95/C330/04
18
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas eligible for aid under a Community 
initiative concerning the economic conversion of steel areas (Resider II)
OJ No C330 p. 10, 1995-12-08 Notice 95/C330/05
19
Notice to the Member States establishing the list of areas eligible for aid under a Community 
initiative concerning the conversion of the armaments industry (Konver)
OJ No C330 p. 11,1995-12-08 Notice 95/C330/06
20
Communication to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which 
Member States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative concerning urban 
areas (URBAN)
OJ No C200 p. 4, 1996-07-10 Notice 96/C200/04
21
Notice 96/C200/07
Communication to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes which 
Member States are invited to establish in the framework of a Community Interreg initiative 
concerning the transitional cooperation on spatial planning (INTERREG IIC )
OJ No C200 p. 23, 1996/07/10
22
397Y0927(02)
Notice to the Member States laying down the list of new areas of France eligible pursuants to the 
Community initiative concerning the conversion of the defence industry (Konver)
OJ No C294 p. 9, 1997/09/27
23 Notice to the Member States laying down the list of new areas of the United Kingdom eligible under the Community initiative concerning the conversion of the defence industry (Konver)
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OJ No C074 10/3/98, p. 8
24
398Y0326(01)
Communication from the Commission to the Member States on the links between regional and 
competition policy
REINFORCING CONCENTRATION AND MUTUAL CONSISTENCY 
Official journal NO. C 090 , 26/03/1998 P. 0003
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Annex 7.2.: The timetable of the accession negotiations
Table 1: Progress in the accession negotiations according to the policy chapters
POLICY AREA ADOPTION OF 
THE 
NEGOTIATION 
POSITION BY 
THE COUNCIL 
OF MINISTERS 
OF POLAND
HANDING 
OVER OF THE 
POSITION TO 
THE 
EUROPEAN 
UNION
OPENING OF 
NEGOTIATIONS
PROVISIONAL 
CLOSURE OF 
THE 
NEGOTIATIONS
1. Free movement of 
goods
26.01.99 29.01.99 21.06.99 29.03.01
2. Free movement of 
persons
27.07.99 30.07.99 26.05.00 21.12.01
3. Freedom to provide 
services
13.07.99 15.07.99 12.11.99 14.11.00
4. Free movement of 
capital
13.07.99 15.07.99 30.09.99 21.03.02
5. Company law 10.12.98 11.12.98 19.05.99 28.11.01
6. Competition Policy 26.01.99 29.01.99 19.05.99 20.11.02
7. Agriculture 09.12.99 16.12.99 14.06.00 13.12.02
8. Fisheries 11.02.99 12.02.99 19.05.99 10.06.02
9. Transport Policy 13.07.99 15.07.99 12.11.99 10.06.02
10. Taxation 19.10.99 22.10.99 07.12.99 21.03.02
11. Economic and 
monetary union
26.01.99 29.01.99 30.09.99 07.12.99
12. Statistics 10.12.98 11.12.98 19.04.99 19.04.99
13. Employment and 
social policy
25.05.99 31.05.99 30.09.99 01.06.01
14. Energy 25.05.99 31.05.99 12.11.99 27.07.01
15. Industrial policy 27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 19.05.99
16. Small and medium­
sized enterprises
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 29.10.98
17. Science and 
research
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 29.10.98
18. Education, training 
and youth
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 29.10.98
19.
T elecommunications 
and information 
technologies
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 19.05.99
20. Culture and 
audiovisual policy
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 04.12.00
21. Regional policy 
and co-ordination of 
struc tu ra l instrum ents
23.11.99 30.11.99 06.04.00 01.10.02
22. Environment 05.10.99 08.10.99 07.12.99 26.10.01
23. Protection of 
consumer and health
10.12.98 11.12.98 19.04.99 19.05.99
24. Justice and Home 
affairs
05.10.99 08.10.99 26.05.00 30.07.02
25. Customs union 10.12.98 11.12.98 19.05.99 29.03.01
26. External relations 10.12.98 11.12.98 19.05.99 12.11.99
27. Common foreign 
and security policy
27.08.98 01.09.98 29.10.98 06.04.00
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28. Financial control 03.08.99 06.08.99 06.04.00 14.06.00
29. Financial and 23.11.99 30.11.99 26.05.00 13.12.02
budgetary provisions
30. Institutions 22.04.02
Source: www.negocjacje.gov.pl
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Annex 7.3.: Organizational structure of the funds distribution system
Framework Document Content Co-ordinating 
and Managing 
Authorities
Source of 
financing
National Development Plan Poland’s regional policy Prepared and co­
ordinated by the 
Ministry of 
Economy, adopted 
by the Council of 
Ministers
Domestic funds,
co-financing
funds,
Structural
Funds,
Cohesion Fund 
and other
Community Support 
Framework
Regional policy co-financed 
by the Structural Funds
CSF Managing 
Authority: 
Ministry of 
Economy
Structural funds 
+ description of 
Cohesion Fund, 
domestic co­
financing
SOP
Improvement 
Competitiveness of 
the Economy
R&D sector, Innovation, 
Industry and services (trade) 
Promotion of investments 
Promotion of exports 
Domestic activities -  
tourism and cultural 
heritage
Ministry of 
Economy
ERDF, 
domestic co­
financing
SOP
Human Resources 
Development
Education 
Long-life learning 
Fighting unemployment
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy
ESF, domestic 
co-financing
SOP
Restructuring and 
Modernisation of 
Agriculture and 
Development of the 
Rural Areas
Creation of jobs outside 
agricultural sector 
Modernisation of food 
sector’s manufacturing 
potential
Investment in farms
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development
EAG G F- 
Guidance 
Section, 
domestic co­
financing
SOP
Fisheries and fish 
processing industry
Modernisation of fishing 
fleet
Modernisation of fish 
processing industry 
Other activities in fishery- 
dependant coastal zone
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development
FIFG, domestic 
co-financing
SOP
Transport
Domestic transport 
infrastructure (domestic 
roads, bridges, ring roads, 
agglomeration problems)
Ministry of 
Infrastructure
ERDF, 
domestic co­
financing
360
Integrated
Regional
Development
Operational
Programme
(composed of 16
sub-programmes)
Regional and local activities 
in the areas:
1) technical and social 
infrastructure
2) entrepreneurship 
promotion, support for 
SMEs
3) activities 
supplementary to 
domestic activities 
related to human 
resources development 
and education
4) tourism and cultural 
heritage
Ministry of 
Economy
(some management 
functions delegated 
to the voivod and 
marshal offices)
ERDF, ESF 
EAG G F- 
Guidance 
section, 
domestic co- 
financing : 
central, local 
self-government 
units, other
Technical Support Support for programmes’ 
preparation and 
implementation
Ministry of 
Economy
ERDF
Cohesion Fund Spatial cohesion of Europe, 
support for large Europe- 
wide projects
coordination - 
Ministry of 
Economy
Cohesion Fund, 
domestic co­
financing
Environmental
Protection
Large environmental 
projects
Ministry of 
Environment
Cohesion Fund, 
domestic co­
financing
Transport Trans-European networks 
(roads, railroads)
Ministry of 
Infrastructure
Cohesion Fund, 
domestic co- 
fmancing
Community Initiatives Variety of structural 
activities essential for the 
whole EU
Co-ordinated by the 
European
Commission and the 
Managing Authority 
responsible for CSF 
-  Ministry of 
Economy
ERDF,
EAGGF, ESF
LEADER Rural development Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development
EAGGF-
Guidance
section
URBAN Social and economic 
restructuring of urban areas
Ministry of 
Infrastructure 
(Housing and Urban 
Development 
Office)
ERDF
INTERREG Cross-border co-operation, 
co-operation between towns 
and regions and in the area 
of spatial planning
Ministry of 
Economy
ERDF
EQUAL Promotion of equal 
opportunities on the labour 
market
Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy
ESF
Source: National Development Plan for 2004-2006
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Annex 7.3.: Regional diversity in Poland
Table 1: Regional Disparities in the EU 25 in 2003 (in PPS, EU 25=100)
The ten highest GDP regions The ten lowest GDP regions
1 Inner London (UK) 278 1 Lubelskie (PL) 33
2 Bruxelles-Capitale (BE) 238 2 Podkarpackie (PL) 33
3 Luxembourg 234 3 Podlaskie (PL) 36
4 Hamburg (DE) 184 4 Swi^tokrzyskie (PL) 37
5 lie de France (FR) 173 5 Warminsko-Mazurskie (PL) 37
6 Wien (AT) 171 6 Opolskie (PL) 37
7 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire&Oxfordshire UK) 165 7 Eszak Magyaroszag (HU) 38
8 Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (IT) 160 8 Vychodne Slovensko (SK) 39
9 Oberbaryern (DE) 158 9 Eszag-Alfold (HU) 39
10 Stockholm (SE) 158 10 40
Source: Eurostat 63/2006
Graph 1: GDP per capita by voivodships in 2003
15,0 17.0 19,2 21,0 23,8 32,8
Source: GUS 2006
80,4%
TYSiACE ZLOTYCH
THOUSAND ZLOTYS
362
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Stephanie la Barth - European Commission, Delegation to Poland, Phare Task Manager -  
Interview in May 2003
Artur Bartoszewicz - adviser on EU affairs of the Polish Confederation of Private 
Employers "Lewiatan" - Interview in December 2005
Casto Lopez Benitez - European Commission, DG Fisheries -  Interview in October 2003
Kazimierz Dettlaff -  the President of the Fish Producers Organization in Wladyslawowo -  
Interview in September 2008
Peter Droell -  Member of Poland’s Team in the European Commission, DG Enlargement -  
Interview in October 2003
Marta Garcia-Fidalgo - European Commission, DG Enlargement -  Interview in October 
2003
Pawel Gras - the Key Expert in Fisheries from the Department of Support of Accession 
Negotiations in the Office of the Committee of European Integration - Interview in May 
2003
Grzegorz Gruca - the Board Member of Polish Humanitarian Action (NGO) - Interview in 
March 2006.
Justyna Janiszewska -  the Secretary General of the Grupa Zagranica (NGO) -  Interview in 
April 2006
Malgorzata Kaluzynska - the Director of the Regulations Department (in 2006-2008) in 
the Ministry of Economy -  Interview in August 2008.
Lech Kempczynski - Director of the Department of Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development in May 2003 -  Interview in May 2003
Michal Kulesza -  the Government Plenipotentiary for the Territorial Reform -  Interview in 
May 2003
Arkadiusz Lewicki -  the Adviser to the President of the Polish Banks Association on the 
EU affairs -  Interview in December 2006
Jaroslaw Mulewicz - the Member of the Establishes' Board of BCC, member of the 
Economic and Social Committee of the European Union - Interview in March 2006.
Piotr Necel - the President of the Association of Maritime Fishermen, President -  
Interview in September 2008
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Tomasz Nowakowski - the Director of the Department of Support for the Committee of 
European Integration (in 2001-2004) at the Office of the Committee of European 
Integration -  Interview in September 2008.
Jerzy Safader - the President of the Polish Association of Fish-processing Industry -  
Interview in August 2008
Patrycja Sawicz - the Political Advisor to the Secretary of State in charge of Fisheries at 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - Interview in March 2006.
Piotr Serafin - Interview with the Director of the Analytical Unit in the Department of 
Support for Accession Negotiations -Interview in March 2006.
Jerzy Skiba -  the President of the National Association of Tobacco Producers -  Interview 
in September 2008
Justyna St^pien -  the PR Director of the Polish Humanitarian Action (NGO) -  Interview in 
April 2006
Dirk Swillens - PHARE Country co-ordinator & National programmes EU Commission, 
Enlargement, Directorate A -  Interview in October 2003
Anna Tuz -  the Deputy Director of the Department of Social Communication and 
European Information in the Office of the Committee for European Integration -  Interview 
in May 2003
Piotr Zuber -  the Director of Department of Co-ordination of Structural Policy in the 
Ministry of Economy -  Interview in May 2003
Zbigniew Zurek - with the Deputy President of BCC and from March 2006 with a member 
of the Establishes' and Organizers' Board of BCC, member of the Economic and Social 
Committee of the European Union -  Interview in January 2006
364
r
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(1963). Act of 21 May 1963 on sea fishery. O.J. 1963.22.114-115.
(1976). Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 
200-mile fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977 O. J. C 105 . 
07/05/1981.
(1977). Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of 
the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis 
of assessment. OJ L 145. 13.6.1977: 0001 - 0040.
(1984). Regina v Kent Kirk Reference for a preliminary ruling: Crown Court, Newcastle-upon- 
Tyne - United Kingdom. - Reference for a preliminary ruling - Sea fisheries - National measure 
restricting access. Case-63/83, European Court of Justice.
(1986). Asociacion Profesional de Empresarios de Pesca Comunitarios (Apesco) v Commission 
of the European Communities. - Fisheries - System of lists introduced by the Act of Accession of 
Spain and Portugal to the European Communities - Discrimination. Case-207/86. European 
Court of Justice.
(1986). Commission Decision No 2064/86/ECSC of 30 June 1986 establishing Community rules 
for State aid to the coal industry O J L 177 .01.07.1986: 0001 - 0009.
(1987). Completing the Internal Market - the introduction of a VAT clearing mechanism for a 
VAT clearing mechanism for intra-Community sales, Working Document from the Commission. 
COM(87)323final. OF 05/08/87.
(1987). Proposal for a Council Directive completing and amending Directive 77/388/EEC 
Removal of fiscal frontiers COM(87)322final. OJ C 252, 22.9.1987.
(1989). Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the 
Republic of Hungary and the Polish People's Republic
(1990). Act of 8 March 1990 on the Local Government. O.J. 1990.16.95.
(1990). Act of 24 February 1990 on combating monopolistic practices. OJ 1997.49.318 with 
amendments
(1991). Act of 12 January 1991 on local taxes and fees,. O.J. 1991.9.31 as amended.
(1991). Act of 21 March 1991 on the Maritime Territory and Maritime Administration of the 
Republic of Poland. O. J. 1991.32.131.
365
(1991). Act on State Treasury control. O.J. 1991.76.442. as amended.
(1991). Council Directive 91/.680/EEC of 16 December 1991 supplementing the common system 
of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view to the abolition of fiscal 
frontiers. OJ L 376. 31.12.1991: 1-19
(1991). Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part, from 16 
December 1991.
(1992). Act on regional settlement chambers. OJ. 1992.85.428. as amended.
(1992). Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for 
products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such products. 
OJ L 76. 23.3.1992: 1-13.
(1992). Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992 supplementing the common system of 
value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC (approximation of VAT rates). OJ L 316. 
31.10.1992: 1-4.
(1992). Council Directive 92/79/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes. OJ L 316. 31.10.1992: 8-9
(1992). Council Directive 92/80/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes. OJ L 316. 31.10.1992: 10-11.
(1992). Council Directive 92/111/EEC of 14 December 1992 amending Directive 77/388/EEC 
and introducing simplification measures with regard to value added tax. OJ L 384. 30.12.1992: 
47-57.
(1992). Council Regulation (EEC) No 3759/92 of 17 December 1992 on the common 
organization of the market in fishery and aquaculture products. O. J. L 388. 31.12.1992
(1992). Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community 
system for fisheries and aquaculture OJ L 389 31.12.1992
(1992). Treaty on European Union, Consolidated Version. Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 
1992
(1993). Act of 8 January 1993 on tax on goods and services and excise Duty. O.J. 1993.11.50.
(1993). Act of 16 April 1993 on combating unfair competition. O. J. 1993.47.211.
(1993). Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system 
applicable to the common fisheries policy. OJ L 261 20.10.93 1.
366
(1994). Act of 10 June 1994 on public procurement. O.J. 1994.76.344. as amended.
(1994). Act of 20 October 1994 on the Special Economic Zones. O.J. 1994.123.600. as amended.
(1994). Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 of May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund. 
OJ L 130. 25.5.1994: 1-13.
(1995). Act of 5 January 1995 on subsidizing interest on some bank loans. O. J. 1995.13.60.
(1995). Act on employment and counteracting unemployment. O.J. 1995.1.1. as amended.
(1995). Act on the Supreme Control Chamber. O.J. 1995.13.59. as amended.
(1995). Council Directive 95/59/EC of 27 November 1995 on taxes other than turnover taxes 
which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco. OJ L 291. 06.12.1995: 0040-0045.
(1996). Act of 8 August 1996 on the Committee of European Integration. O.J. 96.106.494 
amended bv O.J. 01.154.1800.
(1996). A Common System of VAT: a programme for the Single Market. COM(96)328 final.
(1996). Council Regulation (EC) No 2406/96 of 26 November 1996 laying down common 
marketing standards for certain fishery products O. J. L 334. 23.12.1996
(1996). Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronny Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd., Reference for a 
preliminary ruling: Hogsta Domstolen - Sweden. Case C-43/95. European Court of Justice.
(1996). Description of the General Principles, Commission Services technical note. 
XXI/1156/96.
(1996). Law of 18 January 1996 on Maritime Fisheries. OJ. 1996.34.145.
(1997). Commission Communication on the method of application of Article 92 (3)(a)(c) of the 
EC Treaty to national regional aid OJ C 198. 28.6.1997.
(1997). Community framework for State aid to motor vehicle industry. OJ C 279. 15.09.1997.
(1997). The Constitution of the Republic of Poland. O.J. 1997.78.483.
(1997). Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, Meeting within the Council of 1 December 1997 on a code of conduct for business 
taxation. OJ C 2 6.1.98.
(1997). Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 13 from 25 February 1997 on the rules of 
work of the Council of Ministers. M.P. 1997.15.144.
367
(1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and related acts. O J C 340. 10 November 1997.
(1997). Zarz^dzenie nr 3 Przewodnicz^cego Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej z dnia 9 wrzesnia 
1997 r. w sprawie powolania Rady ds. Strategii Informacyjnej.
(1998). Act of 5 June 1998 on Voivodship self-government. O.J. 1998.91.576. as amended.
(1998). Act of 18 December 1998 on amendment of the act on the governmental departments. 
O.J. 1998.162.1122.
(1998). Act of 26 November 1998 on income of territorial self-government units. O.J. 
1998.150.983. as amended.
(1998). Act of 26 November 1998 on public finance. O.J. 1998.155.1014 as amended.
(1998). Act on government administration in the voivodship. O.J. 1998.91.577.
(1998). Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation. OJ C 384. 10.12.1998: 3-9.
(1998). Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 
93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal State 
aid O J L 142. 14.05.1998: 1-4
(1998). Euroregiony bez tajemnic. Prawo i gospodarka.
(1998). Information from the Commission - Guidelines on national regional aid. OJ C 74. 
10.3.1998:9-18
(1998). Ordinance of the Minister of Finance of 16 December 1998 on excise duty. O. J. 
1998.157.1035.
(1998). Rozporz^dzenie Rady Ministrow z dnia 24 marca 1998 r. w sprawie ustanowienia 
Pelnomocnika Rzadu do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europeiskiei. O. J. 98.39.225.
(1998). Uchwala Zespolu Negocjacyjnego do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej z dnia 5 maja 1998 roku w sprawie ustalenia 
regulaminu pracy Zespolu Negocjacyjnego do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej.
(1998). V Regional Forum. Warsaw, 4 September 1998.
(1998). Wystapienie Jana Kulakowskiego, Sekretarza Stanu w Kancelarii Prezesa Rady 
Ministrow, Pelnomocnika Rzadu ds. Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w
368
Unii Europejskiej. 8 posiedzenie Senatu RP. Warszawa, Monitor Integracji Europejskiej nr. 18,
1998.
(1998). Zarz^dzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrow z dnia 27 marca 1998 r. w sprawie Zespolu 
Negocjacyjnego w Sprawie Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej. P-121-19-98.
(1999). Act of 20 November 1999 amending the Act on Tax on Goods and Services and Excise 
Duty. O.J. 1999.95.1100.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in 
the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty. OJ L 83. 27.3.1999: 1-9.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999 on support for rural 
development from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and 
amending and repealing certain Regulations. OJ L 160. 26.6.1999: 80-102
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions 
on the Structural Funds. OJ L 161. 26.6.1999: 1-42.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 1264/1999 of 21 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1164/94 establishing a Cohesion Fund. OJ L 161. 26.6.1999: 57-61.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 establishing a list of types of 
behaviour which seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy. O C L 167.2. 7.
1999.
(1999). Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed 
rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries 
sector(amended by Regulation (EC) No 179/2002) O.J.L337. 30.12.1999 10
(2000). Act of 15 December 2000 on competition and consumer protection. O J 2000.122.1319 
as amended.
(2000). Act of 16 November 2000 on amendment of the act on the special economic zones. O.J. 
2000.117.1228.
(2000). The Act of 20 July 2000 on amendment of the act on the value added tax, excise tax and 
fiscal fees. O. J. 2000.68.805.
(2000). Act of 26 October 2000 on the method of calculating the value of the annual gross 
domestic product. O.J. 2000.114.1188.
369
(2000). Act of 30 June 2000 on the conditions for admissibility and supervising of state aid for 
entrepreneurs. O.J. 2000.60.704.
(2000). Commission Regulation (EC) No 1924/2000 of 11 September 2000 laying down detailed 
rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 as regards the grant of specific 
recognition to producers' organizations in the fisheries sector in order to improve the quality of 
their products. O. J. L 230. 12.9.2000.
(2000). Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common 
organization of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products O. J. L 17. 21.1.2000.
(2000). Law of 12 May 2000 on the principles of support for regional development. O.J. 
2000.48.550.
(2000). Law of 13 October 2000 on amendment of the law on financing of territorial self- 
government O J 2000.95.1041.
(2000). Ordinance of 13 July 2000 on implementation of Territorial Unit Nomenclature for 
Statistical Purposes (NTS). O.J. 2000.58.685.
(2000). Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 1 August 2000 on the public statistical research 
programme. O.J. 2000.79.888.
(2000). Ordinance of the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction (MRRiB) of 17 
August 2000 on the mode of appointment of the social and economic partners' representation. 
O.J. 2000.68.810.
(2000). Sejm o Integracji Europejskiej. Warszawa, Kronika Sejmowa Nr 108 (412) III kadencja.
(2000a). Uchwala Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w sprawie przygotowan do czlonkostwa 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej. Monitor Polski Nr 6, poz. 124.
(2000b). Uchwala Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych i Integracji Europejskiej Senatu
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 31 marca 2000 r. w sprawie
przygotowan do czlonkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej.
(2001). Act on the Tripartite Commission for the Socio-Economic Matters and the voivodship 
commissions of social dialogue. O.J. 100.1080.154.
(2001). Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the management 
and control systems for assistance granted under the Structural Funds. OJ L 63. 3.3.2001: 21-43.
(2001). Commission Regulation (EC) No 448/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules 
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the procedure for
370
making financial corrections to assistance granted under the Structural Funds. OJ L 64. 6.3.2001: 
13-15.
(2001). Law of 6 September 2001 on Maritime Fisheries. O.J. 2001.129.1441.
(2001). Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 20 February 2001 on the regional assistance for 
enterprises. O.J. 2001.28.306.
(2002). Act of 10 October 2002 on fish market organization and amendment of the maritime 
fisheries law. Q.J.2002.181.1514.
(2002). Act of 27 July 2002 on conditions of admissibility and monitoring of state aid to 
enterprises O J 2002.141.1177
(2002). Action brought on 3 December 2002 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against the Republic of Finland. Case C-437/02. ECJ.
(2002). Action brought on 11 September 2002 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against Ireland. Case C-317/02. ECJ.
(2002). Action brought on 24 July 2002 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against the Kingdom of Sweden. Case C-271/02. ECJ.
(2002). Council Directive 2002/10/EC of 12 February 2002 amending Directives 92/79/EEC, 
92/80/EEC and 95/59/EC as regards the structure and rates of excise duty applied on 
manufactured tobacco. OJ L46. 16.2.2002: 26-28.
(2002). Council Regulation (EC) 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy.
(2002). Council Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 of 20 December 2002 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2792/1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community 
structural assistance in the fisheries sector. O J L 358 31.12.2002: 49.
(2002). Council Regulation (EC) No 2370/2002 of 20 December 2002 establishing an emergency 
Community measure for scrapping fishing vessels. OJ L358 31.12.2002: 57.
(2002). Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 5 February 2002 on the enactment of the 
Common Commission of the Territorial Self-government and Government OJ 2002.13.124
(2002). Resolution of the Council of Minister No 49 from 19 March 2002 on the rules of work 
of the Council of Ministers. M.P.2002.13.221
(2003). Act of 2 October 2003 on amendment of the act on the special economic zones. OJ. 
2003.188.1840.
371
(2003). Action brought on 29 July 2003 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against the Portuguese Republic. Case C-332/03. ECJ.
(2003). Community Support Framework ‘Promoting economic growth and an environment for 
job creation’. Brussels-Warsaw, Council of Ministers.
(2004). Act of 11 March 2004 on tax on goods and services and excise duties. O.J. 2004.54.535. 
(2004). Act of 24 May 2004 on the National Development Plan. O.J. 2004.116.1206.
(2004). Act of 29 January 2004 on Public procurement rules. O.J. 2004.19.177.
(2004). Act of 30 April 2004 on proceeding with matters related to State aid O.J. 2004.123.1291. 
(2004). Act on fishery. O. J. 2004.62.573-574: 3647.
(2004). Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of 
the EC Treaty. OJ L 140. 30.04.2004: 1-134.
(2004). Ordinance of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of 11 August 2004 on 
the Sectoral Operational Programme "Fisheries and Fish-processing for 2004-2006". O. J. 
2004.197.2027
(2006). Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 of 27 July 2006 on the European Fisheries Fund. 
O J L 223 15.8.2006.
(2007). Commission Regulation (EC) No 804/2007 of 9 July 2007 establishing a prohibition of 
fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea (Subdivisions 25-32, EC Waters) by vessels flying the flag of 
Poland. O. J.L180 10.7.2007.
(2007). Directive of the Minister of Maritime Economy from 31 July 2007 on appointment of the 
Maritime Economy Team. O. J. of the Ministry of the Maritime Economy from 1 October No. 2 
issue 4.
(2007). Poland v Commission. Case T-379/07. ECJ.
Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal (2000). "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." 
International Organizations 54(3): 421-56.
Ambroziak, A. (2003). Problem udzielania pomocy publicznej w Specjalnych Strefach 
Ekonomicznych w ramach negocjacji Polski o czlonkowstwo w UE, (ed.), : . Okresv
przeisciowe w Traktacie o przvstanieniu Polski do Unii Europejskiej. E. Kawecka- 
Wyrzykowska. Warszawa, Katedra Integracji Europejskiej, SGH.
372
Anon. (1991). Revised Forecast. Presentation on Eastern Europe. 
http://www.pmdocs.com/PDF/2500058044 8090.PDF. June 6, 1991.
Apanowicz, P. (2001). Najwazniejsze jest rozpoznanie. Rzeczpospolita. Warszawa. 123(5896): 
B8.
Apanowicz, P. (2002). Bylismy dobrze przygotowani do negocjacji. Rzeczpospolita. Warszawa: 
29.07.02.
Arato, A. (1991). Social Theory, Civil Society, and the Transformation of Authoritarian 
Socialism. Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe. A. Arato and F. Feher. New Brunswick, 
Transaction Publishers.
Armstrong, H. and P. Taylor (2000). Regional Economics and Policy. 3rd edition. Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers.
Armstrong, H. W. (1978). "Community Regional Policy: A Survey and Critique." Regional 
Studies 12(5).
Artis, M. and S. Ostry (1986). International economic policy coordination. London Routledge & 
Kegan Paul: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Avery, G. (1995). "The Commission's Perspective on the EFTA Accession Negotiations." SEI 
Working Paper No. 12.
Avery, G. (2003). Lessons and Consequences of EU Enlargement.
Bachtler, J. (1997). Instrumenty Polityki Rozwoju Regionalnego. Ekspertyza [Regional 
development policy instruments in the European Union. An expert report]. Warszawa, Task 
Force for Structural Policy in Poland.
Baka, W. (1992). Polska reforma gospodarcza. Warszawa, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo 
Ekonomiczne.
Balcerowicz, L. (1992). 800 Dni. Szok Kontrolowanv. Warszawa, Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza 
"BGW".
Banasinski, C., T. Biriczycka-Majewska, et al. (2003). Costs and Benefits of Poland's 
Membership in the European Union. Warsaw, Centrum Europejskie Natolin.
Bannerman, E. (2002). The Future of EU Competition Policy. London, Centre for European 
Reform.
Barkas, M. (2000). Chcq zwrocic uwag§ rzqdu, Rybacy na redach Kurier Szczecinski. Szczecin. 
25.09.2000.
373
Barnes, I. and C. Randerson (2006). "EU enlargement and the effectiveness of conditionality: 
keeping the deal?" Managerial Law 48(4): 351-65.
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1999). Economic Growth. The MIT Press.
Bauer, P. T. (2000). From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.
Berkowska, E. (2008). "Wspolna Polityka Rybolowstwa a potrzeby i oczekiwania polskiego 
sektora rybolowstwa." Analizv BAS 4(4): 2-6.
Bernhard, M. (1996). "Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-communist 
Democratization in Poland and Beyond." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29(3): 309- 
330.
Bielecki, J. (2002). Polska-UE Specialne Strefy Ekonomiczne, Ust^pstwa z obu stron. 
Rzeczpospolita. Warszawa: 23 maja 2002.
Bilal, S. and P. Nicolaides (1999). Understanding state Aid Policy in the European Union, 
perspectives on Rules and Practice. Netherlands, European Institute of Public Administration.
Blew^ska, J. (2006). Co czeka specjalne strefy ekonomiczne? Gazeta Wvborcza. Warszawa: 
06.02.2006.
Boeckhout, S., L. Boot, et al. (2002). Key indicators for Candidate Countries to Effectively 
Manage the Structural Funds. Rotterdam, NEI Regional and Urban Development.
Bolkestein, F. (2001). The future of European tax policy. Tax Policy in the European Union, 
Rotterdam, 18.10.2001, Speech/01/470.
Borzel, T. and T. Risse (2000). "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic 
Changes." European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 4(15).
Borzel, T. A. (2003). Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why there is (not) a 
'Southern Problem'. Aldershot, UK, Ashgate.
Borzel, T. A. and T. Risse (2003). Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe. The Politics 
of Europeanization. K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bronk, R. (2002). "Commitment and Credibility, EU Conditionality and Interim Gains." El 
Working Paper. London: European Institute. LSE.
Brown, J. (2006). Fishing Capacity Management in the EU post 2002 CFP Reform. London, 
IEEP.
374
: Buchanan, J. (1975). The Samaritan's dilemma. Altruism. Morality, and Economic Theory. E. 
Phelps. New York, Russel Sage Foundation: pp. 71-85.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (1997). "Aid, Policies, Growth." Washington. DC: World Bank: 
Policy Research Working Paper 1(777).
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (1998). Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction. Working 
Paper. Macroeconomics and Growth Group. World Bank.
Caporaso, J. A. and D. P. Levine (1992). Theories of political economy. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
CASE (2004). The Comparative Analysis of State Aid and Government Policy in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic Warsaw, Center for Social and Economic Research.
Castle, M. and R. Taras (2002). Democracy in Poland. Colorado, Oxford, Westview Press.
CBOS (2002). Poparcie dla Integracji Polski z Unia Europejska. Komunikat z Badan. Warszawa, 
Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej.
CBOS (2004). Zaufanie w Sferze Publicznej i Prywatnej. Komunikat z Badan. Warszawa, 
Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej.
CBOS, (2005). Polska, Europa, 6wiat. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.
Checkel, J. T. (2000). "Compliance and Conditionality." Arena Working paper WP 00/18.
Chrzan, M. and K. Niklewicz (2007). Bruksela nadal nam nie pozwala lowic dorsza. Gazeta 
Wvborcza. 26.09.2007.
Club of Investors in the Special Economic Zones (2002). Investment conditions in the SEZ -  
Letter to the Under-secretary of State Jaroslaw Pietras, Warsaw, 28 March 2002
Cnossen, S. (2003). Special Report, Cigarette taxation: issues for EU accession countries. 
International Tax & Investment Center and Oxford Economic Forecasting November 2003.
Collier, P. (1997). The Failure of Conditionality. Perspectives on Aid and Development. E. Berg, 
M. Bruno, M. Collier, M. Ravallion and L. Squire. Washington, DC, Overseas Development 
Council.
Collier, P., D. Dollar, et al. (2000). Fifty Years of Development, World Bank.
Conference on Accession (1998). European Union general position for the Accession Conference 
with Poland. CONF-PL 2/98.
375
Conference on Accession (1999). European Union Common Position, Chapter 6: Competition 
Policy, 12 May 1999. CONF-PL 18/99.
Conference on Accession (1999a). European Union Common Position, Chapter 10: Taxation, 30 
November 1999. CONF-PL 57/99.
Conference on Accession (1999b). European Union Common Position Chapter 8: Fisheries, 15 
April 1999. CONF-PL 10/99.
Conference on Accession (2000). European Union Common Position Chapter 21: Regional 
Policy and coordination of structural instruments, 22 March 2000. CONF-PL 13/00.
Conference on Accession (2000a). European Union Common Position Chapter 21 (Replaces doc. 
200088/00 CONF-PL 13/00), 1 December 2000. CONF-PL 75/00.
Conference on Accession (2000b). Draft European Union Common Position Chapter 6: 
Competition Policy, 28 January 2000. 5722/00.
Conference on Accession (2000c). European Union Common Position Chapter 6: Competition 
Policy, 7 February 2000. CONF-PL 5/00.
Conference on Accession (2000c). European Union Common Position, Chapter 10: Taxation, 27 
September 2000. CONF-PL 57-00.
Conference on Accession (2000d). European Union Common Position Chapter 8: Fisheries 
(Replaces doc 20065/99 CONF-PL 10/99), 4 October 2000. CONF-PL 60/00.
Conference on Accession (2001). European Union Common Position Chapter 6: Competition 
Policy, 21 November 2001. CONF-PL 102/01.
Conference on Accession (2002). European Union Common Position, Chapter 10: Taxation, 7 
March 2002. CONF-PL 13/02.
Convent of Marshals (2006). Stanowisko w sprawie utrzymania dotychczasowego systemu 
dotacji inwestycyjnych dla MSP. Lublin
Copenhagen Economics (2007). Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the 
Member States of the European Union, Final report, European Commission DG TAXUD, 6503.
Council of Europe (1985). European Charter of Local Self-government. European Treaty Series 
No. 122. Strasbourg.
Council of Ministers (1996). Rozwoj Regionalny Polski 1990-1995, Raport Diagnostyczny. 
Warszawa, Zespol Zadaniowy ds. Polityki Regionalnej w Polsce.
376
Council of Ministers (1999). Poland's Negotiation Position in the area of "Competition Policy", 
CONF-PL 2/99.
Council of Ministers (1999). Stanowisko Negocjacyjne w obszarze "Polityka regionalna i 
koordynacja instrumentow strukturalnych", CONF-PL 58/99.
Council of Ministers (2000). Odpowiedz na Wspolne Stanowisko Negocjacyjne Unii 
Europejskiej w obszarze "Polityka regionalna i koordynacja instrumentow strukturalnych", 
CONF-PL 43/00.
Council of Ministers (2002). The Report on the Results of the Negotiations about Poland's 
Membership in the European Union. Warsaw, December 2002.
Cox, T. M. and B. Mason (2000). "Interest Groups and the Development of Tripartism in East 
Central Europe." European Journal of Industrial Relations 6(3): 325-347.
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (2002). Funds and Games, the 
Economics of European Cohesion Policy.
Cremona, M. (2003). The Enlargement of the European Union. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Cunningham, S. and T. Bostock (2005). Successful Fisheries Management. Delft, Eburon 
Academic Publishers.
Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe. London, Chatto&Winds.
de la Fuente, A. (2000). Convergence across countries and regions: theory and empirics. 
European Investment Bank Conference on Economics and Finance: Regional development 
policy and convergence in the EU., Unitat de Fonaments de l'Analisis Economica,, Departament 
d'Economia i Historia Economica Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
de Tocqueville, A. (1998). Democracy in America. Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Etitions Limited.
Dehejia, V. H. and P. Genschel (1998). "Tax Competition in the European Union." MPIfG 
Discussion Paper 98(3).
Diamond, L. (1996). Toward Democratic Consolidation. The Global Resurgence of Democracy. 
L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner. Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L. and M. F. Plattner (1996a). The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diaz, A. C. F. (1984). "IMF Conditionality: What Kind?" PIPE Tidings(January-February): 7-9. 
Dinan, D. (1994). Ever Closer Union. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
I Dobbin, F. (1994). Forging Industrial Policy: The United States. Britain and France in the 
Railway Age. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Dollar, D. and J. Svensson (2000). "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural 
Adjustment Programs." Economic Journal 1 lO(October): pp. 894-917.
Domanski, M., A. Tomaszewski, et al. (2001). Ekspertyza dotycz^ca 5-letniego okresu 
przejsciowego w odniesieniu do art. 2 dyrektywy Rady 92/79/EWG w celu stosowania 
minimalnego udzialu podatku akcyzowego nizszego niz 57% maksymalnej ceny detalicznej 
papierosow. Gdansk, Instytut Badan nad Gospodark^ Rynkow^.
Donigiewicz, A. (2004). Informacja o wynikach kontroli przygotowania polskiego rybolowstwa 
morskiego do integracji z Uni^Europejsk^. Szczecin, Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli,.
Drazen, A. (2001). Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy 
Approach. Second Annual IMF Research Conference, Washington, DC.
Dreher, A. (2002). "The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank 
Conditionality." HWWA Discussion Paper. Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
Druckman. D. (1978). Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual Responsiveness. The 
Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications. W. Zartman. Beverly Hills, Sage.
Dunin-Wasowicz, M. (2004). Europe and the Fifth Enlargement. Warsaw, Wyzsza Szkola 
Handlu i Finansow Miedzynarodowych.
Dziennik Baltycki (2007). Rybacy blokowali port w Gdyni, a Komisja i tak nie zmieni decyzji w 
sprawie dorsza. 18.09.2007. Gdansk.
Dziennik Baltycki (2007a). Zast?pca dyrektora do spraw naukowych Morskiego Instytutu 
Rybackiego w Gdyni Zbigniew Kamicki podal si? do dymisji. 26 wrzesnia 2007. Gdansk.
Easterly, W. (2001). The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures 
in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Easterly, W. (2006). The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done So Much 111 and So Little Good. New York, Penguin Press HC.
Edmondson, R. (1997). Introduction: the context of collective political action. The Political 
Context of Collective Action: Power. Argumentation and Democracy. R. Edmondson. London, 
Routledge.
Edmondson, R. (1997). The Political Context of Collective Action: Power, argumentation and 
democracy. London, Routledge.
378
tEdwards, J. and M. Keen (1996). "Tax competition and Leviathan." European Economic Review 
40: 113-34.
Ekiert, G. (1998). Legacies of Struggle and Defeat. Transition to Democracy in Poland. R. F. 
Staar. Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press Ltd.
Ekiert, G. and J. Kubik (1998). "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-1993." World Politics 50(4): 667-91.
Ekiert, G. and J. Kubik (1999). Rebellious Civil Society. Michigan, University of Michigan.
Emilewicz, J. and A. Wolek (2002). Reformatory i politvcv: Gra o reformy ustroiowa roku 
1998 widziana oczami iei aktorow. Nowy Sacz - Krakow, Wyzsza Szkola Biznesu National - 
Luis University.
Erbas, N. (2003). IMF Conditionality and Program Ownership: A Case for Streamlined 
Conditionality. IMF Working Paper. Middle Eastern Department.
Etmanowicz, J. (2002). Zmiany w polskim systemie podatkowym w zwiazku z planowanym 
wejsciem Polski do Unii Europejskiej. Polska a Wspolnota - Qpracowania. RCIE. Lodz, UKIE.
European Commission (1995). White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union COM(95) 163.
European Commission (1996). Taxation in the European Union. SEC(96) 487 final. Brussels, 
20.03.1996.
European Commission (1997). Towards tax co-ordination in the European Union, A package to 
tackle harmful tax competition, Communication. COM(97) 495 final. Brussels, 01.10.1997.
European Commission (1997a). A package to tackle harmful tax competition in the European 
Union, Communication. COM(97) 564 final. Brussels, 05.11.1997.
European Commission (1997b). Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application 
for Membership of the European Union. DOC/97/16. Brussels.
European Commission (1997c). Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union. Bulletin of 
European Union. Supplement 5/97.
European Commission (1998). 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's progress 
towards accession. Brussels.
European Commission (1998a). Sixth survey on State aid in the European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other sectors. Brussels, COM (98) 417.
379
European Commission (1999). 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's progress 
towards accession. Brussels.
European Commission (1999a). Poland, Accession Partnership 1999. Enlargement DG. Brussels.
European Commission (1999b). Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation and 
the Development of the Regions of the European Union. Brussels.
European Commission (1999c). Draft Common Position - Poland - Chapter 10: Taxation, 19 
November 1999.
European Commission (2000). 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's progress 
towards accession. Brussels.
European Commission (2000a). Accession Negotiations - Poland - Draft Common Position. D. 
Enlargement.
European Commission (2000b). Enlargement Strategy Paper - Report on progress towards 
accession by each of the Candidate Countries. CQM(2000) 700 final. Brussels.
European Commission (2000c). Eight survey on State aid in the European Union. Brussels, 
COM (2000)205 final.
European Commission (2001). Making a Success of Enlargement. COM (2001) 700 final. 
Brussels, 13.11.2001.
European Commission (2001a). Tax policy in the European Union - Priorities for the years 
ahead, Communication. CQM(2001) 260 final. Brussels, 23.5.2001.
European Commission (2001b). 2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's progress 
towards accession. Brussels.
European Commission (2001c). Information Note on Chapter 21 "Regional policy and co­
ordination of structural instruments" of enlargement negotiations. SEC(2001) 1904. Brussels.
European Commission (200Id). Green paper on the future of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
CQM(200n 135 final. Brussels, 20.03.2001.
European Commission (200 le). Accession Negotiations, Progress Report. Negotiation Chapter 8 
Fisheries. Brussels, DG Enlargement.
European Commission (2001f). Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Structure and Rates of the Excise Duty Applied on Cigarettes and Other 
Manufactured Tobacco Products. COM (2001) 133 final. Brussels.
380
European Commission (2002). 2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession. 
CQM(2002) 700 final. Brussels.
European Commission (2002a). Discussion points, Technical meeting with the candidate 
countries, Chapter 21: Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments.
European Commission (2002b). Chapter 21 Regional policy and co-ordination of structural 
instruments, Technical meeting with Candidate Countries, Discussion points. Warsaw, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
European Commission (2002c). European Commission comments on Draft Operational 
Programs Poland 2004-2006. DG. REGIO. 12 November 2002.
European Commission (2002d). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, A Strategy for the Sustainable Development of European Aquaculture. 
Brussels.
European Commission (2003). Communication of the Commission: Structural and Cohesion 
Funds: Acceding countries need to further strengthen their administrative capacity. Brussels.
European Commission (2003a). Communication from the Commission - Compliance with the 
rules of the Common Fisheries Policy - "Compliance work plan and scoreboard". Brussels.
European Commission (2004). VAT rates applied in the Member States of the European 
Community. DQC/2008/2004 - EN. Brussels, DG TAXUD.
European Commission (2004a). Enlargement of the European Union, Guide to the Negotiations, 
Chapter by Chapter. DG Enlargement. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.
European Commission (2004b). Report State Aid scoreboard. Brussels, COM 2004 (256) final.
European Commission (2005). State Aid Action Plan. SEC(2005) 795- CQM(2005) 107 final. 
Brussels, DG Competition.
European Commission (2007). VAT reduced rates: Commission launches a political debate on 
how to simplify current EU legislation, Press Release. IP/07/1017. Brussels, 5 July 2007.
European Commission (2007a). Communication on VAT reduced rates - FAQ MEMQ/07/277. 
Brussels, 5 July 2007.
European Commission (2007b). Vademecum on State Aid Rules. Brussels, DG Competition. 
European Council in Copenhagen (1993). 21-22 June, Conclusions of the Presidency.
European Council in Lisbon (2000). 23-24 March, Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon.
381
European Council in Santa Maria Da Feira (2000). Report from the ECOFIN Council to the 
European Council on the Tax Package, Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV.
European Council in Stockholm (2001). 23-24 March 2001, Presidency Conclusions. Stockholm.
European Parliament (1998). The Phare Programme and the Enlargement of the European Union. 
Briefing Note No 33. Luxembourg, Secretariat Working Party Task Force "Enlargement".
European Parliament (1998). Tax competition in the European Union, Working Paper. ECON - 
105 EN. Economic Affairs Series. Luxembourg, December 1998.
Eurostat (2007). Fishery statistics, data 1990-2006. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities.
Falkner, G., M. Harlapp, et al. (200). "Opposition through the Backdoor? The Case of National 
Non-Compliance with EU Directives." Reihe Politikwissenschaft Political Science Series 83.
Forbrig, J. (2002). "Spoleczenstwo Obywwatelskie, Polska, jej sasiedzi i Europa Zachodnia - 
porownanie." Raportv i Analizv. Center for International Relations 6/02.
Fomalczyk, A. (1998). Pomoc publiczna dla przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europeiskiei i w Polsce. 
Warszawa, UKIE.
Fomalczyk, A. (1998a). Rodzaje, formy i instrumenty pomocy publicznej w Unii Europejskiej. 
Pomoc publiczna dla przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europeiskiei i w Polsce. A. Fomalczyk. Warszawa, 
UKIE.
Fratczak-Rudnicka, B. (2003). Organizacje pozarzadowe i spoleczenstwo obywatelskie. 
Demokracia Polska 1989-2003. W. e. al. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.
Frey, B. S. and R. Eichenberger (1996). "To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question." 
Journal of Public Economics 60: pp. 335-49.
Friis, L. (2005). The European Union's enlargement negotiations with EFTA and central and 
eastern Europe. European Union Negotiations: Processes. Networks and Institutions. C. Joensson 
and O. Elgstroem. London, Ney York, Routledge.
Friis, L. and A. Jarosz (2000). "When the Going Gets Tough - the EU’s Enlargement 
negotiations with Poland." Journal of European Integration 23(1): 29-61.
Fuchs, J. (2000). Fisheries research organizations and research programmes in the European 
Union, Iceland, Israel and Norway. DG Fisheries. European Commission. Luxembourg.
Fundacja Malych i Srednich Przedsiebiorstw (2006). Bariery utrudniajace korzystanie z 
funduszy Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
382
Ganev, V. I. (2005). "The "Triumph of Neoliberalism" Reconsidered: Critical Remarks on Ideas- 
Centered Analyses of Political and Economic Change in Post-Communism." East European 
Politics and Societies 19(3): 343-378.
Gawlikowska-Hueckel, K. and M. Dutkowski (2000). Polska Regionow. Gdansk, Instytut Badan 
nad Gospodarka Rynkowa.
Gazeta Prawna (2007). Wiele przepisow nadal oczekuje na dostosowanie, Trzy lata po 
przyst^pieniu do Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
Gazeta Wyborcza (2006a). Powstanie "morskiego" resortu przes^dzone.
Gazeta Wyborcza (2007). Prezes zwi^zku rybakow wiceministrem gospodarki.
Geremek, B. (1996). Civil Society Then and Now. The Global Resurgence of Democracy. L. 
Diamond and M. F. Plattner. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.
Getimis, P. and D. Economou (1996). Greece. Policy Networks and European structural Funds: 
A Comparison Between European Union Member States. H. Heinelt and R. Smith. Brookfield 
USA, Avebury.
Gibson, C. C., K. Andersson, et al. (2005). The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of 
Development Aid. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Gibson, J. L. (1998). Social Networks and Civil Society in Process of Democratization. Studies 
in Public Policy. Centre for the Study of Public Policy University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 301.
Gilowska, Z. (2000). Pozadanv mechanizm wvkorzvstania srodkow pomocowvch Unii 
Europeiskiei do wspierania rozwoiu regionalnego. Gdansk, Instytut Badan nad Gospodarka 
Regionow.
Gilowska, Z. (2001a). Preferencje spoleczne - preferencje wladzy. Polityka regionalna panstwa 
posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Gilowska, Z. (2001b). Mozliwosci i bariery prowadzenia polityki regionalnej. Polityka 
regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno-regionalnvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Gilowska, Z. (2001c). Reforma finansow publicznych. Reforma tervtorialnei organizacii kraiu: 
dwa lata doswiadczeri. G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki and M. Stec. Warszawa, Scholar.
Gilowska, Z. and W. Misiag (2000). Dostosowanie dochodow samorzadu tervtorialnego do norm 
konstvtucvinvch i standardow europeiskich. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Glinski, P., B. Levenstein, et al. (2003). Samoorganizacia spoleczenstwa polskiego: trzeci sektor. 
Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN.
383
Goetz, K. H. (2001). "Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, 
Europeanization or Latinization?" Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 1032-1051.
Goetz, K. H. and S. Hix (2000). Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National 
Political Systems. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.
Gojtkowski, J. (1999). Wojna morska. Unia & Polska. 6.
Gomiak, J. and J. Jerschina (1995). From Corporatism to ... Corporatism: The Transformation of 
Interest Representation in Poland Strategic Choice and Path-Dependencv in Post-Socialism : 
Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process. J. Hausner, B. Jessop and N. Klaus, 
Brookfield, Vt: E. Elgar.
Grabbe, H. (1999). "A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the 
Central and East European Applicants." Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper. European 
University Institute 12/99.
Grabbe, H. (2001). Heading for a Big Bang. London, Centre for European Reform.
Grabbe, H. (2001a). "How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, 
diffusion and diversity." Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 1013-1031.
Grabbe, H. (2002). "Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession 
Process." Paper for ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Turin.
Grabbe, H. (2002a). "European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire." 
International Political Science Review 23(3): 249-68.
Grabbe, H. (2004). "Poland: The EU's New Awkward Partner." CER Bulletin Issue 34.
Grabbe, H. (2006). The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Gras, A. (2001). Przewodnik po Wspolnei Politvce Rybolowstwa. Warszawa, UKIE.
Gray, J. (1994). "Post-Communist Societies in Transition: A Social Market Perspective." The 
Social Market Foundation(Paper No. 18).
Green Cowles, M. and T. Risse (2001). Transforming Europe: Conclusions. Transforming 
Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. G. M. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse. Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press: 217-237.
Grosse, T. G. (2000). Polityka regionalna Unii Europeiskie i iei wplvw na rozwoi gospodarczv. 
Przvklad Grecii. Wloch. Irlandii i wnioski dla Polski. Warszawa, Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
384
Grosse, T. G. (2003). Zmierzch decentralizacii w Polsce? Polityka rozwoiu w woiewodztwach w 
kontekscie integracii europeiskiei. Warszawa, Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
Grosse, T. G. (2004). "Stan przygotowan administracji regionalnej do wykorzystania pomocy 
strukturalnej UE." Analizv i Qpinie. ISP 18.
Grosse, T. G. (2005). "Ocena projektu Narodowego Planu Rozwoju na lata 2007-2013." Instytut 
Spraw Publicznych. Analizv i Qpinie 31/2005.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994). The politics of free trade agreements Discussion 
Paper Series No 908. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Gumkowska, M. and J. Herbst (2005). Podstawowe Fakty o Organizacjach Pozarzadowych - 
Raport z Badania "Kondycja sektora organizacji pozarzadowych w Polsce". Warszawa, 
Klon/Jawor Association.
Gzel, M. (2002). Przygotowanie polskiej administracji centralnej i terenowej do realizacji 
Wspdlnej Polityki Rybolowstwa.
www.cie.gov.pl/fundusze/kondanreg/gdansk_mat/adm_wpr.pdf.
Hagan, R. (2003). "Europe's New Common Fisheries Policy." Ocean Law On-Line Papers 20.
Hall, P. A. (1986). Governing the Economy. New York, Oxford University Press.
Hall, P. A. and R. Taylor (1996). "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." 
MPIFG Discussion Paper 96/6.
Hallerberg, M. (1996). "Tax Competition In Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the 
European Union " World Politics 48(3): 324-57.
Hancher, L. (1998). Przedstawienie rozwoju prawodawstwa w zakresie pomocy panstwa - 
artykul 92. Pomoc panstwa w Unii Europeiskiei: rozwoi prawa i polityki. K. Kopytko. Lodz, 
Instytut Europejski.
Hanna, S. S. (1995). "User participation and fishery management: performance within the Pacific 
Fishery Management Council." Ocean & Coastal Management 28(1-3): 23-44.
Hausner, J. (2001). Mechanizm polityki regionalnej. Polityka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan 
instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Hausner, J., B. Jessop, et al. (1995). Institutional Change in Post-Socialism. Strategic Choice and 
Path-Dependencv in Post-Socialism Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process. J. 
Hausner, B. Jessop and N. Klaus, Brookfield, Vt: E. Elgar.
385
Hausner, J. and M. Marody (2000). The quality of governance. Poland Closer to the European 
Union? Krakow, Malopolska School of Public Administration, Cracow University of Economics, 
Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung.
Hausner, J., O. K. Pedersen, et al. (1995a). Evolution of Interest Representation and 
Development of the Labour Market in Post-Socialist Countries. Cracow, Cracow Academy of 
Economics, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Haverland, M. (2000). "National adaptation to European integration: the importance of 
institutional veto points." Journal of Public Policy 20(1): 83-103.
Hedley, C. (2002). "Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, The Commission’s Reform 
Package " International Fisheries Bulletin. Focus 4.
Held, D. (1987). Models of Democracy. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
Heritier, A. (1995). 'Leaders' and 'Laggards' in European Clean Air Policy. Convergence or 
Diversity? Internationalization and Economic Policy Response. F. van Waarden and B. Unger. 
Avebury, Aldershot: 278-305.
Hill, C. (2002). The Geo-Political Implications of Enlargement. Europe unbound: enlarging and 
reshaping the boundaries of the European Union. J. Zielonka. New York, Routledge.
Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action. Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell.
Howard, M. M. (2003). The weakness of civil society in Post-Communist Europe. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, J. (2003). "EU Enlargement Conditionality and Coercive Europeanization in the Central 
and Eastern European Transition States." Department of Government. LSE. Working Paper.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2001). "Top Down Policies and Bottom Up Reactions." ESRC ‘One 
Europe or Several?' Working Paper 29/01.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2002). The Ambivalence of Conditionality: Europeanization and 
Regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe. ECPR Joing Sessions, Workshop 4: Enlargement 
and European Governance, Turin, 22-27 March 2002.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2003). "EU Enlargement and Power Asymmetries: Conditionality 
and the Commission's Role in Regionalisation in Central and Eastern Europe." ESRC "One 
Europe or Several?" Programme. Working Paper 49/03.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2003a). EU Enlargement, Europeanisation and the Dynamics of 
Regionalisation in the CEECs. The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe:
386
Territorial Restructuring and European Integration. M. Keating and J. Hughes. Paris, P.I.E.-Peter 
Lang.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2004). Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement 
to Central and Eastern Europe. The Myth of Conditionality. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Hughes, J., G. Sasse, et al. (2004a). "Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward 
Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government." Journal of 
European Public Policy 42(3): 523-51.
Hyvarinen, M. (1997). The merging of context into collective action. The Political Context of 
Collective Action. R. Edmondson. London, Routledge.
IMF (2000). Streamlining Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs, Interim 
Guidance Note.
IMF (2001a). Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programmes - Policy Issues.
IMF (2001b). Structural Conditionality in Fund-supported Programmes, Policy Development and 
Review Department, International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2001c). Streamlining Structural Conditionality: Review of Initial Experience, Policy 
Development and Review Department.
IMF (2002). Guidelines on Conditionality, Legal and Policy Development and Review 
Departments.
IMF (2002a). IMF Conditionality: A Factsheet.
Imiolczyk, B. and J. Regulski (2007). Samorz^dnosc i demokracja lokalna. Warszawa, 
Doswiadczenie i Przyszlosc.
Institute for European Environmental Policy (2003). CFP Reform 2002: Assessing the 2002 
Reforms. Briefing No. 10, January 2003.
Institute for European Environmental Policy (2004). Progress on EU Stock Recovery Plans. CFP 
Developments. Briefing No. 19, IEEP.
Instytut Spraw Publicznych (1998). Oczekiwania Polakow wobec negocjacji z Uni^Europejsk^. 
Warszawa, ISP.
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2003). Environmental Status of the 
European Seas. ICES Report Prepared for the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Copenhagen, ICES.
387
Italian Irish and Dutch Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (2004). A 
Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Impact Assessment in ten EU Countries. Dublin, A Report 
prepared for the EU Directors of Better Regulation Group: May 2004.
Jacoby, W. (2004). The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Ordering from the 
Menu in Central Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Jasiecki, K., M. Moleda-Zdziech, et al. (2000). Lobbing. Krakow, Dom Wydawniczy ABC.
Jaworki, K. (2003). "Organizacja rybolowstwa morskiego i rynku rybnego." ARR Biuletvn 
Informacvinv 7(145).
Jesien, L. (2000). Information Note on the consultations in the "Fisheries" area carried out on 15 
November 2000 in Brussels. PM Chancellery.
Johnson, J. H. and S. S. Wasty (1999). Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs and the 
Political Economy of Reform. World Bank Discussion Papers 316/1999.
Jupille, J. and J. A. Caporaso (1999). "Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond 
International Relations and Comparative Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 2: pp. 
429-44.
Kancelaria Lukowicz Swierzewski i Wspolnicy (2007). Analiza wybranych aktow prawnych pod 
katem ich wykorzystania w procesie konsultacji spolecznych w ramach dobrych praktyk 
regulacyjnych. Warszawa, Raport dla Ministerstwa Gospodarki.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1978). Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced 
Industrial States. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). The Culture of National Security. New York, Columbia University 
Press.
Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, E. (1998). Wdrazanie przez Polske zobowiazan przvietvch w Ukladzie 
Europeiskim. Warszawa, Instytut Koniunktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego.
Keating, M. (1995). Europeanism and Regionalism. The Eurepean Union and the Regions. B. J. 
a. M. Keating. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Keating, M. (1998). The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change. Cheltenham, Massachusetts, Edward Elgar Ltd.
Keating, M. and L. Hooghe (1996). By-passing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy 
process. European Union: Power and Policy-making. J. Richardson. London, Routledge.
Kemmerling, A. and E. Seils (forthcoming). "Managing conflict in Corporate Tax Competition 
between EU Member States." West European Politics 32(4).
388
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Keohane, R. O. and H. V. Milner (1996). Internationalization and domestic politics. Cambridge; 
New York, Cambridge University Press.
Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye (1977). Power and Interdependence. Boston, Little, Brown.
Khan, M. S. and S. Sharma (2001). IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs. 
South Asia Network of Economic Institutes (SANEI) Third Annual Conference, New Delhi, 
India, IMF Institute.
KIE (1997). Narodowa Strategia Integracji. Warszawa, Komitet Integracji Europejskiej,.
KIE (1998). Wytyczne do negocjacji w sprawie czlonkowstwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej 
(mandat negocjacyjny). Ryszard Czamecki - Przewodnicz^cy Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, 
16 marca 1998. No 239/98.
KIE (1999). Program Informowania Spoleczenstwa. Warszawa, Komitet Integracji Europejskiej.
KIE (1999a). Sprawozdanie z Dzialalnosci Pelnomocnika Rzadu do Spraw Negocjacji o 
Czlonkostwo Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej za 5 lutego - 31 grudnia 1998. 
Warszawa, Komitet Integracji Europejskiej.
Killick, T., R. Gunatilaka, et al. (1998). Aid and the political economy of policy change. London, 
Routledge.
Klasik, A. (2001). Uwarunkowania instytucjonalne polityki regionalnej panstwa i polityki 
rozwoju regionalnego wojewodztw. Polityka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan 
instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Knill, C. and D. Lehmkuhl (1999). "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization." European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 3(7).
Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (1998). "Compliance with Europe: The Implementation of EU 
Environmental Policy and Administrative Traditions in Britain and Germany." Journal of 
European Public Policy 5(4): 597-616.
Koc, J. and A. Grabarczyk (2007). Ministrowie finansow Unii Europejskiej: VAT na polsk^ 
zywnosc i ksi^zki nie wzrosnie. Dziennik. 5.12.1007.
Kohler-Koch, B. (1996). "Catching up with change: the tranformation of governance in the 
European Union." Journal of European Public Policy 3(3): 359-80.
389
Kohler-Koch, B. (2002). "European Networks and Ideas: Changing National Policies?" 
European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 6.
Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (1992). Konflikty w nowej Polsce. Gazeta Wvborcza. Warszawa.
Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (1990). "Civil Society and Social Anomy in Poland." Acta Sociologica 
33(4): 277-88.
Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (1994). Aspirations. Values and Interests. Warsaw, IFiS Publishers.
Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (2003). "The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East 
Central Europe: The Case of Poland." East European Politics and Societies 17(1): 91-98.
Kolegium Europejskie, -. N. (1999). Negociacie Akcesvine. Wnioski z doswiadczen Grecii. 
Hiszpanii i Portugalii. Warszawa.
Kolegium Europejskie, -. N. (1999a). Negociacie Akcesvine. Wnioski z doswiadczen Austrii. 
Finlandii. Norwegii i Szwecii. Warszawa.
Kooiman, J. (2005). Governing as Governance. London, Sage Publications.
Kopytko, K. (1998). Pomoc panstwa w Unii Europeiskiei: rozwoi prawa i polityki. Lodz, Instytut 
Europejski.
Korkut, U. (2005). The position of interest groups in Eastern European democracies, maturing 
servicemen of Trojan horses? Democracy and the Role of Associations Political, organizational 
and social contexts. S. Rossteutscher. London and New York, Routledge.
KPMG (2005). Study on the collection and interpretation of data concerning the release for 
consumption of cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco for the rolling of cigarettes, the final report. 
Brussels, KPMG, Tax Advisers CVBA for DG TAXUD.
KPMG (2007). Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne - Badanie edycja 2007. Warszawa.
KPRM (1998). Partnerzy Spoleczni. CONA - Zespol Pelnomocnika Rz^du do spraw Negocjacji 
o Czlonkowstwo RP w Unii Europejskiej.
KPRM (1998a). Ujawnianie stanowiska negocjacyjnego - scenariusze, mozliwosci i zagrozenia. 
Pelnomocnik Rz^du do Spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo RP w Unii Europejskiej Jan 
Kulakowski.
KPRM (1998b). Identyfikacja problemow negocjacyjnych - znaczenie dla kampanii 
informacyjnej. CONA - Zespol Pelnomocnika Rz^du do spraw Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo RP 
w Unii Europejskiej, 13.11.1998.
390
KPRM (1999). Metodologia informowania o negocjacjach w kontekscie regionalnym. Centrum 
Obslugi Negocjacji Akcesyjnych - Zespol Pelnomocnika Rzqdu ds. Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo 
RP w Unii Europejskiej.
KPRM (2000). Komunikat po KIE. Warszawa, 13.03.2000.
Kramer, M. (2002). "Collective protests and democratization in Poland 1989-1993: was civil 
society really "rebellious"?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 35: 213-21.
Krasner, S. D. (1978). United States Commercial and monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox 
of External Strength and Internal Weakness. Between Power and Plenty. P. J. Katzenstein. 
Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.
Krasnicki, A. (2007). Polscy rybacy zlamiq dzis zakaz polowu dorszy. Gazeta Wyborcza.
17.09.2007.
Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and Trade. Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Krynska, E. (2000). Polskie specialne strefy ekonomiczne - zamierzenia i efektv. Warszawa, 
UW, Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
KSPT (2000). Notatka ze spotkania KSPT z wicedyrektorem DONA, UKIE w dniu 27.10.2000. 
Kraiowe Stowarzvszenie Przemvslu Tvtoniowego. Warszawa.
KSPT (2000a). Notatka ze spotkania grupy roboczej KSPT z przedstawicielami UKIE w dniu
16.11.2000. Kraiowe Stowarzvszenie Przemvslu Tvtoniowego. Warszawa.
Kubik, J. (1994). "The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: the Rise of Solidarity 
and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland."
Kudlacz, T. (2001). Rozwoj regionalny Polski lat 90.- ocena dominujacych procesow oraz 
spodziewanych tendencji. Polityka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno- 
regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Kulakowski, J. (2001). Notatka dla Pana Premiera Jerzego Buzka na temat postulatow zmiany 
stanowisk negocjacyjnych. Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrow - Pelnomocnik Rzqdu do Spraw 
Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo RP w Unii Europejskiej, 23 marca 2001 r.
Kumar, K. (1993). "Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term." The 
British Journal of Sociology 44(3): 375-395.
Kuzmicz, M. (2006a). Zgoda rzqdu i samorzqdu? Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa.
Kuzmicz, M. and L. Kostrzewski (2006). Niewydolny SIMIK potrzebuje wsparcia. Gazeta.pl. 
Warszawa.
391
Lece, E. and S. Nalecz (2002). Potencjal ekonomiczny i spoleczny sektora non-profit w Polsce. 
Wybrane wyniki badan miedzynarodowych sektora non-profit. Samoorganizacia spoleczenstwa 
polskiego: trzeci sektor. P. Glinski, B. Lewenstein and A. Sicinski. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo 
Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN.
Leonardi, R. (2005). Cohesion Policy in the European Union, The building of Europe. Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Lewis, P. G. (1990). Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern Europe, St. Martin's Press.
Lippert, B., G. Umbach, et al. (2001). "Europeanization of CEE executives: EU membership 
negotiations as a shaping power." Journal of European Public Policy 8(6): 980-1012.
Litwinczuk, H. (2005). "Obszary niezgodnosci polskich przpisow z regulacjami unijnymi." 
Prawo i Podatki.
Maciejewicz, P. (2006). Patologie specjalnych stref ekonomicznych. Gazeta Wyborcza. 
Warszawa: 17.04.2006.
Maciejewicz, P. (2006a). SSE powstanie tarn gdzie zechce inwestor. Gazeta Wyborcza. 
Warszawa: 12.11.2006.
Maciejewicz, P. (2006b). Zabory wci^z nas dziel^. Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa: 14.02.2006.
Mandelkem Group on Better Regulation (2001). Final Report. 13 November 2001.
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1984). "The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in 
Political Life." The American Political Science Review 78(3).
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1984). "The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in 
Political Life." The American Political Science Review 78(3): 734-749.
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics. New York, Free Press.
Marek, D. and M. Baun (2002). "The EU as a Regional Actor: The Case of the Czech Republic." 
Journal of Common Market Studies 40(5): 895-919.
Maresceau, M. (2003). Pre-accession. The Enlargement of the European Union. M. Cremona. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Marins, M. R. and J. Mawson (1980). "The Evolution of EEC Regional Policy: Additionality in 
the Scottish Coalfields." Local Government Studies 6(4).
392
Marks, G. (1993). Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. The State of the 
European Community: The Maastricht debates and Beyond. Vol.2. A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal. 
London, Longman.
Marks, G., L. Hooge, et al, (1996). "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric versus 
Multi-level Governance." Journal of Common Market Studies 34(3): pp.29-56.
Marks, G., F. W. Scharpf, et al. (1996). Governance in the European Union London. Sage 
Publications L td ..
Martin, L. (2000). Agency and Delegation in IMF Conditionality. IMF Papers.
Martin, R. (1998). Regional policy in the EU: economic foundations and reality Brussels, Centre 
for European Policy Studies.
Martini, J. and L. Karpiesiuk (2006). "Niezgodnosci polskich przepisow dotyczacych odliczania 
oraz zwrotow podatku naliczonego z VI Dyrektywa." Prawo i Podatki.
Mastenbroek, E. and M. Reading (2006). "Europeanization Beyond the Goodness of Fit: 
Domestic Politics in the Forefront." Comparative European Politics 4: 331-54.
Mayhew, A. (1998). "Membership Negotiations and Preparation for Accession: Preparation of 
EU and CEEC Institutions for the Accession Negotiations." SIGMA Papers 
CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA(98)39.
Mayhew, A. (1998a). Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Mayhew, A. (2002). Rozszerzenie Unii Europeiskiei: analiza negocjacji akcesvinvch z 
panstwami kandvduiacvmi z Europv Srodkowei i Wschodniei. Warszawa, Urzad Komitetu 
Integracji Europejskiej.
Mayhew, A. (2002a). "The Negotiation Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the 
Structural Funds and the EU Budget." SEI Working Paper No 52.
Mazurkiewicz, P. (2005). Czy warto wstapic do organizacji pracodawcow? Gazeta Wyborcza. 
Warszawa.
Mersh, D., B. Elisabeth, et al. (2002). Historical Institutionalism: Beyond Pierson and Skocpol. 
Harvard University.
Migalski, M. (2003). Proces integracji Polski z Unia Europejska w programach komitetow 
wyborczych. Wvborv parlamentame 2001. J. Sztumski and M. Kolczynski. Katowice, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slackiego.
393
Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests. Institutions and Information. Domestic Politics and International 
Relations. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Milner, H. V. (1998). "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, 
American, and Comparative Politics." International Organization 42d(4).
Milner, H. V. and P. B. Rosendorff (1997). A Model of Two-Level Game. Interests. Institutions 
and Information. H. V. Milner. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Milward, A. (1984). The Reconstruction of Western Europe. 1945-51. Berkeley, University of 
California Press.
Ministerstwo Finansow (2003). Strategia podatkowa, materialy do dyskusji. Warszawa. 
Ministerstwo Finansow (2004). Strategia podatkowa. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2002). Harmonogram przygotowania Narodowego Planu Rozwoju na 
lata 2004-2006. Warsaw.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2002a). Zarys planu dzialan na rzecz zwi^kszenia potencjalu 
administracyjnego Polski do sprawnego zarz^dzania fiinduszami strukturalnymi i Funduszem 
Spojnosci - projekt z 8.09.2002.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2002b). Raport z przebiegu procesu dostosowan instytucjonalnych w 
administracji rzadowej szczebla centralnego dla absorpcji fimduszy strukturalnych i Funduszu 
Spojnosci. O. 2002.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2005a). Raport na temat wdrazania Narodowego Planu Rozwoju 
2004-2006. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2005b). Pierwszy okres wykorzystania Funduszy Strukturalnych w 
Polsce. Raport IZ PWW. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (2007). Informacja o realizacji ustawy o specjalnych strefach 
ekonomicznych, stan na 31 grudnia 2006. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki, i. P. (2005c). Specjalne strefy ekonomiczne, stan na dzieh 31 grudnia 
2004 r. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Gospodarki Morskiej (2006). Raport roczny o polskiej flocie rybackiej w 2006 
roku. D. Rybolowstwa.
Ministerstwo Infrastruktury (2002). Raport o stanie gospodarki morskiej. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2000). Narodowa Strategia Rozwoju Regionalnego 2001- 
2006. Warszawa.
394
Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2005). Program naprawczy zwi^kszajqcy absorpcj? 
funduszy strukturalnych w ramach Narodowego Planu Rozwoju 2004-2006. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2005a). Raport koncowy z ewaluacji, Analiza wybranych 
elementow systemu implementacji ZPORR pod kqtem okreslenia potencjalu regionow do 
wdrozenia zdecentralizowanego systemu zarzqdzania RPO. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2006). Raport na temat stanu wdrazania programow 
operacyjnych wspolfinansowanych z funduszy strukturalnych Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2008). Wykorzystanie srodkow z funduszy strukturalnych 
i Funduszu Spojnosci w ramach NPR 2004-2006 oraz NSRR 2007-2013. Warszawa, 
Departament Koordynacji i Zarzqdzania Podstawami Wsparcia Wspolnoty,.
Mission of the Republic of Poland to the European Union (2000).
Moravcsik, A. and A. Vachudova (2003). "National Interests, State Power, and EU 
Enlargement." East European Politics and Societies 17(1): 42-57.
Nicolaides, P. (1999). "Enlargement of the EU and Effective Implementation of Community 
Rules: An Integration-Based Approach." EIPA Working Paper 99/W/04.
Niklewicz, K. (2002). SSE - koniec negocjacji juz 31 lipca br.? Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa:
17.06.2002.
Niklewicz, K. (2002a). Dlaczego firmy inwestujqce w specjalnych strefach ekonomicznych 
muszqznowu placic podatek od nieruchomosci. Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa: 13.07.2002.
Niklewicz, K. (2002b). Czym SSE sq dla gospodarki. Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa: 04.04.2002.
Niklewicz, K. (2002c). Specjalne Strefy Ekonomiczne, Inwestorzy grozq odwetem. Gazeta 
Wyborcza. Warszawa: 8-9 czerwca 2002.
Niklewicz, K. (2002d). Polska - UE, Cd. klopotow ze strefami specjalnymi. Gazeta Wyborcza. 
Warszawa: 15.05.2002.
Niklewicz, K., M. Chrzan, et al. (2007). Baltycka wojna o dorsza. Gazeta Wyborcza: 10.10.2007.
NOMISMA (2000). The consequences of rapid alignment to the EU's minimum tax on cigarettes 
in five Accession countries. Bologna, Italy, Institute of Economic Research.
North, D. D. (1990). Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York, 
Cambridge University Press.
395
Nowicki, M. and B. Kosciukiewicz (2002). Polityka spojnosci Unii Europeiskiei w latach 2007- 
2013: Glos polskich regionow. Gdansk, IBnGR.
OBOP (2002). Rybolowstwo polskie w kontekscie integracji z UE Warszawa.
OBOP Communique (2000). Ocena Negocjacji Akcesyjnych oraz Nadzieje i Obawy Zwiazane z 
Wejsciem Polski do Unii Europejskiej.
O'Donnell, G. and P. C. Schmitter (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Olgstroem, O. and C. Joensson (2005). European Union Negotiations Processes. Networks and 
Institutions. New York, Routlage.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods an the Theory of Groups. 
Harvard University Press.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1998). Preparing public 
administrations for the European Administrative Space.
Orfowski, W. M. (1998). Droga do Europy. Makroekonomia wstepowania do Unii Europeiskiei. 
Lodz, Instytut Europejski.
Ost, D. (2005). The Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Post-communist Europe. New 
York, Cornell University Press.
Ozog, I. (2002). Odpowiedz podsekretarza stanu w Ministerstwie Finansow - z upowaznienia 
prezesa Rady Ministrow - na interpelacj? nr 1697 w sprawie podatku akcyzowego na wyroby 
tytoniowe z 29 lipca 2002 r.
Paczynska, A. (2005). "Inequality, Political Participation, and Democratic Deepening in Poland." 
East European Politics and Societies 19(4): 573-613.
Padgett, S. (2000). "Collective Action in Post-Communist Society: The Impact of Structural 
Context." Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics 114.
PAP (2005). Budzet UE 2007-13 UE/ KE daje Polsce wi^cej czasu na skladanie rozliczeri za rok 
2005.
PAP (2005a). Pilarczyk: Wstqpienie do UE ulatwia restrukturyzacj? floty rybackiej.
PAP (2007). Komisarz UE grozi Polsce procedure karnq. 10.10.2007.
PAP (2007a). Sztab Kryzysowy Rybolowstwa poparl zakazane przez KE polowy dorsza.
24.09.2007.
396
Parulski, S. and E. Lis (2006). Podatek akcyzowy. Bankier.pl.
Paszynski, M. (1998). "Formula Akcesji - Potrzeba uznania rownowagi interesow." Wspolnotv 
Europejskie 7-8((83-84)).
Pawlicki, J. (2002). Negocjacje z Uni^ o przyszlosci SSE. Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa:
17.04.2002.
Peers, S. (1995). "An ever closer waiting room?: the case for Eastern European accession to the 
European Economic Area." Common Market Law Review 32(1).
Peet, R. (2003). Unholy Trinity, the IMF, World Bank and WTO. London, New York, Zed 
Books.
Pelowski, W. (2006). PiS dla sciany wschodniej. Gazeta Wyborcza. Warszawa. 23.
Peters, G. B. (1999). Institutional Theory in Political Science, the 'New Institutionalism'. 
London, Pinter.
Pierson, P. (1996). "The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis." 
Comparative Political Studies 29(2): 123-163.
Pierson, P. and T. Skocpol (2002). Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. 
Harvard University.
PKPP (2002). Negotiations with the EU on the special economic zones. J. T. Chief Negotiator. 
Warsaw.
PM Chancellery (1998). Poland's negotiation position in the area of: Fisheries Government 
Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations in the European Union. 11 February 1998
PM Chancellery (1999). Poland's negotiation position in the area of: Regional policy and co­
ordination of structural instruments, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession 
Negotiations in the European Union. 23 November 1999.
PM Chancellery (2000). Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, Reply to 
European Union Common Position, Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession 
Negotiations about Poland's Membership in the European Union. 6 July 2000.
PM Chancellery (2000a). Information Note on the consultations in the "Competition policy" area 
carried out on 21 June 2000 in Brussels, Secretariat of the Government Plenipotentiary for 
Accession Negotiations.
PM Chancellery (2000b). Answers to the European Commission's Queries Concerning the 
Negotiation Position on Taxation. Secretary of State, Government's Plenipotentiary for the 
Negotiations about Poland's Membership in the European Union, Warsaw, 27 April 2000.
397
PM Chancellery (2001). Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, Reply to 
European Union Common Position, Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession 
Negotiations about Poland's Membership in the European Union. 5 February 2001.
PM Chancellery (2001a). Information note on the technical consultations on the "Competition 
policy" conducted on 22 May 2001 in Warsaw. Department of Integration and Negotiations with 
the European Union.
PM Chancellery (2001b). Addendum to Poland's negotiation position in the area of Fisheries, 
Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations about Poland's Membership in 
the European Union. 6 February 2001.
PM Chancellery (2001c). Amendment to Poland's negotiation position in the area of Fisheries, 
Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations about Poland's Membership in 
the European Union. 16 October 2001.
PM Chancellery (200Id). Amendment to Poland's negotiation position in the area of Taxation. 
Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations about Poland's Membership in 
the European Union, 29 March 2001.
PM Chancellery (2001e). Amendment to Poland's negotiation position in the area of Taxation. 
Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations about Poland's Membership in 
the European Union, 23 December 2001.
PM Chancellery (2002). Materials for the Technical Meeting with the EU Commission on 18 
February 2002, Regional Policy and co-ordination of structural instruments.
PM Chancellery (2002a). Amendment to Poland's negotiation position in the area of Fisheries. 
Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations about Poland's Membership in 
the European Union, 9 April 2002.
Podlasiak, Z. (1998). Regionalna pomoc publiczna w Unii Europejskiej. Pomoc publiczna dla 
przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europeiskiei i w Polsce. A. Fomalczyk. Warszawa, UKIE.
Podlasiak, Z. (1998a). Analiza porownawcza pomocy publicznej w Polsce i w krajach 
czlonkowskich Unii Europejskiej. Pomoc publiczna dla przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europeiskiei i w 
Polsce. A. Fomalczyk. Warszawa, UKIE.
Podlasiak, Z. (1998b). Pomoc publiczna a efektywnosc wykorzystania zasobow. Pomoc 
publiczna dla przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europeiskiei i w Polsce. A. Fomalczyk. Warszawa, UKIE.
POHiD, Polska Organizacja Handlu i Dystrybucji (2002). Memorandum on competition. 
Secretary of State, Danuta Huebner, UKIE. Warsaw, 14 June 2002
398
Polak, J. J. (1991). The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality. Essays in International Finance 
No. 184. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University.
Polish Marine Fishery Science Center, M. I. R. (2005). Quality of Life and Management of 
Living Resources Programme. Mi^dzyzdroje, May 2005.
Pollack, M. A. (1993). Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and 
Implementation of EC Structural Policy. The State of the European Union Vol. 3. C. M. Rhodes. 
London, Longman.
Pollit, C. (2001). "Convergence: The Useful Myth?" Public Administration 79(4): 933-47.
Pomeroy, R. and F. Douvere (2008). "The engagement of stakeholders in the marine spatial 
planning process." Marine Policy 32: 816-822.
Pomorskie w Unii (2004). Minister Huebner z wizyt£|. w Gdansku. styczen-marzec 2004. 3.
Powell, W. and P. DiMaggio (1991). Introduction. The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
Preston, C. (1997). Enlargement and integration in the European Union. London, New York, 
Routledge.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." 
International Organization 42(3).
Putnam, R. D., R. Leonardi, et al. (1992). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions In Modem 
Italy. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Pyszkowski, A., J. Szlachta, et al. (2000). Model institucionalnv politvki rozwoiu regionalnego 
w Polsce. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Quah, D. T. (1997). "Regional cohesion from local isolated actions." Centre of Economic 
Performance. Programme on National Economic Performance. London. LSE.
Radaelli, C. (2003). "The Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax Cooperation: Open Method of 
Coordination in Disguise?" Public Administration 81(3): 513-31.
Radaelli, C. M. and U. Kraemer (forthcoming). "Governance arenas and multilateral cooperation 
in EU tax policy." World Politics
Regulski, J. R. (2000). Samorzad III Rzeczpospolitei. Koncepcie i realizacia Warszawa. 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, PWN.
Reynolds, L. G. (1995). Economic Growth in the Third World. 1850-1980. New Haven, CT and 
London, Yale University Press.
399
Risse, T., M. Green Cowles, et al. (2001). Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. M. Green Cowles, J. A. Caporaso 
and T. Risse. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.
Rose, R. (1996). Post-communism and the Problem of Trust. The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy. L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rotta, K. (2005). Wizyta Komisarza ds. Rybolowstwa i Polityki Morskiej UE. Stowarzyszenie 
Przviaciele Helu.
Rzeczpospolita (2002). Polska-UE Zmiana statusu specjalnych stref ekonomicznych, Unia 
przeciwna odszkodowaniom. Warszawa: 4.01.2002.
Sachs, K. and R. Namyslowski (2004). "Czy nowa ustawa o VAT jest zgodna z regulacjami 
unijnymi?"
Salz, P., E. Buisman, et al. (2006). Employment in the fisheries sector: current situation. F. B. 
LEI BV.
Sandecki, M. (2006). Wielkie dorszowe oszustwo. Gazeta Wvborcza. Gdansk.
Sandholtz, W. and A. Stone Sweet. (1998). "European Integration and Supranational 
Governance." from
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/0198294646/toc.html
Sauer, A., E. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, et al. (2000). Politvka regionalna Unii Europeiskiei a 
instrumentv wspierania rozwoiu regionalnego w Polsce. Warszawa, Elipsa.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2000). "International Socialisation in the New Europe: Rational Action in 
an Institutional Environment." European Journal of International Relations 6(1): 109-39.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement." International Organizations 55(47-80).
Schimmelfennig, F., S. Engert, et al. (2003). "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact 
of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey." Journal of Common Market 
Studies 41(31: 495-518.
Schimmelfennig, F., S. Engert, et al. (2005). The Impact of EU Political Conditionality. The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier. Ithaca 
and London, Cornell University Press.
400
Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (2002). "Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, 
hypotheses, and the state of research." Journal of European Public Policy 9(4): 500-28.
Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (2004). "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer 
to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe." Journal of European Public Policy 
11(4): 669-87.
Schmitter, P. C. (1995). Dangers, Dilemmas and Prospects in the Consolidation of Democracy. 
Evolution of Interest Representation and Development of the Labour Market in Post-Socialist 
Countries. J. Hausner, O. K. Pedersen and R. Karsten. Cracow, Cracow Academy of Economics 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Sedelmeier, U. (2002). "Sectoral dynamics of EU enlargement: advocacy, access and alliances in 
a composite policy." Journal of European Public Policy 9(4): 627-49.
Sejm RP (2005). Wykorzystanie funduszy Unii Europejskiej w Polsce, Raport. Warszawa, 
Parlamentamy Zespol ds. Absorpcji Funduszy UE.
Sepiol, J. (2001). Refleksje i wnioski; polityka rozwoju regionalnego. Politvka regionalna 
panstaw posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Shepsle, K. (1986). Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions. Political Science: The 
Science of Politics. W. H.F. New York, Agathon: 51-81.
Sienna, G. D. (2005). Raport: Funkcjonowanie systemu wdrazania Sektorowego Programu 
Operacyjnego Wzrost konkurencyjnosci przedsi^biorstw, lata 2004-2006 - identyfikacja barier i 
problemow organizacyjnych. Warszawa.
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, 
and China. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, E. (1995). Polska w Europie - odmiennosc wizji. Swiat elitv politvcznei. 
W. Wesolowski and I. Pankow. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, E. (1998). Integracja europejska jako os podzialow sceny politycznej. 
Politvka i Seim. Formowanie sie elitv politvcznei. W. Wesolowski and B. Post.
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, E. (2003). Spoleczne uwarunkowania obaw i nadziei nast^pstw polskiego 
czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa, Centrum Europejskie Natolin.
Skowronek, S. (1982). Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities. 1877-1920. New York, Cambridge University Press.
401
Smith, A., H. Holmes, et al. (1996). "The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre­
accession Strategies." SEI Working Paper. University of Sussex 15.
Smith, K. E. (2003). The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality. The 
Enlargement of the European Union. M. Cremona. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Smyrl, M. E. (1997). "Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions?" 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 10(3): 287-309.
Socha, R. (2007). Osc niezgody. Politvka. 40: 115.
Solska, J. (2007). Kilku biednych bogaczy. Politvka. Warszawa. 43: 32.
Solska, J. (2008). Biznes szuka twarzy. Politvka. Warszawa. 5: 38.
Sroka, J. (2004). Politvka Organizacii Pracodawcow i Przedsiebiorcow. Wroclaw, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego.
Staar, R. F. (1998). Transition to Democracy in Poland. Hampshire and London, Macmillan 
Press Ltd.
Steinmo, S. (1993). Taxation and Democracy. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, et al. (1992). Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Steunenberg, B. and A. Dimitrova (2007). "Compliance in the EU enlargement process: The 
limits of conditionality." European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 11(5).
Steves, F. (2001). "Poland and the international system: external influences on democratic 
consolidation." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34: 339-52.
Stokke, O. (1995). Aid and Political Conditionality. London, Frank Cass.
Swank, D. (1998). "Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in 
Advanced Market Economies." Political Studies XLVI: pp. 671-92.
Swierkocki, J. (2001). Negociacie Akcesvine - wvbrane zagadnienia. Raport przeisciowv. 
Integracja Europejska, Instytut Europejski w Lodzi.
Szacki, J. and J. B. Warman (1991). "Polish democracy: Dreams and reality." Social Research 
58(4).
Szczecinski, K. (2000). Rybacy protestuj^. Bez dost?pu do morza? 11.12.2000.
402
Szczerbiak, A. (2000). Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support 
for EU Membership in Poland. Sussex, Sussex European Institute.
Szilagyi, T. and S. Chapman (2003). "Tobacco Industry Efforts to Keep Cigarettes Affordable: A 
Case Study from Hungary." Cent. Eur. J. publ. Health 11(4): 223-228.
Szlachta, J. (2000). "Problems of Regional Development Policy in Poland in the Context of 
European Integration."
Szlachta, J. (2001). "Polityka regionalna Polski w perspektywie integracji z Uni^ Europejsk^." 
Studia Regionalne i Lokalne 1(5).
Szlachta, J. and A. Pyszkowski (1999). Rozwoi Regionalnv iako Element Strategii Spoleczno- 
Regionalnei Polski w latach 2000-2006. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Szomburg, J. (2001). Politvka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno- 
regulacvinvch. Gdansk, IBnGR.
Szomburg, J. (2001a). Hybryda instytucjonalna, czyli licencjonowany regionalizm. Politvka 
regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. Gdansk, 
IBnGR.
Szomburg, J. (2001b). Zamiast zakonczenia - musimy wrocic do redefinicji funkcji panstwa. 
Politvka regionalna panstwa posrod uwiklan instvtucionalno-regulacvinvch. J. Szomburg. 
Gdansk, IBnGR.
Szymanek-Borginon, K. (2003). W pizamie do Europv. Olszanica, Bosz.
Swiader, B. and E. Matyszewska (2008). Papierosy: akcyza i ceny beda rosnac. Gazeta Prawna. 
Warszawa. 06.06.2008.
Swieboda, P. (2002). Information Note on the technical consultations with the European 
Commission in the negotiation chapter "Fisheries" on 14 March 2002 in Brussels. Department of 
the European Union and Support for the Accession Negotiations.
Tadeusiak, M. (1998). Pomoc publiczna - przegl^d przepisow prawa polskiego. Pomoc publiczna 
dla przedsiebiorstw w Unii Europejskiej i w Polsce. A. Fomalczyk. Warszawa, UKIE.
Taras, R. (1998). Voters, Parties, and Leaders. Transition to Democracy in Poland. New York, 
St. Martin's Press.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Task Force for the Regional Development in Poland (1996). Outline of the Regional 
Development Strategy for Poland. Final Report. Warsaw.
403
Task Force for the Regional Development in Poland (1997). Poland's Structural Policy in the 
Context of Integration with the European Union. Warsaw.
Taylor, P. G. (1996). The European Union in the 1990s. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Thelen, K. and S. Steinmo (1992). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. S. Steinmo, K. Thelen 
and F. Longstreth. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Thielemann, E. R. (2002). "The Price of Europeanization: Why European Regional Policy 
Initiatives Are a Mixed Blessing." Regional and Federal Studies 12(1): pp: 43-65.
Thompson, E. M. (1998). The Political Activation of Social Groups. Transition to Democracy in 
Poland. R. F. Staar. Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press Ltd.
Truszczynski, J. (2000). Letter to Jan Kulakowski, the Secretary of State in the Prime Minister 
Chancellery, Plenipotentiary of the Government for the Accession Negotiations on Membership 
in the European Union. Mission of the Republic of Poland to the European Union, Brussels,
29.02.2000. .
Truszczynski, J. (2001). Information about the Accession Negotiations in the Chapter 
"Fisheries". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28.11.2001.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players. New York, Russel Sage Foundation.
UKIE (1998). Narodowy Program Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. 
Warszawa.
UKIE (1998a). Ocena stopnia dostosowania prawa polskiego do prawa Unii Europejskiej. 
Politvka konkurencii i pomoc panstwa a proces harmonizacii prawa polskiego z prawem 
Wspolnot Europeiskich. Warszawa.
UKIE (1998b). Zalozenia do Polityki Informowania o Negocjacjach DONA - Departament 
Obslugi Negocjacji Akcesyjnych. Warszawa.
UKIE (1999). Raport z realizacji w 1998 roku Narodowego Programu Przygotowania do 
Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UKIE (1999a). Narodowy Program Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. 
Warszawa.
UKIE (1999b). Sprawozdanie ze spotkania uzgodnieniowego w obszarze "Podatki". 
Departament Obslugi Negocjacji Akcesyjnych, 19 marca 1999.
404
UKIE (1999c). Zrozumiec negocjacje, program konferencji regionalnych Ministra Jana 
Kulakowskiego. DONA - Zespol Pelnomocnika Rz^du ds. Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo RP w 
Unii Europejskiej.
UKIE (2000). Poland's Position Papers for the Accession Negotiations with the European Union. 
Warsaw, Government Plenipotentiary for Poland's Accession Negotiations to the European 
Union, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.
UKIE (2000a). Negocjacje czlonkowskie: Polska na drodze do Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UKIE (2000b). Raport z realizacji w 1999 roku Narodowego Programu Przygotowania do 
Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UKIE (2000c). Narodowy Program Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. 
Warszawa.
UKIE (2000d). Przebieg negocjacji o czlonkowstwo Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii 
Europejskiej, najwazniejsze dzialania dostosowawcze, stan na 1 stycznia 2000, Departament 
Analiz Ekonomicznych i Spolecznych.
UKIE (2001). Raport z realizacji w 2000 roku Narodowego Programu Przygotowania do 
Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UKIE (2001a). Narodowy Program Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. 
Warszawa.
UKIE (2002). Raport z realizacji w 2001 roku Narodowego Programu Przygotowania do 
Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UKIE (2002a). Narodowy Program Przygotowania Polski do Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. 
Warszawa.
UKIE (2002c). Opinion on the alternative solutions to the SEZ problem proposed by the OCCP. 
D. o. E. a. S. Analyses.
UKIE (2003). Raport z realizacji w 2002 roku Narodowego Programu Przygotowania do 
Czlonkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa.
UOKiK (2000). Report on Public Aid to Enterprises in 1999 Warsaw, Office of Competition and 
Consument Protection.
UOKiK (2002). Report on State aid in Poland granted to enterprises in 2001. Warsaw, Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection.
405
